Wilfred Beckerman and Joanna Pasek
- Published in print:
- 2001
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199245086
- eISBN:
- 9780191598784
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199245088.001.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, Environmental Politics
In rich countries, environmental problems are seen as problems of prosperity. In poor countries, they are seen as problems of poverty. This is because the environmental problems in poor ...
More
In rich countries, environmental problems are seen as problems of prosperity. In poor countries, they are seen as problems of poverty. This is because the environmental problems in poor countries—such as lack of clean drinking water or decent sanitation—are problems that affect them here and now, whereas in rich countries the environmental problems that people worry about most—largely as a result of current prosperity and economic growth—are those that seem likely to harm mainly posterity and hence violate our obligations to future generations.But what exactly are our obligations to future generations? Are they determined by some sort of ethical system, such as the ‘rights’ of future generations, or justice between generations, or intergenerational equity, or sustainable development? The first part of this book is addressed to these questions. It is argued that while ethical ‘systems’ do not provide much help, we still have moral obligations to take account of the interests that future generations will have. But an appraisal of these interests in the light of probable future developments suggests that, while environmental problems have to be taken seriously, our main obligation to future generations is to bequeath to them a more decent society in which there is greater respect for basic human rights than is the case today throughout most of the world.Furthermore, it cannot serve the interests of justice if the burden of protecting the environment for the benefit of posterity is born mainly by poorer people today. More resources devoted to the environment means fewer are devoted competing claims for, say, health care or education or housing, not to mention plain private consumption. And in poor countries millions of people suffer from acute lack of sanitation, clean drinking water, shelter, and basic infrastructures to prevent or cure widespread disease. Neither generations nor nations are homogeneous entities. The later chapters of this book, therefore, are addressed to the ethical aspects of the way that resources ought to be shared out between environmental protection and competing uses in all countries, and how the burden of dealing with global environmental problems ought to be shared out between rich and poor nations.Less
In rich countries, environmental problems are seen as problems of prosperity. In poor countries, they are seen as problems of poverty. This is because the environmental problems in poor countries—such as lack of clean drinking water or decent sanitation—are problems that affect them here and now, whereas in rich countries the environmental problems that people worry about most—largely as a result of current prosperity and economic growth—are those that seem likely to harm mainly posterity and hence violate our obligations to future generations.
But what exactly are our obligations to future generations? Are they determined by some sort of ethical system, such as the ‘rights’ of future generations, or justice between generations, or intergenerational equity, or sustainable development? The first part of this book is addressed to these questions. It is argued that while ethical ‘systems’ do not provide much help, we still have moral obligations to take account of the interests that future generations will have. But an appraisal of these interests in the light of probable future developments suggests that, while environmental problems have to be taken seriously, our main obligation to future generations is to bequeath to them a more decent society in which there is greater respect for basic human rights than is the case today throughout most of the world.
Furthermore, it cannot serve the interests of justice if the burden of protecting the environment for the benefit of posterity is born mainly by poorer people today. More resources devoted to the environment means fewer are devoted competing claims for, say, health care or education or housing, not to mention plain private consumption. And in poor countries millions of people suffer from acute lack of sanitation, clean drinking water, shelter, and basic infrastructures to prevent or cure widespread disease. Neither generations nor nations are homogeneous entities. The later chapters of this book, therefore, are addressed to the ethical aspects of the way that resources ought to be shared out between environmental protection and competing uses in all countries, and how the burden of dealing with global environmental problems ought to be shared out between rich and poor nations.
Tim Mulgan
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- May 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199282203
- eISBN:
- 9780191603624
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/019928220X.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
This book develops a new theory of the obligations to future generations, based on a new Rule Consequentialist account of the morality of individual reproduction. The result is a coherent, ...
More
This book develops a new theory of the obligations to future generations, based on a new Rule Consequentialist account of the morality of individual reproduction. The result is a coherent, intuitively plausible moral theory that is not unreasonably demanding — even when extended to cover future people — and that accounts for a wide range of independently plausible intuitions covering individual morality, intergenerational justice, and international justice. In particular, it is superior to its two main rivals in this area: person-affecting theories and traditional Consequentialism. The former fall foul of Parfit’s Non-Identity Problem, while the latter are invariably implausibly demanding. Furthermore, many puzzles in contemporary value theory (such as Parfit’s Repugnant Conclusion) are best solved if strict Consequentialism is abandoned for a more moderate alternative. The heart of the book is the first systematic exploration of the Rule Consequentialist account of the morality of individual reproduction. This yields a strong commitment to reproductive freedom, and also provides the best foundation for a liberal theory of intergenerational and international justice. The final chapters argue that while it will include a Rule Consequentialist account of the morality of reproduction, the best overall moral theory is likely to be a composite one, such as the Combined Consequentialism the author developed in The Demands of Consequentialism.Less
This book develops a new theory of the obligations to future generations, based on a new Rule Consequentialist account of the morality of individual reproduction. The result is a coherent, intuitively plausible moral theory that is not unreasonably demanding — even when extended to cover future people — and that accounts for a wide range of independently plausible intuitions covering individual morality, intergenerational justice, and international justice. In particular, it is superior to its two main rivals in this area: person-affecting theories and traditional Consequentialism. The former fall foul of Parfit’s Non-Identity Problem, while the latter are invariably implausibly demanding. Furthermore, many puzzles in contemporary value theory (such as Parfit’s Repugnant Conclusion) are best solved if strict Consequentialism is abandoned for a more moderate alternative. The heart of the book is the first systematic exploration of the Rule Consequentialist account of the morality of individual reproduction. This yields a strong commitment to reproductive freedom, and also provides the best foundation for a liberal theory of intergenerational and international justice. The final chapters argue that while it will include a Rule Consequentialist account of the morality of reproduction, the best overall moral theory is likely to be a composite one, such as the Combined Consequentialism the author developed in The Demands of Consequentialism.
Wilfred Beckerman and Joanna Pasek
- Published in print:
- 2001
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199245086
- eISBN:
- 9780191598784
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199245088.003.0002
- Subject:
- Political Science, Environmental Politics
It is widely believed that environmental conservation has to be guided by respect for the ‘rights’ of future generations. But it is argued in this chapter that it may not be plausible to think in ...
More
It is widely believed that environmental conservation has to be guided by respect for the ‘rights’ of future generations. But it is argued in this chapter that it may not be plausible to think in terms of the ‘rights’ of future generations in general or their rights to any specific environmental assets. Future generations may well have rights when they come into existence, but these will only be rights that can be satisfied at the time. But ‘rights’ do not exhaust the whole of morality, and future generations will certainly have interests, which means that we are under moral obligation to take account of them and of the effect that our environmental policies may have on them. Thus, the problem is to predict what the main interests of future generations will be and how to weigh them up against the interests of people alive today. It is argued that this approach will lead to a very different ranking of priorities among our moral obligations to future generations.Less
It is widely believed that environmental conservation has to be guided by respect for the ‘rights’ of future generations. But it is argued in this chapter that it may not be plausible to think in terms of the ‘rights’ of future generations in general or their rights to any specific environmental assets. Future generations may well have rights when they come into existence, but these will only be rights that can be satisfied at the time. But ‘rights’ do not exhaust the whole of morality, and future generations will certainly have interests, which means that we are under moral obligation to take account of them and of the effect that our environmental policies may have on them. Thus, the problem is to predict what the main interests of future generations will be and how to weigh them up against the interests of people alive today. It is argued that this approach will lead to a very different ranking of priorities among our moral obligations to future generations.
Wilfred Beckerman and Joanna Pasek
- Published in print:
- 2001
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199245086
- eISBN:
- 9780191598784
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199245088.003.0003
- Subject:
- Political Science, Environmental Politics
Although there are many theories of justice, one crucial feature of those that are most widely accepted is that they lay down principles that determine the allocation of rights and obligations in ...
More
Although there are many theories of justice, one crucial feature of those that are most widely accepted is that they lay down principles that determine the allocation of rights and obligations in society. They do not eliminate conflicts of interest between different groups but, by specifying such principles, they are designed to enable conflicting interests to be resolved in a peaceful and harmonious manner. But insofar as future generations cannot be said to have any rights, their interests cannot be protected within the framework of any theory of intergenerational justice. This chapter discusses the general relationship between ‘rights’ and ‘justice’, and the obstacles to any theory of intergenerational justice.Less
Although there are many theories of justice, one crucial feature of those that are most widely accepted is that they lay down principles that determine the allocation of rights and obligations in society. They do not eliminate conflicts of interest between different groups but, by specifying such principles, they are designed to enable conflicting interests to be resolved in a peaceful and harmonious manner. But insofar as future generations cannot be said to have any rights, their interests cannot be protected within the framework of any theory of intergenerational justice. This chapter discusses the general relationship between ‘rights’ and ‘justice’, and the obstacles to any theory of intergenerational justice.
David Schlosberg
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199286294
- eISBN:
- 9780191713323
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199286294.003.0005
- Subject:
- Political Science, Environmental Politics
This chapter presents an overview and critique of many existing distributional theories of ecological justice. After a discussion of some of the key difficulties identified by liberal theorists in ...
More
This chapter presents an overview and critique of many existing distributional theories of ecological justice. After a discussion of some of the key difficulties identified by liberal theorists in applying the concept of justice to the natural world, the chapter examines a number of theories that attempt to expand liberal and distributional notions of justice to future generations of humans and to non-human nature.Less
This chapter presents an overview and critique of many existing distributional theories of ecological justice. After a discussion of some of the key difficulties identified by liberal theorists in applying the concept of justice to the natural world, the chapter examines a number of theories that attempt to expand liberal and distributional notions of justice to future generations of humans and to non-human nature.
Wilfred Beckerman and Joanna Pasek
- Published in print:
- 2001
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199245086
- eISBN:
- 9780191598784
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199245088.003.0004
- Subject:
- Political Science, Environmental Politics
Discusses one principle that has been suggested as a guide to the way we ought to take account of the interests of future generations, namely the principle of intergenerational ‘equity’ and its ...
More
Discusses one principle that has been suggested as a guide to the way we ought to take account of the interests of future generations, namely the principle of intergenerational ‘equity’ and its related claim of intergenerational equality, particularly in spheres such as the way we should share out ‘finite’ resources among generations. This chapter examines the possible arguments in favour of intergenerational egalitarianism and concludes that they are difficult to defend. It is proposed that egalitarianism should be replaced by the principle of ‘threshold prioritarianism’, so that our moral obligation to future generations should be based on a humanitarian concern to avoid policies that may impoverish them.Less
Discusses one principle that has been suggested as a guide to the way we ought to take account of the interests of future generations, namely the principle of intergenerational ‘equity’ and its related claim of intergenerational equality, particularly in spheres such as the way we should share out ‘finite’ resources among generations. This chapter examines the possible arguments in favour of intergenerational egalitarianism and concludes that they are difficult to defend. It is proposed that egalitarianism should be replaced by the principle of ‘threshold prioritarianism’, so that our moral obligation to future generations should be based on a humanitarian concern to avoid policies that may impoverish them.
Wilfred Beckerman and Joanna Pasek
- Published in print:
- 2001
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199245086
- eISBN:
- 9780191598784
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199245088.003.0005
- Subject:
- Political Science, Environmental Politics
Another widely suggested principle governing our obligations to future generations is ‘sustainable development’. The first part of this chapter argues that the mainstream interpretations of the ...
More
Another widely suggested principle governing our obligations to future generations is ‘sustainable development’. The first part of this chapter argues that the mainstream interpretations of the concept of sustainable development are open to serious objections on ethical grounds. The chapter also shows that even if intergenerational egalitarianism were a viable objective there is nothing intergenerationally egalitarian about sustainable development.Less
Another widely suggested principle governing our obligations to future generations is ‘sustainable development’. The first part of this chapter argues that the mainstream interpretations of the concept of sustainable development are open to serious objections on ethical grounds. The chapter also shows that even if intergenerational egalitarianism were a viable objective there is nothing intergenerationally egalitarian about sustainable development.
Wilfred Beckerman and Joanna Pasek
- Published in print:
- 2001
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199245086
- eISBN:
- 9780191598784
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199245088.003.0012
- Subject:
- Political Science, Environmental Politics
It is recalled that serious doubts can be raised concerning the status of theories such as those pertaining to the rights of future generations, or the constraints imposed on us by theories of ...
More
It is recalled that serious doubts can be raised concerning the status of theories such as those pertaining to the rights of future generations, or the constraints imposed on us by theories of intergenerational justice. At the same time, we do have moral obligations to future generations. But these must be based on an appraisal of what are likely to be the main interests that future generations will have and which of these are most likely to be under permanent threat. These, it is argued, will be in the field of human relations rather than in the field of the environment. It is concluded, therefore, that the most important bequest we can make to future generations is to leave them a society in which there is a greater respect for basic human rights than is the case today throughout most of the world. And since the best way of bequeathing a more decent society to future generations is, of course, to improve the respect for human rights today, there is no conflict of interest between the present generation and future generations. Hence, theories of intergenerational distributive justice are not only untenable but are also unnecessary.Less
It is recalled that serious doubts can be raised concerning the status of theories such as those pertaining to the rights of future generations, or the constraints imposed on us by theories of intergenerational justice. At the same time, we do have moral obligations to future generations. But these must be based on an appraisal of what are likely to be the main interests that future generations will have and which of these are most likely to be under permanent threat. These, it is argued, will be in the field of human relations rather than in the field of the environment. It is concluded, therefore, that the most important bequest we can make to future generations is to leave them a society in which there is a greater respect for basic human rights than is the case today throughout most of the world. And since the best way of bequeathing a more decent society to future generations is, of course, to improve the respect for human rights today, there is no conflict of interest between the present generation and future generations. Hence, theories of intergenerational distributive justice are not only untenable but are also unnecessary.
David DeGrazia
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- September 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780195389630
- eISBN:
- 9780199949731
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195389630.003.0007
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, Philosophy of Science
Predictable results of global climate change seem to suggest that we have an obligation to make sacrifices to stem the tide of climate change—primarily for the sake of future generations. Do we, in ...
More
Predictable results of global climate change seem to suggest that we have an obligation to make sacrifices to stem the tide of climate change—primarily for the sake of future generations. Do we, in fact, have obligations to persons who will exist only in the future and, if so, how we can coherently explain the basis for these obligations? The chapter addresses the following questions. First, do future persons have interests, moral status, and rights? Second, are our obligations to future generations a matter of justice? Third, even if future persons have rights and our obligations to them are a matter of justice, should their interests nevertheless be discounted—as some economists suggest—in view of their temporal distance from us? Finally, in view of nonidentity—the fact that different policy choices will eventually entail the existence of different people—how can we explain the wrong of irresponsible policy choices and individual choices that leave a compromised world for future generations?Less
Predictable results of global climate change seem to suggest that we have an obligation to make sacrifices to stem the tide of climate change—primarily for the sake of future generations. Do we, in fact, have obligations to persons who will exist only in the future and, if so, how we can coherently explain the basis for these obligations? The chapter addresses the following questions. First, do future persons have interests, moral status, and rights? Second, are our obligations to future generations a matter of justice? Third, even if future persons have rights and our obligations to them are a matter of justice, should their interests nevertheless be discounted—as some economists suggest—in view of their temporal distance from us? Finally, in view of nonidentity—the fact that different policy choices will eventually entail the existence of different people—how can we explain the wrong of irresponsible policy choices and individual choices that leave a compromised world for future generations?
Robert E. Goodin
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199256174
- eISBN:
- 9780191599354
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199256179.003.0011
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory
By imagining ourselves in the place of others, ‘democratic deliberation within’ enables us to bring their interests to bear on democratic decision‐making. Democratically desirable though that always ...
More
By imagining ourselves in the place of others, ‘democratic deliberation within’ enables us to bring their interests to bear on democratic decision‐making. Democratically desirable though that always is, it is absolutely essential when the others are in no position to speak for themselves in the ordinary course of democratic deliberations. The mute interests discussed in this chapter are future generations and non‐human interests (natural objects). ‘Democratic deliberation within’ once again provides a mechanism for including those most dramatically hard‐to‐include interests within democratic deliberations; even if those interests cannot speak for themselves, present people can imaginatively project themselves into the position of others, be they in future times or different species. That they should do so follows from the familiar liberal democratic principle of ‘equal protection of interests’, modified in two ways: on one side, that familiar liberal democratic value premise can and should be buttressed by an expanded view of what sorts of interests should count, specifically, natural objects and future generations are shown to have interests that are as deserving of protection as are those of current humans; on the other side, familiar liberal propositions about ‘equal protection of interests’ can and should be stretched to admit novel mechanisms for politically securing that goal, specifically, notions of ‘encapsulated interests’, discredited in other connections, can be rehabilitated for purposes of protecting future‐oriented and non‐human values.Less
By imagining ourselves in the place of others, ‘democratic deliberation within’ enables us to bring their interests to bear on democratic decision‐making. Democratically desirable though that always is, it is absolutely essential when the others are in no position to speak for themselves in the ordinary course of democratic deliberations. The mute interests discussed in this chapter are future generations and non‐human interests (natural objects). ‘Democratic deliberation within’ once again provides a mechanism for including those most dramatically hard‐to‐include interests within democratic deliberations; even if those interests cannot speak for themselves, present people can imaginatively project themselves into the position of others, be they in future times or different species. That they should do so follows from the familiar liberal democratic principle of ‘equal protection of interests’, modified in two ways: on one side, that familiar liberal democratic value premise can and should be buttressed by an expanded view of what sorts of interests should count, specifically, natural objects and future generations are shown to have interests that are as deserving of protection as are those of current humans; on the other side, familiar liberal propositions about ‘equal protection of interests’ can and should be stretched to admit novel mechanisms for politically securing that goal, specifically, notions of ‘encapsulated interests’, discredited in other connections, can be rehabilitated for purposes of protecting future‐oriented and non‐human values.
Wilfred Beckerman and Joanna Pasek
- Published in print:
- 2001
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199245086
- eISBN:
- 9780191598784
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199245088.003.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, Environmental Politics
During the last two or three decades, various developments in the environmental sphere have led to increasing concern with our obligations to posterity and to the non‐human part of the natural world. ...
More
During the last two or three decades, various developments in the environmental sphere have led to increasing concern with our obligations to posterity and to the non‐human part of the natural world. These developments have exposed gaps in both traditional, moral, and political theory and in conventional economics. Environmental issues have exposed these gaps and have brought to the fore questions such as how far the society, with whose welfare we are concerned, includes future generations or is limited to individual nations or human beings. This book examines these questions as well as related ethical aspects of environmental policy, such as environmental valuation or the equitable allocation among nations of the burden of environmental protection.Less
During the last two or three decades, various developments in the environmental sphere have led to increasing concern with our obligations to posterity and to the non‐human part of the natural world. These developments have exposed gaps in both traditional, moral, and political theory and in conventional economics. Environmental issues have exposed these gaps and have brought to the fore questions such as how far the society, with whose welfare we are concerned, includes future generations or is limited to individual nations or human beings. This book examines these questions as well as related ethical aspects of environmental policy, such as environmental valuation or the equitable allocation among nations of the burden of environmental protection.
Stephen M. Gardiner
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- September 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199282951
- eISBN:
- 9780191712319
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199282951.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General
Contract theories — such as contractarianism and contractualism — seek to justify (and sometimes to explain) moral and political ideals and principles through the notion of ‘mutually agreeable ...
More
Contract theories — such as contractarianism and contractualism — seek to justify (and sometimes to explain) moral and political ideals and principles through the notion of ‘mutually agreeable reciprocity or cooperation between equals’ (Darwall 2002). This chapter argues that such theories face fundamental difficulties in the intergenerational setting. Most prominently, the standard understanding of cooperation appears not to apply, and the intergenerational setting brings on a more severe collective action problem than the traditional prisoner's dilemma. Mainstream contract theorists (such as Gauthier and Rawls) have tried to overcome such difficulties by postulating some kind of chain of connection between generations. However, as this chapter maintains, thus far such attempts have proven inadequate. Given this, it seems either that mainstream contract theory needs to be rethought, or that a new, specifically intergenerational, contract theory is needed.Less
Contract theories — such as contractarianism and contractualism — seek to justify (and sometimes to explain) moral and political ideals and principles through the notion of ‘mutually agreeable reciprocity or cooperation between equals’ (Darwall 2002). This chapter argues that such theories face fundamental difficulties in the intergenerational setting. Most prominently, the standard understanding of cooperation appears not to apply, and the intergenerational setting brings on a more severe collective action problem than the traditional prisoner's dilemma. Mainstream contract theorists (such as Gauthier and Rawls) have tried to overcome such difficulties by postulating some kind of chain of connection between generations. However, as this chapter maintains, thus far such attempts have proven inadequate. Given this, it seems either that mainstream contract theory needs to be rethought, or that a new, specifically intergenerational, contract theory is needed.
Ted Benton
- Published in print:
- 1999
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198294894
- eISBN:
- 9780191599064
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198294891.003.0009
- Subject:
- Political Science, Environmental Politics
Here Ted Benton gives a guarded welcome to the normative intentions of sustainable development, arguing that its commitment to the poor as well as to the meeting of future generations’ needs are ...
More
Here Ted Benton gives a guarded welcome to the normative intentions of sustainable development, arguing that its commitment to the poor as well as to the meeting of future generations’ needs are worth building on. He exposes, though, the deep tensions between these normative commitments and the key tendencies and features of the global economy. In his view, there is a ‘dynamic tendency’ in market systems for over‐exploitation. This can be counteracted, he suggests, by using the normative foundations in sustainable development to argue for radical changes in economic organization and ideology. Benton also argues for a reconceptualization of the idea of ‘need’, suggesting that it take account of demands made on behalf of non‐human nature.Less
Here Ted Benton gives a guarded welcome to the normative intentions of sustainable development, arguing that its commitment to the poor as well as to the meeting of future generations’ needs are worth building on. He exposes, though, the deep tensions between these normative commitments and the key tendencies and features of the global economy. In his view, there is a ‘dynamic tendency’ in market systems for over‐exploitation. This can be counteracted, he suggests, by using the normative foundations in sustainable development to argue for radical changes in economic organization and ideology. Benton also argues for a reconceptualization of the idea of ‘need’, suggesting that it take account of demands made on behalf of non‐human nature.
Dieter Birnbacher
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- September 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199282951
- eISBN:
- 9780191712319
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199282951.003.0011
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General
Recognising moral responsibility in the abstract is generally not causally sufficient for complying with it in relevant situations, not even in the absence of strong conflicting motives. In the case ...
More
Recognising moral responsibility in the abstract is generally not causally sufficient for complying with it in relevant situations, not even in the absence of strong conflicting motives. In the case of responsibility towards future generations this gap widens, for many reasons: prognostic uncertainty, anonymity of ‘moral patients’, lack of reciprocity, and sheer temporal distance. The chapter discusses how far these deficiencies in direct motivation to responsibility to future generations can be compensated by indirect motivations such as those postulated by the ‘chain-of-love’ model, by community ties, and by the wish to preserve what one values. The chapter also considers the role institutions might play in the channelling of indirect motivations and in internal and external self-binding, such as constitutional and other legal norms and the setting up of national and supranational councils capable of correcting the short term orientation of legislative bodies.Less
Recognising moral responsibility in the abstract is generally not causally sufficient for complying with it in relevant situations, not even in the absence of strong conflicting motives. In the case of responsibility towards future generations this gap widens, for many reasons: prognostic uncertainty, anonymity of ‘moral patients’, lack of reciprocity, and sheer temporal distance. The chapter discusses how far these deficiencies in direct motivation to responsibility to future generations can be compensated by indirect motivations such as those postulated by the ‘chain-of-love’ model, by community ties, and by the wish to preserve what one values. The chapter also considers the role institutions might play in the channelling of indirect motivations and in internal and external self-binding, such as constitutional and other legal norms and the setting up of national and supranational councils capable of correcting the short term orientation of legislative bodies.
Mathias Risse
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- October 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780691142692
- eISBN:
- 9781400845507
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Princeton University Press
- DOI:
- 10.23943/princeton/9780691142692.003.0009
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Political Philosophy
This chapter proposes a framework that makes it possible to consider future generations explicitly and presents two future-directed obligations of justice. It argues for a principle of ...
More
This chapter proposes a framework that makes it possible to consider future generations explicitly and presents two future-directed obligations of justice. It argues for a principle of intergenerational equality: each generation can be reasonably expected to leave a nondeclining stock of natural capital behind. It introduces an additional principle of justice relating to the distribution of the original resources and spaces of the earth across different generations of human beings. The chapter first examines Rahul Kumar's view that wronging consists of violations of legitimate expectations in relationships before discussing ways of characterizing our relationship with future generations that have nothing to do with the ownership approach. It then looks at the debate about sustainability and concludes with some reflections on what we can say about duties to future generations that share membership in a state.Less
This chapter proposes a framework that makes it possible to consider future generations explicitly and presents two future-directed obligations of justice. It argues for a principle of intergenerational equality: each generation can be reasonably expected to leave a nondeclining stock of natural capital behind. It introduces an additional principle of justice relating to the distribution of the original resources and spaces of the earth across different generations of human beings. The chapter first examines Rahul Kumar's view that wronging consists of violations of legitimate expectations in relationships before discussing ways of characterizing our relationship with future generations that have nothing to do with the ownership approach. It then looks at the debate about sustainability and concludes with some reflections on what we can say about duties to future generations that share membership in a state.
David Heyd
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- September 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199282951
- eISBN:
- 9780191712319
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199282951.003.0007
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General
This chapter reviews Rawls' attempt to address the theoretical problem of extending the principles of justice to future generations. It examines the two options suggested by Rawls for solving the ...
More
This chapter reviews Rawls' attempt to address the theoretical problem of extending the principles of justice to future generations. It examines the two options suggested by Rawls for solving the problem: the ‘general assembly’ and ‘the present-time-of-entry’. It argues that Rawls does not directly address the problem of the identity of future (possible) people, which means that the conditions for the inclusion of future people in the original position cannot be fully determined. Rawls wishes to offer a theory of just intergenerational distributions but it turns out that such a theory is logically dependent on the number and identity of future people, an issue which cannot itself be fixed in terms of an ideal contract under a veil of ignorance. The conclusion of the article is that the scope of the group in which the principles of justice are decided and implemented cannot itself be determined by a contractarian method.Less
This chapter reviews Rawls' attempt to address the theoretical problem of extending the principles of justice to future generations. It examines the two options suggested by Rawls for solving the problem: the ‘general assembly’ and ‘the present-time-of-entry’. It argues that Rawls does not directly address the problem of the identity of future (possible) people, which means that the conditions for the inclusion of future people in the original position cannot be fully determined. Rawls wishes to offer a theory of just intergenerational distributions but it turns out that such a theory is logically dependent on the number and identity of future people, an issue which cannot itself be fixed in terms of an ideal contract under a veil of ignorance. The conclusion of the article is that the scope of the group in which the principles of justice are decided and implemented cannot itself be determined by a contractarian method.
Janna Thompson
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- September 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199282951
- eISBN:
- 9780191712319
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199282951.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General
Members of a political society typically regard themselves as participating in intergenerational relationships of obligation and entitlement. They value the inheritance they received from past ...
More
Members of a political society typically regard themselves as participating in intergenerational relationships of obligation and entitlement. They value the inheritance they received from past generations, regard themselves as indebted to their forebears, and accept an obligation to pass on their heritage to their descendants. Liberalism, with its emphasis, on rights, contracts, and welfare of existing people, does not provide an adequate basis for intergenerational obligations. Communitarianism, by stressing communal values of the embedded self, is in a better position to explain why obligations in respect to the past as well as the future should play a central role in conceptions of justice. This chapter critically examines communitarian approaches to intergenerational obligations, and argues for an account of the self in which lifetime-transcending interests play an important role. It presents a theory of intergenerational obligations which makes use of communitarian insights but is also compatible with basic assumptions of liberalism.Less
Members of a political society typically regard themselves as participating in intergenerational relationships of obligation and entitlement. They value the inheritance they received from past generations, regard themselves as indebted to their forebears, and accept an obligation to pass on their heritage to their descendants. Liberalism, with its emphasis, on rights, contracts, and welfare of existing people, does not provide an adequate basis for intergenerational obligations. Communitarianism, by stressing communal values of the embedded self, is in a better position to explain why obligations in respect to the past as well as the future should play a central role in conceptions of justice. This chapter critically examines communitarian approaches to intergenerational obligations, and argues for an account of the self in which lifetime-transcending interests play an important role. It presents a theory of intergenerational obligations which makes use of communitarian insights but is also compatible with basic assumptions of liberalism.
Kristin Shrader‐Frechette
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195152036
- eISBN:
- 9780199833665
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195152034.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
Using case studies focusing on the Yucca Mountain, Nevada Nuclear waste dump, the chapter analyzes the concepts of equal treatment, duties to future generations, and proxy consent. It also shows how ...
More
Using case studies focusing on the Yucca Mountain, Nevada Nuclear waste dump, the chapter analyzes the concepts of equal treatment, duties to future generations, and proxy consent. It also shows how these three values are threatened in the Nevada case, and it argues that indigenous people have been especially victimized by nuclear activities that violate principles of environmental justice.Less
Using case studies focusing on the Yucca Mountain, Nevada Nuclear waste dump, the chapter analyzes the concepts of equal treatment, duties to future generations, and proxy consent. It also shows how these three values are threatened in the Nevada case, and it argues that indigenous people have been especially victimized by nuclear activities that violate principles of environmental justice.
James P. Sterba
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- January 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780199580767
- eISBN:
- 9780191745836
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199580767.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, Political Philosophy
Most contemporary moral and political philosophers would like to have an argument showing that morality is rationally required. This book provides just such an argument and further show that ...
More
Most contemporary moral and political philosophers would like to have an argument showing that morality is rationally required. This book provides just such an argument and further show that morality, so justified, leads to substantial equality. The argument from rationality to morality is based on the principle of non-question-beggingness and it has two forms. The first assumes that the egoist is willing to argue for egoism non-question-beggingly, and the second only assumes that the egoist is willing to assent to premises she actually needs to achieve her egoistic goals. Either way, it is argued, morality is rationally (i.e., non-question-beggingly) preferable to egoism. The argument from morality to equality also non-question-beggingly starts with assumptions that are acceptable from a libertarian perspective, the view that appears to endorse the least enforcement of morality, and then shows that this perspective requires a right to welfare, and that further, when this right is extended to distant peoples and future generations, it leads to substantial equality. The strategy is to find conflicts of (negative) liberty within a libertarian perspective, and then argue that when these conflicts are appropriately resolved, they favor an allocation of liberty that supports a right to welfare that, in turn, when fully implemented, leads to substantial equality. The book also defends thus two-part argument against recent critics and further show how the argument is preferable to alternative attempts to justify morality as well as alternative attempts to show that morality leads to a right to welfare and/or to equality.Less
Most contemporary moral and political philosophers would like to have an argument showing that morality is rationally required. This book provides just such an argument and further show that morality, so justified, leads to substantial equality. The argument from rationality to morality is based on the principle of non-question-beggingness and it has two forms. The first assumes that the egoist is willing to argue for egoism non-question-beggingly, and the second only assumes that the egoist is willing to assent to premises she actually needs to achieve her egoistic goals. Either way, it is argued, morality is rationally (i.e., non-question-beggingly) preferable to egoism. The argument from morality to equality also non-question-beggingly starts with assumptions that are acceptable from a libertarian perspective, the view that appears to endorse the least enforcement of morality, and then shows that this perspective requires a right to welfare, and that further, when this right is extended to distant peoples and future generations, it leads to substantial equality. The strategy is to find conflicts of (negative) liberty within a libertarian perspective, and then argue that when these conflicts are appropriately resolved, they favor an allocation of liberty that supports a right to welfare that, in turn, when fully implemented, leads to substantial equality. The book also defends thus two-part argument against recent critics and further show how the argument is preferable to alternative attempts to justify morality as well as alternative attempts to show that morality leads to a right to welfare and/or to equality.
Derek Parfit
- Published in print:
- 1986
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198249085
- eISBN:
- 9780191598173
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/019824908X.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General
This book has four loosely connected parts. Part One discusses some ways in which theories about morality and rationality can be self‐defeating. Such theories give us certain aims, but also tell us ...
More
This book has four loosely connected parts. Part One discusses some ways in which theories about morality and rationality can be self‐defeating. Such theories give us certain aims, but also tell us to act in ways that frustrate these aims. If these theories are revised, these objections can be partly met.Part Two discusses the relations between what a single person can rationally want or do at different times, and what different people can rationally want or do. I also discuss the rationality of four attitudes to time: temporal neutrality, and the three kinds of bias towards the present, the near, and the future.Part Three discusses personal identity, or what is involved in our continuing to exist throughout our lives. Most of us, I argue, have certain beliefs about this subject that are false, but hard to give up. If we accept these claims, they may change some of our emotions or attitudes, and we should revise some of our beliefs about both rationality and morality.Part Four discusses our obligations to future generations, and some related questions about what would be better or worse futures for mankind. The most difficult question here, which I fail to answer, is about the relative importance of the number of people who will exist, and the quality of life of these people.Less
This book has four loosely connected parts. Part One discusses some ways in which theories about morality and rationality can be self‐defeating. Such theories give us certain aims, but also tell us to act in ways that frustrate these aims. If these theories are revised, these objections can be partly met.
Part Two discusses the relations between what a single person can rationally want or do at different times, and what different people can rationally want or do. I also discuss the rationality of four attitudes to time: temporal neutrality, and the three kinds of bias towards the present, the near, and the future.
Part Three discusses personal identity, or what is involved in our continuing to exist throughout our lives. Most of us, I argue, have certain beliefs about this subject that are false, but hard to give up. If we accept these claims, they may change some of our emotions or attitudes, and we should revise some of our beliefs about both rationality and morality.
Part Four discusses our obligations to future generations, and some related questions about what would be better or worse futures for mankind. The most difficult question here, which I fail to answer, is about the relative importance of the number of people who will exist, and the quality of life of these people.
