Christopher Hookway
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199256587
- eISBN:
- 9780191597718
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199256586.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
A discussion of Peirce's claim that belief has no place in science and his views of the different roles of rational self‐control in dealing with scientific matters and with ‘vital questions’. This ...
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A discussion of Peirce's claim that belief has no place in science and his views of the different roles of rational self‐control in dealing with scientific matters and with ‘vital questions’. This appears to be in conflict with Peirce's defence of the scientific method as the best method for the fixation of belief. There is also discussion of Peirce's claim that the laws of logic are regulative ideas, or hopes.Less
A discussion of Peirce's claim that belief has no place in science and his views of the different roles of rational self‐control in dealing with scientific matters and with ‘vital questions’. This appears to be in conflict with Peirce's defence of the scientific method as the best method for the fixation of belief. There is also discussion of Peirce's claim that the laws of logic are regulative ideas, or hopes.
Mark Richard
- Published in print:
- 2019
- Published Online:
- September 2019
- ISBN:
- 9780198842811
- eISBN:
- 9780191878732
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780198842811.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language, American Philosophy
If meanings are interestingly like species, meanings are multitudes and what our words mean isn’t up to us. This chapter doesn’t deny that one finds things that can reasonably be labeled ‘meanings’ ...
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If meanings are interestingly like species, meanings are multitudes and what our words mean isn’t up to us. This chapter doesn’t deny that one finds things that can reasonably be labeled ‘meanings’ at the level of the individual, or that these are of theoretical interest. It does deny that internalist theorizing about meaning provides a way to resuscitate the notion of analyticity. It also argues that meanings turn out to be much like diachronic ensembles of mental states related by analogs of descent—i.e. analogous to species. The first half of this chapter discusses a popular response to ‘Two Dogmas’ and demonstrates that this response requires an untenable picture of meaning. The second half takes up an internalist response to Quine due to David Chalmers, who suggests we think of conceptual constancy only in the intrapersonal case, identifying it with constancy of conditional credence. Chalmers’ proposal is worth serious consideration. But even from an internalist perspective, it’s unacceptable.Less
If meanings are interestingly like species, meanings are multitudes and what our words mean isn’t up to us. This chapter doesn’t deny that one finds things that can reasonably be labeled ‘meanings’ at the level of the individual, or that these are of theoretical interest. It does deny that internalist theorizing about meaning provides a way to resuscitate the notion of analyticity. It also argues that meanings turn out to be much like diachronic ensembles of mental states related by analogs of descent—i.e. analogous to species. The first half of this chapter discusses a popular response to ‘Two Dogmas’ and demonstrates that this response requires an untenable picture of meaning. The second half takes up an internalist response to Quine due to David Chalmers, who suggests we think of conceptual constancy only in the intrapersonal case, identifying it with constancy of conditional credence. Chalmers’ proposal is worth serious consideration. But even from an internalist perspective, it’s unacceptable.
