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Self-Knowing Agents

Lucy O'Brien

Published in print:
2007
Published Online:
September 2007
ISBN:
9780199261482
eISBN:
9780191718632
Item type:
book
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199261482.001.0001
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

This book argues that a satisfactory account of first-person reference and self-knowledge needs to concentrate on our nature as agents. It considers two main questions. First, what account of ... More


I: The Meaning of the First Person Term

Maximilian de Gaynesford

Published in print:
2006
Published Online:
May 2006
ISBN:
9780199287826
eISBN:
9780191603570
Item type:
book
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0199287821.001.0001
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Language

The central claim of this book is that I is a deictic term, like the other singular personal pronouns You and He/She. This is true of the logical character, inferential role, referential function, ... More


Augustine's Way into the Will: The Theological and Philosophical Significance of De libero arbitrio

Simon Harrison

Published in print:
2006
Published Online:
January 2007
ISBN:
9780198269847
eISBN:
9780191713385
Item type:
book
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198269847.001.0001
Subject:
Religion, Early Christian Studies

Augustine is a pivotal figure in the history of the concept of will, but what is his ‘theory of will’? This book investigates Augustine’s use of ‘will’ in one particular context, his dialogue On Free ... More


Conclusion

Simon Harrison

in Augustine's Way into the Will: The Theological and Philosophical Significance of De libero arbitrio

Published in print:
2006
Published Online:
January 2007
ISBN:
9780198269847
eISBN:
9780191713385
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198269847.003.0008
Subject:
Religion, Early Christian Studies

For Augustine, one’s freedom and responsibility is elucidated by means of a process of calling the notion of will into question (‘I don’t know’). This process gives rise to an understanding of will, ... More


Becoming a Subject: Reflections in Philosophy and Psychoanalysis

Marcia Cavell

Published in print:
2006
Published Online:
September 2006
ISBN:
9780199287086
eISBN:
9780191603921
Item type:
book
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0199287082.001.0001
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

This book revolves around the theme that psychological space demands physical space; that the inner world is embedded in, and fabricated from, interactions between world and mind. The following ... More


The Self‐Reference Rule

Lucy O'Brien

in Self-Knowing Agents

Published in print:
2007
Published Online:
September 2007
ISBN:
9780199261482
eISBN:
9780191718632
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199261482.003.0004
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

This chapter examines the self-reference rule (SSR), which states that ‘I’ refers to the subject who produced it. In particular, it analyses the suggestion that SRR is able to provide a satisfactory ... More


Introduction to Part I

Lucy O'Brien

in Self-Knowing Agents

Published in print:
2007
Published Online:
September 2007
ISBN:
9780199261482
eISBN:
9780191718632
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199261482.003.0001
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

This introductory chapter begins with an explanation of the main focus of the book, namely the central aspects of self-consciousness. It then discusses a first-person reference, in particular it ... More


The Agency Account

Lucy O'Brien

in Self-Knowing Agents

Published in print:
2007
Published Online:
September 2007
ISBN:
9780199261482
eISBN:
9780191718632
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199261482.003.0005
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

This chapter focuses on developing an account of first-person reference, which draws on the insights of the two-tier strategy but denies that first-person reference is equivocal. It seeks to make ... More


The First Person as a Case Study

Christopher Peacocke

in Truly Understood

Published in print:
2008
Published Online:
May 2008
ISBN:
9780199239443
eISBN:
9780191717000
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199239443.003.0004
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

This chapter takes the first person as the subject matter for a case study of the thesis of the preceding chapter — the thesis that the fundamental reference rule for a concept contributes ... More


Perceptual Models of First‐Person Reference

Lucy O'Brien

in Self-Knowing Agents

Published in print:
2007
Published Online:
September 2007
ISBN:
9780199261482
eISBN:
9780191718632
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199261482.003.0003
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

This chapter examines Evans's account of first-person reference and finds it unsatisfactory. It argues that to the extent that an account of first-person reference assumes that the referent of ‘I’ is ... More


Wittgenstein's Cloud: Of Unknowing (§246)

Stephen Mulhall

in Wittgenstein's Private Language: Grammar, Nonsense and Imagination in “Philosophical Investigations”, §§ 243–315

Published in print:
2006
Published Online:
January 2007
ISBN:
9780199208548
eISBN:
9780191709067
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199208548.003.0004
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Language

This chapter examines §246 of Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations, which begins to question the conception of sensations as ‘private’. Wittgenstein seems essentially uninterested in the ... More


Consciousness and its Objects

Colin McGinn

Published in print:
2004
Published Online:
January 2005
ISBN:
9780199267606
eISBN:
9780191601798
Item type:
book
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/019926760X.001.0001
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

This book features collection of essays on consciousness. It is intended as a sequel to the author’s 1991 book, The Problem of Consciousness. Although the author has not modified his views in the ... More


Self-Knowledge and Self-Discovery

Marcia Cavell

in Becoming a Subject: Reflections in Philosophy and Psychoanalysis

Published in print:
2006
Published Online:
September 2006
ISBN:
9780199287086
eISBN:
9780191603921
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0199287082.003.0011
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

Self-knowledge is supposed to be transforming. Yet ordinarily, knowledge by itself has no effect on the object known. This chapter discusses the phenomenon of first-person authority; ‘the ocular ... More


Who Knew?: Responsibility Without Awareness

George Sher

Published in print:
2009
Published Online:
September 2009
ISBN:
9780195389197
eISBN:
9780199866724
Item type:
book
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195389197.001.0001
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy

To be responsible for their acts, agents must both act voluntarily and in some sense know what they are doing. Of these requirements, the voluntariness condition has been much discussed, but the ... More


Remembering, Imagining, and the First Person

James Higginbotham

in Tense, Aspect, and Indexicality

Published in print:
2009
Published Online:
May 2010
ISBN:
9780199239313
eISBN:
9780191716904
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199239313.003.0012
Subject:
Linguistics, Semantics and Pragmatics, Theoretical Linguistics

It is widely supposed that certain uses of anaphoric forms (pronouns, reflexives, and others) give rise to peculiarly ‘first-personal’ interpretations, and it has become customary following David ... More


Arguments for the No‐Reference View of ‘I’

Lucy O'Brien

in Self-Knowing Agents

Published in print:
2007
Published Online:
September 2007
ISBN:
9780199261482
eISBN:
9780191718632
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199261482.003.0002
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

This chapter presents an extended discussion of Anscombe on the problem of first-person reference. It introduces and criticizes the internal perceptual model for first-person reference. It also ... More


‘Another I’: Representing Perception and Action

Christopher Peacocke

in Truly Understood

Published in print:
2008
Published Online:
May 2008
ISBN:
9780199239443
eISBN:
9780191717000
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199239443.003.0007
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

The question of what it is to possess the concept of perception is also of interest to the philosophy of mind more generally. A perceiving thinker who has the capacity to appreciate that others also ... More


How Can We Construct a Science of Consciousness?

David J. Chalmers

in The Character of Consciousness

Published in print:
2010
Published Online:
January 2011
ISBN:
9780195311105
eISBN:
9780199870851
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195311105.003.0002
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

In recent years there has been an explosion of scientific work on consciousness in cognitive neuroscience, psychology, and other fields. It has become possible to think that we are moving toward a ... More


The Self: Naturalism, Consciousness, and the First-Person Stance

Jonardon Ganeri

Published in print:
2012
Published Online:
May 2012
ISBN:
9780199652365
eISBN:
9780191740718
Item type:
book
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199652365.001.0001
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, History of Philosophy

What is it to occupy a first‐person stance? Is the first‐personal idea one has of oneself in conflict with the idea of oneself as a physical being? How, if there is a conflict, is it to be resolved? ... More


Mental Action

Christopher Peacocke

in Truly Understood

Published in print:
2008
Published Online:
May 2008
ISBN:
9780199239443
eISBN:
9780191717000
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199239443.003.0008
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

This chapter explores the theory that the distinctive awareness that subjects have of their own mental actions is a form of action-awareness. Subjects' awareness of their own mental actions is a ... More


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