Simon Harrison
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- January 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780198269847
- eISBN:
- 9780191713385
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198269847.001.0001
- Subject:
- Religion, Early Christian Studies
Augustine is a pivotal figure in the history of the concept of will, but what is his ‘theory of will’? This book investigates Augustine’s use of ‘will’ in one particular context, his dialogue On Free ...
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Augustine is a pivotal figure in the history of the concept of will, but what is his ‘theory of will’? This book investigates Augustine’s use of ‘will’ in one particular context, his dialogue On Free Choice of the Will, taking seriously its historical and philosophical form. First, it finds that the dialogical nature of On Free Choice of the Will has been missed, as exemplified by the unhistorical and misleading modern attributions of names to the speakers. Secondly, the commonplace that Augustine changed his mind in the course of its composition is shown to be unfounded, and a case is made for its argumentative coherence. Thirdly, it is shown that it is the form and structure of On Free Choice of the Will that give philosophical content to Augustine’s theory of will. The dialogue constitutes a ‘way in to the will’ that itself instantiates a concept of will. At the heart of this structure is a particular argument that depends on an appeal to a first-person perspective, which ties the vocabulary of will to a concept of freedom and responsibility. This appeal is significantly similar to other arguments deployed by Augustine which are significantly similar to Descartes’ ‘cogito ergo sum’, ‘I think therefore I am’. The book goes on to investigate how Augustine’s ‘way in’ relates to these cogito-like arguments as they occur in Augustine’s major and most read works, the Confessions, the City of God, and On the Trinity. The relationship of Augustine’s to Descartes’ ‘cogito’ is also discussed. Augustine elucidates, within a particular Platonic theory of knowledge, a ‘theory of will’ that is grounded in a ‘way in’, which takes the conditions and limits of knowledge seriously.Less
Augustine is a pivotal figure in the history of the concept of will, but what is his ‘theory of will’? This book investigates Augustine’s use of ‘will’ in one particular context, his dialogue On Free Choice of the Will, taking seriously its historical and philosophical form. First, it finds that the dialogical nature of On Free Choice of the Will has been missed, as exemplified by the unhistorical and misleading modern attributions of names to the speakers. Secondly, the commonplace that Augustine changed his mind in the course of its composition is shown to be unfounded, and a case is made for its argumentative coherence. Thirdly, it is shown that it is the form and structure of On Free Choice of the Will that give philosophical content to Augustine’s theory of will. The dialogue constitutes a ‘way in to the will’ that itself instantiates a concept of will. At the heart of this structure is a particular argument that depends on an appeal to a first-person perspective, which ties the vocabulary of will to a concept of freedom and responsibility. This appeal is significantly similar to other arguments deployed by Augustine which are significantly similar to Descartes’ ‘cogito ergo sum’, ‘I think therefore I am’. The book goes on to investigate how Augustine’s ‘way in’ relates to these cogito-like arguments as they occur in Augustine’s major and most read works, the Confessions, the City of God, and On the Trinity. The relationship of Augustine’s to Descartes’ ‘cogito’ is also discussed. Augustine elucidates, within a particular Platonic theory of knowledge, a ‘theory of will’ that is grounded in a ‘way in’, which takes the conditions and limits of knowledge seriously.
Phillip Cary
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- May 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780195336481
- eISBN:
- 9780199868438
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195336481.001.0001
- Subject:
- Religion, Theology
Rather than constituting a break with his Platonism, Augustine's doctrines of grace and free will are formed from the beginning by Platonist conceptions of happiness, wisdom, intellect, virtue, ...
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Rather than constituting a break with his Platonism, Augustine's doctrines of grace and free will are formed from the beginning by Platonist conceptions of happiness, wisdom, intellect, virtue, purification, conversion, faith, and love. Divine grace is inner help for the will, and our need for it expands “outward” over the course of Augustine's career, being required originally for attaining the happiness of wisdom (i.e., the intellectual vision of God), then for rightly ordered love (i.e., charity), and eventually for Christian faith. Reading the apostle Paul, Augustine emphasizes the difficulty of willing and loving the good, and eventually concludes that even the human choice to believe depends on grace, though this comes to us in the external words of a “suitable call,” which does not directly change the will from within. However, in his later polemics against Pelagianism, Augustine reconceives grace as wholly inward, a divine inner teaching that turns our will and causes us to believe. Since God foresees how he will give the gift of grace, this raises questions of predestination and especially election: why does God choose to bring some people rather than others to conversion, faith, and ultimate salvation? A more biblical and external doctrine of election, in which the chosen people are a blessing for those outside them, would avoid the anxieties of Augustine's doctrine of predestination.Less
Rather than constituting a break with his Platonism, Augustine's doctrines of grace and free will are formed from the beginning by Platonist conceptions of happiness, wisdom, intellect, virtue, purification, conversion, faith, and love. Divine grace is inner help for the will, and our need for it expands “outward” over the course of Augustine's career, being required originally for attaining the happiness of wisdom (i.e., the intellectual vision of God), then for rightly ordered love (i.e., charity), and eventually for Christian faith. Reading the apostle Paul, Augustine emphasizes the difficulty of willing and loving the good, and eventually concludes that even the human choice to believe depends on grace, though this comes to us in the external words of a “suitable call,” which does not directly change the will from within. However, in his later polemics against Pelagianism, Augustine reconceives grace as wholly inward, a divine inner teaching that turns our will and causes us to believe. Since God foresees how he will give the gift of grace, this raises questions of predestination and especially election: why does God choose to bring some people rather than others to conversion, faith, and ultimate salvation? A more biblical and external doctrine of election, in which the chosen people are a blessing for those outside them, would avoid the anxieties of Augustine's doctrine of predestination.
TIM BAYNE
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- January 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780197264898
- eISBN:
- 9780191754074
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- British Academy
- DOI:
- 10.5871/bacad/9780197264898.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
This chapter examines what is arguably the most influential rebutting objection in the current literature, an objection that appeals to Benjamin Libet's studies concerning the neural basis of agency. ...
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This chapter examines what is arguably the most influential rebutting objection in the current literature, an objection that appeals to Benjamin Libet's studies concerning the neural basis of agency. Although Libet himself stopped short of endorsing free will scepticism on the basis of his results, other theorists have not been so cautious, and his work is often said to show that we lack free will. It is argued that Libet's findings show no such thing. However, Libet's experiments do raise a number of interesting and important questions for accounts of free will. In particular, Libet's experiments raise challenging questions about the analysis of the concept of free will. In order to determine whether brain science supports free will scepticism we need not only to understand the relevant brain science, we also need to understand just what the common-sense or folk notion of free will commits us to. The latter requirement may be as difficult to meet as the former one is.Less
This chapter examines what is arguably the most influential rebutting objection in the current literature, an objection that appeals to Benjamin Libet's studies concerning the neural basis of agency. Although Libet himself stopped short of endorsing free will scepticism on the basis of his results, other theorists have not been so cautious, and his work is often said to show that we lack free will. It is argued that Libet's findings show no such thing. However, Libet's experiments do raise a number of interesting and important questions for accounts of free will. In particular, Libet's experiments raise challenging questions about the analysis of the concept of free will. In order to determine whether brain science supports free will scepticism we need not only to understand the relevant brain science, we also need to understand just what the common-sense or folk notion of free will commits us to. The latter requirement may be as difficult to meet as the former one is.
Gregory Graybill
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- September 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199589487
- eISBN:
- 9780191594588
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199589487.001.0001
- Subject:
- Religion, Church History
If one is saved by faith alone in Jesus Christ, then what is the origin of that faith? Is it a preordained gift of God to elect individuals, or is some measure of human free choice involved? ...
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If one is saved by faith alone in Jesus Christ, then what is the origin of that faith? Is it a preordained gift of God to elect individuals, or is some measure of human free choice involved? Initially, Philipp Melanchthon concurred with Martin Luther—that the human will is completely bound by sin, and that the choice of faith can flow only from God's unilateral grace. But if this is so, what about those whom God has not chosen? Is he not casting people into hell who never even had a chance? What are the pastoral implications for believers thinking about the nature of God and their own relationship to him? As a result of practical concerns such as these, aided by an intellectual aversion to paradox, Melanchthon came to believe that the human will does play a key role in the origins of a saving faith in Jesus Christ. This was not the Roman Catholic free will of Erasmus, however. It was a limited free will tied to justification by faith alone. It was an evangelical free will.Less
If one is saved by faith alone in Jesus Christ, then what is the origin of that faith? Is it a preordained gift of God to elect individuals, or is some measure of human free choice involved? Initially, Philipp Melanchthon concurred with Martin Luther—that the human will is completely bound by sin, and that the choice of faith can flow only from God's unilateral grace. But if this is so, what about those whom God has not chosen? Is he not casting people into hell who never even had a chance? What are the pastoral implications for believers thinking about the nature of God and their own relationship to him? As a result of practical concerns such as these, aided by an intellectual aversion to paradox, Melanchthon came to believe that the human will does play a key role in the origins of a saving faith in Jesus Christ. This was not the Roman Catholic free will of Erasmus, however. It was a limited free will tied to justification by faith alone. It was an evangelical free will.
Peter van Inwagen
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- May 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199245604
- eISBN:
- 9780191715310
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199245604.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
This book contains in eight chapters the revised text of eight Gifford lectures, which were delivered at the University of St Andrews in 2003. The problem of evil may be formulated as a question ...
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This book contains in eight chapters the revised text of eight Gifford lectures, which were delivered at the University of St Andrews in 2003. The problem of evil may be formulated as a question addressed to theists: why would an all-powerful and benevolent God permit the existence of vast amounts of truly horrible suffering? Many reflective people are convinced that this question has no answer. The reasons that underlie this conviction can be formulated as an argument for the non-existence of God, the so-called argument from evil: if there were a God, he would not permit the existence of vast amounts of truly horrible suffering; since such suffering exists, there is no God. The examination of the problem of evil in these chapters is largely an examination of the argument from evil, which the author of the book regards as a paradigmatically philosophical argument. The conclusion of the main argument of the chapters (which takes the form of a debate centred on the ‘free-will defence’) is that the argument from evil is, like most philosophical arguments, a failure. The following topics receive special attention: the concept of God; success and failure in philosophical argument; versions of the argument from evil that depend on the vast amount of evil in the world and versions of the argument that depend on a particular evil, such as the Holocaust; the free-will defence; animal suffering; and the problem of the hiddenness of God.Less
This book contains in eight chapters the revised text of eight Gifford lectures, which were delivered at the University of St Andrews in 2003. The problem of evil may be formulated as a question addressed to theists: why would an all-powerful and benevolent God permit the existence of vast amounts of truly horrible suffering? Many reflective people are convinced that this question has no answer. The reasons that underlie this conviction can be formulated as an argument for the non-existence of God, the so-called argument from evil: if there were a God, he would not permit the existence of vast amounts of truly horrible suffering; since such suffering exists, there is no God. The examination of the problem of evil in these chapters is largely an examination of the argument from evil, which the author of the book regards as a paradigmatically philosophical argument. The conclusion of the main argument of the chapters (which takes the form of a debate centred on the ‘free-will defence’) is that the argument from evil is, like most philosophical arguments, a failure. The following topics receive special attention: the concept of God; success and failure in philosophical argument; versions of the argument from evil that depend on the vast amount of evil in the world and versions of the argument that depend on a particular evil, such as the Holocaust; the free-will defence; animal suffering; and the problem of the hiddenness of God.
Jaap Mansfeld
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- January 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780199644384
- eISBN:
- 9780191743344
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199644384.003.0009
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Ancient Philosophy
Michael Frede's posthumously published Sather Lectures discuss the origin and scope of the concept of a free will in antiquity, from the Stoics to Augustine via, among others, Alexander of ...
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Michael Frede's posthumously published Sather Lectures discuss the origin and scope of the concept of a free will in antiquity, from the Stoics to Augustine via, among others, Alexander of Aphrodisias and Plotinus. Here Frede disagrees that a notion of the will as a factor or distinct event in the mind appears only with Augustine. This chapter analyses the Sather Lectures chapter by chapter. The theme of free will is tricky because the concept has become problematic in contemporary philosophy, and so may well have outlived its usefulness, this chapter states. Frede's aim, however, is not philosophical but historical.Less
Michael Frede's posthumously published Sather Lectures discuss the origin and scope of the concept of a free will in antiquity, from the Stoics to Augustine via, among others, Alexander of Aphrodisias and Plotinus. Here Frede disagrees that a notion of the will as a factor or distinct event in the mind appears only with Augustine. This chapter analyses the Sather Lectures chapter by chapter. The theme of free will is tricky because the concept has become problematic in contemporary philosophy, and so may well have outlived its usefulness, this chapter states. Frede's aim, however, is not philosophical but historical.
PATRICK HAGGARD
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- January 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780197264898
- eISBN:
- 9780191754074
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- British Academy
- DOI:
- 10.5871/bacad/9780197264898.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
This chapter explores the interaction between neuroscience and free will. First, it considers how freely willed actions should be defined. Second, it outlines current understanding of brain ...
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This chapter explores the interaction between neuroscience and free will. First, it considers how freely willed actions should be defined. Second, it outlines current understanding of brain mechanisms preceding action, showing in what respects these mechanisms meet the philosophical criteria for freely willed action, and in what respects they do not. Finally, it concludes that the philosophical criteria themselves are based on two underlying psychological facts: human action involves complex mappings between environmental stimuli and goal-directed responses, and human action is associated with a range of quasi-perceptual experiences, classically called ‘motor attention’. These facts lie at the heart of our concept of conscious free will, and are directly related to the recent evolutionary development of the brain's frontal lobes.Less
This chapter explores the interaction between neuroscience and free will. First, it considers how freely willed actions should be defined. Second, it outlines current understanding of brain mechanisms preceding action, showing in what respects these mechanisms meet the philosophical criteria for freely willed action, and in what respects they do not. Finally, it concludes that the philosophical criteria themselves are based on two underlying psychological facts: human action involves complex mappings between environmental stimuli and goal-directed responses, and human action is associated with a range of quasi-perceptual experiences, classically called ‘motor attention’. These facts lie at the heart of our concept of conscious free will, and are directly related to the recent evolutionary development of the brain's frontal lobes.
Roy F. Baumeister, Alfred R. Mele, and Kathleen D. Vohs (eds)
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- September 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780195389760
- eISBN:
- 9780199863341
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195389760.001.0001
- Subject:
- Psychology, Social Psychology, Cognitive Psychology
This volume is aimed at readers who wish to move beyond debates about the existence of free will and the efficacy of consciousness and closer to appreciating how free will and consciousness might ...
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This volume is aimed at readers who wish to move beyond debates about the existence of free will and the efficacy of consciousness and closer to appreciating how free will and consciousness might operate. It draws from philosophy and psychology, the two fields that have grappled most fundamentally with these issues. In this wide-ranging volume, the contributors explore issues such as how free will is connected to rational choice, planning, and self-control; roles for consciousness in decision making; the nature and power of conscious deciding; connections among free will, consciousness, and quantum mechanics; why free will and consciousness might have evolved; how consciousness develops in individuals; the experience of free will; effects on behavior of the belief that free will is an illusion; and connections between free will and moral responsibility in lay thinking. Collectively, these state-of-the-art chapters by accomplished psychologists and philosophers provide a glimpse into the future of research on free will and consciousness.Less
This volume is aimed at readers who wish to move beyond debates about the existence of free will and the efficacy of consciousness and closer to appreciating how free will and consciousness might operate. It draws from philosophy and psychology, the two fields that have grappled most fundamentally with these issues. In this wide-ranging volume, the contributors explore issues such as how free will is connected to rational choice, planning, and self-control; roles for consciousness in decision making; the nature and power of conscious deciding; connections among free will, consciousness, and quantum mechanics; why free will and consciousness might have evolved; how consciousness develops in individuals; the experience of free will; effects on behavior of the belief that free will is an illusion; and connections between free will and moral responsibility in lay thinking. Collectively, these state-of-the-art chapters by accomplished psychologists and philosophers provide a glimpse into the future of research on free will and consciousness.
Robert Hanna
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- January 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199285549
- eISBN:
- 9780191713965
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199285549.003.0009
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
This chapter explores the same basic Kantian presuppositional links with respect to causation. It begins by unpacking the basics of Kant's metaphysics of causation, with special reference to the ...
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This chapter explores the same basic Kantian presuppositional links with respect to causation. It begins by unpacking the basics of Kant's metaphysics of causation, with special reference to the three Analogies of Experience and the Third Antinomy of Pure Reason. It then analyzes the problem of free will and works out a new version of Kant's theory of freedom, called the Embodied Agency Theory. Some of the intimate Kantian links between freedom and nature are explored, and a biological interpretation of the Embodied Agency Theory is developed. It is argued that for Kant, the irreversibility of time — ‘Time's Arrow’ — entails a necessary connection between naturally mechanized causation and the possibility of human practical causation.Less
This chapter explores the same basic Kantian presuppositional links with respect to causation. It begins by unpacking the basics of Kant's metaphysics of causation, with special reference to the three Analogies of Experience and the Third Antinomy of Pure Reason. It then analyzes the problem of free will and works out a new version of Kant's theory of freedom, called the Embodied Agency Theory. Some of the intimate Kantian links between freedom and nature are explored, and a biological interpretation of the Embodied Agency Theory is developed. It is argued that for Kant, the irreversibility of time — ‘Time's Arrow’ — entails a necessary connection between naturally mechanized causation and the possibility of human practical causation.
David Hodgson
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- May 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199845309
- eISBN:
- 9780199932269
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199845309.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, General
In recent years, philosophical discussions of free will have focused largely on whether or not free will is compatible with determinism. In this challenging book, David Hodgson takes a fresh approach ...
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In recent years, philosophical discussions of free will have focused largely on whether or not free will is compatible with determinism. In this challenging book, David Hodgson takes a fresh approach to the question of free will, contending that close consideration of human rationality and human consciousness shows that together they give us free will, in a robust and indeterministic sense. In particular, they give us the capacity to respond appositely to feature-rich gestalts of conscious experiences, in ways that are not wholly determined by laws of nature or computational rules. The author contends that this approach is consistent with what science tells us about the world; and he considers its implications for our responsibility for our own conduct, for the role of retribution in criminal punishment, and for the place of human beings in the wider scheme of things.Less
In recent years, philosophical discussions of free will have focused largely on whether or not free will is compatible with determinism. In this challenging book, David Hodgson takes a fresh approach to the question of free will, contending that close consideration of human rationality and human consciousness shows that together they give us free will, in a robust and indeterministic sense. In particular, they give us the capacity to respond appositely to feature-rich gestalts of conscious experiences, in ways that are not wholly determined by laws of nature or computational rules. The author contends that this approach is consistent with what science tells us about the world; and he considers its implications for our responsibility for our own conduct, for the role of retribution in criminal punishment, and for the place of human beings in the wider scheme of things.
Alfred R Mele
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- May 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780195384260
- eISBN:
- 9780199869909
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195384260.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, General
This book has both a negative aim and a positive aim. The negative aim is to show that some recent influential scientific claims about free will, consciousness, and action‐production are not ...
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This book has both a negative aim and a positive aim. The negative aim is to show that some recent influential scientific claims about free will, consciousness, and action‐production are not warranted by the data. These claims (by Benjamin Libet, Daniel Wegner, and others) include the following: your brain routinely decides what you will do before you become conscious of its decision; there is only a 100‐millisecond window of opportunity for free will, and all you can freely do in that window is veto conscious intentions that you were about to execute; intentions and their physical correlates play no role in producing corresponding actions; and free will is an illusion. The positive aim is to show that there is powerful empirical support for the thesis that there are effective conscious decisions and intentions to act.Less
This book has both a negative aim and a positive aim. The negative aim is to show that some recent influential scientific claims about free will, consciousness, and action‐production are not warranted by the data. These claims (by Benjamin Libet, Daniel Wegner, and others) include the following: your brain routinely decides what you will do before you become conscious of its decision; there is only a 100‐millisecond window of opportunity for free will, and all you can freely do in that window is veto conscious intentions that you were about to execute; intentions and their physical correlates play no role in producing corresponding actions; and free will is an illusion. The positive aim is to show that there is powerful empirical support for the thesis that there are effective conscious decisions and intentions to act.
Christopher Yeomans
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- January 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199794522
- eISBN:
- 9780199919253
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199794522.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
Hegel’s Logic reveals an insightful and subtle engagement with the traditional problem of free will as it emerges from our basic commitment to the explicability of the world. While the dominant ...
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Hegel’s Logic reveals an insightful and subtle engagement with the traditional problem of free will as it emerges from our basic commitment to the explicability of the world. While the dominant current interpretations of Hegel’s theory of agency find little of significance in the Logic and suggest that Hegel avoided the traditional problem, Yeomans argues both that the problem is unavoidable, and that the two versions of the Logic fruitfully engage the tensions between explicability and both the control and alternate possibilities constitutive of free agency. In particular, Yeomans examines Hegel’s response to three different versions of the principle of sufficient reason that have historically seemed to make free will problematic. The central three chapters take up each of these versions in turn. For each, Yeomans first explores the nature of its challenge to free will with glances both at Hegel’s precursors and contemporaries and at the philosophy of action of our own time. Then Yeomans delves into the arguments of Hegel’s Logic to see how he construed the problematic concepts in question. Finally, Yeomans returns to the issue of free will to bring Hegel’s interpretations of the concepts in the Logic together with elements of his moral psychology from his practical philosophy both to show how the problem of free will can be resolved, and to trace in outline the shape of free will that such a resolution produces. The key connection between the Logic’s reflections on the form of explanation and the practical philosophy’s theory of the will is that both attempt to do justice to the mutual necessity of self-determination and external influence.Less
Hegel’s Logic reveals an insightful and subtle engagement with the traditional problem of free will as it emerges from our basic commitment to the explicability of the world. While the dominant current interpretations of Hegel’s theory of agency find little of significance in the Logic and suggest that Hegel avoided the traditional problem, Yeomans argues both that the problem is unavoidable, and that the two versions of the Logic fruitfully engage the tensions between explicability and both the control and alternate possibilities constitutive of free agency. In particular, Yeomans examines Hegel’s response to three different versions of the principle of sufficient reason that have historically seemed to make free will problematic. The central three chapters take up each of these versions in turn. For each, Yeomans first explores the nature of its challenge to free will with glances both at Hegel’s precursors and contemporaries and at the philosophy of action of our own time. Then Yeomans delves into the arguments of Hegel’s Logic to see how he construed the problematic concepts in question. Finally, Yeomans returns to the issue of free will to bring Hegel’s interpretations of the concepts in the Logic together with elements of his moral psychology from his practical philosophy both to show how the problem of free will can be resolved, and to trace in outline the shape of free will that such a resolution produces. The key connection between the Logic’s reflections on the form of explanation and the practical philosophy’s theory of the will is that both attempt to do justice to the mutual necessity of self-determination and external influence.
Ken Gemes and Simon May (eds)
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- September 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199231560
- eISBN:
- 9780191716119
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199231560.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General
The principal aim of this book is to elucidate what freedom, sovereignty, and autonomy mean for Nietzsche and what philosophical resources he gives us to re-think these crucial concepts. A related ...
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The principal aim of this book is to elucidate what freedom, sovereignty, and autonomy mean for Nietzsche and what philosophical resources he gives us to re-think these crucial concepts. A related aim is to examine how Nietzsche connects these concepts to his thoughts about life-affirmation, self-love, promise-making, agency, the ‘will to nothingness’, and the ‘eternal recurrence’, as well as to his search for a ‘genealogical’ understanding of morality. These twelve chapters by leading Nietzsche scholars ask such key questions as: Can we reconcile his rejection of free will with his positive invocations of the notion of free will? How does Nietzsche's celebration of freedom and free spirits sit with his claim that we all have an unchangeable fate? What is the relation between his concepts of freedom and self-overcoming?Less
The principal aim of this book is to elucidate what freedom, sovereignty, and autonomy mean for Nietzsche and what philosophical resources he gives us to re-think these crucial concepts. A related aim is to examine how Nietzsche connects these concepts to his thoughts about life-affirmation, self-love, promise-making, agency, the ‘will to nothingness’, and the ‘eternal recurrence’, as well as to his search for a ‘genealogical’ understanding of morality. These twelve chapters by leading Nietzsche scholars ask such key questions as: Can we reconcile his rejection of free will with his positive invocations of the notion of free will? How does Nietzsche's celebration of freedom and free spirits sit with his claim that we all have an unchangeable fate? What is the relation between his concepts of freedom and self-overcoming?
Alfred R. Mele
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- May 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199896134
- eISBN:
- 9780199949533
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199896134.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
People backslide. They freely do things they believe it would be best on the whole not to do – and best from their own point of view, not just the perspective of their peers or their parents. The aim ...
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People backslide. They freely do things they believe it would be best on the whole not to do – and best from their own point of view, not just the perspective of their peers or their parents. The aim of this book is to explain why that happens. The first main item of business is to clarify the nature of backsliding – of actions that display some weakness of will. To this end, Mele uses traditional philosophical techniques dating back to Plato and Aristotle (whose work on weakness of will or “akrasia” he discusses) and some new studies in the emerging field of experimental philosophy. He then attacks the thesis that backsliding is an illusion because people never freely act contrary to what they judge best. Mele argues that it is extremely plausible that if people ever act freely, they sometimes backslide. The biggest challenge posed by backsliding is to explain why it happens. At the book’s heart is the development of a theoretical and empirical framework that sheds light both on backsliding and on exercises of self-control that prevent it. Here, Mele draws on work in social and developmental psychology and in psychiatry to motivate a view of human behavior in which both backsliding and overcoming the temptation to backslide are explicable. He argues that backsliding is no illusion and our theories about the springs of action, the power of evaluative judgments, human agency, human rationality, practical reasoning, and motivation should accommodate backsliding.Less
People backslide. They freely do things they believe it would be best on the whole not to do – and best from their own point of view, not just the perspective of their peers or their parents. The aim of this book is to explain why that happens. The first main item of business is to clarify the nature of backsliding – of actions that display some weakness of will. To this end, Mele uses traditional philosophical techniques dating back to Plato and Aristotle (whose work on weakness of will or “akrasia” he discusses) and some new studies in the emerging field of experimental philosophy. He then attacks the thesis that backsliding is an illusion because people never freely act contrary to what they judge best. Mele argues that it is extremely plausible that if people ever act freely, they sometimes backslide. The biggest challenge posed by backsliding is to explain why it happens. At the book’s heart is the development of a theoretical and empirical framework that sheds light both on backsliding and on exercises of self-control that prevent it. Here, Mele draws on work in social and developmental psychology and in psychiatry to motivate a view of human behavior in which both backsliding and overcoming the temptation to backslide are explicable. He argues that backsliding is no illusion and our theories about the springs of action, the power of evaluative judgments, human agency, human rationality, practical reasoning, and motivation should accommodate backsliding.
Charles Goodman
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- May 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780195375190
- eISBN:
- 9780199871377
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195375190.001.0001
- Subject:
- Religion, Buddhism
Buddhist ethical views have much in common with certain modern ethical theories, and contain many insights relevant to contemporary moral problems. This book examines the theoretical structure of the ...
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Buddhist ethical views have much in common with certain modern ethical theories, and contain many insights relevant to contemporary moral problems. This book examines the theoretical structure of the normative views found in a number of Indian and Tibetan Buddhist texts. Teachings from all three major traditions of Buddhism, the Theravāda, Mahāyāna, and Vajrayāna, are considered. Although Buddhist philosophy is quite diverse, and these traditions differ in their ethical perspectives, they can all be understood as versions of a general moral outlook known as welfarist consequentialism. Buddhist versions of consequentialism regard virtue as an intrinsic component of the good life. They range from the cautious indirect approach of the Theravāda, which focuses on following rules that lead to the welfare of many, to the bold and often shocking direct approach of the Vajrayāna. Buddhists can respond convincingly to certain often-discussed criticisms of consequentialism, including several powerful arguments due to Kant. Buddhist texts offer an interesting approach to the problem of the demands of morality. These texts also contain a powerful critique of what we would identify as the concept of free will, a critique which leads to a hard determinist view of human action. This view supports Buddhist values of compassion, nonviolence and forgiveness, and leads to a more humane approach to the justification of punishment.Less
Buddhist ethical views have much in common with certain modern ethical theories, and contain many insights relevant to contemporary moral problems. This book examines the theoretical structure of the normative views found in a number of Indian and Tibetan Buddhist texts. Teachings from all three major traditions of Buddhism, the Theravāda, Mahāyāna, and Vajrayāna, are considered. Although Buddhist philosophy is quite diverse, and these traditions differ in their ethical perspectives, they can all be understood as versions of a general moral outlook known as welfarist consequentialism. Buddhist versions of consequentialism regard virtue as an intrinsic component of the good life. They range from the cautious indirect approach of the Theravāda, which focuses on following rules that lead to the welfare of many, to the bold and often shocking direct approach of the Vajrayāna. Buddhists can respond convincingly to certain often-discussed criticisms of consequentialism, including several powerful arguments due to Kant. Buddhist texts offer an interesting approach to the problem of the demands of morality. These texts also contain a powerful critique of what we would identify as the concept of free will, a critique which leads to a hard determinist view of human action. This view supports Buddhist values of compassion, nonviolence and forgiveness, and leads to a more humane approach to the justification of punishment.
Phillip Cary
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- May 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780195336481
- eISBN:
- 9780199868438
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195336481.003.0003
- Subject:
- Religion, Theology
Augustine's doctrine of grace is modified by his reading of the apostle Paul in the 390s, when he realizes it can be difficult to will the good we want to will. The psychological order of salvation ...
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Augustine's doctrine of grace is modified by his reading of the apostle Paul in the 390s, when he realizes it can be difficult to will the good we want to will. The psychological order of salvation fits a four‐stage schema, in which we cannot wholeheartedly will or love the good until we reach the stage under grace. Where faith and merit fit in this schema is unclear until the treatise To Simplicianus, when Augustine concludes that the difference between the saved and the damned is ultimately due to divine election. For it is God who chooses to give unmerited grace to some sinners rather than others by means of a “suitable call,” an external word or admonition that God knows will unfailingly elicit the will's delight and free assent to believe. This attempt to reconcile grace and free will, illustrated by Augustine's own conversion narrative, will prove insufficient.Less
Augustine's doctrine of grace is modified by his reading of the apostle Paul in the 390s, when he realizes it can be difficult to will the good we want to will. The psychological order of salvation fits a four‐stage schema, in which we cannot wholeheartedly will or love the good until we reach the stage under grace. Where faith and merit fit in this schema is unclear until the treatise To Simplicianus, when Augustine concludes that the difference between the saved and the damned is ultimately due to divine election. For it is God who chooses to give unmerited grace to some sinners rather than others by means of a “suitable call,” an external word or admonition that God knows will unfailingly elicit the will's delight and free assent to believe. This attempt to reconcile grace and free will, illustrated by Augustine's own conversion narrative, will prove insufficient.
Shaun Nichols
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- May 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780195189636
- eISBN:
- 9780199868605
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195189636.003.0002
- Subject:
- Psychology, Social Psychology
This chapter offers an introductory overview of freedom and determinism. It contemplates common objections to determinism (presumed fatalism, denial of free choice, and negation of praise, blame, and ...
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This chapter offers an introductory overview of freedom and determinism. It contemplates common objections to determinism (presumed fatalism, denial of free choice, and negation of praise, blame, and responsibility). It identifies psychology's challenges to free will (evolutionary influences, genetic influences, brain control, parental/peer/cultural influences, and non-conscious influences). It indicates how psychological science nevertheless affirms human freedom, through research on self-determination and the benefits of personal control. Finally, it suggests how theological and practical wisdom converge with science in concluding that we are both the products of our biological and social histories, and the architects of our futures.Less
This chapter offers an introductory overview of freedom and determinism. It contemplates common objections to determinism (presumed fatalism, denial of free choice, and negation of praise, blame, and responsibility). It identifies psychology's challenges to free will (evolutionary influences, genetic influences, brain control, parental/peer/cultural influences, and non-conscious influences). It indicates how psychological science nevertheless affirms human freedom, through research on self-determination and the benefits of personal control. Finally, it suggests how theological and practical wisdom converge with science in concluding that we are both the products of our biological and social histories, and the architects of our futures.
Gary Watson
- Published in print:
- 2004
- Published Online:
- September 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199272273
- eISBN:
- 9780191709968
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199272273.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
This volume collects most of the author's publications on human action since the 1970s. The essays collected here are concerned to answer the questions ‘What makes us agents?’ and ‘What makes us ...
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This volume collects most of the author's publications on human action since the 1970s. The essays collected here are concerned to answer the questions ‘What makes us agents?’ and ‘What makes us responsible to one another for how we live our lives?’ The author develops a unified account of human agency and responsibility in terms of our capacity for critical evaluation, or normative competence. We are agents because we have (and to the extent that we exercise) this capacity, and we are responsible to each other for our lives as reflections of our exercise of this capacity. The account is developed in these essays largely by considering possible sources of normative incapacity, such as compulsion, addiction, manipulation, childhood deprivation, and one's own desires. Many of these essays engage critically with contemporary accounts of free will, action, and moral responsibility.Less
This volume collects most of the author's publications on human action since the 1970s. The essays collected here are concerned to answer the questions ‘What makes us agents?’ and ‘What makes us responsible to one another for how we live our lives?’ The author develops a unified account of human agency and responsibility in terms of our capacity for critical evaluation, or normative competence. We are agents because we have (and to the extent that we exercise) this capacity, and we are responsible to each other for our lives as reflections of our exercise of this capacity. The account is developed in these essays largely by considering possible sources of normative incapacity, such as compulsion, addiction, manipulation, childhood deprivation, and one's own desires. Many of these essays engage critically with contemporary accounts of free will, action, and moral responsibility.
SOLOMON FEFERMAN
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- January 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780197264898
- eISBN:
- 9780191754074
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- British Academy
- DOI:
- 10.5871/bacad/9780197264898.003.0007
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
The determinism-free will debate is perhaps as old as philosophy itself and has been engaged in from a great variety of points of view including those of scientific, theological, and logical ...
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The determinism-free will debate is perhaps as old as philosophy itself and has been engaged in from a great variety of points of view including those of scientific, theological, and logical character. This chapter focuses on two arguments from logic. First, there is an argument in support of determinism that dates back to Aristotle, if not farther. It rests on acceptance of the Law of Excluded Middle, according to which every proposition is either true or false, no matter whether the proposition is about the past, present or future. In particular, the argument goes, whatever one does or does not do in the future is determined in the present by the truth or falsity of the corresponding proposition. The second argument coming from logic is much more modern and appeals to Gödel's incompleteness theorems to make the case against determinism and in favour of free will, insofar as that applies to the mathematical potentialities of human beings. The claim more precisely is that as a consequence of the incompleteness theorems, those potentialities cannot be exactly circumscribed by the output of any computing machine even allowing unlimited time and space for its work. The chapter concludes with some new considerations that may be in favour of a partial mechanist account of the mathematical mind.Less
The determinism-free will debate is perhaps as old as philosophy itself and has been engaged in from a great variety of points of view including those of scientific, theological, and logical character. This chapter focuses on two arguments from logic. First, there is an argument in support of determinism that dates back to Aristotle, if not farther. It rests on acceptance of the Law of Excluded Middle, according to which every proposition is either true or false, no matter whether the proposition is about the past, present or future. In particular, the argument goes, whatever one does or does not do in the future is determined in the present by the truth or falsity of the corresponding proposition. The second argument coming from logic is much more modern and appeals to Gödel's incompleteness theorems to make the case against determinism and in favour of free will, insofar as that applies to the mathematical potentialities of human beings. The claim more precisely is that as a consequence of the incompleteness theorems, those potentialities cannot be exactly circumscribed by the output of any computing machine even allowing unlimited time and space for its work. The chapter concludes with some new considerations that may be in favour of a partial mechanist account of the mathematical mind.
Ishtiyaque Haji
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- September 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199899203
- eISBN:
- 9780199949885
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199899203.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
To have free will with respect to an act is to have the ability both to perform and to refrain from performing it. This book argues that no one can have practical reasons of a certain sort—“objective ...
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To have free will with respect to an act is to have the ability both to perform and to refrain from performing it. This book argues that no one can have practical reasons of a certain sort—“objective reasons”—to perform some act unless one has free will regarding that act. So we cannot have objective reasons to perform an act unless we could have done otherwise. This is reason’s debt to freedom. the book argues, further, for the thesis that various things we value, such as moral and prudential obligation, intrinsic value, and a range of moral sentiments that figure centrally in interpersonal relationships, presuppose our having free will. They do so because each of these things essentially requires that we have objective reasons, the having of which, in turn, demands that we have alternatives. Finally, the book distinguishes between two sorts of alternative, strong or incompatibilist alternatives and weak or compatibilist alternatives. Assuming, on the one hand, that obligation and some of the other things we value require strong alternatives, the book concludes that determinism precludes these things because determinism expunges strong alternatives. If, on the other hand, they require only weak alternatives, a chief compatibilist agenda of establishing the compatibility of these things with determinism without appeal to alternatives of any kind—the semi-compatibilist’s agenda—is jeopardized.Less
To have free will with respect to an act is to have the ability both to perform and to refrain from performing it. This book argues that no one can have practical reasons of a certain sort—“objective reasons”—to perform some act unless one has free will regarding that act. So we cannot have objective reasons to perform an act unless we could have done otherwise. This is reason’s debt to freedom. the book argues, further, for the thesis that various things we value, such as moral and prudential obligation, intrinsic value, and a range of moral sentiments that figure centrally in interpersonal relationships, presuppose our having free will. They do so because each of these things essentially requires that we have objective reasons, the having of which, in turn, demands that we have alternatives. Finally, the book distinguishes between two sorts of alternative, strong or incompatibilist alternatives and weak or compatibilist alternatives. Assuming, on the one hand, that obligation and some of the other things we value require strong alternatives, the book concludes that determinism precludes these things because determinism expunges strong alternatives. If, on the other hand, they require only weak alternatives, a chief compatibilist agenda of establishing the compatibility of these things with determinism without appeal to alternatives of any kind—the semi-compatibilist’s agenda—is jeopardized.
