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Because the freedom of movement is somewhat encouraged through its protection by human rights, it is necessary for States to regulate the residence, whereabouts, and physical movement of persons within a particular set of reasonable limitations. The methods of accomplishing such regulation and the basis and justification of such necessity must comply with the criteria established by the human rights that concern the freedom of movement. While public policy accounts for how legislative or administrative methods for controlling the residence and movement of persons within territories, the purposes and forms of such measures vary between and within countries depending on the degree of importance given to public interest that States attempt to protect through enforcing limitations. While it is impractical to discuss the various restriction measures, this chapter looks into the issues of legality of particular restriction through examining the nature and permissibility of such measures.

This chapter studies the new laws against prostitution, enacted to enforce Article 23 of the Constitution, which sought to end the trafficking of women. For nationalists and leaders of the Indian women's movement, independence meant the achievement of constitutional and legal equality and the emergence of the republican female citizen as a moral, productive member of society. However, legislators and social workers were confronted by a different conception of freedom when sex workers began to file constitutional challenges to the anti-trafficking laws. They asserted their constitutional right to a trade or a profession and to freedom of movement around the country, and they challenged the procedural irregularities in the new statutes. The chapter then demonstrates that despite the sex workers' minimal success in the courts, this litigation prompted mobilization and associational politics outside the court and brought rights language into the everyday life of the sex trade.

The freedom of movement and residence within States involve a multitude of concerns such as internal migration, the state of those who are displaced within States brought about by civil conflicts, and the relation economic cultural and social rights with such movement, among other such problems. Addressing these problems, however, entails imposing human rights standards for the freedom of movement and residence in varying contexts, and such requires thorough examination of what is contained in such standards. As the degree of protection that the freedom of movement receives depends greatly on the legality of its restrictions, the book has been able to look into its scope and how these are used to regulate and control the freedom of residence and entry through the following measures: monitoring and regulation, coming up with a policy that addresses racial discrimination, and other such functions.

The United Nations Committee on Human Rights exists under Article 28 of the UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. One of its functions is to study reports submitted by the states parties — in fact, mostly by ‘a constructive dialogue’ with the state party concerned. States parties to the Covenant may become parties to an Optional Protocol allowing the Committee to receive and consider ‘communications from individuals claiming to be victims of violations of any of the rights set forth in the Covenant.’ Article 12 deals with the right of freedom of movement as a whole, including, in Article 12(2) and 12(4) respectively, the right to leave and the right to return to one’s own country. This chapter deals with the right in Article 12(1) — the right to liberty of movement and choice of residence within a territory. It examines the problem of internal banishment, the question of expulsion or deportation (external exile), and case law of the Committee.

International legal standards for such concerns as the freedom of movement and choosing one's residence within States is given importance by both the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and in various subsequent human rights treaties. Because such treaties are able to facilitate the strategic basis for the analysis of these issues through possessing binding capacities on particular parties and determining what legal standards should be pushed through with, this chapter attempts to identify these international standards. As these standards may be derived from the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966, and certain regional human rights treaties, this chapter further investigates the content of such standards for looking into which freedom of residence and movement within States should be established and lawfully exercised.

This chapter examines the issue of how to deal with the accused who is some way at fault in generating the need to use self-defensive force. The most common example is the accused who starts a fight, but then kills his opponent after he reacts disproportionately to the initial aggression. The chapter presents a classification of all the different situations that can be encompassed under the heading self-generated self-defence and assesses the legal options available for dealing with the accused in each situation. It is argued that the defence should not necessarily be denied, except where the accused has deliberately provoked an attack in order to kill the victim and benefit from the defence of self-defence. The chapter also examines the approaches taken to self-generated self-defence in the major common law jurisdictions.

One of the most basic of human rights which international law protects allows an individual to freely move around and select where he or she wants to live within States. Such protection may have originated from the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948, which accounts for the setting up of international standards for various aspects of human rights protection. Including such concerns as the freedom of movement both in terms of entering and leaving the State and travelling within the State entails certain justification for its advancement that such a basic and natural human right is now declared an essential for every individual. Literature about these concerns, however, is not given as much focus and importance as it should be given. This book therefore attempts to bridge the literature gap in issues of human rights and general international law.

The right to enter one’s country, to stay in a country which one has legally entered, and to leave any country including one’s own, have been perceived as basic since the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was adopted in 1948. When individuals claim human rights relating to freedom of movement, they are referring to the same facts and situations that states are concerned with when they assert jurisdiction over their own nationals and over resident aliens. The international law of jurisdiction is the means by which states allocate competence, between themselves, for the prescription and application of authority over events inside and outside their national boundaries. The rights of entry, sojourn, and exit are indivisible: the denial of any one makes the assertion of the others a chimera rather than a reality. Moreover, they flow inexorably from the right of freedom of movement and residence within the borders of a state. Further, these rights of mobility are inextricably intertwined with certain other human rights.

This chapter addresses a different challenge facing the EU: how citizenship is and should be defined in a ‘community’ which is primarily a market and in which non-market ties (political, cultural, social, national) are relatively less articulated. It argues that, notwithstanding broad phrases in the Treaty, access to ‘EU citizenship’ is in practice conditioned upon performance of paid work (housewives need not apply). Nevertheless, it contends that progressive possibilities remain in a ‘notion of a citizen imagined not only as a man but also as a woman’.

The normative problems raised by inter-polity mobility and its restriction engaged courts, councils, and universities throughout the Empire. Some jurists based their theories of free movement on the idea that roads and rivers were exempt from ownership and therefore free for all to use, replicating arguments from the ‘battle of the books’ around the freedom of the seas. Transit was another key concept for negotiating the ordering of movement. In spite of ubiquitous restrictions, some scholars advocated sweeping rights to inter-polity transit and free movement. Like other apologists for free movement, these authors catered to specific political interests. Consequently, the ideological opposition to freedom of movement was substantial. Many jurists argued that justified fears could warrant restrictions of free movement or even that it could be restricted at the full discretion of the ruler, often recurring to domestic analogies and to the language of property.

This chapter argues that people have a human right to immigrate to other states. People have essential interests in being able to make important personal decisions and engage in politics without state restrictions on the options available to them. It is these interests that other human rights, such as the human rights to internal freedom of movement and freedom of association, protect. The human right to immigrate is not absolute. Like the other human freedom rights upon which it is based, the human right to immigrate can be restricted in certain circumstances. Outside these circumstances, however, immigration restrictions are unjust. The idea of a human right to immigrate is not a demand for open borders. Rather it is a demand that basic liberties be awarded the same level of protection when people seek to exercise them across borders and within borders.

Chapter 6 examines three rights-based arguments for freedom of movement across borders. Three rights-based arguments have been offered in support of freedom of international movement. The first claims that freedom of movement is a fundamental human right in itself. The second adopts a “cantilever” strategy, arguing that freedom of international movement is a logical extension of existing fundamental rights, including the right of domestic free movement and the right to exit one’s country. The third argument is libertarian: international free movement is necessary to respect individual freedom of association and contract. This chapter shows why these arguments fail to justify a general right to free movement across the globe. What is morally required is not a general right of international free movement but an approach that privileges those whose basic human rights are at stake.

This chapter explores the aftermath of the 1908 ‘Young Turk’ Revolution in the Ottoman Empire that resulted in the reinstatement of the Ottoman Constitution and the lifting of most restrictions on both domestic and international mobility. As the Chapter demonstrates, the lifting of the migration ban resulted in a sharp increase in both out-migration and return migration. At the same time, the United States and other migrant-receiving states were strengthening restrictions on immigration, stranding many Ottoman migrants in transit ports throughout Europe. Also, Istanbul was forced to balance its commitment to freedom of movement with its growing demand for military-aged men and its increasing concern about the effects of migration on the empire’s economy. The chapter concludes with the Armenian genocide, its aftermath, and the legacies of migration.

Medical migration, the mass movement of medical professionals from the developing to the developed world, is widely seen as one of the most profound problems facing health systems in the poorest countries of the world. Skilled health-workers leave high disease burden areas with acute staff shortages in order to serve patients in low disease burden regions that are already well equipped. The result of medical migration is deepening global inequalities in health. The relationship between medical migration and human rights has become a central concern in the discussions. On the one hand, rich nations actively recruiting doctors and nurses from poor and sick regions are said to be violating the human right to health of the poor. On the other hand, the migrants claim their (human) right to freedom of movement; a claim that is further supported by two instrumental claims concerning the developmental effects of remittances and of service sector liberalization. The paper unfolds the content of these allegedly conflicting claims in order to clarify the normative considerations at stake and to see in what sense can global health deprivations constitute constraints on medical professionals’ freedom of movement.

This chapter discusses integrity in relation to human rights treaties in two senses of that term, referring mostly to the United Nations (UN) International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. The UN Human Rights Committee of the Covenant is responsible for monitoring and encouraging compliance with the Covenant. It does this in two main ways: through the critical examination of reports submitted by states, and through the hearing of cases against states, who under an Optional Protocol to the Covenant, allow the bringing of individual applications. The rights covered in the Civil and Political Covenant include: self-determination; right to life; prohibition of slavery; security of the person; treatment with humanity of persons deprived of their liberty; non-imprisonment for debt; freedom of movement; procedural guarantees for aliens upon expulsion; fair trial; non-retrospection of penal sanctions; entitlement to recognition before the law; privacy; freedom of religion; freedom of expression; prohibition of propaganda for war and incitement to racial or religious discrimination, hatred or violence; peaceful assembly; and freedom of association.

In recounting the last fifteen years of the independent film movement in Hong Kong, it is impossible not to mention Tammy Cheung's name. Even though she does not make narrative films, she has nevertheless made inroads with documentary films. She focuses on social and human problems as her subject matter and uses direct cinema as her approach. Without the use of voice-over narration, she explores the limits of objectivity and what she calls the “freedom of movement” in the direct cinema style. Her works such as Secondary School and July have elicited a significant response from the community. Even though finding capital and support is incredibly difficult, she claims she will continue filming into the future. Likewise, Hong Kong most certainly needs a documentary culture that records both major historical events as well as reflections from the streets.

This chapter demonstrates how the movement of Somalis is a crucial case of survival migration, one that challenges the basis of the refugee regime. Given the range and complexity of factors underlying displacement, states have responded to displaced Somalis differently. The chapter shows how Kenya's response has been unique, in that it has stretched to be inclusive of people escaping fragile and failed states at the margins of the international refugee regime. The price of inclusivity, however, has been a reduction in the quality of asylum at the cost of depriving Somalis of their rights to freedom of movement and self-employment, and their access to basic necessities of life. The chapter argues that the reasons for both the inclusiveness of quantity and the limitations on quality can be found in the configuration of elite interests.

This chapter looks at how domestic violence shelters have become bases of political thought and action; by providing physical spaces for safety and support, these shelters have defied one of the most brutal expressions of gender inequality—male violence—by protecting a woman’s basic right to bodily integrity. For most of history the law has failed to protect women attacked by intimate partners, leading to the question of whether or not battered women are understood as citizens of the state at all. The chapter argues that if women cannot move and act freely in the public sphere, or if they are intimidated in the privacy of their homes, their ability to act as citizens is limited. Domestic violence shelters have thus become places of refuge for these women, within which they can build their self-esteem and acquire a greater autonomy for themselves.

In the politically dense and fractured landscape of the Holy Roman Empire, safe conduct provided a key framework for negotiating freedom of movement and its restriction. The introduction sets out how the book uses safe conduct to approach the Holy Roman Empire in a spatial rather than diachronic perspective. It describes how authorities in the Empire restricted, promoted, and channelled different forms of mobility for political, fiscal, and symbolic reasons. Spatially these efforts were rarely concentrated at borders, which challenges anachronistic assumptions about the functioning of early modern borders. Conflicts around the enclosure of movement led to controversial debates around the rulers’ right to interfere with human mobility, adding a new chapter to the history of free movement. Drawing on manuscript, visual, and printed sources as well as self-designed maps, this book offers a new perspective on the unstable relation of political authority and human mobility in the heartlands of old-regime Europe.