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 The Folk Theorem with Perfect Monitoring

George J. Mailath and Larry Samuelson

in Repeated Games and Reputations: Long-Run Relationships

Published in print:
2006
Published Online:
January 2007
ISBN:
9780195300796
eISBN:
9780199783700
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195300796.003.0003
Subject:
Economics and Finance, Behavioural Economics

This chapter presents and proves the folk theorem for games of perfect monitoring. The chapter first proves the folk theorem for two players with public correlation and pure-action individual ... More


Repeated Games and Reputations: Long-Run Relationships

George J. Mailath and Larry Samuelson

Published in print:
2006
Published Online:
January 2007
ISBN:
9780195300796
eISBN:
9780199783700
Item type:
book
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195300796.001.0001
Subject:
Economics and Finance, Behavioural Economics

This book begins with a careful development of fundamental concepts, including the notions of a repeated game, strategy, and equilibrium. It synthesizes and unifies the vast body of work in repeated ... More


 The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Monitoring

George J. Mailath and Larry Samuelson

in Repeated Games and Reputations: Long-Run Relationships

Published in print:
2006
Published Online:
January 2007
ISBN:
9780195300796
eISBN:
9780199783700
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195300796.003.0009
Subject:
Economics and Finance, Behavioural Economics

This chapter shows that in many situations with patient players, the payoffs bounds from Chapter 8 are tight. It then proves various folk theorems for games of public monitoring, including games with ... More


Reciprocity

Ken Binmore

in Natural Justice

Published in print:
2005
Published Online:
January 2007
ISBN:
9780195178111
eISBN:
9780199783670
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195178111.003.0005
Subject:
Economics and Finance, Microeconomics

The folk theorem shows that cooperative behavior can be sustained as a Nash equilibrium in indefinitely repeated games — a phenomenon known as reciprocal altruism. The same theorem offers a solution ... More


 Variations on the Game

George J. Mailath and Larry Samuelson

in Repeated Games and Reputations: Long-Run Relationships

Published in print:
2006
Published Online:
January 2007
ISBN:
9780195300796
eISBN:
9780199783700
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195300796.003.0005
Subject:
Economics and Finance, Behavioural Economics

This chapter explores variations on the standard repeated game: random matching games and repeated games played in the context of a market or society, multiple repeated games, repeated extensive form ... More


 Repeating Yourself

Ken Binmore

in Playing for Real: Game Theory

Published in print:
2007
Published Online:
May 2007
ISBN:
9780195300574
eISBN:
9780199783748
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195300574.003.0011
Subject:
Economics and Finance, Microeconomics

This chapter studies games played by the same players over and over again. The strategies in repeated games are modeled as finite automata, and a version of the folk theorem is proved. This says that ... More


 Almost Public Monitoring Games

George J. Mailath and Larry Samuelson

in Repeated Games and Reputations: Long-Run Relationships

Published in print:
2006
Published Online:
January 2007
ISBN:
9780195300796
eISBN:
9780199783700
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195300796.003.0013
Subject:
Economics and Finance, Behavioural Economics

This chapter provides a detailed treatment of work on games with almost-public monitoring. The chapter introduces the key distinction between strategies with bounded and unbounded recall, showing ... More


The Analytics of Human Sociality

Herbert Gintis

in The Bounds of Reason: Game Theory and the Unification of the Behavioral Sciences

Published in print:
2014
Published Online:
October 2017
ISBN:
9780691160849
eISBN:
9781400851348
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Princeton University Press
DOI:
10.23943/princeton/9780691160849.003.0010
Subject:
Sociology, Economic Sociology

The folk theorem requires that each action taken by each player carry a signal that is conveyed to the other players. A signal is imperfect if all players receive the same signal; the signal is ... More


Cooperative Homo economicus

Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis

in A Cooperative Species: Human Reciprocity and Its Evolution

Published in print:
2011
Published Online:
October 2017
ISBN:
9780691151250
eISBN:
9781400838837
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Princeton University Press
DOI:
10.23943/princeton/9780691151250.003.0005
Subject:
Economics and Finance, History of Economic Thought

This chapter examines whether recent advances in the theory of repeated games, as exemplified by the so-called folk theorem and related models, address the shortcomings of the self-interest based ... More


The Origins of Fair Play: Keynes Lecture in Economics

Ken Binmore

in Proceedings of the British Academy, Volume 151, 2006 Lectures

Published in print:
2007
Published Online:
January 2012
ISBN:
9780197264249
eISBN:
9780191734045
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
British Academy
DOI:
10.5871/bacad/9780197264249.003.0006
Subject:
History, Cultural History

This lecture gives a brief overview of an evolutionary theory of fairness. Most of the ideas discussed in the lecture can be found in the book Natural Justice. The lecture begins by determining how ... More


Repeated Games

James Bergin

in Microeconomic Theory: A Concise Course

Published in print:
2005
Published Online:
July 2005
ISBN:
9780199280292
eISBN:
9780191602498
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0199280290.003.0011
Subject:
Economics and Finance, Microeconomics

Repeated games are considered. The discussion explains issues surrounding randomization, observability, feasibility, and convexity. Games with pay-off averaging and discounting are examined, along ... More


The Foole, the Shepherd, and the Knave

Peter Vanderschraaf

in Strategic Justice: Convention and Problems of Balancing Divergent Interests

Published in print:
2018
Published Online:
November 2018
ISBN:
9780199832194
eISBN:
9780190213336
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780199832194.003.0007
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, Political Philosophy

The Reconciliation Project, the attempt to show that justice is compatible with rational prudence, is evaluated in light of the classic challenges of Hobbes’ Foole, Plato’s Lydian Shepherd, and ... More


Repeating Yourself

Ken Binmore

in Playing for Real Coursepack Edition: A Text on Game Theory

Published in print:
2012
Published Online:
April 2015
ISBN:
9780199924530
eISBN:
9780190261399
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:osobl/9780199924530.003.0008
Subject:
Economics and Finance, Microeconomics

This chapter discusses the games played in real life with emphasis on how these are played. It examines reciprocity as the glue that holds human societies together, as the key to human cooperation, ... More


Evolution of Cooperation

Daniel Friedman and Barry Sinervo

in Evolutionary Games in Natural, Social, and Virtual Worlds

Published in print:
2016
Published Online:
August 2016
ISBN:
9780199981151
eISBN:
9780190466657
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199981151.003.0013
Subject:
Economics and Finance, Behavioural Economics

This chapter opens with a simple diagram capturing the tension that all social creatures face between self interest and the social good. It then reviews two famous devices for alleviating the ... More


Cooperation and Conflict

Kim Sterelny

in The Evolved Apprentice: How Evolution Made Humans Unique

Published in print:
2012
Published Online:
January 2015
ISBN:
9780262016797
eISBN:
9780262302814
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
The MIT Press
DOI:
10.7551/mitpress/9780262016797.003.0008
Subject:
Biology, Evolutionary Biology / Genetics

This chapter defends an essentially individualist model of the evolution of cooperation amongst Pleistocene foragers. The chapter argues that these foragers satisfied the conditions of the “folk ... More


Integration of Effort

Phanish Puranam

in The Microstructure of Organizations

Published in print:
2018
Published Online:
July 2018
ISBN:
9780199672363
eISBN:
9780191864292
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780199672363.003.0004
Subject:
Business and Management, Organization Studies

For a given division of labor, (potential) breakdowns of integration can be traced to either motivational or knowledge-related sources (or both). Integration failures arising from coordination ... More


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