FRANK JACKSON
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- January 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780197264898
- eISBN:
- 9780191754074
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- British Academy
- DOI:
- 10.5871/bacad/9780197264898.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
There is no single version of physicalism. There is no single argument for physicalism. There is, accordingly, no standard answer concerning the implications of physicalism for the causation of human ...
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There is no single version of physicalism. There is no single argument for physicalism. There is, accordingly, no standard answer concerning the implications of physicalism for the causation of human action by mental states. This chapter begins by describing a preferred version of physicalism and its implications about the connection between subjects' mental states and what they do, and thereby for the determination and predictability of our actions. This serves as a precursor for a short discussion of the implications of physicalism for the possibility of free action. The chapter also discusses an anomalous physicalism that holds it is a mistake in principle to identify the mental and the physical, in the sense of identifying mental and physical kinds. At first blush, this kind of physicalism might seem good news for those who worry about the implications of physicalism for freedom. However, it is shown that the good news is not that good.Less
There is no single version of physicalism. There is no single argument for physicalism. There is, accordingly, no standard answer concerning the implications of physicalism for the causation of human action by mental states. This chapter begins by describing a preferred version of physicalism and its implications about the connection between subjects' mental states and what they do, and thereby for the determination and predictability of our actions. This serves as a precursor for a short discussion of the implications of physicalism for the possibility of free action. The chapter also discusses an anomalous physicalism that holds it is a mistake in principle to identify the mental and the physical, in the sense of identifying mental and physical kinds. At first blush, this kind of physicalism might seem good news for those who worry about the implications of physicalism for freedom. However, it is shown that the good news is not that good.
Galen Strawson
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- September 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780199267422
- eISBN:
- 9780191708343
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199267422.003.0013
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Metaphysics/Epistemology
According to standard compatibilist accounts of freedom, human beings act freely just so long as they are, when they act, free from constraints of certain specified kinds. Such accounts of freedom ...
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According to standard compatibilist accounts of freedom, human beings act freely just so long as they are, when they act, free from constraints of certain specified kinds. Such accounts of freedom are examples of what one may call Constraint Compatibilism (CC). This chapter argues that, properly understood, CC entails not only that we are virtually always able to act freely, but also that virtually all if not all our actual actions are free. The suggestion is not so much that this is a hitherto unnoticed consequence of CC, but, rather, that there is a certain way of conceiving of freedom implicit in CC that has not been taken sufficiently seriously.Less
According to standard compatibilist accounts of freedom, human beings act freely just so long as they are, when they act, free from constraints of certain specified kinds. Such accounts of freedom are examples of what one may call Constraint Compatibilism (CC). This chapter argues that, properly understood, CC entails not only that we are virtually always able to act freely, but also that virtually all if not all our actual actions are free. The suggestion is not so much that this is a hitherto unnoticed consequence of CC, but, rather, that there is a certain way of conceiving of freedom implicit in CC that has not been taken sufficiently seriously.
Alfred R. Mele
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- February 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780195305043
- eISBN:
- 9780199786015
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195305043.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter constructs a libertarian view that grants the main moral of Frankfurt-style cases, and offers a resolution of the problem of present luck. Attention to how human beings may develop from ...
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This chapter constructs a libertarian view that grants the main moral of Frankfurt-style cases, and offers a resolution of the problem of present luck. Attention to how human beings may develop from neonates who do not even act intentionally into free, morally responsible human agents proves instructive in developing the resolution.Less
This chapter constructs a libertarian view that grants the main moral of Frankfurt-style cases, and offers a resolution of the problem of present luck. Attention to how human beings may develop from neonates who do not even act intentionally into free, morally responsible human agents proves instructive in developing the resolution.
Galen Strawson
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- September 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780199267422
- eISBN:
- 9780191708343
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199267422.003.0015
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter begins with some brief reflections on the definition of determinism, on the notion of the subject of experience, and on the relation between conscious experience and brain events. The ...
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This chapter begins with some brief reflections on the definition of determinism, on the notion of the subject of experience, and on the relation between conscious experience and brain events. The main discussion focuses on the traditional view, endorsed by Honderich in his book, A Theory of Determinism, that the truth of determinism poses some special threat to our ordinary conception of ourselves as morally responsible free agents (and also to our ‘life-hopes’). It is argued that this is half right: the truth of determinism does indeed threaten certain vital parts of our ordinary conception of ourselves as morally responsible free agents. The trouble is that the falsity of determinism does not diminish the threat in any useful way. The old, natural, and recurrent mistake is to think that we would really be better off, so far as free will and moral responsibility (and our ‘life-hopes’) were concerned, if determinism was false. It is argued that there is no important sense in which this is true, and that the question of whether determinism is true or false is therefore of no real importance, so far as the free will debate is concerned.Less
This chapter begins with some brief reflections on the definition of determinism, on the notion of the subject of experience, and on the relation between conscious experience and brain events. The main discussion focuses on the traditional view, endorsed by Honderich in his book, A Theory of Determinism, that the truth of determinism poses some special threat to our ordinary conception of ourselves as morally responsible free agents (and also to our ‘life-hopes’). It is argued that this is half right: the truth of determinism does indeed threaten certain vital parts of our ordinary conception of ourselves as morally responsible free agents. The trouble is that the falsity of determinism does not diminish the threat in any useful way. The old, natural, and recurrent mistake is to think that we would really be better off, so far as free will and moral responsibility (and our ‘life-hopes’) were concerned, if determinism was false. It is argued that there is no important sense in which this is true, and that the question of whether determinism is true or false is therefore of no real importance, so far as the free will debate is concerned.
Randolph Clarke
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- January 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780195159875
- eISBN:
- 9780199835010
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/019515987X.003.0009
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
Agent-causal accounts aim to secure greater control than can be secured by any event-causal libertarian account. Assuming that all it requires is possible, an integrated agent-causal view succeeds at ...
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Agent-causal accounts aim to secure greater control than can be secured by any event-causal libertarian account. Assuming that all it requires is possible, an integrated agent-causal view succeeds at this goal and adequately characterizes free will. Such a view captures well the common idea that free agents are originators of their free actions. Responses are offered to Peter van Inwagen’s challenge to agent-causal views and to Galen Strawson’s argument that free will is impossible. A claim that free will requires downward causation—of a sort involving the supersession of microlevel laws—is rejected.Less
Agent-causal accounts aim to secure greater control than can be secured by any event-causal libertarian account. Assuming that all it requires is possible, an integrated agent-causal view succeeds at this goal and adequately characterizes free will. Such a view captures well the common idea that free agents are originators of their free actions. Responses are offered to Peter van Inwagen’s challenge to agent-causal views and to Galen Strawson’s argument that free will is impossible. A claim that free will requires downward causation—of a sort involving the supersession of microlevel laws—is rejected.
Randolph Clarke
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- January 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780195159875
- eISBN:
- 9780199835010
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/019515987X.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter examines the charge that the indeterminism required by standard event-causal libertarian accounts would diminish the control that is exercised in acting. The objection has been advanced ...
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This chapter examines the charge that the indeterminism required by standard event-causal libertarian accounts would diminish the control that is exercised in acting. The objection has been advanced with an ensurance argument and an argument from luck. Both arguments are rejected; nondeterministic causation of an action by its immediate causal antecedents need not diminish at all the type of control relevant to free action. This chapter further assesses the account of free will advanced by Robert Kane, which imposes certain special requirements meant to address the problem of diminished control. These special requirements provide no help; but, in any case, none is needed.Less
This chapter examines the charge that the indeterminism required by standard event-causal libertarian accounts would diminish the control that is exercised in acting. The objection has been advanced with an ensurance argument and an argument from luck. Both arguments are rejected; nondeterministic causation of an action by its immediate causal antecedents need not diminish at all the type of control relevant to free action. This chapter further assesses the account of free will advanced by Robert Kane, which imposes certain special requirements meant to address the problem of diminished control. These special requirements provide no help; but, in any case, none is needed.
Gary Watson
- Published in print:
- 2004
- Published Online:
- September 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199272273
- eISBN:
- 9780191709968
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199272273.003.0007
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
Rival conceptions of free agency can be understood as competing interpretations of the notions of self-determination and alternative possibilities, and the characteristic shape of the dialectic ...
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Rival conceptions of free agency can be understood as competing interpretations of the notions of self-determination and alternative possibilities, and the characteristic shape of the dialectic between compatibilists and incompatibilists can be understood in these terms. Compatibilism holds that self-determining action is action proceeding from an unencumbered will, and likewise freedom to do otherwise is dependency on the agent's will. Incompatibilists object that freedom requires not just dependency on the will but self-determination of the will. It is not clear, however, that any sense can be made of this requirement. This chapter spells out this dialectic by means of a distinction between explanatory and modal incompatibilism, concluding that if there is a coherent account of free agency, then it is compatible with a deterministic or mechanistic metaphysics. The options are compatibilism or scepticism.Less
Rival conceptions of free agency can be understood as competing interpretations of the notions of self-determination and alternative possibilities, and the characteristic shape of the dialectic between compatibilists and incompatibilists can be understood in these terms. Compatibilism holds that self-determining action is action proceeding from an unencumbered will, and likewise freedom to do otherwise is dependency on the agent's will. Incompatibilists object that freedom requires not just dependency on the will but self-determination of the will. It is not clear, however, that any sense can be made of this requirement. This chapter spells out this dialectic by means of a distinction between explanatory and modal incompatibilism, concluding that if there is a coherent account of free agency, then it is compatible with a deterministic or mechanistic metaphysics. The options are compatibilism or scepticism.
Alfred R. Mele
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- February 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780195305043
- eISBN:
- 9780199786015
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195305043.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter clarifies principles of alternative possibilities both for moral responsibility and for free action, locates the most important challenge that Frankfurt-style cases pose for ...
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This chapter clarifies principles of alternative possibilities both for moral responsibility and for free action, locates the most important challenge that Frankfurt-style cases pose for libertarianism, and begins to develop an answer to that challenge.Less
This chapter clarifies principles of alternative possibilities both for moral responsibility and for free action, locates the most important challenge that Frankfurt-style cases pose for libertarianism, and begins to develop an answer to that challenge.
Alfred R. Mele
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- February 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780195305043
- eISBN:
- 9780199786015
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195305043.003.0007
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter defends a history-sensitive compatibilist view of free action and moral responsibility against various criticisms by compatibilists (including Daniel Dennett). It constructs a new ...
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This chapter defends a history-sensitive compatibilist view of free action and moral responsibility against various criticisms by compatibilists (including Daniel Dennett). It constructs a new argument for incompatibilism that makes vivid a problem that luck poses for compatibilism: the zygote argument. It is argued that the zygote argument is much more powerful than more familiar arguments for incompatibilism, and that, even so, compatibilism may survive the attack.Less
This chapter defends a history-sensitive compatibilist view of free action and moral responsibility against various criticisms by compatibilists (including Daniel Dennett). It constructs a new argument for incompatibilism that makes vivid a problem that luck poses for compatibilism: the zygote argument. It is argued that the zygote argument is much more powerful than more familiar arguments for incompatibilism, and that, even so, compatibilism may survive the attack.
Richard Swinburne
- Published in print:
- 1993
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198240709
- eISBN:
- 9780191598586
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198240708.003.0008
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Religion
Explanation is of two kinds—personal (in terms of persons, their intentions, capacities, and beliefs) and scientific (in terms of laws of nature and initial conditions). In explaining things in terms ...
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Explanation is of two kinds—personal (in terms of persons, their intentions, capacities, and beliefs) and scientific (in terms of laws of nature and initial conditions). In explaining things in terms of God's action, theology uses personal explanation. God is the creator of the universe in the sense that he brings about (or permits some other being to bring about) the existence of all things apart from himself; it is irrelevant to this doctrine whether or not the universe had a beginning. God acts directly in that no outside causal factors cause or can influence how he acts; considerations of reason alone influence him; and hence he will always do what he believes that there is overriding reason to do, and never do what he believes that there is overriding reason not to do.Less
Explanation is of two kinds—personal (in terms of persons, their intentions, capacities, and beliefs) and scientific (in terms of laws of nature and initial conditions). In explaining things in terms of God's action, theology uses personal explanation. God is the creator of the universe in the sense that he brings about (or permits some other being to bring about) the existence of all things apart from himself; it is irrelevant to this doctrine whether or not the universe had a beginning. God acts directly in that no outside causal factors cause or can influence how he acts; considerations of reason alone influence him; and hence he will always do what he believes that there is overriding reason to do, and never do what he believes that there is overriding reason not to do.
Randolph Clarke
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- January 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780195159875
- eISBN:
- 9780199835010
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/019515987X.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
Deliberative libertarian accounts allow that basic free actions may be causally determined by their immediate causal antecedents; indeterminism is required only at earlier points in the processes ...
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Deliberative libertarian accounts allow that basic free actions may be causally determined by their immediate causal antecedents; indeterminism is required only at earlier points in the processes leading to free actions. Accounts of this type proposed by Daniel Dennett, Laura Ekstrom, and Alfred Mele are examined here. Given the assumption of incompatibilism, deliberative accounts fail to provide for the sort of difference-making that is distinctive of free action. Further, they fail to evade the problem of diminished control that they are meant to evade.Less
Deliberative libertarian accounts allow that basic free actions may be causally determined by their immediate causal antecedents; indeterminism is required only at earlier points in the processes leading to free actions. Accounts of this type proposed by Daniel Dennett, Laura Ekstrom, and Alfred Mele are examined here. Given the assumption of incompatibilism, deliberative accounts fail to provide for the sort of difference-making that is distinctive of free action. Further, they fail to evade the problem of diminished control that they are meant to evade.
Randolph Clarke
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- January 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780195159875
- eISBN:
- 9780199835010
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/019515987X.003.0007
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
Libertarian accounts commonly hold that only certain acts of will, such as decisions (or choices), can be directly free, with the freedom of actions of other types—whether mental or overt, bodily ...
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Libertarian accounts commonly hold that only certain acts of will, such as decisions (or choices), can be directly free, with the freedom of actions of other types—whether mental or overt, bodily actions—deriving from that of these acts of will. Here this willist view of freedom is rejected in favor of an actionist view. Event-causal libertarian accounts (and agent-causal accounts that employ an event-causal theory of action) can do as good a job of characterizing the freedom of actions other than decisions as they can in the case of decisions.Less
Libertarian accounts commonly hold that only certain acts of will, such as decisions (or choices), can be directly free, with the freedom of actions of other types—whether mental or overt, bodily actions—deriving from that of these acts of will. Here this willist view of freedom is rejected in favor of an actionist view. Event-causal libertarian accounts (and agent-causal accounts that employ an event-causal theory of action) can do as good a job of characterizing the freedom of actions other than decisions as they can in the case of decisions.
Randolph Clarke
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- January 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780195159875
- eISBN:
- 9780199835010
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/019515987X.003.0008
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter begins an assessment of agent-causal libertarian accounts, which require causation by agents, where this is construed as causation by enduring substances and not reducible to event ...
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This chapter begins an assessment of agent-causal libertarian accounts, which require causation by agents, where this is construed as causation by enduring substances and not reducible to event causation. Timothy O’Connor’s agent-causal view is examined. Like most such accounts, it does not require, in any case of acting freely, that events such as the agent’s having certain reasons cause the event that the agent is required to directly cause; the view consequently fails to provide for the reason-explanation of free actions. An alternative agent-causal account is advanced, one that integrates agent causation (as a requirement for free action) with an event-causal theory of action.Less
This chapter begins an assessment of agent-causal libertarian accounts, which require causation by agents, where this is construed as causation by enduring substances and not reducible to event causation. Timothy O’Connor’s agent-causal view is examined. Like most such accounts, it does not require, in any case of acting freely, that events such as the agent’s having certain reasons cause the event that the agent is required to directly cause; the view consequently fails to provide for the reason-explanation of free actions. An alternative agent-causal account is advanced, one that integrates agent causation (as a requirement for free action) with an event-causal theory of action.
Randolph Clarke
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- January 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780195159875
- eISBN:
- 9780199835010
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/019515987X.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
Noncausal libertarian accounts allow that a basic free action may be uncaused and have no internal causal structure. Views of this type advanced by Carl Ginet and Hugh McCann are evaluated here. ...
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Noncausal libertarian accounts allow that a basic free action may be uncaused and have no internal causal structure. Views of this type advanced by Carl Ginet and Hugh McCann are evaluated here. These views fail to provide adequate accounts of the active control that is exercised when one acts freely and of the reason-explanation of free actions. Any satisfactory account of these phenomena must invoke causation.Less
Noncausal libertarian accounts allow that a basic free action may be uncaused and have no internal causal structure. Views of this type advanced by Carl Ginet and Hugh McCann are evaluated here. These views fail to provide adequate accounts of the active control that is exercised when one acts freely and of the reason-explanation of free actions. Any satisfactory account of these phenomena must invoke causation.
John Bricke
- Published in print:
- 2000
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198250111
- eISBN:
- 9780191681240
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198250111.003.0008
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
This chapter reflects on the many properties that David Hume assigns to moral agents and examines the interrelations of those properties. The goal is to summarize the central elements in the closely ...
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This chapter reflects on the many properties that David Hume assigns to moral agents and examines the interrelations of those properties. The goal is to summarize the central elements in the closely argued, and intricately articulated, moral psychology presented by Hume. A typical moral agent is, more primitively, a non-moral one. Her specifically moral desires (and so also her specifically moral affections) aside, she is an individual with non-moral desires and affections, and with a host of other physical, psychological, and social features. For Hume, what makes an individual an agent, whether non-moral or moral, makes her a free agent as well. This can be seen from a consideration of his views about freedom to act and about free action. In the Treatise of Human Nature, he distinguishes two notions of liberty or freedom, allowing the legitimacy of the first. Hume's moral agents are free agents fully subject to nature's causal laws; they are also rational agents.Less
This chapter reflects on the many properties that David Hume assigns to moral agents and examines the interrelations of those properties. The goal is to summarize the central elements in the closely argued, and intricately articulated, moral psychology presented by Hume. A typical moral agent is, more primitively, a non-moral one. Her specifically moral desires (and so also her specifically moral affections) aside, she is an individual with non-moral desires and affections, and with a host of other physical, psychological, and social features. For Hume, what makes an individual an agent, whether non-moral or moral, makes her a free agent as well. This can be seen from a consideration of his views about freedom to act and about free action. In the Treatise of Human Nature, he distinguishes two notions of liberty or freedom, allowing the legitimacy of the first. Hume's moral agents are free agents fully subject to nature's causal laws; they are also rational agents.
Gary Watson
- Published in print:
- 2004
- Published Online:
- September 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199272273
- eISBN:
- 9780191709968
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199272273.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
This chapter defends a distinction between valuing and desiring that is important to an adequate account of free action and the nature of human agency. To account for intentional but unfree action, ...
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This chapter defends a distinction between valuing and desiring that is important to an adequate account of free action and the nature of human agency. To account for intentional but unfree action, we must make sense of the possibility of someone's being motivated to do what she does not most want to do. This requires a contrast between two sources of motivation: evaluative judgments and mere desires. This account differs from Harry Frankfurt's hierarchical theory, since, it is argued, valuing is not a species of desiring.Less
This chapter defends a distinction between valuing and desiring that is important to an adequate account of free action and the nature of human agency. To account for intentional but unfree action, we must make sense of the possibility of someone's being motivated to do what she does not most want to do. This requires a contrast between two sources of motivation: evaluative judgments and mere desires. This account differs from Harry Frankfurt's hierarchical theory, since, it is argued, valuing is not a species of desiring.
Michael S. Moore
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- May 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199256860
- eISBN:
- 9780191719653
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199256860.003.0011
- Subject:
- Law, Philosophy of Law
This chapter lays out the doctrinal intricacies of the test. These mostly concern the crucial idea of an intervening cause. An intervening cause is described as any event (and not a state or an ...
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This chapter lays out the doctrinal intricacies of the test. These mostly concern the crucial idea of an intervening cause. An intervening cause is described as any event (and not a state or an omission) that is causally significant in the production of some harm, that temporally intervenes between defendant's act and that harm, that is causally independent of the defendant's act, and that is either a free, informed, deliberate human action or that abnormal conjunction of natural events we call a coincidence.Less
This chapter lays out the doctrinal intricacies of the test. These mostly concern the crucial idea of an intervening cause. An intervening cause is described as any event (and not a state or an omission) that is causally significant in the production of some harm, that temporally intervenes between defendant's act and that harm, that is causally independent of the defendant's act, and that is either a free, informed, deliberate human action or that abnormal conjunction of natural events we call a coincidence.
Paul Helm
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- January 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199590391
- eISBN:
- 9780191595516
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199590391.003.0007
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Religion, Metaphysics/Epistemology
The alternative hypothesis, that God is in time, is explored. Does it fare any better over problems of indexicality and divine foreknowledge? Is such a God's lack of foreknowledge of free actions ...
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The alternative hypothesis, that God is in time, is explored. Does it fare any better over problems of indexicality and divine foreknowledge? Is such a God's lack of foreknowledge of free actions simply an act of self-denial on his part? Swinburne's claims, in which a central place is given to human indeterministic freedom, are discussed. Maintaining such freedom strongly motivates the idea of God's being in time. A.N. Prior and Peter Geach argue that the future is logically indeterminate, and so now unknowable even to God. But it is hard to see how Geach, consistent with his views about the future, can nevertheless argue that God has complete control of the future, and so can be faithful to his promises.Less
The alternative hypothesis, that God is in time, is explored. Does it fare any better over problems of indexicality and divine foreknowledge? Is such a God's lack of foreknowledge of free actions simply an act of self-denial on his part? Swinburne's claims, in which a central place is given to human indeterministic freedom, are discussed. Maintaining such freedom strongly motivates the idea of God's being in time. A.N. Prior and Peter Geach argue that the future is logically indeterminate, and so now unknowable even to God. But it is hard to see how Geach, consistent with his views about the future, can nevertheless argue that God has complete control of the future, and so can be faithful to his promises.
Gary Watson
- Published in print:
- 2004
- Published Online:
- September 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199272273
- eISBN:
- 9780191709968
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199272273.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
This chapter considers two sorts of scepticism about the possibility of knowingly acting against one's practical judgment, or weakness of will. The Socratic view that weak behaviour is impossible ...
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This chapter considers two sorts of scepticism about the possibility of knowingly acting against one's practical judgment, or weakness of will. The Socratic view that weak behaviour is impossible overlooks the truth that human beings are subject to different sources of motivation: evaluative judgments and mere desires. A second kind of scepticism targets the common view that the difference between weakness and compulsion is that weak agents give into desires which they could resist. The chapter proposes a different understanding of the phenomena, according to which weakness exhibits a culpable failure of self-control. Culpability here does not presume that the agent was at the time able to resist, but only that she is open to criticism for her lack of self-control. This account allows for a distinction between weak and compulsive behaviour that is consistent both with scepticism about resistibility, and with important judgments of responsibility.Less
This chapter considers two sorts of scepticism about the possibility of knowingly acting against one's practical judgment, or weakness of will. The Socratic view that weak behaviour is impossible overlooks the truth that human beings are subject to different sources of motivation: evaluative judgments and mere desires. A second kind of scepticism targets the common view that the difference between weakness and compulsion is that weak agents give into desires which they could resist. The chapter proposes a different understanding of the phenomena, according to which weakness exhibits a culpable failure of self-control. Culpability here does not presume that the agent was at the time able to resist, but only that she is open to criticism for her lack of self-control. This account allows for a distinction between weak and compulsive behaviour that is consistent both with scepticism about resistibility, and with important judgments of responsibility.
Dan Margalit
- Published in print:
- 2017
- Published Online:
- May 2018
- ISBN:
- 9780691158662
- eISBN:
- 9781400885398
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Princeton University Press
- DOI:
- 10.23943/princeton/9780691158662.003.0003
- Subject:
- Mathematics, Geometry / Topology
This chapter considers groups acting on trees. It examines which groups act on which spaces and, if a group does act on a space, what it says about the group. These spaces are called trees—that is, ...
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This chapter considers groups acting on trees. It examines which groups act on which spaces and, if a group does act on a space, what it says about the group. These spaces are called trees—that is, connected graphs without cycles. A group action on a tree is free if no nontrivial element of the group preserves any vertex or any edge of the tree. The chapter first presents the theorem stating that: If a group G acts freely on a tree, then G is a free group. The condition that G is free is equivalent to the condition that G acts freely on a tree. The discussion then turns to the Farey tree and shows how to construct the Farey complex using the Farey graph. The chapter concludes by describing free and non-free actions on trees. Exercises and research projects are included.Less
This chapter considers groups acting on trees. It examines which groups act on which spaces and, if a group does act on a space, what it says about the group. These spaces are called trees—that is, connected graphs without cycles. A group action on a tree is free if no nontrivial element of the group preserves any vertex or any edge of the tree. The chapter first presents the theorem stating that: If a group G acts freely on a tree, then G is a free group. The condition that G is free is equivalent to the condition that G acts freely on a tree. The discussion then turns to the Farey tree and shows how to construct the Farey complex using the Farey graph. The chapter concludes by describing free and non-free actions on trees. Exercises and research projects are included.