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The September 11th Victims Compensation Fund can only hesitatingly find its place within a comprehensive study of reparation programs. While the origin of the Fund lies in the political exigencies surrounding a perceived threat to the security of the United States, it more accurately reflects the desire by the U.S. Congress to ensure the viability of its nation’s air carriers. Unlike traditional reparations which are closely related to a process of social reintegration of the victim, fostering civic trust and social solidarity, the Fund was not established to bring justice to the victims of the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001. Also, unlike traditional reparations, the Fund did not seek to serve as a mechanism of corrective or distributive justice as a result of an authoritarian domestic regime or internal conflict. It was initially created out of fear that recourse to the U.S. courts would threaten the precarious financial health of the airline industry. Implicitly, however, such pragmatism reflected a desire by lawmakers that the government be seen as doing all it could to ease the pain of those who suffered so greatly on September 11, 2001. Initial motivations for the program aside, there is no question that the compensation scheme has since taken on a life of its own. Ultimately, the Fund’s contribution to any reparations case-study lies in its cautionary tale about the creation of elaborate administrative schemes that try to individualize recoveries as the mechanisms through which to compensate victims.

This chapter discusses the separation and independence of the AHRB from the HEFCE. In 2001, through the aid of Bahram Bekhradnia, the AHRB gained autonomy from the HEFCE. At the beginning of the fiscal year in April 2001, the ARHB became a company limited by guarantee. In September of the same year, the organisation gained legal status as a charity, hence affording it certain tax advantages. The newly independent company and charity took on new trustees, however it retained its broad responsibilities. It also took on the responsibility for producing its own audited Statutory Accounts. At the same time, the organisation's staff formally transferred to the employment of the ARHB and in the following year additional staff were recruited. In the month of October, the organisation signed a ten-year lease contract on its new office in Whitefriars Building in Bristol. In addition, the organisation was also attaining full realization of its programmes and objectives. It formed three award schemes including the Research Leave scheme. It also created the Fellowships in the Creative and Performing Arts. In addition, the organisation also formed new funding schemes and in 2002, upon the approval of the government, the Research Council funded projects throughout the UK. In sum, as Chief Executive David Eastwood puts it, the ARHB was achieving independence and operating in ways which still mirrored those of the research councils.

This chapter discusses the developments in terms of research grants and research funding of the newly established AHRB. By 2002 to 2003, during its fifth year, the AHRB's total budget had increased from £17.9 million to £64.8 million. During this period, non-programmed costs were capped at five per cent. Putting aside its administrative costs, the AHRB in its fifth year had programmatic expenditures of £61.7 million, a 20 per cent increase from the initially predicted expenditure. Of the £61.7 million, £9 million was allocated to the operation of museums and galleries of English institutions and the rest was equally divided between postgraduate awards and research awards throughout the UK. As funding rose, intellectual ambitions also increased. Several ambitious projects were initiated such as the editing of Francis Bacon's works, the creation of public policy concerning the film and television of Britain and Europe, the pursuing of the long-delayed multinational Romanian project, and several other projects. During this period, the AHRB garnered a distinct sense of direction and momentum. Over three years, the applications of research funding increased to 58 per cent. The applications for the postgraduate awards increased to 20 per cent in a year and the four year doctoral submission rate for arts and humanities students increased to 78 per cent.

Because of lower fertility and the various advances in terms of medicine, the number of people over 60 will have raisen from 500 million in 1990 to about 1.4 billion in 2030. If seen on a global scale, the issue of population ageing may give rise to various economic problems. As compared to when life expectancy was still relatively low, a large portion of the population will have claims to a share of a particular output in spite of not being about to provide labour sufficient enough to maintain their incomes. One of the major issues in both advanced and Third World countries will then involve how to organize this type of system while retaining economic growth and efficiency. In taking the political and financial risks into account, the resulting option as well as its consequences for pension fund development will significantly affect the financial system's structure.

This chapter examines four possible avenues to rectify the economic impediments to derivative actions. The first two focus on short-term solutions and involve the company and the claimant shareholder. Section 7.2.1 considers making a mandatory requirement for the company to pay the costs of the action. Section 7.2.2 then looks at the merits and demerits of rewarding the shareholder with part of the proceeds of a successful action. The last two sections concentrate on solutions in which the risk of loss is shifted on to the claimant's attorney. Section 7.3 explores new possibilities in the guise of conditional fee agreements; Section 7.4 assesses the possibility of adopting a US-style contingency fees in the limited context of derivative actions. Section 7.5 concludes.

This chapter examines the changes that have taken place in the political organization of research and its possible consequences for research behaviour and research performance by analysing a specific corporate actor, the Swiss National Science Foundation (SNSF) as Switzerland's main funding agency, and its funding instruments. First, it briefly presents the position of the SNSF in the Swiss public science system. It discusses the establishment of the SNSF in the early 1950s then analyses the institutionalization of three funding instruments that characterize the key changes in governance rationales during the second part of the 20th century.

This chapter explores the critical role of institutional investors as fiduciaries and in the governance of public companies. These institutions have more frequently encountered agency conflicts as the complexities of their businesses (managing pension funds, mutual funds, and 401ks of various types for both corporate and individual accounts) and competitive pressures have increased. They are powerful players in exercising control rights. As an industry, they can make the difference between governance successes and failures.

The empirical evidence examined in this book is highly supportive of the idea that economic rents play a key role in determining the degree of association between partisanship and corporate governance change in nonliberal market economies. Economic rents are the key factor that mould the preferences of political parties vis‐à‐vis corporate governance policy, and determine the ability of such policy to translate into changes in firm‐level corporate governance outcomes.

This chapter comments on the international community's crisis prevention and crisis resolution efforts. It suggests that though a variety of initiatives have been successful, two gaps remain. One is addressing the problems of the poorest countries because several elements of the so-called new international financial architecture have created further obstacles to their road to economic development. The other gap involves creating alternatives to bailouts for resolving crises in order to ease the pressure on the International Monetary Fund to extend to financial assistance.

This chapter reconstructs developments of EC law (including case law) relating to social protection, and traces the differential impact that free movement and competition rules have had on the various functional schemes and tiers or pillars of provision within national welfare states. It also identifies and illustrates the new strategies of spatial politics prompted by the boundary redefinitions operated by the EU, focussing on pensions (including pension funds), health care, and social assistance. Special attention is devoted to the position of third country nationals.

This chapter presents a map describing the new spatial architecture of social protection in the European Union resulting from free movement and competition rules, and their effects on traditional welfare state boundaries. The destructuring consequences of the new boundary configuration are discussed, with specific reference to pensions systems and the issue of migration. The chapter concludes by highlighting the margins of manoeuvre for a possible “nesting” of nation-based forms of social protection in a wider EU space, capable of promoting adaptation and reform, while upholding at the same time the basic pre-conditions for maintaining adequate levels of social protection.

Private equity funds contribute heavily to the performance of the firms in which they invest beyond the provision of capital. Through detailed examination of seven case studies of private equity funds and portfolio companies, this chapter shows how private equity funds provide ‘commercial savvy’ and international connections to the companies in which they invest, as well as sector-specific knowledge. The funds may involve themselves in areas traditionally considered as matters of concern to investors, such as corporate strategy, and in matters normally considered the province of managers, such as innovation and employee skill development.

Ten new members, eight of them post-communist states, joined the EU on 1 May 2004. This chapter takes up three issues that will shape the future of an enlarged EU. First, the EU’s active leverage has had a substantial impact on the political and economic institutions of the new members: has it promoted robust democratic institutions and a vigorous economy, as I have argued, or did it in fact undermine them? Second, the endgame of the negotiations forced unfavourable terms of accession onto the new members: will these unfavourable terms translate into a permanent second-class status? Or will the new members, bargaining hard to improve their position and importing diversity, bring European integration to a standstill? I argue that both concerns are overblown. Third, why did the EU decide to enlarge to these eight post-communist states, and how much further it is likely to go? The EU’s active leverage has been working in parts of the Western Balkans and in Turkey, and it could work elsewhere. The costs of foreclosing future membership for countries such as Turkey, Ukraine, or Belarus could be substantial, yet EU elites and publics are far from reconciled to further enlargements.