Martine Nida-Rümelin
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- May 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199590650
- eISBN:
- 9780191741043
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199590650.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Mind
According to subject–body dualism the experiencing subject is neither identical nor constituted by its body. It is argued that a weak version of subject–body dualism is deeply incorporated into our ...
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According to subject–body dualism the experiencing subject is neither identical nor constituted by its body. It is argued that a weak version of subject–body dualism is deeply incorporated into our thought. The purpose of the paper is to describe the conceptual origin of subject–body dualism and to thereby uncover a deep intuition according to which we are perfect individuals. A perfect individual is not constituted by any of its properties, or by being composed of a specific concrete stuff. The intuitive appeal of subject–body dualism can be explained by the insight that we naturally conceive of conscious beings as perfect individuals; this conception can be detected in features of counterfactual thought about ourselves and other beings that we take to be conscious. The conceptual explanation proposed of the dualist intuition does not, however, undermine the dualist view which is based on that intuition.Less
According to subject–body dualism the experiencing subject is neither identical nor constituted by its body. It is argued that a weak version of subject–body dualism is deeply incorporated into our thought. The purpose of the paper is to describe the conceptual origin of subject–body dualism and to thereby uncover a deep intuition according to which we are perfect individuals. A perfect individual is not constituted by any of its properties, or by being composed of a specific concrete stuff. The intuitive appeal of subject–body dualism can be explained by the insight that we naturally conceive of conscious beings as perfect individuals; this conception can be detected in features of counterfactual thought about ourselves and other beings that we take to be conscious. The conceptual explanation proposed of the dualist intuition does not, however, undermine the dualist view which is based on that intuition.
Martine Nida‐Rümelin
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- September 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199556182
- eISBN:
- 9780191721014
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199556182.003.0009
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Metaphysics/Epistemology
Subject body dualism is the view that conscious individuals (including human and non-human animals) are neither identical nor constituted by material things. An argument in favor of subject body ...
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Subject body dualism is the view that conscious individuals (including human and non-human animals) are neither identical nor constituted by material things. An argument in favor of subject body dualism is developed which is based on a description of conceptual features of first person thought. This chapter argues that certain central conceptual features of first person thought carry over to the way we conceive of the future and the past of other conscious individuals and their identity across time. These conceptual features are deeply incorporated into the way we perceive each other and into our emotional attitudes. An indirect argument for subject body dualism is developed which is distinct from conceivability arguments: any alternative to subject body dualism implies that we suffer from a permanent and ubiquitous illusion in our cognitive and emotional life. The version of subject body dualism defended has no religious motivation, presupposition or consequences.Less
Subject body dualism is the view that conscious individuals (including human and non-human animals) are neither identical nor constituted by material things. An argument in favor of subject body dualism is developed which is based on a description of conceptual features of first person thought. This chapter argues that certain central conceptual features of first person thought carry over to the way we conceive of the future and the past of other conscious individuals and their identity across time. These conceptual features are deeply incorporated into the way we perceive each other and into our emotional attitudes. An indirect argument for subject body dualism is developed which is distinct from conceivability arguments: any alternative to subject body dualism implies that we suffer from a permanent and ubiquitous illusion in our cognitive and emotional life. The version of subject body dualism defended has no religious motivation, presupposition or consequences.
Matthew Kennedy
- Published in print:
- 2013
- Published Online:
- January 2014
- ISBN:
- 9780262019200
- eISBN:
- 9780262315050
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- The MIT Press
- DOI:
- 10.7551/mitpress/9780262019200.003.0010
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
This chapter argues that we can affirm the pattern of first-person thinking without the epistemic conception of hallucination. The chapter starts by explaining the link that Michael Martin draws ...
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This chapter argues that we can affirm the pattern of first-person thinking without the epistemic conception of hallucination. The chapter starts by explaining the link that Michael Martin draws between the first-person thinking and the epistemic conception of hallucination. It then goes on to explain how to achieve Martin's ambition without his theory. The chapter uses a naive-realist-friendly conception of first-person access to experience. The metaphysical theory used is a form of naive realism that endorses an intentionalist or representationalist “common-factor” approach to veridical and hallucinatory experience. The chapter finally develops this theory.Less
This chapter argues that we can affirm the pattern of first-person thinking without the epistemic conception of hallucination. The chapter starts by explaining the link that Michael Martin draws between the first-person thinking and the epistemic conception of hallucination. It then goes on to explain how to achieve Martin's ambition without his theory. The chapter uses a naive-realist-friendly conception of first-person access to experience. The metaphysical theory used is a form of naive realism that endorses an intentionalist or representationalist “common-factor” approach to veridical and hallucinatory experience. The chapter finally develops this theory.
José Luis Bermúdez
- Published in print:
- 2017
- Published Online:
- February 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780198796213
- eISBN:
- 9780191837319
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198796213.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
Why are we interested in the first person pronoun “I”? One famous answer, associated with David Lewis and John Perry, is that first person thoughts (thoughts typically expressed through sentences ...
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Why are we interested in the first person pronoun “I”? One famous answer, associated with David Lewis and John Perry, is that first person thoughts (thoughts typically expressed through sentences involving “I”) have a unique and indispensable role in generating and explaining action. This chapter responds to the challenge recently raised by Cappelen and Dever in their book The Inessential Indexical (OUP, 2013). Using the framework proposed by Cappelen and Dever, it shows that, even on their own terms, psychological explanations have to be indexical. This argument sets the agenda for the book. Sentences using “I” express first person thoughts. Those thoughts have a distinctive role, evidenced by but not restricted to their role in motivating action. Explaining how we understand the first person pronoun is one way of explaining what first person thoughts are and how they work.Less
Why are we interested in the first person pronoun “I”? One famous answer, associated with David Lewis and John Perry, is that first person thoughts (thoughts typically expressed through sentences involving “I”) have a unique and indispensable role in generating and explaining action. This chapter responds to the challenge recently raised by Cappelen and Dever in their book The Inessential Indexical (OUP, 2013). Using the framework proposed by Cappelen and Dever, it shows that, even on their own terms, psychological explanations have to be indexical. This argument sets the agenda for the book. Sentences using “I” express first person thoughts. Those thoughts have a distinctive role, evidenced by but not restricted to their role in motivating action. Explaining how we understand the first person pronoun is one way of explaining what first person thoughts are and how they work.
Manuel García-Carpintero and Stephan Torre (eds)
- Published in print:
- 2016
- Published Online:
- January 2016
- ISBN:
- 9780198713265
- eISBN:
- 9780191781711
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198713265.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
This volume addresses foundational issues concerning the nature of first-personal, or de se thought and how such thoughts are communicated. One of the question addressed is whether there is anything ...
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This volume addresses foundational issues concerning the nature of first-personal, or de se thought and how such thoughts are communicated. One of the question addressed is whether there is anything distinctive about de se thought or whether it can be subsumed under broader phenomena. Many have held that de se thought motivates a revision to traditional accounts of content or positing special ways of accessing such contents. Gottlob Frege famously held that first-person thoughts involve a subject being “presented to himself in a particular and primitive way, in which he is presented to no-one else.” However, as Frege also noted, this raises many puzzling questions when we consider how we are able to communicate such thoughts. Is there indeed something special about first-person thought such that it requires a primitive mode of presentation that cannot be grasped by others? If there really is something special about first-person thought, what happens when I communicate this thought to you? Do you come to believe the very thing that I believe? Or is my first-person belief only entertained by me? If it is only entertained by me, how does it relate to what you come to believe? It is these questions that the volume addresses and seeks to answer.Less
This volume addresses foundational issues concerning the nature of first-personal, or de se thought and how such thoughts are communicated. One of the question addressed is whether there is anything distinctive about de se thought or whether it can be subsumed under broader phenomena. Many have held that de se thought motivates a revision to traditional accounts of content or positing special ways of accessing such contents. Gottlob Frege famously held that first-person thoughts involve a subject being “presented to himself in a particular and primitive way, in which he is presented to no-one else.” However, as Frege also noted, this raises many puzzling questions when we consider how we are able to communicate such thoughts. Is there indeed something special about first-person thought such that it requires a primitive mode of presentation that cannot be grasped by others? If there really is something special about first-person thought, what happens when I communicate this thought to you? Do you come to believe the very thing that I believe? Or is my first-person belief only entertained by me? If it is only entertained by me, how does it relate to what you come to believe? It is these questions that the volume addresses and seeks to answer.
