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Explores the recent enactment of two pieces of legislation: the Domestic Abuse (Scotland) Act 2011 which makes it a criminal offence to breach any interdict that contains a power of arrest, and the Forced Marriage etc (Protection and Jurisdiction) (Scotland) Act 2011, which creates the “forced marriage protection order”, breach of which is a criminal offence. The interplay between these two Acts and the new Children's Hearings (Scotland) Act 2011 is subject to some analysis

The end of the Cold War provoked a wide-ranging debate amongst policy-makers about security challenges now facing the United States. The Army’s intellectual culture however, was remarkably stable. Nonetheless the Army did adapt itself to this ‘new world order’ in two ways. Firstly, reticence towards intervention was elevated almost to the level of formal doctrine within the Army. Secondly the Army began to formulate a new peacekeeping doctrine for the 1990s. The tensions between these two approaches, both derived from different sets of lessons from Vietnam, never really affected the broader institutional identity of the Army, but they did create a paradox: that of an anti-interventionist military that nonetheless acquiesced in peacekeeping interventions. This paradox speaks not only to the particular difficulties the US faced when undertaking peacekeeping or peace enforcement missions, but the way in which the ghosts of Vietnam continued to haunt the Army.

Clarifies the concepts of collateral damage and moral responsibility, as well as terms such as combatant, noncombatant, and civilian as they are used in international law and ethics. Other terms, such as force protection and risk transfer are also key. Sustained attention to the terms is necessary because the fact of repeated incidents of unintended harm or killing of civilians is not simple. Collateral damage is legal and regrettable at the same time. Moral responsibility includes the primary responsibility to reduce the likelihood of collateral damage and the secondary responsibility to act to reduce collateral damage in case those with primary responsibility fail to do so. The underlying moral grammar — the structure of moral reasoning — is partially revealed by attention to the vocabulary.

This chapter discusses the interaction between (the law of) self-defence and the rules of engagement (ROE), and how they play out against the military, and subsequently the political objectives of governments. It analyses the various forms of self-defence, from a national to individual perspective, including unit self-defence and force protection, and examines the legal basis and framework for each type of self-defence. The chapter goes on to analyse how these frameworks interact with, and influence, the ROE for military operations, discussing the concepts and applications of Hostile Act and Hostile Intent as followed by the North America Treaty Organization and the European Union in specific detail.

This chapter addresses force protection and the degree to which necessity permits attacking forces to prioritize the lives of their own soldiers over the lives of enemy civilians. This is a difficult problem of application; although everyone agrees that the lives of enemy civilians must be safeguarded, the question is how much must be risked in order to safeguard them. The chapter discusses the case of the Israeli Defense Forces, in which great emphasis is placed on preventing the abduction of Israeli troops and on facilitating their rescue, even at the cost of other lives. This chapter concludes by articulating a standard of reasonable force protection that is neither too restrictive nor too permissive.

Should the interest of protecting the lives of soldiers be examined as part of the military advantage anticipated from an attack? To what level of risk should parties to an armed conflict expose their soldiers in order to minimize harm to civilians? This dilemma, also known as force protection, has been gaining prominence in legal discourse and military practice as Western societies have become more averse to suffering casualties of members of their own military. The chapter promotes the position that protecting the lives of soldiers should be considered in the proportionality analysis as part of the military advantage. Regarding the weight that should be given to the protection of soldiers’ lives, the chapter differentiates between three types of situations in which different levels of protection should afforded to lives of soldiers: (1) attacks that are preplanned, where the protection of the lives of soldiers should be at the lowest level; (2) situations in which units encounter civilians during an operation, where protection of the lives of soldiers should be at a higher level; and (3) units that find themselves under attack, where the protection of lives of soldiers should be at the highest level.

This chapter investigates cooperation between NATO and the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) during the Bosnian War. It argues that the level of cooperation depended on the organizations’ resource dependence perceptions: In a first phase from July 1992 to July 1995, NATO and the UN adopted a dysfunctional “dual key” procedure for the authorization of air strikes to protect designated safe areas for civilians from attack. The agreement reflected most member states’ assessments that closer coordination of UN ground forces with NATO air power was unnecessary for attaining the modest goal of conflict containment. The July 1995 massacre at Srebrenica dramatically altered this perception. In a second phase from late July to December 1995, both organizations overhauled the dual key mechanism and cooperated closely during NATO’s sustained air campaign against Bosnian Serb forces, which laid the ground for the December 1995 Dayton Peace Accords.

Attacking forces are legally and morally required to take feasible precautions in attack that will avoid harm or minimize harm to civilians, even if taking these precautions will endanger attacking forces or the success of their mission. A precaution is “feasible” if the humanitarian considerations in favor of taking the precaution outweigh the military considerations against taking the precaution. On a “risk‐egalitarian” interpretation, we should place equal weight on the lives and welfare of combatants and civilians and take those precautions that maximize expected value. This chapter argues that the feasibility of a precaution should reflect the moral asymmetry between doing and allowing harm. A precaution should be considered feasible unless taking the precaution would increase the marginal risk to combatants substantially more than foregoing the precaution would increase the marginal risk to civilians. In addition, this chapter rejects arguments that precautionary obligations should be less stringent in humanitarian interventions.

Chapter 4 focuses on the second and latest radical change in the social meaning of soldiers’ individuality, which emerged fully after the Second World War. In that period the glorification of death in war lost its social attractiveness and turned into the aversion to death typical of the present age. While a soldier’s death maintained its social importance, its meaning was gradually reversed from glorification of death in war to aversion. As a result, death lost its sacrificial connotation, and the preservation of soldiers’ lives became an end in itself. These changes in the social bodies of soldiers, far from being merely ritualistic and cosmetic, profoundly affected how western states wage war. For, as the cold war proceeded, western societies became gradually more sensitive to friendly casualties, and their military authorities adopted a set of practices intended to reduce their human losses.

This chapter reviews the literature addressing the challenge of radical asymmetry, with a particular focus on gaps in the research. The most significant of these is the consistent failure of existing sources to engage the principle of reciprocal risk in a theoretically and historically rigorous way. This chapter then outlines the methodological response of this book. It will first determine the extent to which—amidst the change and variance of the history of war—a thread of reciprocal risk has endured as an underpinning assumption in both the warrior ethos and Just War Tradition. Alongside this, the book will undertake a more specified analysis of the asymmetry-challenges of military sniping, manned aerial bombing, and UAV-exclusive violence.