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Two Governments, One State: Recognition Contests and the Use of Force

Brad R. Roth

in Governmental Illegitimacy in International Law

This chapter examines the relationship between U.N. delegation credentials and legal recognition, summarizing the substance of the major collective recognition controversies that have occurred in the ... More

This chapter examines the relationship between U.N. delegation credentials and legal recognition, summarizing the substance of the major collective recognition controversies that have occurred in the course of the U.N. era. It also discusses controversies over delegation credentials and over ‘invitations’ of foreign military armed resistance. It also describes cases in Nicaragua, Grenada, and Panama, where the debate focused on the internal character of the incumbent regime, thereby bringing the competing considerations involved in establishing criteria for legal recognition.Less

Rising Tensions and Renewed Reform, 1860–1866

D. Colin Jaundrill

in Samurai to Soldier: Remaking Military Service in Nineteenth-Century Japan

This chapter shows the military reforms of the late 1850s, which were intended as a response to the perceived threat of foreign military incursions in the wake of the Perry expedition. Unlike the ... More

This chapter shows the military reforms of the late 1850s, which were intended as a response to the perceived threat of foreign military incursions in the wake of the Perry expedition. Unlike the initiatives of the previous decade, the military reform programs of the early 1860s constituted pragmatic responses to the various military challenges posed by both foreign powers and internal rivals. The internal politics of the warrior status group undercut otherwise ambitious attempts to incorporate new technology and revamp existing military organizations. Despite lackluster results, these reforms continued through the early months of the 1860s without any impetus for further reaching reforms.Less

The United States and South Korea’s Nuclear Weapons Program, 1970–1981

Jeffrey W. Taliaferro

in Defending Frenemies: Alliances, Politics, and Nuclear Nonproliferation in US Foreign Policy

Chapter 5 examines the proliferation dispute between the United States and the Republic of Korea (ROK). The Nixon administration’s efforts to extricate the United States from the Vietnam War, draw ... More

Chapter 5 examines the proliferation dispute between the United States and the Republic of Korea (ROK). The Nixon administration’s efforts to extricate the United States from the Vietnam War, draw down US troops in East and Southeast Asia, and seek a rapprochement with China precipitated this dispute. ROK president Park Chung-hee authorized a secret nuclear weapons program in 1972. The Ford administration used a mix of threats to suspend bilateral nuclear cooperation and promises to stabilize US troop levels to get Park to cancel the purchase of a French reprocessing plant in 1975 and 1976. The dispute erupted anew in 1977, when Carter proposed withdrawing all US troops and tactical nuclear weapons. The crisis was finally resolved in 1981, when the Reagan administration pledged to maintain troop levels in exchange for ROK president Chun Doo-hwan’s redirecting nuclear energy research to civilian purposes.Less

From Guantánamo to K2

Sebastian Schmidt

in Armed Guests: Territorial Sovereignty and Foreign Military Basing

This chapter lays out the empirical puzzle and theoretical explanation with which the book is concerned. Prior to the Second World War, foreign military presences could be understood only in terms of ... More

This chapter lays out the empirical puzzle and theoretical explanation with which the book is concerned. Prior to the Second World War, foreign military presences could be understood only in terms of the subjugation of the host state. However, in contemporary security politics, states may enter contractual arrangements governing such presences and end them as desired. This development is rooted in a change in relations between military presence and territorial authority occasioned by the exigencies of the war and the early Cold War. Mainstream theories of international relations cannot adequately account for this development. Turning to practices and a pragmatist understanding of action helps explain the origins of what I call “sovereign basing,” as well as its persistence through recent changes in international politics. The chapter lays the foundation for the study by carefully defining the practice of sovereign basing and setting the bounds of the investigation.Less

‘Shaken’

Rudra Chaudhuri

in Forged in Crisis: India and the United States Since 1947

Recounting India’s humiliating defeat against Chinese forces in the latter quarter of 1962, this chapter argues how even shattered Indian elites sought to safeguard Indian interests whilst at the ... More

Recounting India’s humiliating defeat against Chinese forces in the latter quarter of 1962, this chapter argues how even shattered Indian elites sought to safeguard Indian interests whilst at the same time as requesting desperately needed military equipment from abroad, and principally the US and later the UK and the Commonwealth. Considered a watershed moment in Indian strategic history, this part of the book pushes its readers to consider the less known and less visited story of how Indian elites worked with western envoys like US Ambassador John Kenneth Galbraith and President John F. Kennedy to make sure that India’s advance in international politics was not jeopardised because of the need for foreign military assistance. It adds a sense of balance in re-reading a crisis that no doubt changed India. Yet, and as the chapter also highlights, the idea and practice of change needs to be studied in balance. Change did not mean a break away from non-alignment towards alliances: as practitioners turned scholars – like Indian Ambassador to the US B. K. Nehru – suggest. Rather it introduced a tension between changing realities and vested ideas that was evidenced in India’s dealings with the US in the testier months following the war.Less

The United States and Taiwan’s Nuclear Weapons Program, 1967–1978

Jeffrey W. Taliaferro

in Defending Frenemies: Alliances, Politics, and Nuclear Nonproliferation in US Foreign Policy

Chapter 6 examines the nonproliferation dispute between the United States and the Republic of China (ROC) on Taiwan between 1967 and 1987. Like the South Korean case, the Nixon administration’s ... More

Chapter 6 examines the nonproliferation dispute between the United States and the Republic of China (ROC) on Taiwan between 1967 and 1987. Like the South Korean case, the Nixon administration’s efforts to extricate the United States from the Vietnam War, draw down US troop levels in East and Southeast Asia, and seek a rapprochement with the People’s Republic of China precipitated this dispute. The overriding goal of the Nixon, Ford, and Carter administrations was to enlist China as an ally of convenience against the Soviet Union, but without completely abandoning Taiwan. The Ford and the Carter administrations used a mix of threats to suspend bilateral nuclear cooperation and promises of limited arms transfers to convince ROC premier (and later president) Chiang Ching-kuo to abandon nuclear weapons research in the late 1970s. Reports that Taiwan achieved a “controlled” nuclear reaction in 1987 led the Reagan administration to demand ROC president Lee Teng-hui renounce all nuclear weapons research.Less

The Coordinating and Steering Function of Status of Forces Agreements

Dieter Fleck

in The 'Legal Pluriverse' Surrounding Multinational Military Operations

This chapter examines the role of status of forces agreements (SOFAs) in extraterritorial military missions. Addressing typical problems of the negotiation process, the enactment of SOFAs, and their ... More

This chapter examines the role of status of forces agreements (SOFAs) in extraterritorial military missions. Addressing typical problems of the negotiation process, the enactment of SOFAs, and their implementation as a cooperative effort, the author highlights the difference between declaratory and constitutive elements of SOFA provisions and emphasizes that practical implementation measures should be considered right from the beginning and throughout the negotiation process. Furthermore, he proposes a development of policy guidelines on important aspects of military operations, such as respecting human rights and protecting the natural environment. To support an effective settlement of possible disputes, SOFAs should exclude recourse to third parties or courts and provide for dispute settlement by negotiation at the lowest possible level.Less

The United States and Israel’s Nuclear Weapons Program, 1961–1973

Jeffrey W. Taliaferro

in Defending Frenemies: Alliances, Politics, and Nuclear Nonproliferation in US Foreign Policy

Chapter 3 posits that the overriding objective of the Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon administrations was to avoid containment failure in the Middle East. Thwarting the Israeli nuclear weapons program ... More

Chapter 3 posits that the overriding objective of the Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon administrations was to avoid containment failure in the Middle East. Thwarting the Israeli nuclear weapons program was a secondary objective. As Soviet arms sales to Egypt and Syria accelerated in the mid-1960s, the regional power distribution became unfavorable and the time horizons of threats to US interests grew shorter. The Johnson administration abandoned Kennedy’s demands for inspections of the Dimona reactor and instead sold M-48 tanks, A-4 Skyhawks, and later F-12 Phantoms to bolster Israel’s defenses. Congress, however, made it difficult for the Johnson and the Nixon administrations to link arms transfers to Israeli concessions on the nuclear issue. Chapter 3 examines the evolution of the US-Israeli strategic relationship against the backdrop of the Cold War from Kennedy’s demands for inspections in 1961 through the October 1973 Middle East War.Less

National and State Capitalism

Rafael Torres Sánchez

in Military Entrepreneurs and the Spanish Contractor State in the Eighteenth Century

State–entrepreneur relationships in Spain in the eighteenth century were not set in stone but evolved over successive historical junctures. This chapter tries to explain why national policies loomed ... More

State–entrepreneur relationships in Spain in the eighteenth century were not set in stone but evolved over successive historical junctures. This chapter tries to explain why national policies loomed ever larger in these relations and examines the advent of Spanish entrepreneurs operating on a national scale which, crucially, led to the first ever ousting of foreign military entrepreneurs from the victualling business. The success of Spanish entrepreneurs is not to be explained solely by the government’s will. The entrepreneurs themselves pulled out all the stops to offer the government a financial system that was a solvent and creditworthy alternative to the foreign merchants. Both parties, entrepreneurs and state, were pursuing a mutual objective, resulting in the appearance of a national military supply market, bigger and more cohesive. This proved to be a very positive occurrence for the country’s general development.Less

Beyond Geneva

in Apocalypse Management: Eisenhower and the Discourse of National Insecurity

This chapter describes the post-Geneva moves by President Dwight Eisenhower, whose administration was committed more strongly than ever to changing the balance of power, especially in Europe. ... More

This chapter describes the post-Geneva moves by President Dwight Eisenhower, whose administration was committed more strongly than ever to changing the balance of power, especially in Europe. Eisenhower's post-Geneva moves to encourage the stability and the U.S. position were bound to be destabilizing and weaken the U.S. position. He distinguished that every attempt to keep change in one area opened up risks of change somewhere else, and, in addition, was confident that more foreign military and economic aid was economically wise and important for the cold war campaign. Moreover, Eisenhower depended on military technology and economic aid as his primary tools of apocalypse management.Less