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The Generality Problem for Reliabilism

Earl Conee and Richard Feldman

in Evidentialism: Essays in Epistemology

Published in print:
2004
Published Online:
August 2004
ISBN:
9780199253722
eISBN:
9780191601361
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0199253722.003.0007
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

Argues that reliability approaches to justification are severely defective. They fail even to assert a necessary and sufficient condition for justification, much less a correct condition, if they do ... More


Tracking: More and Better

Sherrilyn Roush

in Tracking Truth: Knowledge, Evidence, and Science

Published in print:
2005
Published Online:
February 2006
ISBN:
9780199274734
eISBN:
9780191603228
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0199274738.003.0003
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

This chapter introduces the rules of applying the tracking conditions, and discusses the upshot of formulating the tracking conditions in terms of probability and counterfactuals. Criteria are ... More


Refutation of the Reformed Objection

Herman Philipse

in God in the Age of Science?: A Critique of Religious Reason

Published in print:
2012
Published Online:
May 2012
ISBN:
9780199697533
eISBN:
9780191738470
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199697533.003.0004
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Religion, Metaphysics/Epistemology

The aim of Chapter 4 is to decide whether Alvin Plantinga’s reformed objection to natural theology is successful for modern, well-educated Christian believers. Although there is a solution to the ... More


The Argument from Reliability: The Role of Reference Classes

Peter Baumann

in Epistemic Contextualism: A Defense

Published in print:
2016
Published Online:
November 2016
ISBN:
9780198754312
eISBN:
9780191815980
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198754312.003.0003
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

This chapter starts with a defense of a very broad and general type of reliabilism according to which knowledge requires reliability. The core of the chapter is dedicated to an extension and ... More


Does Phenomenal Conservatism Solve Internalism’s Dilemma?

Matthias Steup

in Seemings and Justification: New Essays on Dogmatism and Phenomenal Conservatism

Published in print:
2013
Published Online:
September 2013
ISBN:
9780199899494
eISBN:
9780199367719
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199899494.003.0006
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, General

According to Michael Bergmann, advocates of internalism face a serious dilemma. He argues that, depending on how the key notion of awareness is construed, internalism is either strong or weak. Strong ... More


Looking Outwards

Quassim Cassam

in Self-Knowledge for Humans

Published in print:
2015
Published Online:
December 2014
ISBN:
9780199657575
eISBN:
9780191793110
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199657575.003.0009
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

Rationalists like Moran take it that use of the Transparency Method (TM) is a basic source of intentional self-knowledge. Three problems for simple Rationalism are identified: the Generality Problem, ... More


Arguments Against the Representational View

Berit Brogaard

in Seeing and Saying: The Language of Perception and the Representational View of Experience

Published in print:
2018
Published Online:
June 2018
ISBN:
9780190495251
eISBN:
9780190495275
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780190495251.003.0005
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, General

This chapter defends the representational view of visual experience against objections by Brewer, Siegel, Johnston, and Travis. Four problems are discussed: (1) the generality problem, or how to ... More


Fooled by Cognitive Artifacts

Edouard Machery

in Philosophy Within Its Proper Bounds

Published in print:
2017
Published Online:
August 2017
ISBN:
9780198807520
eISBN:
9780191845444
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780198807520.003.0004
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

Chapter 3 examines one of the two concerns often brought up against the method of cases: The judgments elicited by cases seem epistemically deficient. This concern is captured by the first argument ... More


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