Willem A. deVries (ed.)
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- February 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199573301
- eISBN:
- 9780191722172
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199573301.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Metaphysics/Epistemology
These chapters in this book were written to celebrate the 50th anniversary of Wilfrid Sellars's essay ‘Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind’, a landmark of 20th-century philosophy. Ranging widely ...
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These chapters in this book were written to celebrate the 50th anniversary of Wilfrid Sellars's essay ‘Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind’, a landmark of 20th-century philosophy. Ranging widely through Sellars's oeuvre, the chapters are both appreciative and critical of Sellars's accomplishment. Their topics include the standing of empiricism in Sellars's philosophy, Sellars's theory of perception, his dissatisfaction with both foundationalist and coherentist epistemologies, his critique of idealism and commitment to realism, his conception of picturing, and the status of the normative (both the ‘logical space of reasons’ and the ‘manifest image’) in a broadly naturalistic form of scientific realism. These chapters show how vibrant Sellarsian philosophy remains in the 21st century.Less
These chapters in this book were written to celebrate the 50th anniversary of Wilfrid Sellars's essay ‘Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind’, a landmark of 20th-century philosophy. Ranging widely through Sellars's oeuvre, the chapters are both appreciative and critical of Sellars's accomplishment. Their topics include the standing of empiricism in Sellars's philosophy, Sellars's theory of perception, his dissatisfaction with both foundationalist and coherentist epistemologies, his critique of idealism and commitment to realism, his conception of picturing, and the status of the normative (both the ‘logical space of reasons’ and the ‘manifest image’) in a broadly naturalistic form of scientific realism. These chapters show how vibrant Sellarsian philosophy remains in the 21st century.
A. N. Williams
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- September 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199236367
- eISBN:
- 9780191728556
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199236367.001.0001
- Subject:
- Religion, Theology
This work proposes a new reading of Christian theology. Examining theological warrants, philosophical debates over the structures of arguments, and the role of beauty in intellectual structures, it ...
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This work proposes a new reading of Christian theology. Examining theological warrants, philosophical debates over the structures of arguments, and the role of beauty in intellectual structures, it suggests theology is inherently systematic, its systematicity reflecting its two subjects, ‘God and other things as they are related to God’ (Aquinas). The roles of the warrants (scripture, tradition, and reason) are re‐evaluated, showing their necessary interdependence. Debates in philosophical epistemology are also examined; these have conventionally contrasted foundationalism and coherentism. A contemporary consensus has emerged, however, of a chastened foundationalism or hybrid foundationalism‐coherentism, in light of which, arguments are understood both as reasoning from foundational propositions and as gaining plausibility from the coherence of claims. Theological arguments also exhibit a dual structure, with propositions underwritten by their dependence on both scripture and tradition and by their coherence in integrated webs, or systems. Theology is therefore shown to be systematic in its fundamental structure. The systematicity of theology is a function of its subject matter, ‘God and other things as they are related to God’. Both the two chief subjects of theology (God and humanity) and theology itself are characterized by rationality and relationality. Theology is therefore doubly mimetic, reflecting its subject matter in its structures of reasoning. The order and harmony of those structures however have an aesthetic appeal and potentially attract because of their beauty, rather than their truth. Theological aesthetics is surveyed, asking whether the beauty of systematic structures counts for or against their truth.Less
This work proposes a new reading of Christian theology. Examining theological warrants, philosophical debates over the structures of arguments, and the role of beauty in intellectual structures, it suggests theology is inherently systematic, its systematicity reflecting its two subjects, ‘God and other things as they are related to God’ (Aquinas). The roles of the warrants (scripture, tradition, and reason) are re‐evaluated, showing their necessary interdependence. Debates in philosophical epistemology are also examined; these have conventionally contrasted foundationalism and coherentism. A contemporary consensus has emerged, however, of a chastened foundationalism or hybrid foundationalism‐coherentism, in light of which, arguments are understood both as reasoning from foundational propositions and as gaining plausibility from the coherence of claims. Theological arguments also exhibit a dual structure, with propositions underwritten by their dependence on both scripture and tradition and by their coherence in integrated webs, or systems. Theology is therefore shown to be systematic in its fundamental structure. The systematicity of theology is a function of its subject matter, ‘God and other things as they are related to God’. Both the two chief subjects of theology (God and humanity) and theology itself are characterized by rationality and relationality. Theology is therefore doubly mimetic, reflecting its subject matter in its structures of reasoning. The order and harmony of those structures however have an aesthetic appeal and potentially attract because of their beauty, rather than their truth. Theological aesthetics is surveyed, asking whether the beauty of systematic structures counts for or against their truth.
Andrew Vincent
- Published in print:
- 2004
- Published Online:
- April 2004
- ISBN:
- 9780199271252
- eISBN:
- 9780191601101
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199271259.001.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory
This is a controversial book that challenges established views of contemporary political theory. It offers a synoptic, critical, and comparative analysis of the widely different accounts of how the ...
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This is a controversial book that challenges established views of contemporary political theory. It offers a synoptic, critical, and comparative analysis of the widely different accounts of how the discipline developed during the twentieth century. Its ‘nature’ is seen as intrinsically pluralistic and internally divided. The discussion utilizes the idea of foundationalism to bring coherence to the complex practices associated with theory during the twentieth century. Overall, the book aims to dispute current monistic trends in the way the discipline is understood. It will be an immensely useful resource for students of politics, as well as in providing critical perspectives on the future of the subject.Less
This is a controversial book that challenges established views of contemporary political theory. It offers a synoptic, critical, and comparative analysis of the widely different accounts of how the discipline developed during the twentieth century. Its ‘nature’ is seen as intrinsically pluralistic and internally divided. The discussion utilizes the idea of foundationalism to bring coherence to the complex practices associated with theory during the twentieth century. Overall, the book aims to dispute current monistic trends in the way the discipline is understood. It will be an immensely useful resource for students of politics, as well as in providing critical perspectives on the future of the subject.
Robert C. Stalnaker
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- May 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199545995
- eISBN:
- 9780191719929
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199545995.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Metaphysics/Epistemology
On the traditional Cartesian picture, knowledge of one's own current inner experience is the unproblematic foundation for all knowledge. The philosophical problem is to explain how we move beyond ...
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On the traditional Cartesian picture, knowledge of one's own current inner experience is the unproblematic foundation for all knowledge. The philosophical problem is to explain how we move beyond this knowledge to form a conception of an external world, and to know that the world answers to our conception. This book is in the anti-Cartesian tradition that seeks to reverse the order of explanation, arguing that we can understand our knowledge of our thoughts and feeling only by situating ourselves in a conception of an external world. The argument begins with Frank Jackson's famous example of Mary, who lacks knowledge of what it is like to see color because she has had no visual experience of color. The framework of possible worlds and a new account of self-locating information are used to clarify Mary's situation, and more generally to represent our knowledge of both our inner experience and the external world. The argument criticizes the use by philosophers of the notion of acquaintance to characterize our epistemic relation to the phenomenal character of our experience, and to attempt to provide a foundation for knowledge, and it explores the tension between an anti-individualist conception of the propositional content of thought and the thesis that we have introspective access to that content. The conception of knowledge that emerges is contextualist and anti-foundationalist, but it is argued that this conception is compatible with realism about both the external and the internal worlds.Less
On the traditional Cartesian picture, knowledge of one's own current inner experience is the unproblematic foundation for all knowledge. The philosophical problem is to explain how we move beyond this knowledge to form a conception of an external world, and to know that the world answers to our conception. This book is in the anti-Cartesian tradition that seeks to reverse the order of explanation, arguing that we can understand our knowledge of our thoughts and feeling only by situating ourselves in a conception of an external world. The argument begins with Frank Jackson's famous example of Mary, who lacks knowledge of what it is like to see color because she has had no visual experience of color. The framework of possible worlds and a new account of self-locating information are used to clarify Mary's situation, and more generally to represent our knowledge of both our inner experience and the external world. The argument criticizes the use by philosophers of the notion of acquaintance to characterize our epistemic relation to the phenomenal character of our experience, and to attempt to provide a foundation for knowledge, and it explores the tension between an anti-individualist conception of the propositional content of thought and the thesis that we have introspective access to that content. The conception of knowledge that emerges is contextualist and anti-foundationalist, but it is argued that this conception is compatible with realism about both the external and the internal worlds.
Stewart Shapiro
- Published in print:
- 2000
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198250296
- eISBN:
- 9780191598388
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198250290.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics
A language is second‐order, or higher‐order, if it has bound variables that range over properties or sets of the items in the range of the ordinary, first‐order variables. This book presents a formal ...
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A language is second‐order, or higher‐order, if it has bound variables that range over properties or sets of the items in the range of the ordinary, first‐order variables. This book presents a formal development of second‐ and higher‐order logic and an extended argument that higher‐order systems have an important role to play in the philosophy and foundations of mathematics. The development includes the languages, deductive systems, and model‐theoretic semantics for higher‐order languages, and the basic and advanced results in its meta‐theory: completeness, compactness, and the Löwenheim–Skolem theorems for Henkin semantics, and the failure of those results for standard semantics. Argues that second‐order theories and formalizations, with standard semantics, provide better models of important aspects of mathematics than their first‐order counterparts. Despite the fact that Quine is the main opponent of second‐order logic (arguing that second‐order logic is set‐theory in disguise), the present argument is broadly Quinean, proposing that there is no sharp line dividing mathematics from logic, especially the logic of mathematics. Also surveys the historical development in logic, tracing the emergence of first‐order logic as the de facto standard among logicians and philosophers. The connection between formal deduction and reasoning is related to Wittgensteinian issues concerning rule‐following. The book closes with an examination of several alternatives to second‐order logic: first‐order set theory, infinitary languages, and systems that are, in a sense, intermediate between first order and second order.Less
A language is second‐order, or higher‐order, if it has bound variables that range over properties or sets of the items in the range of the ordinary, first‐order variables. This book presents a formal development of second‐ and higher‐order logic and an extended argument that higher‐order systems have an important role to play in the philosophy and foundations of mathematics. The development includes the languages, deductive systems, and model‐theoretic semantics for higher‐order languages, and the basic and advanced results in its meta‐theory: completeness, compactness, and the Löwenheim–Skolem theorems for Henkin semantics, and the failure of those results for standard semantics. Argues that second‐order theories and formalizations, with standard semantics, provide better models of important aspects of mathematics than their first‐order counterparts. Despite the fact that Quine is the main opponent of second‐order logic (arguing that second‐order logic is set‐theory in disguise), the present argument is broadly Quinean, proposing that there is no sharp line dividing mathematics from logic, especially the logic of mathematics. Also surveys the historical development in logic, tracing the emergence of first‐order logic as the de facto standard among logicians and philosophers. The connection between formal deduction and reasoning is related to Wittgensteinian issues concerning rule‐following. The book closes with an examination of several alternatives to second‐order logic: first‐order set theory, infinitary languages, and systems that are, in a sense, intermediate between first order and second order.
Alvin Plantinga
- Published in print:
- 1993
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195078626
- eISBN:
- 9780199833559
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195078624.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
In this book and in its sequels, Warrant and Proper Function and Warranted Christian Belief, I examine the nature of epistemic warrant, that quantity, enough of which distinguishes knowledge from ...
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In this book and in its sequels, Warrant and Proper Function and Warranted Christian Belief, I examine the nature of epistemic warrant, that quantity, enough of which distinguishes knowledge from mere true belief. Contemporary epistemologists seldom focus attention on the nature of warrant; and when they do, they display deplorable diversity: some claim that what turns true belief into knowledge is a matter of epistemic dutifulness, others that it goes by coherence, and still others that it is conferred by reliability. I shall argue that none of these claims is correct, and (in Warrant and Proper Function) suggest a more satisfactory alternative. In the present book, I survey current contributions to the discussion of warrant and neighboring issues. I begin with internalism, looking first at the carefully crafted foundationalist internalism of Roderick Chisholm (Chs. 2 and 3). To better understand Chisholm and other internalists, however, I first make a preliminary excursus (Ch 1) into the classical internalism of Descartes, Locke, and others. After Chisholmian internalism, I turn to coherentism, which for classificatory purposes I take as a form of internalism. In the next three chapters, I consider coherentism taken generally (Ch. 4), the specific version of coherentism developed by Laurence BonJour (Ch. 5), and contemporary Bayesian versions of coherentism (Chs. 6 and 7). Next (Ch. 8), there is the more attenuated internalism of John Pollock, which I see as a transition from internalism to externalism. Finally, I examine the reliabilist and externalist views of William Alston, Fred Dretske, and Alvin Goldman (Ch. 9), and close with a preview of Warrant and Proper Function (Ch. 10).Less
In this book and in its sequels, Warrant and Proper Function and Warranted Christian Belief, I examine the nature of epistemic warrant, that quantity, enough of which distinguishes knowledge from mere true belief. Contemporary epistemologists seldom focus attention on the nature of warrant; and when they do, they display deplorable diversity: some claim that what turns true belief into knowledge is a matter of epistemic dutifulness, others that it goes by coherence, and still others that it is conferred by reliability. I shall argue that none of these claims is correct, and (in Warrant and Proper Function) suggest a more satisfactory alternative. In the present book, I survey current contributions to the discussion of warrant and neighboring issues. I begin with internalism, looking first at the carefully crafted foundationalist internalism of Roderick Chisholm (Chs. 2 and 3). To better understand Chisholm and other internalists, however, I first make a preliminary excursus (Ch 1) into the classical internalism of Descartes, Locke, and others. After Chisholmian internalism, I turn to coherentism, which for classificatory purposes I take as a form of internalism. In the next three chapters, I consider coherentism taken generally (Ch. 4), the specific version of coherentism developed by Laurence BonJour (Ch. 5), and contemporary Bayesian versions of coherentism (Chs. 6 and 7). Next (Ch. 8), there is the more attenuated internalism of John Pollock, which I see as a transition from internalism to externalism. Finally, I examine the reliabilist and externalist views of William Alston, Fred Dretske, and Alvin Goldman (Ch. 9), and close with a preview of Warrant and Proper Function (Ch. 10).
Alvin Plantinga
- Published in print:
- 1993
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195078640
- eISBN:
- 9780199872213
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195078640.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
In this book and in its companion volumes, Warrant: The Current Debate and Warranted Christian Belief, I examine the nature of epistemic warrant, that quantity enough of which distinguishes knowledge ...
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In this book and in its companion volumes, Warrant: The Current Debate and Warranted Christian Belief, I examine the nature of epistemic warrant, that quantity enough of which distinguishes knowledge from mere true belief. In Warrant: The Current Debate, the first volume in this series, I considered some of the main contemporary views of warrant. In this book, the second in the series, I present my own account of warrant, arguing that the best way to construe warrant is in terms of proper function. In my view, a belief has warrant for a person if it is produced by her cognitive faculties functioning properly in a congenial epistemic environment according to a design plan successfully aimed at the production of true or verisimilitudinous belief. In the first two chapters of this volume, I fill out, develop, qualify, and defend this view, exploring along the way some of the convoluted contours of the notion of proper function. In the next seven chapters, I consider how the proposed account works in the main areas of our cognitive design plan: memory, introspection, knowledge of other minds, testimony, perception, a priori belief, induction, and probability. Then, in Ch. 10, I consider broader, structural questions of coherentism and foundationalism. My account of warrant meets the conditions for being a naturalistic account; but in Chs. 11 and 12, I claim that naturalism in epistemology flourishes best in the context of supernaturalism in metaphysics. For, as I argue in Ch. 11, there appears to be no successful naturalistic account of the notion of proper function. In Ch. 12, I argue, further, that metaphysical naturalism when combined with contemporary evolutionary accounts of the origin and provenance of human life is an irrational stance; it provides for itself an ultimately undefeated defeater.Less
In this book and in its companion volumes, Warrant: The Current Debate and Warranted Christian Belief, I examine the nature of epistemic warrant, that quantity enough of which distinguishes knowledge from mere true belief. In Warrant: The Current Debate, the first volume in this series, I considered some of the main contemporary views of warrant. In this book, the second in the series, I present my own account of warrant, arguing that the best way to construe warrant is in terms of proper function. In my view, a belief has warrant for a person if it is produced by her cognitive faculties functioning properly in a congenial epistemic environment according to a design plan successfully aimed at the production of true or verisimilitudinous belief. In the first two chapters of this volume, I fill out, develop, qualify, and defend this view, exploring along the way some of the convoluted contours of the notion of proper function. In the next seven chapters, I consider how the proposed account works in the main areas of our cognitive design plan: memory, introspection, knowledge of other minds, testimony, perception, a priori belief, induction, and probability. Then, in Ch. 10, I consider broader, structural questions of coherentism and foundationalism. My account of warrant meets the conditions for being a naturalistic account; but in Chs. 11 and 12, I claim that naturalism in epistemology flourishes best in the context of supernaturalism in metaphysics. For, as I argue in Ch. 11, there appears to be no successful naturalistic account of the notion of proper function. In Ch. 12, I argue, further, that metaphysical naturalism when combined with contemporary evolutionary accounts of the origin and provenance of human life is an irrational stance; it provides for itself an ultimately undefeated defeater.
Robert J. Fogelin
- Published in print:
- 1994
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195089875
- eISBN:
- 9780199833238
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195089871.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This work addresses the following question: What would be the consequence of allowing a representative of ancient Pyrrhonian scepticism to become a party to contemporary debates in theory of ...
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This work addresses the following question: What would be the consequence of allowing a representative of ancient Pyrrhonian scepticism to become a party to contemporary debates in theory of knowledge? The conclusion of this work is that most of our contemporary epistemologists would fare badly in this encounter.Part 1 concerns the analysis of knowledge claims. It defends the almost universally rejected view that knowledge is simply justified true belief. This analysis is generally thought to be untenable because it yields skepticism or Gettier problems (or both). In response, it is argued that everyday knowledge claims are protected from both difficulties by placing limits on the level of scrutiny, that is, limits are placed on the range of possible defeators that are taken seriously. Conversely, when these constraints are set aside, as epistemologists often do, skepticism and Gettier problems understandably arise. Three chapters are dedicated to examining and criticizing alternative analyses of knowledge claims: various fourth‐clause analyses, externalist analyses, and subjunctive (possible‐world) analyses.Part 2 concerns theories of justification. It presents a confrontation between Agrippa's Five Modes Leading to the Suspension of Belief (as found in Sextus Empiricus's Outlines of Pyrrhonism) and three contemporary theories of justification: Chisholm's foundationalist theory, BonJour's internal coherentism, and Davidson's external coherentism. The conclusion of this examination is that none of these accounts of justification makes serious headway in responding to Agrippa's Five Modes.Less
This work addresses the following question: What would be the consequence of allowing a representative of ancient Pyrrhonian scepticism to become a party to contemporary debates in theory of knowledge? The conclusion of this work is that most of our contemporary epistemologists would fare badly in this encounter.
Part 1 concerns the analysis of knowledge claims. It defends the almost universally rejected view that knowledge is simply justified true belief. This analysis is generally thought to be untenable because it yields skepticism or Gettier problems (or both). In response, it is argued that everyday knowledge claims are protected from both difficulties by placing limits on the level of scrutiny, that is, limits are placed on the range of possible defeators that are taken seriously. Conversely, when these constraints are set aside, as epistemologists often do, skepticism and Gettier problems understandably arise. Three chapters are dedicated to examining and criticizing alternative analyses of knowledge claims: various fourth‐clause analyses, externalist analyses, and subjunctive (possible‐world) analyses.
Part 2 concerns theories of justification. It presents a confrontation between Agrippa's Five Modes Leading to the Suspension of Belief (as found in Sextus Empiricus's Outlines of Pyrrhonism) and three contemporary theories of justification: Chisholm's foundationalist theory, BonJour's internal coherentism, and Davidson's external coherentism. The conclusion of this examination is that none of these accounts of justification makes serious headway in responding to Agrippa's Five Modes.
Bobby Sayyid and Lilian Zac
- Published in print:
- 1998
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198292371
- eISBN:
- 9780191600159
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198292376.003.0011
- Subject:
- Political Science, Reference
Introducing central conceptual themes employed in discourse analysis, another challenge to the positivist assumptions underlying conventional social science. The concepts covered are ...
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Introducing central conceptual themes employed in discourse analysis, another challenge to the positivist assumptions underlying conventional social science. The concepts covered are anti‐foundationalism; anti‐essentialism; identity and difference; post‐structuralism; hegemony; subjects and identities. How these concepts are used in discourse theoretical approaches to analysing socio‐political phenomena is outlined.Less
Introducing central conceptual themes employed in discourse analysis, another challenge to the positivist assumptions underlying conventional social science. The concepts covered are anti‐foundationalism; anti‐essentialism; identity and difference; post‐structuralism; hegemony; subjects and identities. How these concepts are used in discourse theoretical approaches to analysing socio‐political phenomena is outlined.
Michael Bergmann
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199275748
- eISBN:
- 9780191603907
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199275742.003.0007
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
One prominent objection to externalism is that it commits its adherents to approving of epistemic circularity. This chapter explains and then responds to this objection by giving two arguments for ...
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One prominent objection to externalism is that it commits its adherents to approving of epistemic circularity. This chapter explains and then responds to this objection by giving two arguments for the conclusion that we should sometimes approve of epistemic circularity, that being committed to approving of it is not, in itself, a defect of externalism. It then explains why approving of epistemic circularity misleadingly seems like a defect, and how epistemic circularity is likely to occur in an acceptable manner.Less
One prominent objection to externalism is that it commits its adherents to approving of epistemic circularity. This chapter explains and then responds to this objection by giving two arguments for the conclusion that we should sometimes approve of epistemic circularity, that being committed to approving of it is not, in itself, a defect of externalism. It then explains why approving of epistemic circularity misleadingly seems like a defect, and how epistemic circularity is likely to occur in an acceptable manner.
Randal Rauser
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- February 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199214600
- eISBN:
- 9780191706509
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199214600.001.0001
- Subject:
- Religion, Theology
The justification of theology within the public square remains a matter of pressing concern. After the dissolution of Christendom, a number of Christian philosophers sought to justify theology ...
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The justification of theology within the public square remains a matter of pressing concern. After the dissolution of Christendom, a number of Christian philosophers sought to justify theology relative to a foundation of reason (René Descartes, John Locke) or primal experience (Immanuel Kant). While theologians widely accepted these preconditions and so sought to defend theology by appealing to proof and evidence or religious experience, these efforts more often distorted theology. In order to navigate this debate over theological justification one must understand central epistemological concepts, including faith and reason, justification and knowledge, and foundationalist and coherentist theories of noetic structure. Philosophically, the theory of classical foundationalism that has dominated in modernity has crucial, if not quite fatal, weaknesses. Recently many philosophers, like Richard Rorty and Hilary Putnam, have embraced a non‐foundationalist epistemology. While philosophical non‐foundationalism has been appropriated by theologians like Stanley Grenz and Nancey Murphy as a way to ensure theological justification and autonomy, the anti‐realist non‐foundationalist themes are deeply problematic and impact adversely on Grenz's and Murphy's proposals. Bruce Marshall offers another way to appropriate non‐foundationalism that avoids anti‐realism while explaining justification and truth within a Trinitarian framework. Unfortunately, Marshall's theory also faces significant philosophical and theological objections. The failure of non‐foundationalism warrants a return to foundationalism, albeit in the moderate form proposed by Alvin Plantinga. While objections remain, Plantinga's proper‐function foundationalism provides the best account of theological rationality, justification, and knowledge, while grounding theological rigour, prima facie doctrinal conservatism, and the potential for a robust ecumenism.Less
The justification of theology within the public square remains a matter of pressing concern. After the dissolution of Christendom, a number of Christian philosophers sought to justify theology relative to a foundation of reason (René Descartes, John Locke) or primal experience (Immanuel Kant). While theologians widely accepted these preconditions and so sought to defend theology by appealing to proof and evidence or religious experience, these efforts more often distorted theology. In order to navigate this debate over theological justification one must understand central epistemological concepts, including faith and reason, justification and knowledge, and foundationalist and coherentist theories of noetic structure. Philosophically, the theory of classical foundationalism that has dominated in modernity has crucial, if not quite fatal, weaknesses. Recently many philosophers, like Richard Rorty and Hilary Putnam, have embraced a non‐foundationalist epistemology. While philosophical non‐foundationalism has been appropriated by theologians like Stanley Grenz and Nancey Murphy as a way to ensure theological justification and autonomy, the anti‐realist non‐foundationalist themes are deeply problematic and impact adversely on Grenz's and Murphy's proposals. Bruce Marshall offers another way to appropriate non‐foundationalism that avoids anti‐realism while explaining justification and truth within a Trinitarian framework. Unfortunately, Marshall's theory also faces significant philosophical and theological objections. The failure of non‐foundationalism warrants a return to foundationalism, albeit in the moderate form proposed by Alvin Plantinga. While objections remain, Plantinga's proper‐function foundationalism provides the best account of theological rationality, justification, and knowledge, while grounding theological rigour, prima facie doctrinal conservatism, and the potential for a robust ecumenism.
Martin Kusch
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- January 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780199251223
- eISBN:
- 9780191601767
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199251223.003.0008
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
Introduces the key question for the discussion of Ch. 7–11: Why is it that the dichotomy ‘rational versus irrational’ can be applied to empirical beliefs? It uses this question in order to develop a ...
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Introduces the key question for the discussion of Ch. 7–11: Why is it that the dichotomy ‘rational versus irrational’ can be applied to empirical beliefs? It uses this question in order to develop a taxonomy of different positions regarding the sources of rational constraints upon beliefs.Less
Introduces the key question for the discussion of Ch. 7–11: Why is it that the dichotomy ‘rational versus irrational’ can be applied to empirical beliefs? It uses this question in order to develop a taxonomy of different positions regarding the sources of rational constraints upon beliefs.
Michael Williams
- Published in print:
- 2004
- Published Online:
- May 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780195169720
- eISBN:
- 9780199786343
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195169727.003.0007
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This essay argues that the Pyrrhonian regress argument presupposes a Prior Grounding conception of justification. This is contrasted with a Default and Challenge structure, which leads to a ...
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This essay argues that the Pyrrhonian regress argument presupposes a Prior Grounding conception of justification. This is contrasted with a Default and Challenge structure, which leads to a contextualist picture of justification. Contextualism is said to incorporate the best features of its traditionalist rivals — foundationalism and coherentism — and also to avoid skepticism. It is argued that we should not ask which conception is really true, but instead give up epistemological realism.Less
This essay argues that the Pyrrhonian regress argument presupposes a Prior Grounding conception of justification. This is contrasted with a Default and Challenge structure, which leads to a contextualist picture of justification. Contextualism is said to incorporate the best features of its traditionalist rivals — foundationalism and coherentism — and also to avoid skepticism. It is argued that we should not ask which conception is really true, but instead give up epistemological realism.
Ernest Sosa
- Published in print:
- 2004
- Published Online:
- May 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780195169720
- eISBN:
- 9780199786343
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195169727.003.0008
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This essay lays out the rationale for two principles — ascent and closure — and shows how they imply further principles of exclusion and of the criterion. These principles lead to the “Pyrrhonian ...
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This essay lays out the rationale for two principles — ascent and closure — and shows how they imply further principles of exclusion and of the criterion. These principles lead to the “Pyrrhonian Problematic”, which foundationalism and coherentism attempt to solve, and also to the clash of intuitions between internalists and externalists. It is argued that the kind of knowledge that externalists and foundationalists claim differs from the kind of knowledge that internalists and coherentists claim, and which Pyrrhonists doubt. This distinction between kinds of knowledge is traced back to Descartes’s distinction between cognitio and scientia. If this is correct, externalism and internalism might both be correct, and Pyrrhonism might turn out to be compatible with externalism.Less
This essay lays out the rationale for two principles — ascent and closure — and shows how they imply further principles of exclusion and of the criterion. These principles lead to the “Pyrrhonian Problematic”, which foundationalism and coherentism attempt to solve, and also to the clash of intuitions between internalists and externalists. It is argued that the kind of knowledge that externalists and foundationalists claim differs from the kind of knowledge that internalists and coherentists claim, and which Pyrrhonists doubt. This distinction between kinds of knowledge is traced back to Descartes’s distinction between cognitio and scientia. If this is correct, externalism and internalism might both be correct, and Pyrrhonism might turn out to be compatible with externalism.
Mark Bevir and R. A. W. Rhodes
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- May 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199580750
- eISBN:
- 9780191723179
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199580750.003.0003
- Subject:
- Political Science, Comparative Politics, Political Theory
This chapter explores what many observers suggest are the leading present-day forms of interpretive social science: postmodern theories of discourse. First, we challenge the belief these approaches ...
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This chapter explores what many observers suggest are the leading present-day forms of interpretive social science: postmodern theories of discourse. First, we challenge the belief these approaches have a shared paradigm stemming from anti-foundational philosophy. Instead, we suggest that anti-foundationalism is compatible with all kinds of approaches to political science, and these approaches arose out of distinctive socialist or radical traditions, not mainstream political science. Second, we argue that much post-Marxist discourse theory still relies on structuralist and occasionally even determinist forms of explanation associated with modernist-empiricism. There is a clear tension between this lingering structuralism and historicist genealogies. Third, we suggest that discourse introduces several new topics to the theory of the state. These topics include governmentality, collective identities, ideologies, and resistance in governance.Less
This chapter explores what many observers suggest are the leading present-day forms of interpretive social science: postmodern theories of discourse. First, we challenge the belief these approaches have a shared paradigm stemming from anti-foundational philosophy. Instead, we suggest that anti-foundationalism is compatible with all kinds of approaches to political science, and these approaches arose out of distinctive socialist or radical traditions, not mainstream political science. Second, we argue that much post-Marxist discourse theory still relies on structuralist and occasionally even determinist forms of explanation associated with modernist-empiricism. There is a clear tension between this lingering structuralism and historicist genealogies. Third, we suggest that discourse introduces several new topics to the theory of the state. These topics include governmentality, collective identities, ideologies, and resistance in governance.
David K. Henderson and Terence Horgan
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- September 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199608546
- eISBN:
- 9780191729584
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199608546.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This book argues for several dramatic breaks with the epistemological tradition, while also arguing for significant continuity with epistemology as it has come to be practiced. At important ...
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This book argues for several dramatic breaks with the epistemological tradition, while also arguing for significant continuity with epistemology as it has come to be practiced. At important junctures, the book finds a way of “going between” the commonly conceived epistemological alternatives. The result is both a retentive and a revisionary account of various matters: (i) of the character of a priori reflective inquiry, (ii) of conceptual analysis as a form of a priori inquiry and as a cornerstone of philosophical methodology, (iii) of reliabilism, (iv) of epistemological internalism and epistemological externalism, (v) of epistemically relevant, evidence-sensitive, cognitive processes, (vi) of both epistemic foundationalism and coherentism, and (vii) of the role of a priori, a posteriori, and empirical elements within epistemological theorizing itself. “The epistemological spectrum” comprises inquiry ranging from a priori reflection on concepts such as epistemic justification and knowledge to richly empirical work within cognitive science. The conceptual truths regarding justification (for one example) serve to orient a fitting naturalized epistemology, while empirical information is necessarily involved in arriving at determinate specification of what processes are fitting and justificatory of beliefs. The book argues for this “big-tent” understanding of naturalized epistemology. It also illustrates it while arriving at a distinctive form of reliabilism, an importantly expansive view of the range and character of information on which human epistemic agents can and must rely, and a principled way of reconciling what are commonly thought to be incompatible positions such as foundationalism and coherentism.Less
This book argues for several dramatic breaks with the epistemological tradition, while also arguing for significant continuity with epistemology as it has come to be practiced. At important junctures, the book finds a way of “going between” the commonly conceived epistemological alternatives. The result is both a retentive and a revisionary account of various matters: (i) of the character of a priori reflective inquiry, (ii) of conceptual analysis as a form of a priori inquiry and as a cornerstone of philosophical methodology, (iii) of reliabilism, (iv) of epistemological internalism and epistemological externalism, (v) of epistemically relevant, evidence-sensitive, cognitive processes, (vi) of both epistemic foundationalism and coherentism, and (vii) of the role of a priori, a posteriori, and empirical elements within epistemological theorizing itself. “The epistemological spectrum” comprises inquiry ranging from a priori reflection on concepts such as epistemic justification and knowledge to richly empirical work within cognitive science. The conceptual truths regarding justification (for one example) serve to orient a fitting naturalized epistemology, while empirical information is necessarily involved in arriving at determinate specification of what processes are fitting and justificatory of beliefs. The book argues for this “big-tent” understanding of naturalized epistemology. It also illustrates it while arriving at a distinctive form of reliabilism, an importantly expansive view of the range and character of information on which human epistemic agents can and must rely, and a principled way of reconciling what are commonly thought to be incompatible positions such as foundationalism and coherentism.
Laurence BonJour
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780195311952
- eISBN:
- 9780199871070
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195311952.003.0008
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
This chapter addresses the question of whether perceptual beliefs can have a foundational status in epistemology. It argues that, although Audi's defense of the foundational status of perceptual ...
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This chapter addresses the question of whether perceptual beliefs can have a foundational status in epistemology. It argues that, although Audi's defense of the foundational status of perceptual beliefs does not succeed, a similar defense might succeed. It first considers a defense based on considerations of intuitive plausibility. The chapter next considers Audi's more extended defense based on a form of “epistemic realism”. According to this chapter, both defenses fail to provide any explanation of why certain experiences are justificatorily relevant to the existence of certain material objects. BonJour then sketches a “best explanation” account of this justificatory relevance, and attempts to show how, despite serious difficulties, such an account can deliver foundational justification.Less
This chapter addresses the question of whether perceptual beliefs can have a foundational status in epistemology. It argues that, although Audi's defense of the foundational status of perceptual beliefs does not succeed, a similar defense might succeed. It first considers a defense based on considerations of intuitive plausibility. The chapter next considers Audi's more extended defense based on a form of “epistemic realism”. According to this chapter, both defenses fail to provide any explanation of why certain experiences are justificatorily relevant to the existence of certain material objects. BonJour then sketches a “best explanation” account of this justificatory relevance, and attempts to show how, despite serious difficulties, such an account can deliver foundational justification.
Ernest Sosa
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199297023
- eISBN:
- 9780191711411
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199297023.003.0006
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter confronts the Pyrrhonian problematic based on the fearsome circle/regress/foundations trilemma using the animal/reflective epistemology developed in earlier chapters. It is argued that ...
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This chapter confronts the Pyrrhonian problematic based on the fearsome circle/regress/foundations trilemma using the animal/reflective epistemology developed in earlier chapters. It is argued that this is the main key to Cartesian epistemology.Less
This chapter confronts the Pyrrhonian problematic based on the fearsome circle/regress/foundations trilemma using the animal/reflective epistemology developed in earlier chapters. It is argued that this is the main key to Cartesian epistemology.
Michael Moore
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- September 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199599493
- eISBN:
- 9780191594649
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199599493.003.0005
- Subject:
- Law, Philosophy of Law, Criminal Law and Criminology
A fundamental division within the theory of responsibility is between those who think that causation of a harm attempted or culpably risks increases blameworthiness, and those who think it does not. ...
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A fundamental division within the theory of responsibility is between those who think that causation of a harm attempted or culpably risks increases blameworthiness, and those who think it does not. This is the issue commonly called ‘moral luck.’ The chapter first seeks to recast the problem, finding it to be ill-cast as a problem of luck. It then defends the view that causation of a harm matters to overall blameworthiness. It does so after rejecting all extent arguments for this conclusion in the existing literature, arguing not just that they are bad but that they are hopeless. The defense offered in the chapter is first put in foundationalist justificatory mode and then in non-foundationalist justificatory mode.Less
A fundamental division within the theory of responsibility is between those who think that causation of a harm attempted or culpably risks increases blameworthiness, and those who think it does not. This is the issue commonly called ‘moral luck.’ The chapter first seeks to recast the problem, finding it to be ill-cast as a problem of luck. It then defends the view that causation of a harm matters to overall blameworthiness. It does so after rejecting all extent arguments for this conclusion in the existing literature, arguing not just that they are bad but that they are hopeless. The defense offered in the chapter is first put in foundationalist justificatory mode and then in non-foundationalist justificatory mode.
Oliver Marchart
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- September 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780748624973
- eISBN:
- 9780748672066
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Edinburgh University Press
- DOI:
- 10.3366/edinburgh/9780748624973.001.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory
This book, a wide-ranging overview of the emergence of post-foundationalism and a survey of the work of its key contemporary exponents, presents the first systematic coverage of the conceptual ...
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This book, a wide-ranging overview of the emergence of post-foundationalism and a survey of the work of its key contemporary exponents, presents the first systematic coverage of the conceptual difference between ‘politics’ (the practice of conventional politics: the political system or political forms of action) and ‘the political’ (a much more radical aspect which cannot be restricted to the realms of institutional politics). It is also an introductory overview of post-foundationalism and the tradition of ‘left Heideggerianism’: the political thought of contemporary theorists who make frequent use of the idea of political difference: Jean-Luc Nancy, Claude Lefort, Alain Badiou and Ernesto Laclau. After an overview of current trends in social post-foundationalism and a genealogical chapter on the historical emergence of the difference between the concepts of ‘politics’ and ‘the political’, the work of individual theorists is presented and discussed at length. Individual chapters are presented on the political thought of Jean-Luc Nancy (including Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe), Claude Lefort, Alain Badiou, and Ernesto Laclau (including Chantal Mouffe). Overall, the book offers an elaboration of the idea of a post-foundational conception of politics.Less
This book, a wide-ranging overview of the emergence of post-foundationalism and a survey of the work of its key contemporary exponents, presents the first systematic coverage of the conceptual difference between ‘politics’ (the practice of conventional politics: the political system or political forms of action) and ‘the political’ (a much more radical aspect which cannot be restricted to the realms of institutional politics). It is also an introductory overview of post-foundationalism and the tradition of ‘left Heideggerianism’: the political thought of contemporary theorists who make frequent use of the idea of political difference: Jean-Luc Nancy, Claude Lefort, Alain Badiou and Ernesto Laclau. After an overview of current trends in social post-foundationalism and a genealogical chapter on the historical emergence of the difference between the concepts of ‘politics’ and ‘the political’, the work of individual theorists is presented and discussed at length. Individual chapters are presented on the political thought of Jean-Luc Nancy (including Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe), Claude Lefort, Alain Badiou, and Ernesto Laclau (including Chantal Mouffe). Overall, the book offers an elaboration of the idea of a post-foundational conception of politics.
