Max. M Edling
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- January 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780195148701
- eISBN:
- 9780199835096
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195148703.001.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, American Politics
In this new interpretation of America's origins, the author argues that during the Constitutional debates, the Federalists were primarily concerned with building a state able to act vigorously in ...
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In this new interpretation of America's origins, the author argues that during the Constitutional debates, the Federalists were primarily concerned with building a state able to act vigorously in defense of American national interests. By transferring the powers of war making and resource extraction from states to the national government, the US Constitution created a nation‐state invested with all the important powers of Europe's eighteenth‐century “fiscal‐military states.” However, the political traditions and institutions of America, whose people had a deeply ingrained distrust of unduly concentrated authority, were incompatible with a strong centralized government based on the European pattern. To secure the adoption of the Constitution, the Federalists needed to build a very different state – they had to accommodate the formation of a powerful national government to the strong current of anti‐statism in the American political tradition. They did so by designing an administration that would be powerful in times of crisis, but would make limited demands on citizens and entailed sharp restrictions on the physical presence of the national government in society. The Constitution was the Federalists’ promise of the benefits of government without its costs – statecraft rather than strong central authority as the solution to governing. The book takes advantage of a newly published edition of the constitutional debates in recovering a neglected strand of Federalist argument, and making a case for rethinking the formation of the federal American state. It is arranged in three main parts: I. Interpreting the Debate over Ratification (four chapters); II. Military Powers (five chapters); and III. Fiscal Powers (five chapters).Less
In this new interpretation of America's origins, the author argues that during the Constitutional debates, the Federalists were primarily concerned with building a state able to act vigorously in defense of American national interests. By transferring the powers of war making and resource extraction from states to the national government, the US Constitution created a nation‐state invested with all the important powers of Europe's eighteenth‐century “fiscal‐military states.” However, the political traditions and institutions of America, whose people had a deeply ingrained distrust of unduly concentrated authority, were incompatible with a strong centralized government based on the European pattern. To secure the adoption of the Constitution, the Federalists needed to build a very different state – they had to accommodate the formation of a powerful national government to the strong current of anti‐statism in the American political tradition. They did so by designing an administration that would be powerful in times of crisis, but would make limited demands on citizens and entailed sharp restrictions on the physical presence of the national government in society. The Constitution was the Federalists’ promise of the benefits of government without its costs – statecraft rather than strong central authority as the solution to governing. The book takes advantage of a newly published edition of the constitutional debates in recovering a neglected strand of Federalist argument, and making a case for rethinking the formation of the federal American state. It is arranged in three main parts: I. Interpreting the Debate over Ratification (four chapters); II. Military Powers (five chapters); and III. Fiscal Powers (five chapters).
Max. M Edling
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- January 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780195148701
- eISBN:
- 9780199835096
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195148703.003.0015
- Subject:
- Political Science, American Politics
Offers brief sketches of the institutionalization of the military and fiscal powers granted by the US Constitution, and of the uses made of them by the Federalists in the 1790s. Gives an outline of ...
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Offers brief sketches of the institutionalization of the military and fiscal powers granted by the US Constitution, and of the uses made of them by the Federalists in the 1790s. Gives an outline of the fiscal and financial policy of the Federalists, thereby assessing Alexander Hamilton's claim to have restored public credit while reducing the tax pressure on the citizens. Also looks at the fate of the Federalist program after the Federalists had lost power to the Jeffersonian Republicans.Less
Offers brief sketches of the institutionalization of the military and fiscal powers granted by the US Constitution, and of the uses made of them by the Federalists in the 1790s. Gives an outline of the fiscal and financial policy of the Federalists, thereby assessing Alexander Hamilton's claim to have restored public credit while reducing the tax pressure on the citizens. Also looks at the fate of the Federalist program after the Federalists had lost power to the Jeffersonian Republicans.
Max. M Edling
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- January 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780195148701
- eISBN:
- 9780199835096
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195148703.003.0012
- Subject:
- Political Science, American Politics
Provides the layout of the Federalist argument that Congress had to possess an unlimited power to raise men and money from American society without any intervention from the states. While the ...
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Provides the layout of the Federalist argument that Congress had to possess an unlimited power to raise men and money from American society without any intervention from the states. While the following chapter looks in greater depth at Antifederalist objections to the federal fiscal powers of the US Constitution, here the concern is solely with the restrictions to this power that they suggested in the form of amendments. The reasons are discussed as to why the Federalists refused to accept these Antifederalist amendments (and indeed any restrictions on the fiscal power of Congress other than those already written into the Constitution), repeatedly and forcefully making it clear why it was crucial that no restrictions be placed on the right of Congress to extract money from society by means of taxation. The different sections of the chapter argue that the need for an unbridled federal right to raise tax revenue arose from the conviction that Congress had to have full command over all the resources of the nation in times of crisis. Primarily, this was needed so that the government could borrow money abroad and at home, which suggests that the Federalists designed the Constitution as much for future challenges as for present problems, and that for this reason, they refused to let the powers of the national government be defined by the demands on the union existing in the late 1780s, but instead strove to create a government with powers sufficiently extensive to safeguard the union's future existence, in peace as well as in war.Less
Provides the layout of the Federalist argument that Congress had to possess an unlimited power to raise men and money from American society without any intervention from the states. While the following chapter looks in greater depth at Antifederalist objections to the federal fiscal powers of the US Constitution, here the concern is solely with the restrictions to this power that they suggested in the form of amendments. The reasons are discussed as to why the Federalists refused to accept these Antifederalist amendments (and indeed any restrictions on the fiscal power of Congress other than those already written into the Constitution), repeatedly and forcefully making it clear why it was crucial that no restrictions be placed on the right of Congress to extract money from society by means of taxation. The different sections of the chapter argue that the need for an unbridled federal right to raise tax revenue arose from the conviction that Congress had to have full command over all the resources of the nation in times of crisis. Primarily, this was needed so that the government could borrow money abroad and at home, which suggests that the Federalists designed the Constitution as much for future challenges as for present problems, and that for this reason, they refused to let the powers of the national government be defined by the demands on the union existing in the late 1780s, but instead strove to create a government with powers sufficiently extensive to safeguard the union's future existence, in peace as well as in war.
Max. M Edling
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- January 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780195148701
- eISBN:
- 9780199835096
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195148703.003.0013
- Subject:
- Political Science, American Politics
Presents the Antifederalist objections to a stronger national government in the “fiscal‐military” sphere, with this chapter looking closely at Antifederalist objections to the federal fiscal powers ...
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Presents the Antifederalist objections to a stronger national government in the “fiscal‐military” sphere, with this chapter looking closely at Antifederalist objections to the federal fiscal powers of the US Constitution, and the answers of the Federalists to these. Only rarely did the Antifederalists raise any objections to the right of Congress to borrow money, but the fact that they seemed to accept that public borrowing might sometimes be necessary did not mean that they accepted the need for an unlimited federal power over taxation. In their opposition to the Constitution's tax clauses, the Antifederalists continued an Anglo‐American political tradition of opposition against state growth that in turn is but an instant of a universal resistance to the centralization of power characteristic of early modern Europe. The Antifederalist opposition centered on the future role of the state legislatures: in Antifederalist thought the state assembly had come to take on the function filled by the House of Commons in English “Country” thought, so it was regarded as a crucial barrier against government abuse and as the only institution that made possible taxation with the consent of the governed.Less
Presents the Antifederalist objections to a stronger national government in the “fiscal‐military” sphere, with this chapter looking closely at Antifederalist objections to the federal fiscal powers of the US Constitution, and the answers of the Federalists to these. Only rarely did the Antifederalists raise any objections to the right of Congress to borrow money, but the fact that they seemed to accept that public borrowing might sometimes be necessary did not mean that they accepted the need for an unlimited federal power over taxation. In their opposition to the Constitution's tax clauses, the Antifederalists continued an Anglo‐American political tradition of opposition against state growth that in turn is but an instant of a universal resistance to the centralization of power characteristic of early modern Europe. The Antifederalist opposition centered on the future role of the state legislatures: in Antifederalist thought the state assembly had come to take on the function filled by the House of Commons in English “Country” thought, so it was regarded as a crucial barrier against government abuse and as the only institution that made possible taxation with the consent of the governed.
Michael Keating
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- September 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199545957
- eISBN:
- 9780191719967
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199545957.003.0007
- Subject:
- Political Science, Comparative Politics, UK Politics
Short of independence, Scotland's constitutional position might evolve gradually, with a slow accretion of powers. Fiscal powers are an important element although fiscal equalization poses major ...
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Short of independence, Scotland's constitutional position might evolve gradually, with a slow accretion of powers. Fiscal powers are an important element although fiscal equalization poses major problems. There are strong arguments for devolving welfare matters in order to strengthen the Scottish political arena, although this divides neo-nationalists and neo-unionists. The West Lothian Question can be resolved by excluding Scottish MPs from voting on English matters. Neo-unionists have argued for a written constitution and a British bill of rights, but these are nation-building measures unacceptable to neo-nationalists. The main difficulty in stronger Scottish self-government is the need for common institutions to manage common issues. English political and public opinion remains unitary in its thinking and would want to retain a unitary English polity and resist federalizing measures.Less
Short of independence, Scotland's constitutional position might evolve gradually, with a slow accretion of powers. Fiscal powers are an important element although fiscal equalization poses major problems. There are strong arguments for devolving welfare matters in order to strengthen the Scottish political arena, although this divides neo-nationalists and neo-unionists. The West Lothian Question can be resolved by excluding Scottish MPs from voting on English matters. Neo-unionists have argued for a written constitution and a British bill of rights, but these are nation-building measures unacceptable to neo-nationalists. The main difficulty in stronger Scottish self-government is the need for common institutions to manage common issues. English political and public opinion remains unitary in its thinking and would want to retain a unitary English polity and resist federalizing measures.
Max. M Edling
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- January 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780195148701
- eISBN:
- 9780199835096
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195148703.003.0011
- Subject:
- Political Science, American Politics
Provides background accounts of political development in the USA from the American War of Independence to the Philadelphia Convention, and establish that, by 1787, Congress was marked by military ...
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Provides background accounts of political development in the USA from the American War of Independence to the Philadelphia Convention, and establish that, by 1787, Congress was marked by military weakness and financial insolvency. Here, an account is given of the efforts of Congress to implement the fiscal clauses of the US Constitution, which shows that the national government created by the Articles of Confederation experienced serious difficulties in its ability to raise money, and in the end failed to raise sufficient money to meet its expenses. The focus of the chapter is on the means by which Congress raised money from the outbreak of the War of Independence up to the Philadelphia Convention, and also on how, one by one, these means were lost, so that by 1787 the insolvency of the national government was total. The first two parts of the chapter describe the attempts of Congress to raise money through fiat (printed) money, loans, and taxes, with the author contending that the Federalists accepted existing restrictions to taxation and formed a tax system that would be able to generate sufficient income for the national government without putting undue pressure on the American people. The last section of the chapter looks at the problem of the public debts run up by Congress and the states during the War of Independence, and at the reasons for the federal assumption of state debts – whether they were democratic or economic – and the reasons given by the Federalists as to why Congress had to resume payment of the public domestic and foreign debt.Less
Provides background accounts of political development in the USA from the American War of Independence to the Philadelphia Convention, and establish that, by 1787, Congress was marked by military weakness and financial insolvency. Here, an account is given of the efforts of Congress to implement the fiscal clauses of the US Constitution, which shows that the national government created by the Articles of Confederation experienced serious difficulties in its ability to raise money, and in the end failed to raise sufficient money to meet its expenses. The focus of the chapter is on the means by which Congress raised money from the outbreak of the War of Independence up to the Philadelphia Convention, and also on how, one by one, these means were lost, so that by 1787 the insolvency of the national government was total. The first two parts of the chapter describe the attempts of Congress to raise money through fiat (printed) money, loans, and taxes, with the author contending that the Federalists accepted existing restrictions to taxation and formed a tax system that would be able to generate sufficient income for the national government without putting undue pressure on the American people. The last section of the chapter looks at the problem of the public debts run up by Congress and the states during the War of Independence, and at the reasons for the federal assumption of state debts – whether they were democratic or economic – and the reasons given by the Federalists as to why Congress had to resume payment of the public domestic and foreign debt.
Max. M Edling
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- January 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780195148701
- eISBN:
- 9780199835096
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195148703.003.0014
- Subject:
- Political Science, American Politics
Shows how the Federalists responded to the Antifederalist objections to a stronger national government in the “fiscal‐military” sphere, thereby creating an understanding of the kind of state that was ...
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Shows how the Federalists responded to the Antifederalist objections to a stronger national government in the “fiscal‐military” sphere, thereby creating an understanding of the kind of state that was proper to American conditions. In the debate over ratification of the US Constitution there was little discussion about the exact way in which the Federalists intended to organize the revenue administration, but nevertheless, it is the argument of this chapter that with the important exception of the assumption of the state debts, the general outline of Hamiltonian public finance was in place in 1787, and widely shared by the supporters of the Constitution. Thus, the idea that the least oppressive tax was also the most productive, the claim that adoption of the Constitution would mean a change in the structure of taxation from direct to indirect taxes and a reliance on the impost (customs duties), and the ideal of the federal government as a “waterfront state” hardly noticed by the people, were all among the most important points made in Federalist rhetoric on the fiscal powers of the Constitution. In the ratifying debate, the Federalists presented a solution to the equation of how to create a sufficiently powerful government without making unacceptable demands on society: the federal government had the right to mobilize the full resources of society at will, but in peacetime it would keep a very low profile while assuming the payment of the union's debts and the cost of defense using money raised by taxation. This federal assumption of expenses that had earlier been carried by the states, and the mode of raising the taxes to pay for it ensured that overall taxation would not increase, as the Antifederalists claimed, but would become less burdensome to the majority of the people.Less
Shows how the Federalists responded to the Antifederalist objections to a stronger national government in the “fiscal‐military” sphere, thereby creating an understanding of the kind of state that was proper to American conditions. In the debate over ratification of the US Constitution there was little discussion about the exact way in which the Federalists intended to organize the revenue administration, but nevertheless, it is the argument of this chapter that with the important exception of the assumption of the state debts, the general outline of Hamiltonian public finance was in place in 1787, and widely shared by the supporters of the Constitution. Thus, the idea that the least oppressive tax was also the most productive, the claim that adoption of the Constitution would mean a change in the structure of taxation from direct to indirect taxes and a reliance on the impost (customs duties), and the ideal of the federal government as a “waterfront state” hardly noticed by the people, were all among the most important points made in Federalist rhetoric on the fiscal powers of the Constitution. In the ratifying debate, the Federalists presented a solution to the equation of how to create a sufficiently powerful government without making unacceptable demands on society: the federal government had the right to mobilize the full resources of society at will, but in peacetime it would keep a very low profile while assuming the payment of the union's debts and the cost of defense using money raised by taxation. This federal assumption of expenses that had earlier been carried by the states, and the mode of raising the taxes to pay for it ensured that overall taxation would not increase, as the Antifederalists claimed, but would become less burdensome to the majority of the people.
Richard Bonney (ed.)
- Published in print:
- 1999
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198204022
- eISBN:
- 9780191676093
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198204022.001.0001
- Subject:
- History, Economic History
This book builds up a comprehensive analysis of the fiscal history of Europe over six centuries. It forms a fundamental starting-point for an understanding of the distinctiveness of the emerging ...
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This book builds up a comprehensive analysis of the fiscal history of Europe over six centuries. It forms a fundamental starting-point for an understanding of the distinctiveness of the emerging European states, and highlights the issue of fiscal power as an essential prerequisite for the development of the modern state. The study underlines the importance of technical developments by the state, its capacity to innovate, and, however imperfect the techniques, the greater detail and sophistication of accounting practice towards the end of the period. New taxes had been developed, new wealth had been tapped, and new mechanisms of enforcement had been established. In general, these developments were made in western Europe; the lack of progress in some fiscal systems, especially those in eastern Europe, is an issue of historical importance in its own right and lends particular significance to the chapters on Poland and Russia. By the 18th century, ‘mountains of debt’ and high debt-revenue ratios had become the norm in western Europe, yet in the east only Russia was able to adapt to the western model by 1815. The capacity of governments to borrow, and the interaction of the constraints on borrowing and the power to tax had become the real test of the fiscal powers of the ‘modern state’ by 1800–15.Less
This book builds up a comprehensive analysis of the fiscal history of Europe over six centuries. It forms a fundamental starting-point for an understanding of the distinctiveness of the emerging European states, and highlights the issue of fiscal power as an essential prerequisite for the development of the modern state. The study underlines the importance of technical developments by the state, its capacity to innovate, and, however imperfect the techniques, the greater detail and sophistication of accounting practice towards the end of the period. New taxes had been developed, new wealth had been tapped, and new mechanisms of enforcement had been established. In general, these developments were made in western Europe; the lack of progress in some fiscal systems, especially those in eastern Europe, is an issue of historical importance in its own right and lends particular significance to the chapters on Poland and Russia. By the 18th century, ‘mountains of debt’ and high debt-revenue ratios had become the norm in western Europe, yet in the east only Russia was able to adapt to the western model by 1815. The capacity of governments to borrow, and the interaction of the constraints on borrowing and the power to tax had become the real test of the fiscal powers of the ‘modern state’ by 1800–15.
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- March 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780226771120
- eISBN:
- 9780226771151
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- University of Chicago Press
- DOI:
- 10.7208/chicago/9780226771151.003.0002
- Subject:
- Law, Constitutional and Administrative Law
This chapter discusses the judicial power of the purse from the perspective of each branch of government. It establishes the possible upper and lower bound of judicial fiscal power. The Congressional ...
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This chapter discusses the judicial power of the purse from the perspective of each branch of government. It establishes the possible upper and lower bound of judicial fiscal power. The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) and the Joint Committee on Taxation (JCT) were the two most significant bodies contributing to Congress' understanding of the judicial power of the purse. Their work provided a surprising level of detail about the nature and extent of judicial fiscal power. The CBO determined court-induced costs to the federal government to the fullest extent possible. The judicial branch's view of its own fiscal powers strongly showed that court decisions can and do have budgetary effects, and judges understand this facet of their Article III power. The available evidence revealed that every branch of government is keenly aware of judicial power and explicitly accounts for it in their respective decision-making processes.Less
This chapter discusses the judicial power of the purse from the perspective of each branch of government. It establishes the possible upper and lower bound of judicial fiscal power. The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) and the Joint Committee on Taxation (JCT) were the two most significant bodies contributing to Congress' understanding of the judicial power of the purse. Their work provided a surprising level of detail about the nature and extent of judicial fiscal power. The CBO determined court-induced costs to the federal government to the fullest extent possible. The judicial branch's view of its own fiscal powers strongly showed that court decisions can and do have budgetary effects, and judges understand this facet of their Article III power. The available evidence revealed that every branch of government is keenly aware of judicial power and explicitly accounts for it in their respective decision-making processes.
Agustina Giraudy
- Published in print:
- 2015
- Published Online:
- April 2015
- ISBN:
- 9780198706861
- eISBN:
- 9780191778537
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198706861.001.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, Democratization
The study is premised on the notion that subnational undemocratic regimes (SURs) within countries not only differ among each other but that they maintain different relations with the federal ...
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The study is premised on the notion that subnational undemocratic regimes (SURs) within countries not only differ among each other but that they maintain different relations with the federal government, which is why they are reproduced differently. The book argues that alternative pathways of SUR continuity result first and foremost from the capacity (or lack thereof) of democratic presidents to wield power over SURs and autocrats. If presidents have the (fiscal or partisan) resources to induce cooperation from subnational autocrats and can thus secure credible and routine political support, the former have strong incentives to invest in the continuity and stability of undemocratic provincial regimes and autocrats. Under these circumstances, SUR reproduction from above takes place. Conversely, if presidents fail to exert effective power and are prevented from disciplining subnational autocrats via fiscal or partisan means, they will implement policies to oppose and weaken SURs. This does not necessarily lead to SUR breakdown. Local variables, such as subnational autocrats’ capacity to ensure party elite unity and/or mass political support, shape autocrats’ ability to counterbalance presidential attempts at destabilization, and also allow autocrats to keep their regimes alive. Where this occurs, SUR self-reproduction takes place. This explanation of SUR continuity is tested in contemporary Argentina and Mexico using a multi-method approach. Both quantitative and qualitative methods, as well as cross-national and within-country comparisons, are employed to test pathways of SUR continuity in two of Latin America’s largest countries.Less
The study is premised on the notion that subnational undemocratic regimes (SURs) within countries not only differ among each other but that they maintain different relations with the federal government, which is why they are reproduced differently. The book argues that alternative pathways of SUR continuity result first and foremost from the capacity (or lack thereof) of democratic presidents to wield power over SURs and autocrats. If presidents have the (fiscal or partisan) resources to induce cooperation from subnational autocrats and can thus secure credible and routine political support, the former have strong incentives to invest in the continuity and stability of undemocratic provincial regimes and autocrats. Under these circumstances, SUR reproduction from above takes place. Conversely, if presidents fail to exert effective power and are prevented from disciplining subnational autocrats via fiscal or partisan means, they will implement policies to oppose and weaken SURs. This does not necessarily lead to SUR breakdown. Local variables, such as subnational autocrats’ capacity to ensure party elite unity and/or mass political support, shape autocrats’ ability to counterbalance presidential attempts at destabilization, and also allow autocrats to keep their regimes alive. Where this occurs, SUR self-reproduction takes place. This explanation of SUR continuity is tested in contemporary Argentina and Mexico using a multi-method approach. Both quantitative and qualitative methods, as well as cross-national and within-country comparisons, are employed to test pathways of SUR continuity in two of Latin America’s largest countries.
Max M. Edling
- Published in print:
- 2014
- Published Online:
- May 2015
- ISBN:
- 9780226181578
- eISBN:
- 9780226181608
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- University of Chicago Press
- DOI:
- 10.7208/chicago/9780226181608.003.0002
- Subject:
- History, American History: 19th Century
The Constitution of the United States was first and foremost a reformed compact of union. It replaced the defunct Articles of Confederation with a working central government. In the so-called ...
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The Constitution of the United States was first and foremost a reformed compact of union. It replaced the defunct Articles of Confederation with a working central government. In the so-called “critical period” that preceded the adoption of the Constitution in 1787 several critical issues emanating from the activities of rival North American and Atlantic powers confronted the newly independent United States. The significance of the framing and adoption of the Constitution lies in the fact that it made possible the creation of an energetic national government that could begin to address these issues. Chapter one analyzes both the reform movement that attempted to amend the Articles of Confederation and the work of the Constitutional Convention. It explains how the centralization of fiscal and financial powers that resulted from the adoption of the Constitution was central to the creation of an effective federal government.Less
The Constitution of the United States was first and foremost a reformed compact of union. It replaced the defunct Articles of Confederation with a working central government. In the so-called “critical period” that preceded the adoption of the Constitution in 1787 several critical issues emanating from the activities of rival North American and Atlantic powers confronted the newly independent United States. The significance of the framing and adoption of the Constitution lies in the fact that it made possible the creation of an energetic national government that could begin to address these issues. Chapter one analyzes both the reform movement that attempted to amend the Articles of Confederation and the work of the Constitutional Convention. It explains how the centralization of fiscal and financial powers that resulted from the adoption of the Constitution was central to the creation of an effective federal government.
Agustina Giraudy
- Published in print:
- 2015
- Published Online:
- April 2015
- ISBN:
- 9780198706861
- eISBN:
- 9780191778537
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198706861.003.0006
- Subject:
- Political Science, Democratization
This chapter presents in-depth qualitative evidence, comparing two Argentine SURs under Presidents Néstor Kirchner and Cristina Fernández de Kirchner: one in which presidential fiscal power over the ...
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This chapter presents in-depth qualitative evidence, comparing two Argentine SURs under Presidents Néstor Kirchner and Cristina Fernández de Kirchner: one in which presidential fiscal power over the SUR was strong, leading to SUR reproduction from above (La Rioja), and one in which presidential power over subnational autocrats was low, leading to SUR weakening from above (San Luis). Evidence from the two SURs demonstrates that presidents hold greater power over SURs that are financially vulnerable and this incentivizes presidents to sustain the existence of the SUR (as in La Rioja). The study of San Luis reveals that local variables, such as party elite unity and mass support explain the capacity of SUR incumbents to sustain the regime despite presidential strategies of regime weakening. This evidence further highlights the importance of recognizing how within-country differences between SURs influence the likelihood of an SUR retaining power.Less
This chapter presents in-depth qualitative evidence, comparing two Argentine SURs under Presidents Néstor Kirchner and Cristina Fernández de Kirchner: one in which presidential fiscal power over the SUR was strong, leading to SUR reproduction from above (La Rioja), and one in which presidential power over subnational autocrats was low, leading to SUR weakening from above (San Luis). Evidence from the two SURs demonstrates that presidents hold greater power over SURs that are financially vulnerable and this incentivizes presidents to sustain the existence of the SUR (as in La Rioja). The study of San Luis reveals that local variables, such as party elite unity and mass support explain the capacity of SUR incumbents to sustain the regime despite presidential strategies of regime weakening. This evidence further highlights the importance of recognizing how within-country differences between SURs influence the likelihood of an SUR retaining power.
Agustina Giraudy
- Published in print:
- 2015
- Published Online:
- April 2015
- ISBN:
- 9780198706861
- eISBN:
- 9780191778537
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198706861.003.0002
- Subject:
- Political Science, Democratization
This chapter examines current approaches to the study of subnational undemocratic regimes (SURs) and highlights their contributions and main limitations. Against this backdrop the chapter introduces ...
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This chapter examines current approaches to the study of subnational undemocratic regimes (SURs) and highlights their contributions and main limitations. Against this backdrop the chapter introduces the general argument of this book that the capacity (or lack thereof) of presidents to exert control over subnational autocrats triggers different pathways of SUR continuity within countries. It discusses in detail the argument’s building blocks, namely, (a) the factors that make presidential power important for determining SUR continuity, (b) the instruments to which presidents can resort to in order to exert power over subnational autocrats and their SURs, (c) the instruments which autocrats can employ in order to neutralize this power and to ultimately render it ineffective, (d) the conditions under which two different types of presidential power, i.e. fiscal or partisan, can ensue, and (e) the different pathways of SUR reproduction that result from the capacity (or lack thereof) of presidents to wield power over autocrats and SURs.Less
This chapter examines current approaches to the study of subnational undemocratic regimes (SURs) and highlights their contributions and main limitations. Against this backdrop the chapter introduces the general argument of this book that the capacity (or lack thereof) of presidents to exert control over subnational autocrats triggers different pathways of SUR continuity within countries. It discusses in detail the argument’s building blocks, namely, (a) the factors that make presidential power important for determining SUR continuity, (b) the instruments to which presidents can resort to in order to exert power over subnational autocrats and their SURs, (c) the instruments which autocrats can employ in order to neutralize this power and to ultimately render it ineffective, (d) the conditions under which two different types of presidential power, i.e. fiscal or partisan, can ensue, and (e) the different pathways of SUR reproduction that result from the capacity (or lack thereof) of presidents to wield power over autocrats and SURs.
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- March 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780226771120
- eISBN:
- 9780226771151
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- University of Chicago Press
- DOI:
- 10.7208/chicago/9780226771151.003.0003
- Subject:
- Law, Constitutional and Administrative Law
This chapter introduces the information theory of crisis jurisprudence, positing that judges wield their fiscal power as a double-edged sword with the goal of assuring the nation consumes the ...
More
This chapter introduces the information theory of crisis jurisprudence, positing that judges wield their fiscal power as a double-edged sword with the goal of assuring the nation consumes the preferred level of defense. The account of judicial behavior presented forecasted that federal judges will use their decision-making powers to promote their preferred level of national safety and security, although they may not explicitly state this as their goal. Congress and the president may assume the factors that influence judicial decision making in times of peace will also be present in times of war. Investigations that focus on circumstances in which the president cues a desire to increase the nation's military activities are explored. Judges were experts in law and constitutional matters and thus will not rely on their own information and expertise when making the determination to pursue more or less defense.Less
This chapter introduces the information theory of crisis jurisprudence, positing that judges wield their fiscal power as a double-edged sword with the goal of assuring the nation consumes the preferred level of defense. The account of judicial behavior presented forecasted that federal judges will use their decision-making powers to promote their preferred level of national safety and security, although they may not explicitly state this as their goal. Congress and the president may assume the factors that influence judicial decision making in times of peace will also be present in times of war. Investigations that focus on circumstances in which the president cues a desire to increase the nation's military activities are explored. Judges were experts in law and constitutional matters and thus will not rely on their own information and expertise when making the determination to pursue more or less defense.
Jason Brownlee, Tarek Masoud, and Andrew Reynolds
- Published in print:
- 2015
- Published Online:
- May 2015
- ISBN:
- 9780199660063
- eISBN:
- 9780191755941
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199660063.001.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, Comparative Politics
This book is premised on the notion that subnational undemocratic regimes (SURs) within countries not only differ among each other but that they maintain different relations with the federal ...
More
This book is premised on the notion that subnational undemocratic regimes (SURs) within countries not only differ among each other but that they maintain different relations with the federal government, which is why they are reproduced differently. The book argues that alternative pathways of SUR continuity result first and foremost from the capacity (or lack thereof) of democratic presidents to wield power over SURs and autocrats. If presidents have the (fiscal or partisan) resources to induce cooperation from subnational autocrats and can thus secure credible and routine political support, the former have strong incentives to invest in the continuity and stability of undemocratic provincial regimes and autocrats. Under these circumstances, SUR reproduction from above takes place. Conversely, if presidents fail to exert effective power and are prevented from disciplining subnational autocrats via fiscal or partisan means, they will implement policies to oppose and weaken SURs. This does not necessarily lead to SUR breakdown. Local variables, such as subnational autocrats’ capacity to ensure party elite unity and/or mass political support, shape autocrats’ ability to counterbalance presidential attempts at destabilization, and also allow autocrats to keep their regimes alive. Where this occurs, SUR self-reproduction takes place. This explanation of SUR continuity is tested in contemporary Argentina and Mexico using a multi-method approach. Both quantitative and qualitative methods, as well as cross-national and within-country comparisons, are employed to test pathways of SUR continuity in two of Latin America’s largest countries.Less
This book is premised on the notion that subnational undemocratic regimes (SURs) within countries not only differ among each other but that they maintain different relations with the federal government, which is why they are reproduced differently. The book argues that alternative pathways of SUR continuity result first and foremost from the capacity (or lack thereof) of democratic presidents to wield power over SURs and autocrats. If presidents have the (fiscal or partisan) resources to induce cooperation from subnational autocrats and can thus secure credible and routine political support, the former have strong incentives to invest in the continuity and stability of undemocratic provincial regimes and autocrats. Under these circumstances, SUR reproduction from above takes place. Conversely, if presidents fail to exert effective power and are prevented from disciplining subnational autocrats via fiscal or partisan means, they will implement policies to oppose and weaken SURs. This does not necessarily lead to SUR breakdown. Local variables, such as subnational autocrats’ capacity to ensure party elite unity and/or mass political support, shape autocrats’ ability to counterbalance presidential attempts at destabilization, and also allow autocrats to keep their regimes alive. Where this occurs, SUR self-reproduction takes place. This explanation of SUR continuity is tested in contemporary Argentina and Mexico using a multi-method approach. Both quantitative and qualitative methods, as well as cross-national and within-country comparisons, are employed to test pathways of SUR continuity in two of Latin America’s largest countries.
