Peter Carruthers
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- July 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780199277360
- eISBN:
- 9780191602597
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199277362.003.0006
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
Presents and develops what the author takes to be the main argument, both against the most plausible version of first-order representationalist theory of phenomenal consciousness, and in support of ...
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Presents and develops what the author takes to be the main argument, both against the most plausible version of first-order representationalist theory of phenomenal consciousness, and in support of his own higher-order perception/dual-content account. The primary goal of the chapter is to lay out the case for saying that dual-content theory (but not first-order theory) provides us with a successful reductive explanation of the various puzzling features of phenomenal consciousness. Also takes up the question whether a first-order theorist can also accept the higher-order analogue contents postulated by dual-content theory, and can thereby obtain all of the advantages of the latter, while retaining their distinctively first-order account of phenomenal consciousness itself. It returns a negative answer.Less
Presents and develops what the author takes to be the main argument, both against the most plausible version of first-order representationalist theory of phenomenal consciousness, and in support of his own higher-order perception/dual-content account. The primary goal of the chapter is to lay out the case for saying that dual-content theory (but not first-order theory) provides us with a successful reductive explanation of the various puzzling features of phenomenal consciousness. Also takes up the question whether a first-order theorist can also accept the higher-order analogue contents postulated by dual-content theory, and can thereby obtain all of the advantages of the latter, while retaining their distinctively first-order account of phenomenal consciousness itself. It returns a negative answer.
Peter Carruthers
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- July 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780199277360
- eISBN:
- 9780191602597
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199277362.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
Presents arguments against both first order (FOR) theories and actualist higher-order thought (HOT) theory (of the sort espoused by Rosenthal), and argues for the superiority of higher-order ...
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Presents arguments against both first order (FOR) theories and actualist higher-order thought (HOT) theory (of the sort espoused by Rosenthal), and argues for the superiority of higher-order perception (HOP) theories over each of them. But HOP theories come in two very different varieties. One is the ‘inner sense’ theory of Armstrong and Lycan, according to which we have a set of inner sense-organs charged with scanning the outputs of our first-order senses to produce higher-order perceptions of our own experiential states. The other is the author’s own dispositional form of HOT theory, according to which the availability of our first-order perceptions to a faculty of higher-order thought confers on those perceptual states a dual higher-order content. Argues that this latter form of HOP theory is superior to the inner-sense theory, and also defends it against the charge that it is vulnerable to the very same arguments that sink FOR theories and actualist HOT theory.Less
Presents arguments against both first order (FOR) theories and actualist higher-order thought (HOT) theory (of the sort espoused by Rosenthal), and argues for the superiority of higher-order perception (HOP) theories over each of them. But HOP theories come in two very different varieties. One is the ‘inner sense’ theory of Armstrong and Lycan, according to which we have a set of inner sense-organs charged with scanning the outputs of our first-order senses to produce higher-order perceptions of our own experiential states. The other is the author’s own dispositional form of HOT theory, according to which the availability of our first-order perceptions to a faculty of higher-order thought confers on those perceptual states a dual higher-order content. Argues that this latter form of HOP theory is superior to the inner-sense theory, and also defends it against the charge that it is vulnerable to the very same arguments that sink FOR theories and actualist HOT theory.
Peter Carruthers
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- July 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780199277360
- eISBN:
- 9780191602597
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199277362.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
Works its way through a variety of different accounts of phenomenal consciousness, looking at the strengths and weaknesses of each. At the heart of the chapter is an extended critical examination of ...
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Works its way through a variety of different accounts of phenomenal consciousness, looking at the strengths and weaknesses of each. At the heart of the chapter is an extended critical examination of first-order representational (FOR) theories, of the sort espoused by Dretske and Tye, arguing that they are inferior to higher-order representational (HOR) accounts. Acknowledges as a problem for HOR theories that they might withhold phenomenal consciousness from most other species of animal, but claims that this problem should not be regarded as a serious obstacle to the acceptance of some such theory. Different versions of HOR theory are discussed, and the author’s own account (dual-content theory, here called dispositional higher-order thought theory) is briefly elaborated and defended.Less
Works its way through a variety of different accounts of phenomenal consciousness, looking at the strengths and weaknesses of each. At the heart of the chapter is an extended critical examination of first-order representational (FOR) theories, of the sort espoused by Dretske and Tye, arguing that they are inferior to higher-order representational (HOR) accounts. Acknowledges as a problem for HOR theories that they might withhold phenomenal consciousness from most other species of animal, but claims that this problem should not be regarded as a serious obstacle to the acceptance of some such theory. Different versions of HOR theory are discussed, and the author’s own account (dual-content theory, here called dispositional higher-order thought theory) is briefly elaborated and defended.
Rocco J. Gennaro
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- August 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780262016605
- eISBN:
- 9780262298582
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- The MIT Press
- DOI:
- 10.7551/mitpress/9780262016605.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
Consciousness is arguably the most important area within contemporary philosophy of mind and perhaps the most puzzling aspect of the world. Despite an explosion of research from philosophers, ...
More
Consciousness is arguably the most important area within contemporary philosophy of mind and perhaps the most puzzling aspect of the world. Despite an explosion of research from philosophers, psychologists, and scientists, attempts to explain consciousness in neurophysiological, or even cognitive, terms are often met with great resistance. This book aims to solve an underlying paradox, namely, how it is possible to hold a number of seemingly inconsistent views, including higher-order thought (HOT) theory, conceptualism, infant and animal consciousness, concept acquisition, and what the book calls the HOT-brain thesis. It defends and further develops a metapsychological reductive representational theory of consciousness and applies it to several importantly related problems. The book proposes a version of the HOT theory of consciousness that the text calls the “wide intrinsicality view” and shows why it is superior to various alternatives, such as self-representationalism and first-order representationalism. HOT theory says that what makes a mental state conscious is that a suitable higher-order thought is directed at that mental state. Thus it argues for an overall philosophical theory of consciousness while applying it to other significant issues not usually addressed in the philosophical literature on consciousness. Most cognitive science and empirical works on such topics as concepts and animal consciousness do not address central philosophical theories of consciousness. The book’s integration of empirical and philosophical concerns will make its argument of interest to both philosophers and nonphilosophers.Less
Consciousness is arguably the most important area within contemporary philosophy of mind and perhaps the most puzzling aspect of the world. Despite an explosion of research from philosophers, psychologists, and scientists, attempts to explain consciousness in neurophysiological, or even cognitive, terms are often met with great resistance. This book aims to solve an underlying paradox, namely, how it is possible to hold a number of seemingly inconsistent views, including higher-order thought (HOT) theory, conceptualism, infant and animal consciousness, concept acquisition, and what the book calls the HOT-brain thesis. It defends and further develops a metapsychological reductive representational theory of consciousness and applies it to several importantly related problems. The book proposes a version of the HOT theory of consciousness that the text calls the “wide intrinsicality view” and shows why it is superior to various alternatives, such as self-representationalism and first-order representationalism. HOT theory says that what makes a mental state conscious is that a suitable higher-order thought is directed at that mental state. Thus it argues for an overall philosophical theory of consciousness while applying it to other significant issues not usually addressed in the philosophical literature on consciousness. Most cognitive science and empirical works on such topics as concepts and animal consciousness do not address central philosophical theories of consciousness. The book’s integration of empirical and philosophical concerns will make its argument of interest to both philosophers and nonphilosophers.
Rocco J. Gennaro
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- August 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780262016605
- eISBN:
- 9780262298582
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- The MIT Press
- DOI:
- 10.7551/mitpress/9780262016605.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
This chapter can be considered as an additional argument by elimination in support for the HOT Thesis. It would be impossible to attempt to refute all, or most, philosophical theories of ...
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This chapter can be considered as an additional argument by elimination in support for the HOT Thesis. It would be impossible to attempt to refute all, or most, philosophical theories of consciousness existing at the present time, but this chapter presents a criticism of three related theories that share the common goal of offering a reductive theory of consciousness in mentalistic terms. It begins by offering a criticism of first-order representationalism (FOR), specifically Tye’s PANIC theory and Dretske’s own version of FOR, which refers to theories that attempt to explain conscious experience primarily in terms of first-order intentional states. A rejection of Carruthers’s dual-content or dispositional HOT theory as well as a criticism of Lycan’s higher-order perception (HOP) theory follow suit in an effort to make the case for the HOT Thesis.Less
This chapter can be considered as an additional argument by elimination in support for the HOT Thesis. It would be impossible to attempt to refute all, or most, philosophical theories of consciousness existing at the present time, but this chapter presents a criticism of three related theories that share the common goal of offering a reductive theory of consciousness in mentalistic terms. It begins by offering a criticism of first-order representationalism (FOR), specifically Tye’s PANIC theory and Dretske’s own version of FOR, which refers to theories that attempt to explain conscious experience primarily in terms of first-order intentional states. A rejection of Carruthers’s dual-content or dispositional HOT theory as well as a criticism of Lycan’s higher-order perception (HOP) theory follow suit in an effort to make the case for the HOT Thesis.
