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While the lives of millions of people are overshadowed by poverty and destitution, a relatively small subset of the world’s population enjoys an unprecedented level of wealth. No doubt the world’s rich have a duty to address the plight of the global poor. But are these duties of egalitarian justice to be considered much like those applying domestically, or as weaker duties of humanitarian assistance? This book begins by offering an in-depth critique of the two most prominent answers to this question – cosmopolitanism and statism – and then develops a novel normative framework for addressing it. Central to this framework is the idea that, unlike duties of assistance – which bind us to help the needy – duties of justice place constraints on the ways we may legitimately coerce one another. Because coercion exists domestically as well as internationally, duties of justice apply to both realms. However, as the forms of coercion characterizing these two realms differ, the content of duties of justice varies across them. Unlike statism and cosmopolitanism, the proposed normative framework successfully meets the joint desiderata of (a) consistency with liberal values and (b) capacity to guide action, and steers a middle course between these two views. Given the nature of existing international coercion, on this framework, global justice requires more than statist assistance, yet less than full cosmopolitan equality.

This book is a critical survey of the following three questions of egalitarian distributive justice. where does distributive equality matter? Why does it matter? And among whom does it matter? These questions may be referred to, respectively, as the questions of the site, ground, and scope of distributive equality. The book defends an institutional site for egalitarian justice, a luck eglitarian ideal of why equality matters, and the idea that the scope of distributive justice is global. The account of equality proposed in this work may be described as “institutional luck egalitarianism” that is global in scope.

The claim that people in developed countries have vast, unmet obligations to help people in developing countries is usually based on duties of kindness or a global extrapolation of justice among compatriots. This book constructs a different basis, the need for responsible engagement in transnational interactions in which power is currently abused. After arguing for an undemanding principle of beneficence and deriving duties of justice among compatriots from their special relations, the book develops standards of responsible conduct in current global interactions that determine: what must be done to avoid exploitation in transnational manufacturing, what framework for world trade and investment would be fair, what response to the challenge of global warming is adequate and equitable, what responsibilities to help meet basic needs arise when foreign powers steer the course of development, and what obligations are created by uses of violence to sustain global power. Through detailed empirical inquiries, the book argues that there has been a massive failure to live up to these standards, creating demanding duties to avoid undue advantage and repair abuses of power, on the part of developed countries in general and especially the United States. The book describes policies that would meet these obligations, leading obstacles, and the role of social movements in reducing injustice, especially a global form of social democracy expressing the book's perspective

Examines which political principles should govern global politics. It explores ethical issues in justice that arise at the global level and addresses questions such as: are there universal values, and if so, what are they; what human rights, if any, are there; are there global principles of distributive justice; should there be a system of supra-state institutions; is national self-determination defensible; when, if ever, may political regimes wage war; and is humanitarian intervention justified?

The book outlines and defends an egalitarian liberal brand of cosmopolitanism to address these questions, maintaining that there are universal principles, arguing that these include universal civil and political human rights, and defending the application of global principles of distributive justice. On this basis, it makes a case for a system of supra-state political institutions to promote these universal principles of justice further. Having set out principles of ideal theory, the book then examines what principles should apply when injustices are committed. To do this it examines when political regimes may wage war and when they may engage in intervention, and thereby draws on cosmopolitan principles to derive and defend a cosmopolitan conception of just war and humanitarian intervention. In arriving at these conclusions, the book engages in a sustained analysis of the competing arguments on all the above issues, examining the arguments of nationalists, realists, and those who affirm the ideal of a society of states. To do this, the book explores and integrates the work of philosophers, political theorists, and international relations scholars, and illustrates its ethical argument and theoretical analysis with empirical examples. Furthermore, it argues that the issues examined in the book cannot be adequately treated in isolation from each other but must be treated as an interlinked whole.

Do we have positive duties to help others in need or are our moral duties only negative, focused on not harming them? Are any of the former duties of justice that respond to enforceable rights? Is their scope global? Should we aim for global equality besides the eradication of severe global poverty? Is a humanist approach to egalitarian distribution based on rights that all human beings as such have defensible, or must egalitarian distribution be seen in an associativist way, as tracking existing frameworks such as statehood and economic interdependence? Are the eradication of global poverty and the achievement of global equality practically feasible or are they hopelessly utopian wishes? This book argues that there are basic positive duties of justice to help eradicate severe global poverty, that global egalitarian principles are also reasonable even if they cannot be fully realized in the short term, and that there are dynamic duties to enhance the feasibility of the transition from global poverty to global equality in the face of nonideal circumstances such as the absence of robust international institutions and the lack of a strong ethos of cosmopolitan solidarity. The very notion of feasibility is crucial for normative reasoning, but has received little explicit philosophical discussion. This book offers a systematic exploration of that concept as well as of its application to global justice. It also arbitrates the current debate between humanist and associativist accounts of the scope of distributive justice. Drawing on moral contractualism (the view that we ought to follow the principles that no one could reasonably reject), this book provides a novel defense of humanism, challenges several versions of associativism (which remains the most popular view among political philosophers), and seeks to integrate the insights underlying both views.

Historical injustice and global inequality are basic problems embedded in territorial rights. We ask questions such as: How can the descendants of colonists claim territory that isn’t really ‘theirs’? Are the immense, exclusive oil claims of Canada or Saudi Arabia justified in the face of severe global poverty? Wouldn’t the world be more just if rights over natural resources were shared with the world’s poorest? These concerns are central to territorial rights theory and at the same time they are relatively unexplored. In fact, while there is a sizeable debate focused on particular territorial disputes, there is little sustained attention given to providing a general standard for territorial entitlement. This widespread omission is disastrous. If we don’t understand why territorial rights are justified in a general, principled form, then how do we know they can be justified in any particular solution to a dispute? As part of an effort to remedy this omission, this book advances a general theory of territorial rights. This book puts forward a theory of territorial rights that starts with the idea that territorial rights affect everybody. Territorial rights, it asserts, must be universally justified. it adapts a theoretical framework from natural law theory to ground all territorial claims. In this framework, particular territorial rights are claimable by the collectives that establish legitimate, minimal conditions for justice within a geographical region. A consequence of this theoretical approach to territorial rights is that exclusive resource entitlements are justified, even if they maintain global inequality.

This book develops a viable cosmopolitan model of global justice that takes seriously the equal moral worth of persons, yet leaves scope for defensible forms of nationalism and for other legitimate identifications and affiliations people have. The book addresses two prominent skeptics about global justice: those who doubt its feasibility and those who believe that cosmopolitanism interferes illegitimately with the defensible scope of nationalism by undermining goods of national importance, such as authentic democracy or national self‐determination. The model addresses concerns about implementation in the world, showing how we can move from theory to public policy that makes progress toward global justice. It also makes clear how legitimate forms of nationalism are compatible with commitments to global justice. The book is divided into three central parts. In the first, the book defends a cosmopolitan model of global justice. In the second, which is largely concerned with public policy issues, it argues that there is much we can and should do toward achieving global justice. The book addresses several pressing problems, discussing bo theoretical and public policy issues involved with each. These include tackling global poverty, taxation reform, protection of basic liberties, humanitarian intervention, immigration, and problems associated with global economic arrangements. In the third part, the book shows how the discussion of public policy issues can usefully inform our theorizing; in particular, it assists our thinking about the place of nationalism and equality in an account of global justice.

The relationship between international order and justice has long been central to the study and practice of international relations. This book sets current interest in that relationship within a broad historical and theoretical context, and underscores the complexity and tensions inherent in agreeing on, establishing, and sustaining a just world order. The chapters examine a wide range of state and transnational perspectives on order and justice including those from China, Europe, India, Russia, the US, and the Islamic world. Other chapters investigate how the order/justice relationship is mediated within major international institutions including the UN, the World Trade Organization, the International Monetary Fund, and the World Bank.