Mark Wilson
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- January 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199269259
- eISBN:
- 9780191710155
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199269259.003.0008
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
This chapter investigates the implications of these conclusions with respect to rule-following and rigor's implementation. It begins with a survey of common philosophical tensions over these topics ...
More
This chapter investigates the implications of these conclusions with respect to rule-following and rigor's implementation. It begins with a survey of common philosophical tensions over these topics and recommends a seasonal sensitivity with respect to the competing demands that syntax and ‘semantic picture’ place upon a usage. The historical travails of Oliver Heaviside's operational calculus provide a vivid illustration of how reasonable standards of rigor must adapt and shift over time.Less
This chapter investigates the implications of these conclusions with respect to rule-following and rigor's implementation. It begins with a survey of common philosophical tensions over these topics and recommends a seasonal sensitivity with respect to the competing demands that syntax and ‘semantic picture’ place upon a usage. The historical travails of Oliver Heaviside's operational calculus provide a vivid illustration of how reasonable standards of rigor must adapt and shift over time.
Paul Horwich
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- September 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199251247
- eISBN:
- 9780191603983
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/019925124X.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
Truth and meaning each have evaluative import. However, contrary to Dummett, Gibbard, Brandom, and many others, these notions are not constitutively normative — they are not themselves evaluative ...
More
Truth and meaning each have evaluative import. However, contrary to Dummett, Gibbard, Brandom, and many others, these notions are not constitutively normative — they are not themselves evaluative concepts. One element of this argument is a discussion of why true belief is desirable. Another element is a demonstration — in case meaning is a matter of implicitly following rules for the use of words — that such rule following can be analyzed in terms that are purely naturalistic (i.e., non-normative and non-semantic).Less
Truth and meaning each have evaluative import. However, contrary to Dummett, Gibbard, Brandom, and many others, these notions are not constitutively normative — they are not themselves evaluative concepts. One element of this argument is a discussion of why true belief is desirable. Another element is a demonstration — in case meaning is a matter of implicitly following rules for the use of words — that such rule following can be analyzed in terms that are purely naturalistic (i.e., non-normative and non-semantic).
Charles Travis
- Published in print:
- 2001
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199245871
- eISBN:
- 9780191598630
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199245878.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
The Uses of Sense presents a reading of Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations, concentrating on themes concerning representation, truth, and objectivity. It offers a particular ...
More
The Uses of Sense presents a reading of Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations, concentrating on themes concerning representation, truth, and objectivity. It offers a particular understanding of the radical break Wittgenstein made with what is still the conventional understanding as to what it is for a representation to be true—an understanding manifest in standard treatments of the relation between meaning and truth. On the new view, for any specifiable way things may be represented as being, there are various possible understandings as to what it is for things to be that way; in representing things as that way, one may so represent them on any of these understandings. So it is only where there is a given occasion for representing things in that way that such a representation may bear the sort of understanding that permits engagement with truth. This view of how representation works allowed Wittgenstein a new and fruitful view of scepticism of various forms—metaphysical as well as epistemological. The book sets out in detail what that new view comes to.Less
The Uses of Sense presents a reading of Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations, concentrating on themes concerning representation, truth, and objectivity. It offers a particular understanding of the radical break Wittgenstein made with what is still the conventional understanding as to what it is for a representation to be true—an understanding manifest in standard treatments of the relation between meaning and truth. On the new view, for any specifiable way things may be represented as being, there are various possible understandings as to what it is for things to be that way; in representing things as that way, one may so represent them on any of these understandings. So it is only where there is a given occasion for representing things in that way that such a representation may bear the sort of understanding that permits engagement with truth. This view of how representation works allowed Wittgenstein a new and fruitful view of scepticism of various forms—metaphysical as well as epistemological. The book sets out in detail what that new view comes to.
Charles Travis
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- January 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199291465
- eISBN:
- 9780191710667
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199291465.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
This chapter focuses on the two rule-following discussions in the Investigations, the first in §§84-7, the second beginning at §138 and continuing to §242. The avowed aim is to achieve greater ...
More
This chapter focuses on the two rule-following discussions in the Investigations, the first in §§84-7, the second beginning at §138 and continuing to §242. The avowed aim is to achieve greater clarity about the nature of meaning, understanding, thinking, and, in the first discussion, saying — about the representing we go in for. Central to this work is the idea that an understanding for words to bear consists in part of singular thoughts: of what is encountered (or to be encountered) in given episodes that things being thus would be their being thus and so.Less
This chapter focuses on the two rule-following discussions in the Investigations, the first in §§84-7, the second beginning at §138 and continuing to §242. The avowed aim is to achieve greater clarity about the nature of meaning, understanding, thinking, and, in the first discussion, saying — about the representing we go in for. Central to this work is the idea that an understanding for words to bear consists in part of singular thoughts: of what is encountered (or to be encountered) in given episodes that things being thus would be their being thus and so.
Emily Sherwin
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- May 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780195367584
- eISBN:
- 9780199776917
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195367584.003.0008
- Subject:
- Psychology, Forensic Psychology
Judges confront rules in two ways, as rule-makers and as rule-followers. When a judge decides a case that is not governed by an existing rule, the judge must formulate a rule of decision and ...
More
Judges confront rules in two ways, as rule-makers and as rule-followers. When a judge decides a case that is not governed by an existing rule, the judge must formulate a rule of decision and calculate the effects of the rule in future cases. Rule-making is a highly deliberative process, in which the judge must select the rule that will best realize relevant values over the range of cases to which it applies. When a judge decides a case that is governed by a precedent rule, the judge is expected to treat the precedent rule as authoritative. To do this, the judge must follow the rule mechanically, without reflecting on the relationship between the outcome of the rule and the values on which the rule is based. These two tasks — rule-making and rule-following — make different, and possibly conflicting, cognitive demands on judges.Less
Judges confront rules in two ways, as rule-makers and as rule-followers. When a judge decides a case that is not governed by an existing rule, the judge must formulate a rule of decision and calculate the effects of the rule in future cases. Rule-making is a highly deliberative process, in which the judge must select the rule that will best realize relevant values over the range of cases to which it applies. When a judge decides a case that is governed by a precedent rule, the judge is expected to treat the precedent rule as authoritative. To do this, the judge must follow the rule mechanically, without reflecting on the relationship between the outcome of the rule and the values on which the rule is based. These two tasks — rule-making and rule-following — make different, and possibly conflicting, cognitive demands on judges.
Joseph Heath
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- January 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780195370294
- eISBN:
- 9780199871230
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195370294.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics
This book attempts to show how rule-following can be understood as an essential element of rational action. The first step involves showing how rational choice theory can be modified to incorporate ...
More
This book attempts to show how rule-following can be understood as an essential element of rational action. The first step involves showing how rational choice theory can be modified to incorporate deontic constraint as a feature of rational deliberation. The second involves disarming the suspicion that there is something mysterious or irrational about the psychological states underlying rule-following. Human rationality is interpreted as a by-product of the so-called “language upgrade” that we receive as a consequence of the development of specific social practices. As a result, certain constitutive features of our social environment — such as the rule-governed structure of social life — migrate inwards, and become constitutive features of our psychological faculties. This in turn explains why there is an indissoluble bond between practical rationality and deontic constraint. In the end, the book offers a naturalistic, evolutionary argument in favor of the traditional Kantian view that there is an internal connection between being a rational agent and feeling the force of one's moral obligations.Less
This book attempts to show how rule-following can be understood as an essential element of rational action. The first step involves showing how rational choice theory can be modified to incorporate deontic constraint as a feature of rational deliberation. The second involves disarming the suspicion that there is something mysterious or irrational about the psychological states underlying rule-following. Human rationality is interpreted as a by-product of the so-called “language upgrade” that we receive as a consequence of the development of specific social practices. As a result, certain constitutive features of our social environment — such as the rule-governed structure of social life — migrate inwards, and become constitutive features of our psychological faculties. This in turn explains why there is an indissoluble bond between practical rationality and deontic constraint. In the end, the book offers a naturalistic, evolutionary argument in favor of the traditional Kantian view that there is an internal connection between being a rational agent and feeling the force of one's moral obligations.
Philip Pettit
- Published in print:
- 1996
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195106459
- eISBN:
- 9780199872251
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195106458.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
A subject will be a thinking subject if and only if, among the things that it can do intentionally, it can do things that are designed to promote the prospect of its meeting various constraints of ...
More
A subject will be a thinking subject if and only if, among the things that it can do intentionally, it can do things that are designed to promote the prospect of its meeting various constraints of rationality – to promote the prospect of its having beliefs that are indeed true, for example, or the prospect of its performing actions that are indeed desirable. This chapter is devoted to building up a picture of what it is like for an intentional system to be, not just intentional, but capable of thought – to be a subject like one of us. I identify two crucial requirements that must be fulfilled by any thinking system and most of the chapter is given to how these are met in the human case. I describe the first requirement as that of intentional ascent, the second as that of rule‐following. The discussion of rule‐following offers an “ethocentric” line on the well‐known Wittgensteinian problems.Less
A subject will be a thinking subject if and only if, among the things that it can do intentionally, it can do things that are designed to promote the prospect of its meeting various constraints of rationality – to promote the prospect of its having beliefs that are indeed true, for example, or the prospect of its performing actions that are indeed desirable. This chapter is devoted to building up a picture of what it is like for an intentional system to be, not just intentional, but capable of thought – to be a subject like one of us. I identify two crucial requirements that must be fulfilled by any thinking system and most of the chapter is given to how these are met in the human case. I describe the first requirement as that of intentional ascent, the second as that of rule‐following. The discussion of rule‐following offers an “ethocentric” line on the well‐known Wittgensteinian problems.
David Pears
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- January 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199247707
- eISBN:
- 9780191714481
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199247707.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
What holds together the things to which a general word applies and distinguishes them from other things? The idea behind Wittgenstein's treatment of linguistic regularity (commonly called ...
More
What holds together the things to which a general word applies and distinguishes them from other things? The idea behind Wittgenstein's treatment of linguistic regularity (commonly called ‘rule-following’) is that the answers given to this question by traditional theories, like classical Realism and Nominalism, are empty because there is no independent way of identifying either the universals or the specific similarities that are invoked. But what, if anything, does philosophy have to say about linguistic regularity? Given the difficulty of saying exactly what Wittgenstein's answer is, different commentators pick different features of his treatment and optimistically treat them as central.Less
What holds together the things to which a general word applies and distinguishes them from other things? The idea behind Wittgenstein's treatment of linguistic regularity (commonly called ‘rule-following’) is that the answers given to this question by traditional theories, like classical Realism and Nominalism, are empty because there is no independent way of identifying either the universals or the specific similarities that are invoked. But what, if anything, does philosophy have to say about linguistic regularity? Given the difficulty of saying exactly what Wittgenstein's answer is, different commentators pick different features of his treatment and optimistically treat them as central.
David Pears
- Published in print:
- 1988
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198244868
- eISBN:
- 9780191598210
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/019824486X.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
This is the second of David Pears's acclaimed two‐volume work on the development of Wittgenstein's philosophy, covering the Philosophical Investigations and other writings from 1929 onwards. Though ...
More
This is the second of David Pears's acclaimed two‐volume work on the development of Wittgenstein's philosophy, covering the Philosophical Investigations and other writings from 1929 onwards. Though more selective in its coverage than the first volume (it deals mainly with Wittgenstein's philosophy of psychology and the ego, the possibility of a private language and rule‐following), the book reveals with great clarity the style, method, and content of Wittgenstein's later thought. While this volume is independently comprehensible, Pears remains largely within the structural framework of the first volume and uncovers thereby the general overall configuration and internal organization of Wittgenstein's thought.Less
This is the second of David Pears's acclaimed two‐volume work on the development of Wittgenstein's philosophy, covering the Philosophical Investigations and other writings from 1929 onwards. Though more selective in its coverage than the first volume (it deals mainly with Wittgenstein's philosophy of psychology and the ego, the possibility of a private language and rule‐following), the book reveals with great clarity the style, method, and content of Wittgenstein's later thought. While this volume is independently comprehensible, Pears remains largely within the structural framework of the first volume and uncovers thereby the general overall configuration and internal organization of Wittgenstein's thought.
P. M. S Hacker
- Published in print:
- 2001
- Published Online:
- April 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780199245697
- eISBN:
- 9780191602245
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/019924569X.003.0010
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
Professor Saul Kripke argued that the ‘real’ private language argument terminates with section 202 of the Investigations and is concerned with the logical and epistemological character of following a ...
More
Professor Saul Kripke argued that the ‘real’ private language argument terminates with section 202 of the Investigations and is concerned with the logical and epistemological character of following a rule. According to his interpretation, Wittgenstein is propounding a sceptical paradox concerning rule following, which he resolves by means of a Humean answer. Careful examination of Wittgenstein’s text and of his preparatory notebooks shows this interpretation to be very far from anything Wittgenstein intended.Less
Professor Saul Kripke argued that the ‘real’ private language argument terminates with section 202 of the Investigations and is concerned with the logical and epistemological character of following a rule. According to his interpretation, Wittgenstein is propounding a sceptical paradox concerning rule following, which he resolves by means of a Humean answer. Careful examination of Wittgenstein’s text and of his preparatory notebooks shows this interpretation to be very far from anything Wittgenstein intended.
Paul A. Boghossian
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- January 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780199278053
- eISBN:
- 9780191745386
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199278053.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language, Metaphysics/Epistemology
In this chapter a new problem about rule-following is outlined, one that is distinct both from Kripke’s and Wright’s versions of the problem. This new problem cannot be correctly responsed to, as ...
More
In this chapter a new problem about rule-following is outlined, one that is distinct both from Kripke’s and Wright’s versions of the problem. This new problem cannot be correctly responsed to, as Kripke’s can, by invoking Wright’s Intentional Account of rule-following. The upshot might be called, following Kant, an antinomy of pure reason: we both must — and cannot — make sense of someone’s following a rule. The chapter explores various ways out of this antinomy without here endorsing any of them.Less
In this chapter a new problem about rule-following is outlined, one that is distinct both from Kripke’s and Wright’s versions of the problem. This new problem cannot be correctly responsed to, as Kripke’s can, by invoking Wright’s Intentional Account of rule-following. The upshot might be called, following Kant, an antinomy of pure reason: we both must — and cannot — make sense of someone’s following a rule. The chapter explores various ways out of this antinomy without here endorsing any of them.
Mark Wilson
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- January 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199269259
- eISBN:
- 9780191710155
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199269259.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
This chapter focuses upon the role of the term ‘concept’ in the management of everyday and scientific tasks: how we utilize the term as a measure of our preparedness with respect to designing an ...
More
This chapter focuses upon the role of the term ‘concept’ in the management of everyday and scientific tasks: how we utilize the term as a measure of our preparedness with respect to designing an invention, predicting an outcome, fulfilling a recipe, and other tasks of that nature. It is argued that standard views (dubbed the ‘classical picture’ here) frequently exaggerate our anticipatory capacities by presuming that ‘concepts’ embody simple repositories of invariant directive instructions, whereas in real life usage is affected by far more variegated sources than we commonly recognize. Through a series of case studies drawn from science and everyday life, the book attempts to delimit our real state of ‘conceptual preparedness’ in more realistic terms, without tumbling into the intractable scepticism of Wittgenstein's celebrated ‘rule following’ considerations.Less
This chapter focuses upon the role of the term ‘concept’ in the management of everyday and scientific tasks: how we utilize the term as a measure of our preparedness with respect to designing an invention, predicting an outcome, fulfilling a recipe, and other tasks of that nature. It is argued that standard views (dubbed the ‘classical picture’ here) frequently exaggerate our anticipatory capacities by presuming that ‘concepts’ embody simple repositories of invariant directive instructions, whereas in real life usage is affected by far more variegated sources than we commonly recognize. Through a series of case studies drawn from science and everyday life, the book attempts to delimit our real state of ‘conceptual preparedness’ in more realistic terms, without tumbling into the intractable scepticism of Wittgenstein's celebrated ‘rule following’ considerations.
Philip Pettit
- Published in print:
- 1996
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195106459
- eISBN:
- 9780199872251
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195106458.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
This issue between individualism and collectivism has to do with how far individuals are compromised from on high, by aggregate or structural factors. It is a vertical issue, as we may put it. The ...
More
This issue between individualism and collectivism has to do with how far individuals are compromised from on high, by aggregate or structural factors. It is a vertical issue, as we may put it. The issue between atomism and holism, by contrast, has a horizontal character. The question bears, not on the relation between high‐level factors and individual human beings but on the relation between the individuals themselves; it is the question as to how far people's social relationships with one another are of significance in their constitution as subjects and agents. Atomists occupy an extreme position according to which it is possible for a human being to develop all the capacities characteristic of our kind in total isolation from her fellows, if indeed she has any fellows; there is no incoherence, as it is often put, in the notion of the solitary individual. Holists deny this claim, arguing that one or another distinctive capacity – usually the capacity for thought – depends in a noncausal or constitutive way on the enjoyment of social relationships. Drawing on analysis in the first part of the book, this chapter maintains that thought does require social relationships in a constitutive manner, at least if thought is to be “commonable” – accessible in principle to others.Less
This issue between individualism and collectivism has to do with how far individuals are compromised from on high, by aggregate or structural factors. It is a vertical issue, as we may put it. The issue between atomism and holism, by contrast, has a horizontal character. The question bears, not on the relation between high‐level factors and individual human beings but on the relation between the individuals themselves; it is the question as to how far people's social relationships with one another are of significance in their constitution as subjects and agents. Atomists occupy an extreme position according to which it is possible for a human being to develop all the capacities characteristic of our kind in total isolation from her fellows, if indeed she has any fellows; there is no incoherence, as it is often put, in the notion of the solitary individual. Holists deny this claim, arguing that one or another distinctive capacity – usually the capacity for thought – depends in a noncausal or constitutive way on the enjoyment of social relationships. Drawing on analysis in the first part of the book, this chapter maintains that thought does require social relationships in a constitutive manner, at least if thought is to be “commonable” – accessible in principle to others.
Hubert Schwyzer
- Published in print:
- 1990
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198248293
- eISBN:
- 9780191681110
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198248293.003.0006
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter discusses what the implications of Kant's failure to show why it is only judgment by means of the categories that can yield consciousness of anything are for his broader concerns about ...
More
This chapter discusses what the implications of Kant's failure to show why it is only judgment by means of the categories that can yield consciousness of anything are for his broader concerns about the human understanding and the nature of knowledge. Based on the discussions presented in this chapter, specifically that surrounding Wittgenstein, it is stated that resistance to the atomization of rule-following behaviour should be formed.Less
This chapter discusses what the implications of Kant's failure to show why it is only judgment by means of the categories that can yield consciousness of anything are for his broader concerns about the human understanding and the nature of knowledge. Based on the discussions presented in this chapter, specifically that surrounding Wittgenstein, it is stated that resistance to the atomization of rule-following behaviour should be formed.
Roland Kley
- Published in print:
- 1994
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198279167
- eISBN:
- 9780191684289
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198279167.003.0007
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory
This chapter examines Friedrich A. Hayek's thesis that some of the rules of just conduct, which form the institutional basis of spontaneous economic order, are followed unconsciously. Hayek thinks ...
More
This chapter examines Friedrich A. Hayek's thesis that some of the rules of just conduct, which form the institutional basis of spontaneous economic order, are followed unconsciously. Hayek thinks that wide areas of human activity are guided by behavioural rules. He says individuals are able to orient themselves in the world, exercise skills, and interact with others they observe rules. Yet it would in his view be a misunderstanding to believe that thought, perception, skills, and social interaction are all the result of the deliberate application of known rules. Human conduct, he claims, is also based on unconscious, or tacit, rule-following. Hayek defines tacit rule-following as conduct guided by rules which the acting person need not explicitly know, be able to specify, describe discursively, or verbalise. The claim, then, appears to be that often people are not aware of, and are not in a position expressly to state, the rules which actually direct their behaviour.Less
This chapter examines Friedrich A. Hayek's thesis that some of the rules of just conduct, which form the institutional basis of spontaneous economic order, are followed unconsciously. Hayek thinks that wide areas of human activity are guided by behavioural rules. He says individuals are able to orient themselves in the world, exercise skills, and interact with others they observe rules. Yet it would in his view be a misunderstanding to believe that thought, perception, skills, and social interaction are all the result of the deliberate application of known rules. Human conduct, he claims, is also based on unconscious, or tacit, rule-following. Hayek defines tacit rule-following as conduct guided by rules which the acting person need not explicitly know, be able to specify, describe discursively, or verbalise. The claim, then, appears to be that often people are not aware of, and are not in a position expressly to state, the rules which actually direct their behaviour.
Martin Kusch
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- January 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780199251223
- eISBN:
- 9780191601767
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199251223.003.0015
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
Argues that normativity can only exist for interacting individuals. The various individualistic responses to the communitarian position regarding rule‐following fail without exception. Moreover, of ...
More
Argues that normativity can only exist for interacting individuals. The various individualistic responses to the communitarian position regarding rule‐following fail without exception. Moreover, of different communitarian views the most plausible and defensible is this: an individual is able to follow a rule only if the individual is currently a participating member of a group in which the very same rule is followed by other members. It is this thesis that ultimately supports the communitarian epistemology proposed in this book. It is also the thesis which informs the views of language, truth, and objectivity that connect with this epistemology.Less
Argues that normativity can only exist for interacting individuals. The various individualistic responses to the communitarian position regarding rule‐following fail without exception. Moreover, of different communitarian views the most plausible and defensible is this: an individual is able to follow a rule only if the individual is currently a participating member of a group in which the very same rule is followed by other members. It is this thesis that ultimately supports the communitarian epistemology proposed in this book. It is also the thesis which informs the views of language, truth, and objectivity that connect with this epistemology.
P. M. S Hacker
- Published in print:
- 2001
- Published Online:
- April 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780199245697
- eISBN:
- 9780191602245
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/019924569X.003.0011
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
Wittgenstein held that speaking a language is a rule-governed activity. He argued that following a rule presupposes the existence of a practice. It is unclear whether the concept of a practice that ...
More
Wittgenstein held that speaking a language is a rule-governed activity. He argued that following a rule presupposes the existence of a practice. It is unclear whether the concept of a practice that is invoked is that of a social practice—in which case, as Norman Malcolm argued, language is essentially social, or whether the concept of a practice allows for the practices of a solitary individual—in which case, as is argued here, language is essentially shareable, but need not actually be shared.Less
Wittgenstein held that speaking a language is a rule-governed activity. He argued that following a rule presupposes the existence of a practice. It is unclear whether the concept of a practice that is invoked is that of a social practice—in which case, as Norman Malcolm argued, language is essentially social, or whether the concept of a practice allows for the practices of a solitary individual—in which case, as is argued here, language is essentially shareable, but need not actually be shared.
Crispin Wright
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- January 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780199278053
- eISBN:
- 9780191745386
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199278053.003.0015
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language, Metaphysics/Epistemology
The replies in this part of the book are divided into four chapters. In this first one, the issues raised by Boghossian, Peacocke, Horwich, and Bilgrami concerning the problem of rule-following and ...
More
The replies in this part of the book are divided into four chapters. In this first one, the issues raised by Boghossian, Peacocke, Horwich, and Bilgrami concerning the problem of rule-following and the normativity of meaning are addressed, and an up-to-date overview of Crispin Wright's current views on these matters is presented.Less
The replies in this part of the book are divided into four chapters. In this first one, the issues raised by Boghossian, Peacocke, Horwich, and Bilgrami concerning the problem of rule-following and the normativity of meaning are addressed, and an up-to-date overview of Crispin Wright's current views on these matters is presented.
Mark Wilson
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- January 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199269259
- eISBN:
- 9780191710155
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199269259.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
The book's discussion is divided into two parts. Chapters 1-5 trace the unnoticed yet occasionally harmful role that uncritical thinking about ‘concepts’ plays within our practical life, whether in ...
More
The book's discussion is divided into two parts. Chapters 1-5 trace the unnoticed yet occasionally harmful role that uncritical thinking about ‘concepts’ plays within our practical life, whether in guiding scientific progress or simply in the management of our everyday affairs. The motivations central to classical conceptual traditionalists (such as Bertrand Russell) and neo-pragmatic holists (such as W. V. Quine) are sympathetically presented, but it is nonetheless argued that some middle route between these philosophical centres needs to be found. The purpose of the survey of the initial chapters is to indicate the benchmarks that an improved conception of concept should accommodate. In Chapters 6 and 7, a simple non-classical pattern (called a ‘facade') is formulated, which allows a descriptive practice to encode useful physical information in unexpected ways. The pattern’s utilities are defended through a series of important scientific exemplars and shown to be silently incorporated within various forms of everyday usage as well. Many of the standard philosophical puzzles canvassed earlier in the book are shown to have arisen when a ‘facade’ (or allied descriptive structure) has become mistaken for a simpler form of linguistic arrangement. Awareness of these potential ‘semantic mimicries’ provides a guide to the moderated approach to conceptual evaluation that the book eventually defends. Its concluding chapters map out the allied caution with respect to ‘rigor’ and ‘rule following’ that also needs to be observed, lest a descriptive useful language be prevented from assuming its optimal contours. Because the book is rather long, the preface indicates several abbreviated courses of reading that may help a reader find the material of greatest personal salience.Less
The book's discussion is divided into two parts. Chapters 1-5 trace the unnoticed yet occasionally harmful role that uncritical thinking about ‘concepts’ plays within our practical life, whether in guiding scientific progress or simply in the management of our everyday affairs. The motivations central to classical conceptual traditionalists (such as Bertrand Russell) and neo-pragmatic holists (such as W. V. Quine) are sympathetically presented, but it is nonetheless argued that some middle route between these philosophical centres needs to be found. The purpose of the survey of the initial chapters is to indicate the benchmarks that an improved conception of concept should accommodate. In Chapters 6 and 7, a simple non-classical pattern (called a ‘facade') is formulated, which allows a descriptive practice to encode useful physical information in unexpected ways. The pattern’s utilities are defended through a series of important scientific exemplars and shown to be silently incorporated within various forms of everyday usage as well. Many of the standard philosophical puzzles canvassed earlier in the book are shown to have arisen when a ‘facade’ (or allied descriptive structure) has become mistaken for a simpler form of linguistic arrangement. Awareness of these potential ‘semantic mimicries’ provides a guide to the moderated approach to conceptual evaluation that the book eventually defends. Its concluding chapters map out the allied caution with respect to ‘rigor’ and ‘rule following’ that also needs to be observed, lest a descriptive useful language be prevented from assuming its optimal contours. Because the book is rather long, the preface indicates several abbreviated courses of reading that may help a reader find the material of greatest personal salience.
Warren Goldfarb
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- January 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780199737666
- eISBN:
- 9780199933372
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199737666.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, General
This chapter argues that Wittgenstein does not aim, as many interpreters suggest, to show that our practices of rule-following are groundless, but nor does he aim to show that these practices are ...
More
This chapter argues that Wittgenstein does not aim, as many interpreters suggest, to show that our practices of rule-following are groundless, but nor does he aim to show that these practices are grounded, in any philosophical sense of these terms. Rather, Wittgenstein wishes to undermine the very notions of grounds and groundlessness that philosophers attempt to employ in discussions of rule-following. The mistake that many of Wittgenstein’s readers make, it is argued, is to suppose that questions of justification or explanation concerning rule-following can be appropriately posed quite generally, i.e., without respect to particular, ordinary cases in which a need for justification or explanation arises. It is here where Wittgenstein’s emphasis on practice is important. The practices that Wittgenstein has in mind are not merely, as many interpreters have assumed, the practices of how to proceed in certain cases--that we put 1,002 after 1,000 when following the instruction “add 2”, for instance. But they crucially include the practices we engage in when questions of justification or grounds arise in ordinary contexts, what we say and do in those situations.Less
This chapter argues that Wittgenstein does not aim, as many interpreters suggest, to show that our practices of rule-following are groundless, but nor does he aim to show that these practices are grounded, in any philosophical sense of these terms. Rather, Wittgenstein wishes to undermine the very notions of grounds and groundlessness that philosophers attempt to employ in discussions of rule-following. The mistake that many of Wittgenstein’s readers make, it is argued, is to suppose that questions of justification or explanation concerning rule-following can be appropriately posed quite generally, i.e., without respect to particular, ordinary cases in which a need for justification or explanation arises. It is here where Wittgenstein’s emphasis on practice is important. The practices that Wittgenstein has in mind are not merely, as many interpreters have assumed, the practices of how to proceed in certain cases--that we put 1,002 after 1,000 when following the instruction “add 2”, for instance. But they crucially include the practices we engage in when questions of justification or grounds arise in ordinary contexts, what we say and do in those situations.
