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Physicalism and the determination of action

FRANK JACKSON

in Free Will and Modern Science

Published in print:
2011
Published Online:
January 2013
ISBN:
9780197264898
eISBN:
9780191754074
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
British Academy
DOI:
10.5871/bacad/9780197264898.003.0004
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

There is no single version of physicalism. There is no single argument for physicalism. There is, accordingly, no standard answer concerning the implications of physicalism for the causation of human ... More


On the Inevitability of Freedom from the Compatibilist Point of View

Galen Strawson

in Real Materialism: and Other Essays

Published in print:
2008
Published Online:
September 2008
ISBN:
9780199267422
eISBN:
9780191708343
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199267422.003.0013
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Metaphysics/Epistemology

According to standard compatibilist accounts of freedom, human beings act freely just so long as they are, when they act, free from constraints of certain specified kinds. Such accounts of freedom ... More


 A Daring Soft Libertarian Response to Present Luck

Alfred R. Mele

in Free Will and Luck

Published in print:
2006
Published Online:
February 2006
ISBN:
9780195305043
eISBN:
9780199786015
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0195305043.003.0005
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

This chapter constructs a libertarian view that grants the main moral of Frankfurt-style cases, and offers a resolution of the problem of present luck. Attention to how human beings may develop from ... More


Consciousness, Free Will, and Determinism

Galen Strawson

in Real Materialism: and Other Essays

Published in print:
2008
Published Online:
September 2008
ISBN:
9780199267422
eISBN:
9780191708343
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199267422.003.0015
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Metaphysics/Epistemology

This chapter begins with some brief reflections on the definition of determinism, on the notion of the subject of experience, and on the relation between conscious experience and brain events. The ... More


Agent Causation and Control

Randolph Clarke

in Libertarian Accounts of Free Will

Published in print:
2003
Published Online:
January 2005
ISBN:
9780195159875
eISBN:
9780199835010
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/019515987X.003.0009
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

Agent-causal accounts aim to secure greater control than can be secured by any event-causal libertarian account. Assuming that all it requires is possible, an integrated agent-causal view succeeds at ... More


The Problem of Diminished Control

Randolph Clarke

in Libertarian Accounts of Free Will

Published in print:
2003
Published Online:
January 2005
ISBN:
9780195159875
eISBN:
9780199835010
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/019515987X.003.0005
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

This chapter examines the charge that the indeterminism required by standard event-causal libertarian accounts would diminish the control that is exercised in acting. The objection has been advanced ... More


 Frankfurt‐style Cases, Luck, and Soft Libertarianism

Alfred R. Mele

in Free Will and Luck

Published in print:
2006
Published Online:
February 2006
ISBN:
9780195305043
eISBN:
9780199786015
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0195305043.003.0004
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

This chapter clarifies principles of alternative possibilities both for moral responsibility and for free action, locates the most important challenge that Frankfurt-style cases pose for ... More


 My Compatibilist Proposal: Objections and Replies

Alfred R. Mele

in Free Will and Luck

Published in print:
2006
Published Online:
February 2006
ISBN:
9780195305043
eISBN:
9780199786015
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0195305043.003.0007
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

This chapter defends a history-sensitive compatibilist view of free action and moral responsibility against various criticisms by compatibilists (including Daniel Dennett). It constructs a new ... More


Free Action and Free Will

Gary Watson

in Agency and Answerability: Selected Essays

Published in print:
2004
Published Online:
September 2010
ISBN:
9780199272273
eISBN:
9780191709968
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199272273.003.0007
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

Rival conceptions of free agency can be understood as competing interpretations of the notions of self-determination and alternative possibilities, and the characteristic shape of the dialectic ... More


The Freedom of Decisions and Other Actions

Randolph Clarke

in Libertarian Accounts of Free Will

Published in print:
2003
Published Online:
January 2005
ISBN:
9780195159875
eISBN:
9780199835010
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/019515987X.003.0007
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

Libertarian accounts commonly hold that only certain acts of will, such as decisions (or choices), can be directly free, with the freedom of actions of other types—whether mental or overt, bodily ... More


An Integrated Agent‐Causal Account

Randolph Clarke

in Libertarian Accounts of Free Will

Published in print:
2003
Published Online:
January 2005
ISBN:
9780195159875
eISBN:
9780199835010
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/019515987X.003.0008
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

This chapter begins an assessment of agent-causal libertarian accounts, which require causation by agents, where this is construed as causation by enduring substances and not reducible to event ... More


Free and Creator of the Universe

Richard Swinburne

in The Coherence of Theism

Published in print:
1993
Published Online:
November 2003
ISBN:
9780198240709
eISBN:
9780191598586
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0198240708.003.0008
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Religion

Explanation is of two kinds—personal (in terms of persons, their intentions, capacities, and beliefs) and scientific (in terms of laws of nature and initial conditions). In explaining things in terms ... More


Deliberative Libertarian Accounts

Randolph Clarke

in Libertarian Accounts of Free Will

Published in print:
2003
Published Online:
January 2005
ISBN:
9780195159875
eISBN:
9780199835010
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/019515987X.003.0004
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

Deliberative libertarian accounts allow that basic free actions may be causally determined by their immediate causal antecedents; indeterminism is required only at earlier points in the processes ... More


Moral Agents

John Bricke

in Mind and Morality: An Examination of Hume's Moral Psychology

Published in print:
2000
Published Online:
October 2011
ISBN:
9780198250111
eISBN:
9780191681240
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198250111.003.0008
Subject:
Philosophy, History of Philosophy, Moral Philosophy

This chapter reflects on the many properties that David Hume assigns to moral agents and examines the interrelations of those properties. The goal is to summarize the central elements in the closely ... More


Active Control and Causation

Randolph Clarke

in Libertarian Accounts of Free Will

Published in print:
2003
Published Online:
January 2005
ISBN:
9780195159875
eISBN:
9780199835010
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/019515987X.003.0002
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

Noncausal libertarian accounts allow that a basic free action may be uncaused and have no internal causal structure. Views of this type advanced by Carl Ginet and Hugh McCann are evaluated here. ... More


Free Agency

Gary Watson

in Agency and Answerability: Selected Essays

Published in print:
2004
Published Online:
September 2010
ISBN:
9780199272273
eISBN:
9780191709968
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199272273.003.0002
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

This chapter defends a distinction between valuing and desiring that is important to an adequate account of free action and the nature of human agency. To account for intentional but unfree action, ... More


The Legal Doctrines of Intervening Causation

Michael S. Moore

in Causation and Responsibility: An Essay in Law, Morals, and Metaphysics

Published in print:
2009
Published Online:
May 2009
ISBN:
9780199256860
eISBN:
9780191719653
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199256860.003.0011
Subject:
Law, Philosophy of Law

This chapter lays out the doctrinal intricacies of the test. These mostly concern the crucial idea of an intervening cause. An intervening cause is described as any event (and not a state or an ... More


Omniscience and the Future

Paul Helm

in Eternal God: A Study of God without Time

Published in print:
2010
Published Online:
January 2011
ISBN:
9780199590391
eISBN:
9780191595516
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199590391.003.0007
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Religion, Metaphysics/Epistemology

The alternative hypothesis, that God is in time, is explored. Does it fare any better over problems of indexicality and divine foreknowledge? Is such a God's lack of foreknowledge of free actions ... More


Skepticism about Weakness of Will

Gary Watson

in Agency and Answerability: Selected Essays

Published in print:
2004
Published Online:
September 2010
ISBN:
9780199272273
eISBN:
9780191709968
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199272273.003.0003
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

This chapter considers two sorts of scepticism about the possibility of knowingly acting against one's practical judgment, or weakness of will. The Socratic view that weak behaviour is impossible ... More


Groups Acting on Trees

Dan Margalit

in Office Hours with a Geometric Group Theorist

Published in print:
2017
Published Online:
May 2018
ISBN:
9780691158662
eISBN:
9781400885398
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Princeton University Press
DOI:
10.23943/princeton/9780691158662.003.0003
Subject:
Mathematics, Geometry / Topology

This chapter considers groups acting on trees. It examines which groups act on which spaces and, if a group does act on a space, what it says about the group. These spaces are called trees—that is, ... More


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