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This chapter focuses on the thesis of Humility and how it has led to disagreements between philosophers. Being the ground of a certain disposition is only one case among many of role-occupancy. Generally, to the extent that we know of the properties of things only as role-occupants, those properties are yet to be identified. No amount of knowledge about what roles are occupied will tell us which properties occupy which roles. While this chapter does not agree with Langton that the predicament is “ominous,” it accepts that it exists. First, the chapter argues from fairly weak assumptions that Humility applies to at least some of the fundamental properties. Next it argues from somewhat more contentious assumptions that it applies to all of them. Finally it is argued that if Humility applies to most or all of the fundamental properties, then it spreads to a great range of less than fundamental properties—intrinsic and extrinsic alike.

This chapter focuses on the dispute between necessitarians and contingentists, mainly addressing the issue as to whether laws of nature are metaphysically necessary or metaphysically contingent with a weaker kind of necessity, commonly referred to as natural, nomological, or nomic necessity. It is assumed here that all fundamental properties are dispositional or role properties, making the dispute a strictly verbal one. The existence of categorical intrinsic properties as well as dispositional properties is also assumed and the relationship between them examined. Finally, the chapter concludes by returning to the debate between necessitarians and contingentists under the assumption that both dispositional and categorical fundamental properties exist. It is argued here that necessitarian positions can be recast as contingentist, but that there are unequivocally contingentist positions preferred because they are less mysterious despite being ontologically more complex.

There are people, but how people exist is unclear. This chapter argues that it is part of our evaluative self-conception that persons are fully real, but decline to take this as proof that we are fully real. Instead, It explores a series of arguments for this conclusion. A common premise of these arguments is that a sufficient condition for being fully real is instantiating a perfectly natural property or relation. Specific arguments appeal to properties such as what it’s like to taste chocolate, being Kris McDaniel, certain moral properties such as intrinsic value, and freedom. We will not settle the question of whether we fully exist, but in this chapter the author demonstrates how complex the issues involved are.

This chapter argues that we are irremediably ignorant about the identities of the fundamental properties that figure in the actual realization of the true final theory. Of the three published responses to Lewis’s work, each argues that even if Lewis’s metaphysical assumption, the thesis known as “quidditism,” is accepted, we need not accept his epistemic conclusion, the thesis of Humility. The aim of this chapter is to defend Lewis against these critics. Ann Whittle attempts to refute Humility by an appeal to a more lenient account of identification. Following is a defense of Lewis carried by showing that his taxing account of identification is a perfectly good account of at least one perfectly legitimate sense of identification.