Justin D’Arms and Daniel Jacobson
- Published in print:
- 2014
- Published Online:
- June 2014
- ISBN:
- 9780198709299
- eISBN:
- 9780191781056
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198709299.003.0009
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
The literature on the wrong kind of reason (WKR) problem largely assumes that such reasons pose only a theoretical problem for certain theories of value rather than a practical problem. Since the ...
More
The literature on the wrong kind of reason (WKR) problem largely assumes that such reasons pose only a theoretical problem for certain theories of value rather than a practical problem. Since the normative force of the canonical examples is obvious, the only difficulty is to identify what reasons of the right and wrong kind have in common without circularity. This chapter argues that in addition to the obvious WKRs on which the literature focuses, there are also more interesting WKRs that do not overtly refer to the advantages of having some evaluative attitude. Instead they refer to features of the object that bear on the propriety of having certain attitudes toward it. What is interesting about these cases is that their normative force is opaque. It can be clear that some consideration bears on whether or not to feel shame, pity, or amusement, for example, but unclear just how it does so—specifically, whether the consideration helps make the object of the attitude shameful, pitiable, or funny. The problems caused by WKRs are ubiquitous, and they outstrip the wrong kind of reason problem as it has ordinarily been conceived, since extant solutions to the technical problem offer no help resolving the opacity of normative force.Less
The literature on the wrong kind of reason (WKR) problem largely assumes that such reasons pose only a theoretical problem for certain theories of value rather than a practical problem. Since the normative force of the canonical examples is obvious, the only difficulty is to identify what reasons of the right and wrong kind have in common without circularity. This chapter argues that in addition to the obvious WKRs on which the literature focuses, there are also more interesting WKRs that do not overtly refer to the advantages of having some evaluative attitude. Instead they refer to features of the object that bear on the propriety of having certain attitudes toward it. What is interesting about these cases is that their normative force is opaque. It can be clear that some consideration bears on whether or not to feel shame, pity, or amusement, for example, but unclear just how it does so—specifically, whether the consideration helps make the object of the attitude shameful, pitiable, or funny. The problems caused by WKRs are ubiquitous, and they outstrip the wrong kind of reason problem as it has ordinarily been conceived, since extant solutions to the technical problem offer no help resolving the opacity of normative force.
Ulrike Heuer
- Published in print:
- 2018
- Published Online:
- March 2018
- ISBN:
- 9780198758709
- eISBN:
- 9780191818622
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780198758709.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
There is a wide-ranging discussion of two kinds of reasons for attitudes, which are sometimes called the right and wrong kinds of reasons. The distinction, some think, applies to a whole range of ...
More
There is a wide-ranging discussion of two kinds of reasons for attitudes, which are sometimes called the right and wrong kinds of reasons. The distinction, some think, applies to a whole range of different attitudes such as beliefs and intentions, as well as pro-attitudes, e.g. admiration or desire, in similar ways. Explaining it may therefore contribute significantly to understanding the nature of reasons and normativity in general. This chapter argues for two claims: (1) we should sharply distinguish the wrong kind of reasons problem as it arises for fitting attitude theories from other problems that come under the same name; (2) the wrong kind of reasons problem outside of fitting attitude theory doesn’t have a very clear shape. In particular, there is no similarity between reasons to believe and reasons to intend in this regard, and therefore no hope for a unified explanation of the alleged phenomenon.Less
There is a wide-ranging discussion of two kinds of reasons for attitudes, which are sometimes called the right and wrong kinds of reasons. The distinction, some think, applies to a whole range of different attitudes such as beliefs and intentions, as well as pro-attitudes, e.g. admiration or desire, in similar ways. Explaining it may therefore contribute significantly to understanding the nature of reasons and normativity in general. This chapter argues for two claims: (1) we should sharply distinguish the wrong kind of reasons problem as it arises for fitting attitude theories from other problems that come under the same name; (2) the wrong kind of reasons problem outside of fitting attitude theory doesn’t have a very clear shape. In particular, there is no similarity between reasons to believe and reasons to intend in this regard, and therefore no hope for a unified explanation of the alleged phenomenon.
