James Higginbotham
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- May 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199239313
- eISBN:
- 9780191716904
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199239313.003.0012
- Subject:
- Linguistics, Semantics and Pragmatics, Theoretical Linguistics
It is widely supposed that certain uses of anaphoric forms (pronouns, reflexives, and others) give rise to peculiarly ‘first-personal’ interpretations, and it has become customary following David ...
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It is widely supposed that certain uses of anaphoric forms (pronouns, reflexives, and others) give rise to peculiarly ‘first-personal’ interpretations, and it has become customary following David Lewis (1979) to call these interpretations de se. Assuming that de se interpretations do indeed contrast with interpretations along the familiar, if not necessarily pellucid, de dicto-de re axis, there are then four questions about the de se, the first two more philosophical and the latter two more linguistic: (i) what is the nature of de se interpretations?; (ii) what relation do they bear to ordinary uses of the first-person pronoun?; (iii) why are they triggered by the particular linguistic items that trigger them?; and (iv) are they universal in human language, and what relation, if any, do they bear to logophoric phenomena in languages having special logophoric forms? This chapter considers almost exclusively the first question, hazarding only a few remarks about the second and third; and omits the fourth, most properly linguistic, question entirely.Less
It is widely supposed that certain uses of anaphoric forms (pronouns, reflexives, and others) give rise to peculiarly ‘first-personal’ interpretations, and it has become customary following David Lewis (1979) to call these interpretations de se. Assuming that de se interpretations do indeed contrast with interpretations along the familiar, if not necessarily pellucid, de dicto-de re axis, there are then four questions about the de se, the first two more philosophical and the latter two more linguistic: (i) what is the nature of de se interpretations?; (ii) what relation do they bear to ordinary uses of the first-person pronoun?; (iii) why are they triggered by the particular linguistic items that trigger them?; and (iv) are they universal in human language, and what relation, if any, do they bear to logophoric phenomena in languages having special logophoric forms? This chapter considers almost exclusively the first question, hazarding only a few remarks about the second and third; and omits the fourth, most properly linguistic, question entirely.
Kripke Saul A.
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- January 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199730155
- eISBN:
- 9780199918430
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199730155.003.0010
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General
This chapter focuses on the perplexities some philosophers have felt concerning the simple first person pronoun “I.” It considers the views of David Kaplan, Frege, and David Lewis. It argues that the ...
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This chapter focuses on the perplexities some philosophers have felt concerning the simple first person pronoun “I.” It considers the views of David Kaplan, Frege, and David Lewis. It argues that the first person use of “I” does not have a Fregean sense, at least if this means that it has a definition. But it might be a paradigmatic case of fixing a reference by means of a description: it is a rule of the common language that each of us fixes the reference of “I” by the description “the subject.” However, since each of us speaks a natural language, and not an imaginary “scientific language” spoken by no one, for each of us the referent can be different.Less
This chapter focuses on the perplexities some philosophers have felt concerning the simple first person pronoun “I.” It considers the views of David Kaplan, Frege, and David Lewis. It argues that the first person use of “I” does not have a Fregean sense, at least if this means that it has a definition. But it might be a paradigmatic case of fixing a reference by means of a description: it is a rule of the common language that each of us fixes the reference of “I” by the description “the subject.” However, since each of us speaks a natural language, and not an imaginary “scientific language” spoken by no one, for each of us the referent can be different.
Garry L. Hagberg
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- September 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780199234226
- eISBN:
- 9780191715440
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199234226.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Philosophy of Language
This chapter covers the early influence on Wittgenstein's thought concerning selfhood of Schopenhauer. It details the picture of philosophical solipsism and the grammar of the ‘I’, what Wittgenstein ...
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This chapter covers the early influence on Wittgenstein's thought concerning selfhood of Schopenhauer. It details the picture of philosophical solipsism and the grammar of the ‘I’, what Wittgenstein called ‘the inner picture’ and its metaphysical presuppositions concerning privacy, and the value of turning to cases to see how the concept of privacy actually functions. Cases from Rousseau, Frederick Douglass, Jane Addams, Ellen Glasgow, Siegfried Sassoon, and others, as adapted from philosophically helpful discussions by Jill Kerr Conway are given. Genuine versus philosophically-misled wonder concerning what is going on behind a facial expression is discussed.Less
This chapter covers the early influence on Wittgenstein's thought concerning selfhood of Schopenhauer. It details the picture of philosophical solipsism and the grammar of the ‘I’, what Wittgenstein called ‘the inner picture’ and its metaphysical presuppositions concerning privacy, and the value of turning to cases to see how the concept of privacy actually functions. Cases from Rousseau, Frederick Douglass, Jane Addams, Ellen Glasgow, Siegfried Sassoon, and others, as adapted from philosophically helpful discussions by Jill Kerr Conway are given. Genuine versus philosophically-misled wonder concerning what is going on behind a facial expression is discussed.
C. Thomas Powell
- Published in print:
- 1990
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198244486
- eISBN:
- 9780191680779
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198244486.003.0007
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
This chapter examines the views of Immanuel Kant on the first person as they relate to his theory of self-consciousness and compares them with those of Gertrude Elizabeth Margaret Anscombe. In recent ...
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This chapter examines the views of Immanuel Kant on the first person as they relate to his theory of self-consciousness and compares them with those of Gertrude Elizabeth Margaret Anscombe. In recent years, a good deal of literature has developed around the location of a philosophical/linguistic datum: that the first-person pronoun is completely immune from reference failure. In fact, this datum is actually two, since there are two ways of failing to achieve a reference that are not possible when one uses the expression ‘I’. The first kind of reference failure is the referential equivalent of shooting at one's shadow: the attempted reference fails precisely because no referent exists. The second kind of reference failure is more a matter of shooting an innocent bystander: the attempted reference actually does refer, but to the wrong referent.Less
This chapter examines the views of Immanuel Kant on the first person as they relate to his theory of self-consciousness and compares them with those of Gertrude Elizabeth Margaret Anscombe. In recent years, a good deal of literature has developed around the location of a philosophical/linguistic datum: that the first-person pronoun is completely immune from reference failure. In fact, this datum is actually two, since there are two ways of failing to achieve a reference that are not possible when one uses the expression ‘I’. The first kind of reference failure is the referential equivalent of shooting at one's shadow: the attempted reference fails precisely because no referent exists. The second kind of reference failure is more a matter of shooting an innocent bystander: the attempted reference actually does refer, but to the wrong referent.
Gabriele Stein
- Published in print:
- 2014
- Published Online:
- April 2014
- ISBN:
- 9780199683192
- eISBN:
- 9780191763205
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199683192.003.0006
- Subject:
- Linguistics, Historical Linguistics, Lexicography
Lexicographers have to decide which forms they will use when the explanation of the lexical item cannot be done without a generic reference, e.g. a person, someone, somebody, one’s, etc. Elyot uses a ...
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Lexicographers have to decide which forms they will use when the explanation of the lexical item cannot be done without a generic reference, e.g. a person, someone, somebody, one’s, etc. Elyot uses a range of forms as authorial reference points: first person pronouns, third person pronouns, generic nouns like man, person, thing, etc. These forms are discussed and their occurrence and function investigated and exemplified. Elyot’s usage provides interesting insights into the grammar of indefinite expressions in sixteenth-century English.Less
Lexicographers have to decide which forms they will use when the explanation of the lexical item cannot be done without a generic reference, e.g. a person, someone, somebody, one’s, etc. Elyot uses a range of forms as authorial reference points: first person pronouns, third person pronouns, generic nouns like man, person, thing, etc. These forms are discussed and their occurrence and function investigated and exemplified. Elyot’s usage provides interesting insights into the grammar of indefinite expressions in sixteenth-century English.
John Frow
- Published in print:
- 2014
- Published Online:
- May 2014
- ISBN:
- 9780198704515
- eISBN:
- 9780191775239
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198704515.003.0005
- Subject:
- Literature, Film, Media, and Cultural Studies, Criticism/Theory
To be a fictional character is to be both an agent and an object of discourse; at once a speaker, a person spoken to, and a person referred to. Chapter 5 undertakes a lengthy analysis of the ...
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To be a fictional character is to be both an agent and an object of discourse; at once a speaker, a person spoken to, and a person referred to. Chapter 5 undertakes a lengthy analysis of the first-person pronoun, initially through discussions in analytical philosophy and then through Benveniste’s exploration of the performative constitution of the subject in discourse. Fillmore’s work on deixis, together with Goffman’s notion of ‘footing’, help develop an account of the first-person pronoun as structurally riven, positional and alienable yet embodied, a reference point in time and space and yet movable from discursive point to point. The chapter concludes with a close analysis of shifting passages of free indirect discourse in Madame Bovary and Emma which allows it to deepen the earlier argument about modes of identification in narrative texts.Less
To be a fictional character is to be both an agent and an object of discourse; at once a speaker, a person spoken to, and a person referred to. Chapter 5 undertakes a lengthy analysis of the first-person pronoun, initially through discussions in analytical philosophy and then through Benveniste’s exploration of the performative constitution of the subject in discourse. Fillmore’s work on deixis, together with Goffman’s notion of ‘footing’, help develop an account of the first-person pronoun as structurally riven, positional and alienable yet embodied, a reference point in time and space and yet movable from discursive point to point. The chapter concludes with a close analysis of shifting passages of free indirect discourse in Madame Bovary and Emma which allows it to deepen the earlier argument about modes of identification in narrative texts.
Rodanthi Christofaki
- Published in print:
- 2018
- Published Online:
- May 2018
- ISBN:
- 9780198786658
- eISBN:
- 9780191828966
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780198786658.003.0005
- Subject:
- Linguistics, Semantics and Pragmatics, Psycholinguistics / Neurolinguistics / Cognitive Linguistics
Christofaki’s chapter provides an analysis of terms used for first-person reference in Japanese, addressing the question of how de se thought is expressed in a language with a multitude of ...
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Christofaki’s chapter provides an analysis of terms used for first-person reference in Japanese, addressing the question of how de se thought is expressed in a language with a multitude of expressions for self-reference, and in particular what aspects of the self such expressions map to. The analysis shows that in addition to the direct reference account, predicated of first-person pronouns in languages such as English, these terms also convey rich conceptual and expressive content and as such defy the standard Kaplanian (1989) classification. The chapter next moves to a critical assessment of the plausibility of a linguistic relativity account of the self which has been based on these data, and supports a universalist view instead, on which, on the one hand, different aspects (or facets) of the self are distinguished, but on the other they sum up to a cross-culturally comparable self.Less
Christofaki’s chapter provides an analysis of terms used for first-person reference in Japanese, addressing the question of how de se thought is expressed in a language with a multitude of expressions for self-reference, and in particular what aspects of the self such expressions map to. The analysis shows that in addition to the direct reference account, predicated of first-person pronouns in languages such as English, these terms also convey rich conceptual and expressive content and as such defy the standard Kaplanian (1989) classification. The chapter next moves to a critical assessment of the plausibility of a linguistic relativity account of the self which has been based on these data, and supports a universalist view instead, on which, on the one hand, different aspects (or facets) of the self are distinguished, but on the other they sum up to a cross-culturally comparable self.
Ann Moss
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199249879
- eISBN:
- 9780191697838
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199249879.003.0010
- Subject:
- Literature, 16th-century and Renaissance Literature
This chapter provides an exploration of ‘self-narration’. The chapter concentrates on love poetry, a kind of discourse in which the first person pronoun predominates and turns attention on itself. ...
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This chapter provides an exploration of ‘self-narration’. The chapter concentrates on love poetry, a kind of discourse in which the first person pronoun predominates and turns attention on itself. Other literary works that are discussed in this chapter are prayers, hymns, and even sermons.Less
This chapter provides an exploration of ‘self-narration’. The chapter concentrates on love poetry, a kind of discourse in which the first person pronoun predominates and turns attention on itself. Other literary works that are discussed in this chapter are prayers, hymns, and even sermons.
Nicholas Wolterstorff
- Published in print:
- 2018
- Published Online:
- March 2018
- ISBN:
- 9780198805380
- eISBN:
- 9780191843457
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780198805380.003.0007
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Religion
Chapters 6–9 analyze some of the ways in which Scripture is evoked in Christian liturgical enactments. One of the most obvious of these is the reading aloud by a lector of a passage from Scripture. ...
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Chapters 6–9 analyze some of the ways in which Scripture is evoked in Christian liturgical enactments. One of the most obvious of these is the reading aloud by a lector of a passage from Scripture. This proves considerably more complex than would appear at first glance, especially when the passage includes first-person pronouns. What, for example, is the lector doing or saying when she reads, from the opening of Luke’s Gospel, “I too decided … to write an orderly account for you, most excellent Theophilus”? To whom does the “I” refer (and the “you”) when the lector reads this passage? Various alternatives are explored. And how does the liturgical voicing of a Psalm differ from reading aloud a Shakespeare sonnet—as surely it does? These are among the questions addressed in Chapter 6.Less
Chapters 6–9 analyze some of the ways in which Scripture is evoked in Christian liturgical enactments. One of the most obvious of these is the reading aloud by a lector of a passage from Scripture. This proves considerably more complex than would appear at first glance, especially when the passage includes first-person pronouns. What, for example, is the lector doing or saying when she reads, from the opening of Luke’s Gospel, “I too decided … to write an orderly account for you, most excellent Theophilus”? To whom does the “I” refer (and the “you”) when the lector reads this passage? Various alternatives are explored. And how does the liturgical voicing of a Psalm differ from reading aloud a Shakespeare sonnet—as surely it does? These are among the questions addressed in Chapter 6.
Minyao Huang and Kasia M. Jaszczolt (eds)
- Published in print:
- 2018
- Published Online:
- May 2018
- ISBN:
- 9780198786658
- eISBN:
- 9780191828966
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780198786658.001.0001
- Subject:
- Linguistics, Semantics and Pragmatics, Psycholinguistics / Neurolinguistics / Cognitive Linguistics
This book addresses different linguistic and philosophical aspects of referring to the self in a wide range of languages from different language families, including Amharic, English, French, ...
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This book addresses different linguistic and philosophical aspects of referring to the self in a wide range of languages from different language families, including Amharic, English, French, Japanese, Korean, Mandarin, Newari (Sino-Tibetan), Polish, Tariana (Arawak), and Thai. In the domain of speaking about oneself, languages use a myriad of expressions that cut across grammatical and semantic categories, as well as a wide variety of constructions. Languages of Southeast and East Asia famously employ a great number of terms for first-person reference to signal honorification. The number and mixed properties of these terms make them debatable candidates for pronounhood, with many grammar-driven classifications opting to classify them with nouns. Some languages make use of egophors or logophors, and many exhibit an interaction between expressing the self and expressing evidentiality qua the epistemic status of information held from the ego perspective. The volume’s focus on expressing the self, however, is not directly motivated by an interest in the grammar or lexicon, but instead stems from philosophical discussions of the special status of thoughts about oneself, known as de se thoughts. It is this interdisciplinary understanding of expressing the self that underlies this volume, comprising philosophy of mind at one end of the spectrum and cross-cultural pragmatics of self-expression at the other. This unprecedented juxtaposition results in a novel method of approaching de se and de se expressions, in which research methods from linguistics and philosophy inform each other. The importance of this interdisciplinary perspective on expressing the self cannot be overemphasized. Crucially, the volume also demonstrates that linguistic research on first-person reference makes a valuable contribution to research on the self tout court, by exploring the ways in which the self is expressed, and thereby adding to the insights gained through philosophy, psychology, and cognitive science.Less
This book addresses different linguistic and philosophical aspects of referring to the self in a wide range of languages from different language families, including Amharic, English, French, Japanese, Korean, Mandarin, Newari (Sino-Tibetan), Polish, Tariana (Arawak), and Thai. In the domain of speaking about oneself, languages use a myriad of expressions that cut across grammatical and semantic categories, as well as a wide variety of constructions. Languages of Southeast and East Asia famously employ a great number of terms for first-person reference to signal honorification. The number and mixed properties of these terms make them debatable candidates for pronounhood, with many grammar-driven classifications opting to classify them with nouns. Some languages make use of egophors or logophors, and many exhibit an interaction between expressing the self and expressing evidentiality qua the epistemic status of information held from the ego perspective. The volume’s focus on expressing the self, however, is not directly motivated by an interest in the grammar or lexicon, but instead stems from philosophical discussions of the special status of thoughts about oneself, known as de se thoughts. It is this interdisciplinary understanding of expressing the self that underlies this volume, comprising philosophy of mind at one end of the spectrum and cross-cultural pragmatics of self-expression at the other. This unprecedented juxtaposition results in a novel method of approaching de se and de se expressions, in which research methods from linguistics and philosophy inform each other. The importance of this interdisciplinary perspective on expressing the self cannot be overemphasized. Crucially, the volume also demonstrates that linguistic research on first-person reference makes a valuable contribution to research on the self tout court, by exploring the ways in which the self is expressed, and thereby adding to the insights gained through philosophy, psychology, and cognitive science.
José Luis Bermúdez
- Published in print:
- 2017
- Published Online:
- February 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780198796213
- eISBN:
- 9780191837319
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198796213.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
Understanding “I”: Thought and Language develops a model of how language-users understand sentences involving the first person pronoun “I.” This model illuminates the unique psychological role that ...
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Understanding “I”: Thought and Language develops a model of how language-users understand sentences involving the first person pronoun “I.” This model illuminates the unique psychological role that self-conscious thoughts (typically expressed using “I”) play in action and cognition—a unique role often summarized by describing “I” as an essential indexical. The author motivates a broadly Fregean account of linguistic understanding and develops an account of the sense of “I” within that framework. This account explains a cluster of related phenomena, including essential indexicality, immunity to error through misidentification, the shareability of “I”-thoughts, and the role of autobiographical memory in self-consciousness.Less
Understanding “I”: Thought and Language develops a model of how language-users understand sentences involving the first person pronoun “I.” This model illuminates the unique psychological role that self-conscious thoughts (typically expressed using “I”) play in action and cognition—a unique role often summarized by describing “I” as an essential indexical. The author motivates a broadly Fregean account of linguistic understanding and develops an account of the sense of “I” within that framework. This account explains a cluster of related phenomena, including essential indexicality, immunity to error through misidentification, the shareability of “I”-thoughts, and the role of autobiographical memory in self-consciousness.
