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This chapter considers another factor that plays a role in eroding the public’s trust in science: concerns about the negative influence of nonepistemic values in science, particularly in controversial areas of inquiry with important effects on public policy. It shows that the credibility of scientists can be undermined when the public perceives that scientists have a political agenda or will be biased by their own personal or political values. However, to assume that the best way to address this problem is try to eliminate such values from science altogether would be a mistake. Ethical and social values are necessary and important to knowledge production. Consequently, the chapter explores alternative strategies to increase transparency and stakeholder involvement so as to address legitimate concerns about bias and sustain warranted trust in scientific communities.

Chapter 10 proposes a second recommendation to deal with the negative adverse effects that normatively inappropriate dissent (NID) can have: it calls for a recognition of the limits of scientific evidence when it comes to public policymaking and for an increased focus on potential differences in the values that underlie policy decisions. It contends that while confusion and doubt about the existing empirical evidence or about its strength can contribute to stalled policies, disagreements about values can also play a significant role. Such disagreements can involve what people take to be valuable, how to interpret shared values, how to weigh conflicting values, and what policies are better for promoting certain valuable goals.

This chapter assesses whether focusing on rules of engagement for fruitful discussions about competing scientific views provides a good strategy for reliably identifying normatively inappropriate dissent (NID). It discusses some of the rules for effective criticism dominant in the philosophy of science literature: shared standards, uptake, and expertise. It shows that although all these criteria appear eminently reasonable as requirements for transformative criticism, what they actually involve is not straightforward. Some of the interpretations of these criteria are likely to identify as inappropriate dissent that is actually epistemically valuable, while other interpretations of these criteria would fail to pinpoint the very cases of dissent that some consider paradigm cases of NID.

This chapters evaluates whether inductive risks judgments can serve as a reliable criterion to identify normatively inappropriate dissent (NID). Dissent that calls for rejecting certain consensus views related to public policy can be risky. When consensus views are mistakenly rejected, it can have serious consequences for public health and well-being. These risks may not be worth taking when the risks disproportionately fall on the public, or when the dissent in question fails to conform to widely shared standards of good science. It concludes that this account also fails to offer a criterion to reliably identify NID. In part this is because of the difficulties presented by the criterion of shared standards in science. Also, the ambiguities present in judgments about inductive risks lead to serious problems in practice.