Lisa Tessman
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- October 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780195179149
- eISBN:
- 9780199835782
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195179145.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Feminist Philosophy
Lisa Tessman’s Burdened Virtues: Virtue Ethics for Liberatory Struggles engages questions central to feminist theory and practice, from the perspective of Aristotelian ethics. Focused primarily on ...
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Lisa Tessman’s Burdened Virtues: Virtue Ethics for Liberatory Struggles engages questions central to feminist theory and practice, from the perspective of Aristotelian ethics. Focused primarily on selves who endure and resist oppression, the book addresses the ways in which the devastating conditions confronted by these selves both limit and burden their moral goodness, and affect their possibilities for flourishing. The book describes two different forms of “moral trouble” prevalent under oppression. The first is that the oppressed self may be morally damaged, prevented from developing or exercising some of the virtues; the second is that the very conditions of oppression require the oppressed to develop a set of virtues that carry a moral cost to those who practice them, and that are referred to as “burdened virtues.” These virtues have the unusual feature of being disjoined from their bearer’s own well being. It is suggested that eudaimonistic theories should be able to account for virtues of this sort.Less
Lisa Tessman’s Burdened Virtues: Virtue Ethics for Liberatory Struggles engages questions central to feminist theory and practice, from the perspective of Aristotelian ethics. Focused primarily on selves who endure and resist oppression, the book addresses the ways in which the devastating conditions confronted by these selves both limit and burden their moral goodness, and affect their possibilities for flourishing. The book describes two different forms of “moral trouble” prevalent under oppression. The first is that the oppressed self may be morally damaged, prevented from developing or exercising some of the virtues; the second is that the very conditions of oppression require the oppressed to develop a set of virtues that carry a moral cost to those who practice them, and that are referred to as “burdened virtues.” These virtues have the unusual feature of being disjoined from their bearer’s own well being. It is suggested that eudaimonistic theories should be able to account for virtues of this sort.
Mary Briody Mahowald
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780195176179
- eISBN:
- 9780199786558
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195176170.003.0014
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Feminist Philosophy
After recapitulating the egalitarian perspective of the book, this chapter explains how this is necessarily directed toward an ideal of justice. The ideal is best approximated through an ethic of ...
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After recapitulating the egalitarian perspective of the book, this chapter explains how this is necessarily directed toward an ideal of justice. The ideal is best approximated through an ethic of virtue rather than an ethic of obligation. An egalitarian ethic of virtue promotes the flourishing of all individuals throughout the life span by attending to their different needs, preferences, and capabilities, and by minimizing the inequities that are often associated with these differences. An ethic of obligation requires minimal efforts to reduce these inequities, whereas an ethic of virtue calls for maximal efforts to reduce them. In the context of women’s health care, gender justice demands attention to gender differences as both obligatory and virtuous.Less
After recapitulating the egalitarian perspective of the book, this chapter explains how this is necessarily directed toward an ideal of justice. The ideal is best approximated through an ethic of virtue rather than an ethic of obligation. An egalitarian ethic of virtue promotes the flourishing of all individuals throughout the life span by attending to their different needs, preferences, and capabilities, and by minimizing the inequities that are often associated with these differences. An ethic of obligation requires minimal efforts to reduce these inequities, whereas an ethic of virtue calls for maximal efforts to reduce them. In the context of women’s health care, gender justice demands attention to gender differences as both obligatory and virtuous.
Gilbert Harman
- Published in print:
- 2000
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198238041
- eISBN:
- 9780191597626
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198238045.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
Considers the following questions: What accounts for the existence of basic moral disagreements? Why do most people think it is worse to injure someone than to fail to save them from injury? Where ...
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Considers the following questions: What accounts for the existence of basic moral disagreements? Why do most people think it is worse to injure someone than to fail to save them from injury? Where does the right of self‐defence come from? Why do many people think it is morally permissible to treat animals in ways we would not treat people? Why are some people moral relativists and others not? What is it to value something and what is it to value something intrinsically? How are a person's values (noun) related to what the person values (verb)? How much of morality can or should be explained in terms of human flourishing or the possession of virtuous character traits? For that matter, are there character traits of the sort we normally suppose there are? How do people come to be moral? Is morality something one learns or does it arise in everyone naturally without instruction?Less
Considers the following questions: What accounts for the existence of basic moral disagreements? Why do most people think it is worse to injure someone than to fail to save them from injury? Where does the right of self‐defence come from? Why do many people think it is morally permissible to treat animals in ways we would not treat people? Why are some people moral relativists and others not? What is it to value something and what is it to value something intrinsically? How are a person's values (noun) related to what the person values (verb)? How much of morality can or should be explained in terms of human flourishing or the possession of virtuous character traits? For that matter, are there character traits of the sort we normally suppose there are? How do people come to be moral? Is morality something one learns or does it arise in everyone naturally without instruction?
David B. Wong
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780195305395
- eISBN:
- 9780199786657
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195305396.003.0008
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
Morality can enter deeply into human identity, but we can question whether its influence is a good thing for us. Though a traditional goal of moral philosophy is to establish that the individual’s ...
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Morality can enter deeply into human identity, but we can question whether its influence is a good thing for us. Though a traditional goal of moral philosophy is to establish that the individual’s flourishing requires morality, this chapter explores the more modest and achievable goal of showing that morality is consistent with flourishing. Criticism is directed at the pessimistic stance, based on Foucault, that morality’s constitution of individual selves is necessarily an exercise in power and domination. A case is made, partly through the exploration of an argument from Xunzi, that morality answers to powerful needs in human beings, and partly through discussion of the story of John Sassall, a country doctor who found fulfillment not only in caring for his patients but in bearing witness to their lives. He also found deep depression in recognizing the limits on what he could do for his patients, and this leads to the conclusion that any vindication of morality must be incomplete as long as those who seek to accomplish moral ends must do so in oppressive structures that drastically limit the life prospects of many.Less
Morality can enter deeply into human identity, but we can question whether its influence is a good thing for us. Though a traditional goal of moral philosophy is to establish that the individual’s flourishing requires morality, this chapter explores the more modest and achievable goal of showing that morality is consistent with flourishing. Criticism is directed at the pessimistic stance, based on Foucault, that morality’s constitution of individual selves is necessarily an exercise in power and domination. A case is made, partly through the exploration of an argument from Xunzi, that morality answers to powerful needs in human beings, and partly through discussion of the story of John Sassall, a country doctor who found fulfillment not only in caring for his patients but in bearing witness to their lives. He also found deep depression in recognizing the limits on what he could do for his patients, and this leads to the conclusion that any vindication of morality must be incomplete as long as those who seek to accomplish moral ends must do so in oppressive structures that drastically limit the life prospects of many.
Bruce Frohnen
- Published in print:
- 1998
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198294962
- eISBN:
- 9780191598708
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198294964.003.0013
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory
Sandel retains the primal liberal attachment to individual flourishing as the proper end of life. On Sandel’s view, Rawls’s largely Kantian theory of justice rests on an emptying out of human nature. ...
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Sandel retains the primal liberal attachment to individual flourishing as the proper end of life. On Sandel’s view, Rawls’s largely Kantian theory of justice rests on an emptying out of human nature. Attachments, for Locke and for Sandel, are necessary because they are the natural means by which we become capable of meaningful choice. Precisely because he refuses to question the self’s centrality, Sandel remains safely within liberal confines, unwilling or unable to question the validity of liberal suppositions. Sandel’s vision of the individual and of political life does not seem conducive to the institutions, beliefs, and practices on which any substantive community must rely.Less
Sandel retains the primal liberal attachment to individual flourishing as the proper end of life. On Sandel’s view, Rawls’s largely Kantian theory of justice rests on an emptying out of human nature. Attachments, for Locke and for Sandel, are necessary because they are the natural means by which we become capable of meaningful choice. Precisely because he refuses to question the self’s centrality, Sandel remains safely within liberal confines, unwilling or unable to question the validity of liberal suppositions. Sandel’s vision of the individual and of political life does not seem conducive to the institutions, beliefs, and practices on which any substantive community must rely.
Julia Annas
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- May 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199228782
- eISBN:
- 9780191725524
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199228782.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, Ancient Philosophy
The book develops an account of virtue which, in a contemporary version, foregrounds the idea that virtue is an exercise of practical intelligence (ideally, a form of practical wisdom) similar to the ...
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The book develops an account of virtue which, in a contemporary version, foregrounds the idea that virtue is an exercise of practical intelligence (ideally, a form of practical wisdom) similar to the practical exercise of a skill. A practical skill is acquired through experience and habituation, but the result is not routine but an educated and intelligent application of thinking in action. This way of thinking of virtue shows how virtue does not conform to modern expectations of ‘moral reasoning’ and enables us to see how many contemporary objections to virtue as it figures in ethical theories misfire. The book does not present an ethics of virtue, but shows how the account can illuminatingly distinguish among different varieties of virtue ethics, depending on the conception of the good to which they are committed. The book also shows how an account of virtue which emphasizes its structural likeness to a practical skill fits a theory of eudaimonism, which takes us to have the aim, over our lives as wholes, of achieving happiness or flourishing.Less
The book develops an account of virtue which, in a contemporary version, foregrounds the idea that virtue is an exercise of practical intelligence (ideally, a form of practical wisdom) similar to the practical exercise of a skill. A practical skill is acquired through experience and habituation, but the result is not routine but an educated and intelligent application of thinking in action. This way of thinking of virtue shows how virtue does not conform to modern expectations of ‘moral reasoning’ and enables us to see how many contemporary objections to virtue as it figures in ethical theories misfire. The book does not present an ethics of virtue, but shows how the account can illuminatingly distinguish among different varieties of virtue ethics, depending on the conception of the good to which they are committed. The book also shows how an account of virtue which emphasizes its structural likeness to a practical skill fits a theory of eudaimonism, which takes us to have the aim, over our lives as wholes, of achieving happiness or flourishing.
Mary L. Hirschfeld
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- September 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199739813
- eISBN:
- 9780199866120
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199739813.003.0008
- Subject:
- Religion, History of Christianity
This chapter examines the fundamental hypothesis of the True Wealth of Nations project—that the economic and cultural criteria identified in the tradition of Catholic social thought provide an ...
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This chapter examines the fundamental hypothesis of the True Wealth of Nations project—that the economic and cultural criteria identified in the tradition of Catholic social thought provide an effective path to sustainable prosperity for all—from a Thomistic perspective. After pointing out some key features of Thomas's theological framework and contrasting it with the modern day more secular perspective, it focuses on three issues. First, it discusses how Thomas understood the end of this-worldly (earthly) human flourishing in relationship to our final end, which for Thomas lies in the beatific vision. Second, turning to the question of how prosperity is understood, it discusses Thomas's understanding of the relationship between material well-being and virtue, which Thomas identifies with human flourishing. Third, it examines Thomas's understanding of material well-being in itself. The chapter concludes with an assessment of the degree to which we could or should incorporate Thomas' s perspective.Less
This chapter examines the fundamental hypothesis of the True Wealth of Nations project—that the economic and cultural criteria identified in the tradition of Catholic social thought provide an effective path to sustainable prosperity for all—from a Thomistic perspective. After pointing out some key features of Thomas's theological framework and contrasting it with the modern day more secular perspective, it focuses on three issues. First, it discusses how Thomas understood the end of this-worldly (earthly) human flourishing in relationship to our final end, which for Thomas lies in the beatific vision. Second, turning to the question of how prosperity is understood, it discusses Thomas's understanding of the relationship between material well-being and virtue, which Thomas identifies with human flourishing. Third, it examines Thomas's understanding of material well-being in itself. The chapter concludes with an assessment of the degree to which we could or should incorporate Thomas' s perspective.
Frank Lovett
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- September 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199579419
- eISBN:
- 9780191722837
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199579419.003.0005
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory
The various connections between freedom from domination and human flourishing are shown to account for the wrongness of domination. Benevolent and consensual dominations are shown not to detract from ...
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The various connections between freedom from domination and human flourishing are shown to account for the wrongness of domination. Benevolent and consensual dominations are shown not to detract from the general claim that freedom from domination is an important good. The limited significance of the claim from Hegel and others that domination will be self‐defeating is discussed.Less
The various connections between freedom from domination and human flourishing are shown to account for the wrongness of domination. Benevolent and consensual dominations are shown not to detract from the general claim that freedom from domination is an important good. The limited significance of the claim from Hegel and others that domination will be self‐defeating is discussed.
DAVID LAMETTI
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- May 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780195391572
- eISBN:
- 9780199775804
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195391572.003.001
- Subject:
- Law, Environmental and Energy Law
The values underlying private property are illuminated by an appreciation of the virtues served by objects of property. Turning to Aristotelian and Thomistic ethics, particularly to understanding ...
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The values underlying private property are illuminated by an appreciation of the virtues served by objects of property. Turning to Aristotelian and Thomistic ethics, particularly to understanding Aristotle's phrase in the Politics, “private in possession, common in use,” both in the light of Aristotle's justifications for private property and in the larger context of his ethics, light is shed on the virtues that the institution was meant to foster. Thus, “common in use” is to be understood in the service of larger individual and social goals. Aquinas provides further clarity by “Christianizing” the virtues and teleology to be fostered and served by private property. The foundational values identified still resonate in modern property discourse, and point to a contextual appreciation of property objects as the focal point for the dialogue over how resources ought to be distributed and used. Objects of property are thus the objects of virtue.Less
The values underlying private property are illuminated by an appreciation of the virtues served by objects of property. Turning to Aristotelian and Thomistic ethics, particularly to understanding Aristotle's phrase in the Politics, “private in possession, common in use,” both in the light of Aristotle's justifications for private property and in the larger context of his ethics, light is shed on the virtues that the institution was meant to foster. Thus, “common in use” is to be understood in the service of larger individual and social goals. Aquinas provides further clarity by “Christianizing” the virtues and teleology to be fostered and served by private property. The foundational values identified still resonate in modern property discourse, and point to a contextual appreciation of property objects as the focal point for the dialogue over how resources ought to be distributed and used. Objects of property are thus the objects of virtue.
C. Stephen Evans
- Published in print:
- 2004
- Published Online:
- January 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780199272174
- eISBN:
- 9780191602061
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199272174.001.0001
- Subject:
- Religion, Philosophy of Religion
Kierkegaard presents a form of divine command theory of moral obligation similar to accounts developed by Robert Adams and Philip Quinn. The account understands the relation humans have with a loving ...
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Kierkegaard presents a form of divine command theory of moral obligation similar to accounts developed by Robert Adams and Philip Quinn. The account understands the relation humans have with a loving God as making possible the greatest human good, and as creating those unique obligations we designate as moral. God’s commands should be obeyed, not because of fear of divine punishment, but out of love and gratitude for the good that God has bestowed on humanity. Though God can and does address specific individuals, the fundamental divine command is the injunction – common to Judaism and Christianity – to love one’s neighbour as oneself. God’s commands are not arbitrary; they are directed at human flourishing and lead to genuine happiness, even though obedience to them requires self-denial and is not egoistically motivated. This Kierkegaardian ethic, found principally in Works of Love, has advantages over its contemporary secular rivals, such as evolutionary naturalism, social contract theories, and moral relativism. Additionally, this form of divine command theory resists the fundamental objections often posed against a religiously grounded ethic.Less
Kierkegaard presents a form of divine command theory of moral obligation similar to accounts developed by Robert Adams and Philip Quinn. The account understands the relation humans have with a loving God as making possible the greatest human good, and as creating those unique obligations we designate as moral. God’s commands should be obeyed, not because of fear of divine punishment, but out of love and gratitude for the good that God has bestowed on humanity. Though God can and does address specific individuals, the fundamental divine command is the injunction – common to Judaism and Christianity – to love one’s neighbour as oneself. God’s commands are not arbitrary; they are directed at human flourishing and lead to genuine happiness, even though obedience to them requires self-denial and is not egoistically motivated. This Kierkegaardian ethic, found principally in Works of Love, has advantages over its contemporary secular rivals, such as evolutionary naturalism, social contract theories, and moral relativism. Additionally, this form of divine command theory resists the fundamental objections often posed against a religiously grounded ethic.
C. Stephen Evans
- Published in print:
- 2004
- Published Online:
- January 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780199272174
- eISBN:
- 9780191602061
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199272174.003.0001
- Subject:
- Religion, Philosophy of Religion
Moral obligations are overriding and objective, in a way that other kinds of obligations are not. A divine command theory of moral obligations claims that all truly moral obligations owe their status ...
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Moral obligations are overriding and objective, in a way that other kinds of obligations are not. A divine command theory of moral obligations claims that all truly moral obligations owe their status as moral duties to the fact that God commands them. God’s commands, however, are not arbitrary; instead, God’s command is a call to human flourishing and happiness. Kierkegaard answers the question posed in the Euthyphro by importing a Kantian dimension to an Aristotelian framework; he can do so only because he sees the self as spiritually and morally qualified. The two chief passions that are crucial to the formation of the self that God intends one to be are faith and love.Less
Moral obligations are overriding and objective, in a way that other kinds of obligations are not. A divine command theory of moral obligations claims that all truly moral obligations owe their status as moral duties to the fact that God commands them. God’s commands, however, are not arbitrary; instead, God’s command is a call to human flourishing and happiness. Kierkegaard answers the question posed in the Euthyphro by importing a Kantian dimension to an Aristotelian framework; he can do so only because he sees the self as spiritually and morally qualified. The two chief passions that are crucial to the formation of the self that God intends one to be are faith and love.
C. Stephen Evans
- Published in print:
- 2004
- Published Online:
- January 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780199272174
- eISBN:
- 9780191602061
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199272174.003.0005
- Subject:
- Religion, Philosophy of Religion
Divine command theory gives an account of obligation, specifically moral obligation. Any action God commands his human creatures to do is morally binding for them, and any action that is morally ...
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Divine command theory gives an account of obligation, specifically moral obligation. Any action God commands his human creatures to do is morally binding for them, and any action that is morally obligatory for humans has the status of being a moral obligation because God commands it. In Works of Love, Kierkegaard argues that our motivation to obey God is grounded in the special relationship we have with God – a relationship that begins with our birth and continues beyond our death. The grounds for God’s authority is not his power but his love, and God’s commands are not arbitrary but are rooted in God’s desire for human flourishing.Less
Divine command theory gives an account of obligation, specifically moral obligation. Any action God commands his human creatures to do is morally binding for them, and any action that is morally obligatory for humans has the status of being a moral obligation because God commands it. In Works of Love, Kierkegaard argues that our motivation to obey God is grounded in the special relationship we have with God – a relationship that begins with our birth and continues beyond our death. The grounds for God’s authority is not his power but his love, and God’s commands are not arbitrary but are rooted in God’s desire for human flourishing.
C. Stephen Evans
- Published in print:
- 2004
- Published Online:
- January 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780199272174
- eISBN:
- 9780191602061
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199272174.003.0006
- Subject:
- Religion, Philosophy of Religion
Neighbour-love, grounded by divine authority, provides a basis for genuine human flourishing despite the fact that this love requires self-denial. God does not suggest neighbour-love but commands it, ...
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Neighbour-love, grounded by divine authority, provides a basis for genuine human flourishing despite the fact that this love requires self-denial. God does not suggest neighbour-love but commands it, and being a duty makes neighbour-love steadfast, autonomous, and significant. True happiness is not found when we aim directly at our own happiness, but when we discover God’s love for us and respond to God in grateful obedience. Loving God in the right way, we will want to obey his command – the command to love our neighbours as ourselves.Less
Neighbour-love, grounded by divine authority, provides a basis for genuine human flourishing despite the fact that this love requires self-denial. God does not suggest neighbour-love but commands it, and being a duty makes neighbour-love steadfast, autonomous, and significant. True happiness is not found when we aim directly at our own happiness, but when we discover God’s love for us and respond to God in grateful obedience. Loving God in the right way, we will want to obey his command – the command to love our neighbours as ourselves.
Eleonore Stump
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- September 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199277421
- eISBN:
- 9780191594298
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199277421.003.0013
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy, Philosophy of Religion
This chapter uses the narratives in the preceding chapters as well as the worldview of Aquinas outlined in earlier chapters to present Aquinas's theodicy. Taken in the context of the biblical ...
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This chapter uses the narratives in the preceding chapters as well as the worldview of Aquinas outlined in earlier chapters to present Aquinas's theodicy. Taken in the context of the biblical narratives and encompassed in Aquinas's whole worldview but especially his account of love, Aquinas's theodicy is the heart of the defence promised at the outset of the book. On Aquinas's theodicy, God is justified in allowing the suffering of a mentally fully functional adult human person by one or the other or both of two possible benefits, where Aquinas's scale of value is the measure of the benefits. For a person whose suffering is entirely involuntary, suffering is defeated in virtue of its contributing to warding off a greater harm for her. For a person whose suffering is involuntary only in a certain respect, suffering is defeated in virtue of its contributing to providing a greater good for her. The chapter concludes with an argument that Aquinas's theodicy is incomplete as it stands and in need of further development.Less
This chapter uses the narratives in the preceding chapters as well as the worldview of Aquinas outlined in earlier chapters to present Aquinas's theodicy. Taken in the context of the biblical narratives and encompassed in Aquinas's whole worldview but especially his account of love, Aquinas's theodicy is the heart of the defence promised at the outset of the book. On Aquinas's theodicy, God is justified in allowing the suffering of a mentally fully functional adult human person by one or the other or both of two possible benefits, where Aquinas's scale of value is the measure of the benefits. For a person whose suffering is entirely involuntary, suffering is defeated in virtue of its contributing to warding off a greater harm for her. For a person whose suffering is involuntary only in a certain respect, suffering is defeated in virtue of its contributing to providing a greater good for her. The chapter concludes with an argument that Aquinas's theodicy is incomplete as it stands and in need of further development.
Jessica N. Berry
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- January 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780195368420
- eISBN:
- 9780199867479
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195368420.003.0006
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General
This chapter takes up the question whether Nietzsche's philosophy ought to be characterized as “therapeutic,” as it so often has been, and investigates both his and the Greek skeptics' relationship ...
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This chapter takes up the question whether Nietzsche's philosophy ought to be characterized as “therapeutic,” as it so often has been, and investigates both his and the Greek skeptics' relationship with “health” as a goal of the philosophic enterprise. It might be objected that the Pyrrhonists' adoption of ataraxia (tranquility) as the ultimate aim of their practice, an aim which has often been linked with indifference, impassivity, and the avoidance of suffering, could not be consistent with any notion of health advanced by Nietzsche. Yet an exploration of the history and etymology of ataraxia—indeed, a genealogy of ataraxia—conducted in light of Nietzsche's longtime interest in the pre-Platonic philosopher Democritus of Abdera illuminates a model of psychological health and well-being that again brings him in line with the Skeptical tradition.Less
This chapter takes up the question whether Nietzsche's philosophy ought to be characterized as “therapeutic,” as it so often has been, and investigates both his and the Greek skeptics' relationship with “health” as a goal of the philosophic enterprise. It might be objected that the Pyrrhonists' adoption of ataraxia (tranquility) as the ultimate aim of their practice, an aim which has often been linked with indifference, impassivity, and the avoidance of suffering, could not be consistent with any notion of health advanced by Nietzsche. Yet an exploration of the history and etymology of ataraxia—indeed, a genealogy of ataraxia—conducted in light of Nietzsche's longtime interest in the pre-Platonic philosopher Democritus of Abdera illuminates a model of psychological health and well-being that again brings him in line with the Skeptical tradition.
John Barry
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- May 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199695393
- eISBN:
- 9780191738982
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199695393.001.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, Environmental Politics
Going against both the naive techno-optimist of ‘greening business as usual’ and a resurgent ‘catastrophism’ within green thinking and politics, The Politics of Actually Existing Unsustainability ...
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Going against both the naive techno-optimist of ‘greening business as usual’ and a resurgent ‘catastrophism’ within green thinking and politics, The Politics of Actually Existing Unsustainability offers an analysis of the causes of unsustainability and diminished human flourishing. The books locates the causes of unsustainability in dominant capitalist modes of production, debt-based consumer culture, the imperative for orthodox economic growth and the dominant ideology of neoclassical economics. It suggests that valuable insights into the causes of and alternatives to unsustainability can be found in a critical embracing of human vulnerability and dependency as both constitutive and ineliminable aspects of what it means to be human. The book defends resilience, the ability to ‘cope with’ rather than somehow ‘solve’ vulnerability. The book offers a trenchant critique of the dominant neoclassical economic ‘groupthink’, viewing it not as some value-neutral form of ‘expert knowledge’, but as a thoroughly ideological ‘common sense’. Outlining a green political economic alternative replacing economic growth with economic security, it argues economic growth has done its work in the minority, affluent world, which should now focus on improving human flourishing, lowering socio-economic equality and fostering solidarity as part of a new re-orientation of public policy. Complementing this, a, ‘green republicanism’ is developed as an innovative and original contribution to contemporary debates on a ‘post-growth’ economy and society. The Politics of Actually Existing Unsustainability draws widely from a range of disciplines and thinkers, from cultural critic Susan Sontag to the critical theory of the Frankfurt School, contemporary debates in green political thinking, and the latest thinking in heterodox and green economics, to produce a highly relevant, timely, and provocatively original statement on the human predicament in the twenty-first century.Less
Going against both the naive techno-optimist of ‘greening business as usual’ and a resurgent ‘catastrophism’ within green thinking and politics, The Politics of Actually Existing Unsustainability offers an analysis of the causes of unsustainability and diminished human flourishing. The books locates the causes of unsustainability in dominant capitalist modes of production, debt-based consumer culture, the imperative for orthodox economic growth and the dominant ideology of neoclassical economics. It suggests that valuable insights into the causes of and alternatives to unsustainability can be found in a critical embracing of human vulnerability and dependency as both constitutive and ineliminable aspects of what it means to be human. The book defends resilience, the ability to ‘cope with’ rather than somehow ‘solve’ vulnerability. The book offers a trenchant critique of the dominant neoclassical economic ‘groupthink’, viewing it not as some value-neutral form of ‘expert knowledge’, but as a thoroughly ideological ‘common sense’. Outlining a green political economic alternative replacing economic growth with economic security, it argues economic growth has done its work in the minority, affluent world, which should now focus on improving human flourishing, lowering socio-economic equality and fostering solidarity as part of a new re-orientation of public policy. Complementing this, a, ‘green republicanism’ is developed as an innovative and original contribution to contemporary debates on a ‘post-growth’ economy and society. The Politics of Actually Existing Unsustainability draws widely from a range of disciplines and thinkers, from cultural critic Susan Sontag to the critical theory of the Frankfurt School, contemporary debates in green political thinking, and the latest thinking in heterodox and green economics, to produce a highly relevant, timely, and provocatively original statement on the human predicament in the twenty-first century.
Jennifer Prah Ruger
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- February 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199559978
- eISBN:
- 9780191721489
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199559978.001.0001
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, Public and Welfare
Envision a society in which all people have the ability to achieve the central health capabilities of avoiding premature death and escapable morbidity, and where everyone has comprehensive health ...
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Envision a society in which all people have the ability to achieve the central health capabilities of avoiding premature death and escapable morbidity, and where everyone has comprehensive health insurance and access to high‐quality health care. This vision is the animating principle behind the health capability paradigm, a unique new approach where not just health care, or the right to health alone, but health and the capability for health itself are moral imperatives. Ruger has been developing this health capability paradigm for over 15 years. Her innovative approach bridges the gaps at the interdisciplinary intersection of ethics, economics, political science, law and human rights, with practical and theoretical applications for the financing and delivery of health care and public health. The health capability paradigm provides philosophical justification for the direct moral importance of health, health capability, and the right to health, as well as a theoretical basis for prioritizing needs and allocating resources. There are no guarantees of good health, but society can, if it will, design and build effective institutions and social systems, structures and practices, that support all citizens in the pursuit of central health capabilities. Key tenets of this theory, which emphasizes responsibility and choice for health, include health agency, shared health governance, incompletely theorized agreements, internalized public moral norms to guide social choice and collective action, and a joint scientific and deliberative approach to decision-making that incorporates medical necessity, medical appropriateness, and shortfall equality. This paradigm integrates both proceduralist and consequentialist approaches to justice, and emphasizes the critical roles of both moral and political legitimacy. We can no longer afford to ignore human suffering. This book weaves together a number of disparate constructs and original insights to produce a foundational new framework for thinking about and taking action to achieve health and social justice— the health capability paradigm.Less
Envision a society in which all people have the ability to achieve the central health capabilities of avoiding premature death and escapable morbidity, and where everyone has comprehensive health insurance and access to high‐quality health care. This vision is the animating principle behind the health capability paradigm, a unique new approach where not just health care, or the right to health alone, but health and the capability for health itself are moral imperatives. Ruger has been developing this health capability paradigm for over 15 years. Her innovative approach bridges the gaps at the interdisciplinary intersection of ethics, economics, political science, law and human rights, with practical and theoretical applications for the financing and delivery of health care and public health. The health capability paradigm provides philosophical justification for the direct moral importance of health, health capability, and the right to health, as well as a theoretical basis for prioritizing needs and allocating resources. There are no guarantees of good health, but society can, if it will, design and build effective institutions and social systems, structures and practices, that support all citizens in the pursuit of central health capabilities. Key tenets of this theory, which emphasizes responsibility and choice for health, include health agency, shared health governance, incompletely theorized agreements, internalized public moral norms to guide social choice and collective action, and a joint scientific and deliberative approach to decision-making that incorporates medical necessity, medical appropriateness, and shortfall equality. This paradigm integrates both proceduralist and consequentialist approaches to justice, and emphasizes the critical roles of both moral and political legitimacy. We can no longer afford to ignore human suffering. This book weaves together a number of disparate constructs and original insights to produce a foundational new framework for thinking about and taking action to achieve health and social justice— the health capability paradigm.
Lisa Tessman
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- October 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780195179149
- eISBN:
- 9780199835782
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195179145.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Feminist Philosophy
Virtue ethics seems to present a puzzle about the privileged: If moral virtue is necessary for flourishing (which is a core assumption of virtue ethics), then members of privileged groups can only ...
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Virtue ethics seems to present a puzzle about the privileged: If moral virtue is necessary for flourishing (which is a core assumption of virtue ethics), then members of privileged groups can only flourish if they are morally good, but it is more plausible to conceive of the privileged as morally deficient than as morally good, since their privileges result from unjust social positions. Thus it appears that they are barred from flourishing, which is odd since one would expect conditions of oppression to prevent the victims rather than the beneficiaries of these conditions from living the good life. The puzzle begins to dissolve when one distinguishes between the contemporary understanding of happiness and the ancient Greek conception of flourishing, for it turns out that privileged people can be said to be happy without granting that they flourish. The distinction helps uncover a key assumption of interdependence behind the belief that even the so-called other-regarding virtues (and not just self-regarding virtues) are necessary for one’s own flourishing; if people are interdependent in such a way that the flourishing of one is tied to the flourishing of all, then for the privileged to flourish they would have to worry a lot more about the well-being of the disadvantaged. This suggests a critical revision to Aristotle’s eudaimonistic theory, by the addition of the claim that a trait that contributes to one’s own well-being cannot count as morally praiseworthy if it detracts from the flourishing of an inclusive social collectivity.Less
Virtue ethics seems to present a puzzle about the privileged: If moral virtue is necessary for flourishing (which is a core assumption of virtue ethics), then members of privileged groups can only flourish if they are morally good, but it is more plausible to conceive of the privileged as morally deficient than as morally good, since their privileges result from unjust social positions. Thus it appears that they are barred from flourishing, which is odd since one would expect conditions of oppression to prevent the victims rather than the beneficiaries of these conditions from living the good life. The puzzle begins to dissolve when one distinguishes between the contemporary understanding of happiness and the ancient Greek conception of flourishing, for it turns out that privileged people can be said to be happy without granting that they flourish. The distinction helps uncover a key assumption of interdependence behind the belief that even the so-called other-regarding virtues (and not just self-regarding virtues) are necessary for one’s own flourishing; if people are interdependent in such a way that the flourishing of one is tied to the flourishing of all, then for the privileged to flourish they would have to worry a lot more about the well-being of the disadvantaged. This suggests a critical revision to Aristotle’s eudaimonistic theory, by the addition of the claim that a trait that contributes to one’s own well-being cannot count as morally praiseworthy if it detracts from the flourishing of an inclusive social collectivity.
Lisa Tessman
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- October 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780195179149
- eISBN:
- 9780199835782
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195179145.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Feminist Philosophy
This chapter examines the way that liberatory movements—including both feminist movements and Black liberation movements—offer praise for their best members, holding them up to model the character ...
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This chapter examines the way that liberatory movements—including both feminist movements and Black liberation movements—offer praise for their best members, holding them up to model the character traits that enable political resistance. This praise appears strange given a eudaimonistic ethics in which character traits that are morally praiseworthy are usually conducive to or constitutive of flourishing, for the character traits recommended for resistance often disable resisters themselves from flourishing. Based on Aristotle’s discussion of “mixed actions,” a description is given of the political resister as displaying “mixed traits” that are routinely unlinked from flourishing and thereby burdened. The problematic traits of the politically resistant self include those such as anger that contribute to maintaining a hard resolve against the oppressors, those such as courage that help resisters take risks and accept loss and sacrifice, and those that resisters must display in their relationships with one another, such as loyalty coupled with an openness to criticism and self-criticism. The chapter includes an extended analysis of one of these questionable virtues, namely anger.Less
This chapter examines the way that liberatory movements—including both feminist movements and Black liberation movements—offer praise for their best members, holding them up to model the character traits that enable political resistance. This praise appears strange given a eudaimonistic ethics in which character traits that are morally praiseworthy are usually conducive to or constitutive of flourishing, for the character traits recommended for resistance often disable resisters themselves from flourishing. Based on Aristotle’s discussion of “mixed actions,” a description is given of the political resister as displaying “mixed traits” that are routinely unlinked from flourishing and thereby burdened. The problematic traits of the politically resistant self include those such as anger that contribute to maintaining a hard resolve against the oppressors, those such as courage that help resisters take risks and accept loss and sacrifice, and those that resisters must display in their relationships with one another, such as loyalty coupled with an openness to criticism and self-criticism. The chapter includes an extended analysis of one of these questionable virtues, namely anger.
Lisa Tessman
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- October 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780195179149
- eISBN:
- 9780199835782
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195179145.003.0007
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Feminist Philosophy
The conclusion addresses a question that emerges given all of the critical revisions to a eudaimonistic virtue ethics that are suggested in the course of the book, and especially given the proposed ...
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The conclusion addresses a question that emerges given all of the critical revisions to a eudaimonistic virtue ethics that are suggested in the course of the book, and especially given the proposed addition of an odd category of virtues—burdened virtues—that lack the usual feature of virtues because they are exercised in contexts in which flourishing tends to be diminished or unattainable. The conclusion considers how one could identify the virtues under conditions in which the link between virtue and flourishing is so unreliable. Given that the burdened virtues tend to fail to enable their bearers to flourish, one cannot find these virtues simply by beginning with a conception of flourishing and then working backwards from there to see which traits are conducive to or constitutive of such flourishing. What is proposed instead is a variety of ways in which a trait, despite being costly or detrimental, could be otherwise identifiably praiseworthy.Less
The conclusion addresses a question that emerges given all of the critical revisions to a eudaimonistic virtue ethics that are suggested in the course of the book, and especially given the proposed addition of an odd category of virtues—burdened virtues—that lack the usual feature of virtues because they are exercised in contexts in which flourishing tends to be diminished or unattainable. The conclusion considers how one could identify the virtues under conditions in which the link between virtue and flourishing is so unreliable. Given that the burdened virtues tend to fail to enable their bearers to flourish, one cannot find these virtues simply by beginning with a conception of flourishing and then working backwards from there to see which traits are conducive to or constitutive of such flourishing. What is proposed instead is a variety of ways in which a trait, despite being costly or detrimental, could be otherwise identifiably praiseworthy.
