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This chapter addresses the question of whether the conventional right to life has become part of general international law and, if so, whether it may be derogated from under the rules of general international law. It also examines the territorial scope of the non-conventional right to life. It argues that, today, the jus cogens character of the right to life has become virtually unassailable. Outside the conduct of hostilities, even a single targeted killing carried out by State agents in deviation from the normative paradigm of law enforcement constitutes an unjustifiable violation of international jus cogens.

Due to globalization, States are increasingly affected by external factors, whilst at the same time influencing the behaviour of individuals and firms, including foreign investors. Their decisions produce binding effects, for example, when an authorization is issued or refused. The question thus arises whether procedural safeguards aiming at achieving due process of law may be regarded as minimum standards that must be observed. This chapter first looks at the history of ideas and argues that the works of Montesquieu, Smith, and Tocqueville show that the idea of general principles of law is not necessarily in contrast with the recognition of particularities. Then, it observes that, as far as administrative adjudication is concerned, some common standards emerged within the OECD, both as a result of common developments and as a consequence of the action of multilateral institutions. It suggests, therefore, that an ‘echelle des garantie’ may be identified.

The system of international jurisdiction allows for the exercise of concurrent jurisdiction by more than one State. Especially in the field of economic law, this system may yield unsatisfactory outcomes. Because restrictive or fraudulent practices may wreak worldwide havoc, several States that have some connection to the practice may start exercising jurisdiction and may claim regulatory primacy. A rule may therefore have to be devised on the basis of which jurisdiction is conferred on the State with a strong, or even better, the strongest link with the matter to be regulated — a rule of jurisdictional reasonableness derived from international comity. This rule has most forcefully been set out in § 403 of the U.S. Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law, although the customary law status of that provision is unclear.

This chapter begins by identifying the various elements that together define modern and post-modern law. It explains how legal principles function within each of these legal models, for both international and municipal law, with particular attention to the role they assume in the field of environmental law. It highlights the distinction that must be made between General Principles of Law, which are characteristic of modernity, and directing principles, which are better suited to adapting to the shifting forms that characterize current public policies including environmental policy. It demonstrates that directing principles do not represent a complete break with modernity, since they eventually result in the rediscovery of the same values upon which modernity is based. It explains that post-modernity is not merely a chaotic system composed of anti-modern elements; rather, it is a system whereby chaotic elements are ordered differently from modern law.

This chapter examines the methods available to international courts to refer to the practice of other international judicial bodies, and to interpret and apply their procedure and remedies in similar ways. It begins by outlining the sources of law relating to procedure and remedies, which are principally the constitutive instruments and rules of procedure of international courts. Such instruments are not drafted in identical terms, and often contain lacunae. It examines what international courts do when faced with lacunae in these sources. It then discusses the concept of inherent powers in detail, argues that the exercise of such powers by international courts is justified, and reviews their relevant practice. The possible sources of inherent powers are examined, and it is concluded that they lie in the need of international courts to fulfil their functions, being, principally, the settlement of international disputes and the proper administration of international justice. These functions also serve as limitations on the exercise of inherent powers.

This chapter examines the sources of peremptory norms, and examines which of them can be proper sources of jus cogens. It considers the modification of peremptory norms in terms of the requirements of Article 53 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.

The jurisprudence of investment tribunals in cases brought against Argentina in the context of the country's 2001/02 economic crisis show the potential and limits of the necessity defence as codified in Article 25 of the ILC Articles on State Responsibility in situations of economic emergency. This chapter examines the emergency regimes of national legal systems for additional insights that might assist in more closely delineating a State's emergency powers in times of (economic) crisis; more particularly concerning the conditions governing the adoption of emergency measures and the consequences thereof. This is done with reference to four representative legal systems — two from common law jurisdictions and two from those under civil law: the British, French, German, and US systems.

The doctrine of criminal jurisdiction has two sets of sources. On the one hand, the modern shape of jurisdiction to prescribe and to adjudicate emerged from national lawmaking, including legislation, case law, and other sources. On the other hand, international law sets limits on the external acts and external actors that a state may seek to regulate through the criminal law.

This chapter begins by identifying the various elements that together define modern and post-modern law. How legal principles function within each of these legal models, for both international and municipal law, is explained, with particular attention to the role they assume in the field of environmental law. The chapter highlights the distinction that must be made between general principles of law, which are characteristic of modernity, and directing principles, which are better suited to adapting to the shifting forms that characterize current public policies including environmental policy. It demonstrates that directing principles do not represent a complete break with modernity, since they eventually result in the rediscovery of the same values upon which modernity is based. Finally, the chapter explains that post-modernity is not merely a chaotic system composed of anti-modern elements; rather, it is a system whereby chaotic elements are ordered differently from modern law.

The chapter documents the complex relationship between, on the one hand, equity and international law and, on the other, principles and rules, and it discusses equity as a source of international law. The thrust of its argument is that equity is a source of international law, which means that international adjudicators have the power to apply it. While conceding that the felicitous conjunction of law and equity presents a formidable challenge, the chapter suggests that equity can only be conceived as forming part of the law. After discussing equity embedded in conventional law, the chapter turns to customary international law, general principles of law, and general principles of international law. It puts forward the argument that equity is a general principle of international law of a customary law nature, having mutated from a general principle of law through its repeated use at the international level.

Even though the Netherlands was one of the founding fathers of the CoE, the impact of CoE conventions and soft law on Dutch administrative law and the development of the principles of good administration is rather patchy and uneven. This ‘Dutch paradox’ can be explained by the much more significant and direct impact of the European Convention on Human Rights on both substantive and procedural national administrative law. At least partly, this impact can be explained by the existence of a coherent body of ECtHR case law that is relevant to almost all areas of administrative law and that can be readily and easily applied on the national level. Nevertheless, the chapter concludes that it might be useful for Dutch authorities to keep an eye on other CoE instruments that may be relevant for the development of general administrative law, especially because the ECHR provides for minimum protection only.

This chapter argues that principles in international law have their basis in comparative and analogical reasoning. It provides a taxonomy of principles ranging from general principles of law to soft legal principles and structural principles which are devoid of normative significance. The classification of principles in international law depends on the extent to which they find confirmation in domestic and/or international law and to which their extrapolation to the international level might be suitable. In this regard, international soft law codifications like the UNCTAD Principles on Promoting Responsible Sovereign Lending and Borrowing might corroborate the formation of principles in international law. The chapter analyzes this process by using two examples from the field of fiscal policy: Substantive fiscal policy rules on debt or deficit ceilings; and rules on fiscal transparency. In both respects, the UNCTAD Principles strengthen important trends in domestic fiscal policy and fosters the emergence of an array of principles of varying legal character.

This chapter considers the role of international law in sovereign financing, a legal area currently underdeveloped. It briefly presents the content and implications of the Principles and analyses whether and to what extent international law supports them. The Principles are embodied in a itself so called soft law instrument. However, a few principles are backed by international treaties and customary international law, and some others could even be considered as general principles of international law. This chapter argues that the legal character of the Principles is not determined by its soft law shell and will mainly depend on two variables: (a) the extent to which each principle is supported by hard rules of international law, including general principles of international law, and; (b) their intrinsic value to persuade stakeholders that they are necessary in international sovereign financing to overcome global problems. The fact that the Principles are well-rooted and broadly tested in domestic laws influences these two variables.

This chapter considers how modified universalism may be elevated from a broad approach to a recognized, international legal source that can be invoked and applied in a more concrete and consistent manner across legal systems in circumstances of international insolvencies. It draws from sources of international law and, specifically, the concept of customary international law (CIL). CIL is a key legal source that fills gaps in international treaties, influences treaty regimes, and regulates in areas not covered by treaties or by other instruments or regarding countries that are not parties to a treaty or to another regime. CIL is also useful as a debiasing mechanism because its application does not require active action by all participants. The chapter suggests how modified universalism can transform into CIL. It also highlights the prominent international role of private international law and, thus, the role of actors and participants in international insolvencies as creators and guardians of international law.

As Chapter 9 submits, the (public international law) principle of good faith is key to understanding the distinction between ‘legitimate nationality planning’ and ‘abusive treaty shopping’. Yet, the principle comes in many concretizations and manifestations, and arbitral tribunals have taken different approaches towards it in the research question at issue. This heterogeneity of approaches, though understandable in a system formally based on bilateral relationships and without precedent, has added to a picture of inconsistent jurisprudence, furthering legal insecurity in a matter where the lines are already blurry. The chapter analyses the different uses of the principle of good faith (such as abuse of rights, ‘piercing of the veil’, nemo dat quod non habet, etc.) by arbitral tribunals in distinguishing the ‘right’ from the ‘wrong’ kind of treaty shopping and proposes a systematic approach towards this question.

This chapter discusses the impact on German administrative law of the pan-European general principles of good administration developed within the framework of the Council of Europe (CoE). The chapter highlights that most of the German core statutes on administrative law had already been enacted or were developed before the adoption of the said principles. Moreover, the low availability and the lack of translation of the ‘CoE sources’ as well as the (over)reliance of German courts on the national constitution in developing standards of individual protection present further hindrances for their full permeation. However—at least conceptually—German law lives up to the said principles and often even exceeds them. The chapter concludes that it seems to be only a matter of time and the right opportunity for such impact to become full-blown in the German legal system.