Search Results

Since the retirement of President Kekkonen in 1981, a process of piecemeal constitutional reform has strengthened the core concept of parliamentary government at the expense of the old quasi‐monarchical elements in the Finnish political system; this modernization process has been propelled by a concern to avoid the possibility of a recurrence of the ‘enlightened despotism’ of the Kekkonen era, and has been aided by the collapse of the Soviet Union. Recent constitutional changes have also enhanced the involvement of the prime minister and government in the performance of the federative (foreign policy) function; above all, the institutional adaptation required by membership of the EU has emphasized the bicephalous character of the Finnish political executive in a way reminiscent of interwar practice. Political factors, notably the ability of the party system to deliver stable majority coalitions, have worked in the same direction, and indeed arguments have been made in favour of the abolition of the whole institution of the presidency. With parliament having recently accepted the main findings of the Nikula Committee's report and restricted the president's involvement in the process of coalition‐building, as well as vesting the government with powers jointly to manage foreign policy, it is clear that Finland is en route to becoming an orthodox parliamentary democracy: the head of state has lost his exclusive charge of the federative function; his involvement in the legislative process is limited and exceptional; and even his executive powers—particularly his powers of appointment—have been restricted in recent years. The different sections of the chapter are: Constitution‐Making 1917–1919: A Monarchical Republic?; The Shift to a President‐Dominant System, 1940–1987; From President‐Dominant to Pluralist Foreign Policy‐Making, 1987–1998; and Towards a Ceremonial Presidency?

This chapter discusses British policy toward Russia in the period from 1894 to 1917 and describes the group of men, who constituted the foreign-policy-making elite. Foreign policy making was centred in the Cabinet and determined almost exclusively by the secretary of state of foreign affairs. The civil servants were primarily in the Foreign Office, but occasionally in other departments of state, who provided ministers with advice and information. The British representatives in Russia gathered a wide range of information about Russia and helped to shape perceptions of Russia since they could decide what information was important and how it should be presented. The ‘old Russia hands’ possessed an expertise concerning Russia as a result of various circumstances. They reported on Russia to the other members of the elite, and helped shape the public's views of Russia.

China’s foreign policy must rely on opaque and behind-the-scenes coordination organs to work through a large number of bureaucratic agencies of the state, party, and military, whose primary roles are information gathering and the implementation and recommendation of policy. In addition, some new players, such as think tanks, media, local governments, and transnational corporations, have played a variety of roles to influence China’s foreign policy. This chapter examines the evolving role of the paramount leader, the foreign policy coordination and elaboration organs, the bureaucracies, and the new players in the making and transformation of China’s foreign policy. Providing a historical overview, it also observes how President Xi Jinping has centralized and personalized foreign policy making power in the name of strengthening a unified party leadership.

Triumphalists believe that President Ronald Reagan “won” the Cold War by introducing a military buildup and threatening the Soviet Union. His hawkish policies compelled Moscow to agree to arms reductions, democratic reforms, and a withdrawal from its war in Afghanistan. Ultimately, the president forced the Soviet Union to collapse. Triumphalists assert that contemporary leaders should follow Reagan’s lead: they should seek to end conflicts by compelling adversaries into submission. Despite its popularity, triumphalism is a series of myths about President Reagan’s intentions, his policies, and the impact his administration had on the USSR. Drawing upon sources from both the United States and the Soviet Union, each chapter of this book debunks a different falsehood. Chapters 1–3 clarify Reagan’s views and objectives, while Chapters 4 and 5 explain Soviet decision making. Chapter 6 considers larger debates about the effectiveness of compellence and diplomacy in ending the Cold War.

This chapter focuses on Project Camelot, a research project organized by the Special Operations Research Office (SORO) to determine the fundamental causes of communist revolution and prescribe solutions to them. Promising a breakthrough in “peace research,” this multiyear, multimillion-dollar project was described as “an attempt to find nonmilitary and nonviolent solutions to international problems.” Indeed, social scientists hoped that social science would bring reason and rationality into American relationships with the third world. However, scholars and government officials in Chile learned that the research was sponsored not by a university or a research foundation, but by the Defense Department. A study that Americans deemed peace research appeared to Latin Americans as a prelude to American military invasion. The allegation spread around the globe, and as a result, civilian government officials responded with outrage, charging that Camelot proved their worst fears: the Pentagon was attempting to seize control of foreign policy making from the State Department.

The conclusion summarizes the findings of the books and then explores further avenues of research. This chapter explains how one needs to look at India’s Israel policy more like a segmented foreign policy-making process with different actors, levels of analysis, and niched interests. At the political-state level, there has always been an impression of policy continuity, because the Indian government followed its historical and principled pro-Palestine policy to satisfy historically-held ideological principles, domestic constituencies and its Arab and Muslim allies in the region. The new Israel policy compromise is now defined by an emerging ‘coalition’ of technical-military experts who appreciate the Israeli military industry’s unique expertise and assistance, and of domestic political and economic actors who benefit from specialised joint ventures (in irrigation technology for example) with Israeli private actors.