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This chapter analyses how China converts its financial power into influence abroad. It argues that the provision of aid, loans, and foreign direct investment is a key tool China uses to project its power. It further asserts that China’s financial resources have a greater impact in less developed states, which by definition are lacking in capital, and in authoritarian regimes, due to the much smaller number of those whose support must be garnered in order to influence policies. It shows how Chinese finance secures influence over foreign state governments by enhancing the resources available for the foreign leader to disburse to the ruling coalition that keeps the leader in power. A stylized “aid game” illustrates the bargaining that occurs between state leaders over such capital imports. It further examines some of the accepted wisdom concerning Chinese “aid”, including the strings attached to what is often termed “no strings attached” aid, as well as whether China’s financial assistance is accurately termed “aid.” It also shows the myriad of channels through which capital inflows from China can be diverted from the projects they are funding in order to help the recipient state leader maintain power, thereby enhancing China’s influence over that leader.

This chapter focuses on obstructing floor proceedings. It starts with three noteworthy instances in which delay was significant and obstruction was the minority party's clear intent, discussing why these happened and what benefits these yielded the minority, if any. The chapter also describes two particular floor procedures that were used clearly and constantly to delay the US House minority and whether they had any impact on political outcomes. It briefly addresses the politics of minority party obstruction in the House and the reasoning behind such as tactic. It presents a brief review of changes in House obstructive tactics and strategy since the mid-20th century. It reviews three noteworthy cases of procedural delay by the minority party since the late 1960s, namely the Election Debate Bill in October 1968, the Foreign Aid Bill in July 1997 and the Housing and Iraq Spending Bills in May 2008. The data and analysis presented in this chapter reveals that minority parties are eager to depend on their procedural toolbox to delay Congress.

This chapter describes the run-up to the World Conference on Education for All held at Jomtien (1990), the negotiation process and the outcomes of that Conference. It outlines the paradigmatic shifts in the economic thinking on primary education which resulted in primary education becoming ‘cool’ and the World Bank emerging as a champion of primary education. The chapter narrates how India with the World’s largest out-of-school children became a hot destination by agencies eager to fund basic education, and how the bright prospects of large scape external funding arose at the very time India was drifting to an acute macroeconomic crisis. It outlines the role external assistance had hitherto played in Indian economic development in general and to education in particular. It also outlines the parameters developed by the Union Department of education for availing external assistance, and scoffs at the radical criticism in India that the Jomtien Conference was neo-liberal conspiracy.