Lucy O'Brien
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199261482
- eISBN:
- 9780191718632
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199261482.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
This book argues that a satisfactory account of first-person reference and self-knowledge needs to concentrate on our nature as agents. It considers two main questions. First, what account of ...
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This book argues that a satisfactory account of first-person reference and self-knowledge needs to concentrate on our nature as agents. It considers two main questions. First, what account of first-person reference can we give that respects the guaranteed nature of such reference? Second, what account can we give of our knowledge of our mental and physical actions?Less
This book argues that a satisfactory account of first-person reference and self-knowledge needs to concentrate on our nature as agents. It considers two main questions. First, what account of first-person reference can we give that respects the guaranteed nature of such reference? Second, what account can we give of our knowledge of our mental and physical actions?
Maximilian de Gaynesford
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- May 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199287826
- eISBN:
- 9780191603570
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199287821.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
The central claim of this book is that I is a deictic term, like the other singular personal pronouns You and He/She. This is true of the logical character, inferential role, referential function, ...
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The central claim of this book is that I is a deictic term, like the other singular personal pronouns You and He/She. This is true of the logical character, inferential role, referential function, expressive use, and communicative role of all and only expressions used to formulate first-personal reference in any language. The first part of the book shows why the standard account of I as a ‘pure indexical’ (‘purism’) should be rejected. Purism requires three mutually supportive doctrines which turn out to be myths: a) that a simple rule is sufficient to give the meaning of I (‘rule theory’); b) that one can use I to express thoughts without having to identify what is being referred to (‘independence’); and c) that as a matter of the meaning of I, any use of the term is logically guaranteed against failure to refer (‘the guarantee’). The second part of the book shows why the radically new account of I should be endorsed as a deictic term. Substitution instances and the behaviour of I in inference reveal that it has an obligatorily deictic logical character and inferential role. I fulfils its referential function in the deictic way, providing determinacy of reference by making an individual referentially salient in the extra-sentential context. The discriminability of the referent of an I-use depends on recognizing the referentially salient individual. This is true of its discriminability both to the reference-maker and to the audience. So I has the expressive use and communicative role of a deictic term. The conclusion of the book directs research towards the next step, showing how the meaning of I may be used to elucidate the thoughts expressed by the term, and from there questions relating to self-knowledge, practical reasoning, belief-acquisition, and belief-ascription.Less
The central claim of this book is that I is a deictic term, like the other singular personal pronouns You and He/She. This is true of the logical character, inferential role, referential function, expressive use, and communicative role of all and only expressions used to formulate first-personal reference in any language. The first part of the book shows why the standard account of I as a ‘pure indexical’ (‘purism’) should be rejected. Purism requires three mutually supportive doctrines which turn out to be myths: a) that a simple rule is sufficient to give the meaning of I (‘rule theory’); b) that one can use I to express thoughts without having to identify what is being referred to (‘independence’); and c) that as a matter of the meaning of I, any use of the term is logically guaranteed against failure to refer (‘the guarantee’). The second part of the book shows why the radically new account of I should be endorsed as a deictic term. Substitution instances and the behaviour of I in inference reveal that it has an obligatorily deictic logical character and inferential role. I fulfils its referential function in the deictic way, providing determinacy of reference by making an individual referentially salient in the extra-sentential context. The discriminability of the referent of an I-use depends on recognizing the referentially salient individual. This is true of its discriminability both to the reference-maker and to the audience. So I has the expressive use and communicative role of a deictic term. The conclusion of the book directs research towards the next step, showing how the meaning of I may be used to elucidate the thoughts expressed by the term, and from there questions relating to self-knowledge, practical reasoning, belief-acquisition, and belief-ascription.
Simon Harrison
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- January 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780198269847
- eISBN:
- 9780191713385
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198269847.001.0001
- Subject:
- Religion, Early Christian Studies
Augustine is a pivotal figure in the history of the concept of will, but what is his ‘theory of will’? This book investigates Augustine’s use of ‘will’ in one particular context, his dialogue On Free ...
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Augustine is a pivotal figure in the history of the concept of will, but what is his ‘theory of will’? This book investigates Augustine’s use of ‘will’ in one particular context, his dialogue On Free Choice of the Will, taking seriously its historical and philosophical form. First, it finds that the dialogical nature of On Free Choice of the Will has been missed, as exemplified by the unhistorical and misleading modern attributions of names to the speakers. Secondly, the commonplace that Augustine changed his mind in the course of its composition is shown to be unfounded, and a case is made for its argumentative coherence. Thirdly, it is shown that it is the form and structure of On Free Choice of the Will that give philosophical content to Augustine’s theory of will. The dialogue constitutes a ‘way in to the will’ that itself instantiates a concept of will. At the heart of this structure is a particular argument that depends on an appeal to a first-person perspective, which ties the vocabulary of will to a concept of freedom and responsibility. This appeal is significantly similar to other arguments deployed by Augustine which are significantly similar to Descartes’ ‘cogito ergo sum’, ‘I think therefore I am’. The book goes on to investigate how Augustine’s ‘way in’ relates to these cogito-like arguments as they occur in Augustine’s major and most read works, the Confessions, the City of God, and On the Trinity. The relationship of Augustine’s to Descartes’ ‘cogito’ is also discussed. Augustine elucidates, within a particular Platonic theory of knowledge, a ‘theory of will’ that is grounded in a ‘way in’, which takes the conditions and limits of knowledge seriously.Less
Augustine is a pivotal figure in the history of the concept of will, but what is his ‘theory of will’? This book investigates Augustine’s use of ‘will’ in one particular context, his dialogue On Free Choice of the Will, taking seriously its historical and philosophical form. First, it finds that the dialogical nature of On Free Choice of the Will has been missed, as exemplified by the unhistorical and misleading modern attributions of names to the speakers. Secondly, the commonplace that Augustine changed his mind in the course of its composition is shown to be unfounded, and a case is made for its argumentative coherence. Thirdly, it is shown that it is the form and structure of On Free Choice of the Will that give philosophical content to Augustine’s theory of will. The dialogue constitutes a ‘way in to the will’ that itself instantiates a concept of will. At the heart of this structure is a particular argument that depends on an appeal to a first-person perspective, which ties the vocabulary of will to a concept of freedom and responsibility. This appeal is significantly similar to other arguments deployed by Augustine which are significantly similar to Descartes’ ‘cogito ergo sum’, ‘I think therefore I am’. The book goes on to investigate how Augustine’s ‘way in’ relates to these cogito-like arguments as they occur in Augustine’s major and most read works, the Confessions, the City of God, and On the Trinity. The relationship of Augustine’s to Descartes’ ‘cogito’ is also discussed. Augustine elucidates, within a particular Platonic theory of knowledge, a ‘theory of will’ that is grounded in a ‘way in’, which takes the conditions and limits of knowledge seriously.
Simon Harrison
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- January 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780198269847
- eISBN:
- 9780191713385
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198269847.003.0008
- Subject:
- Religion, Early Christian Studies
For Augustine, one’s freedom and responsibility is elucidated by means of a process of calling the notion of will into question (‘I don’t know’). This process gives rise to an understanding of will, ...
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For Augustine, one’s freedom and responsibility is elucidated by means of a process of calling the notion of will into question (‘I don’t know’). This process gives rise to an understanding of will, freedom, and responsibility as the condition for the possibility of knowledge. It is this process that is most cogito-like. However, it is significantly cogito-unlike in that the argument depends on the very possibility of denying that one has will. Augustine’s account of freedom and responsibility is grounded in a deep notion of subjectivity, and the epistemological significance of the first-person perspective.Less
For Augustine, one’s freedom and responsibility is elucidated by means of a process of calling the notion of will into question (‘I don’t know’). This process gives rise to an understanding of will, freedom, and responsibility as the condition for the possibility of knowledge. It is this process that is most cogito-like. However, it is significantly cogito-unlike in that the argument depends on the very possibility of denying that one has will. Augustine’s account of freedom and responsibility is grounded in a deep notion of subjectivity, and the epistemological significance of the first-person perspective.
Marcia Cavell
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199287086
- eISBN:
- 9780191603921
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199287082.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
This book revolves around the theme that psychological space demands physical space; that the inner world is embedded in, and fabricated from, interactions between world and mind. The following ...
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This book revolves around the theme that psychological space demands physical space; that the inner world is embedded in, and fabricated from, interactions between world and mind. The following themes in moral philosophy are considered: the nature of the ‘subject’, agency, free will, and self-knowledge. The first three chapters of the book focus on memory, anxiety, and time. The next three chapters are explicitly about the subject, and about first-person, propositional thought. The final chapters articulate the idea that one cannot hive off the subjective aspects of a person from those that are objective.Less
This book revolves around the theme that psychological space demands physical space; that the inner world is embedded in, and fabricated from, interactions between world and mind. The following themes in moral philosophy are considered: the nature of the ‘subject’, agency, free will, and self-knowledge. The first three chapters of the book focus on memory, anxiety, and time. The next three chapters are explicitly about the subject, and about first-person, propositional thought. The final chapters articulate the idea that one cannot hive off the subjective aspects of a person from those that are objective.
Lucy O'Brien
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199261482
- eISBN:
- 9780191718632
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199261482.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
This chapter examines the self-reference rule (SSR), which states that ‘I’ refers to the subject who produced it. In particular, it analyses the suggestion that SRR is able to provide a satisfactory ...
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This chapter examines the self-reference rule (SSR), which states that ‘I’ refers to the subject who produced it. In particular, it analyses the suggestion that SRR is able to provide a satisfactory account of first-person reference, and it also examines the reductionist approach to first-person reference. It is argued that while we may concede that there may be a kind of basic reflexive reference that the approach explains, there is nevertheless an element of self consciousness in the kind of first-person reference under consideration which the approach fails to capture.Less
This chapter examines the self-reference rule (SSR), which states that ‘I’ refers to the subject who produced it. In particular, it analyses the suggestion that SRR is able to provide a satisfactory account of first-person reference, and it also examines the reductionist approach to first-person reference. It is argued that while we may concede that there may be a kind of basic reflexive reference that the approach explains, there is nevertheless an element of self consciousness in the kind of first-person reference under consideration which the approach fails to capture.
Lucy O'Brien
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199261482
- eISBN:
- 9780191718632
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199261482.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
This introductory chapter begins with an explanation of the main focus of the book, namely the central aspects of self-consciousness. It then discusses a first-person reference, in particular it ...
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This introductory chapter begins with an explanation of the main focus of the book, namely the central aspects of self-consciousness. It then discusses a first-person reference, in particular it talks about two strategies one might take in response to the objection that an appeal to the self-reference principle will be insufficient to explain first-person reference: the reductionist strategy and the two-tier strategy. An inquiry into actions and self-knowledge and an overview of the chapters in this volume are presented.Less
This introductory chapter begins with an explanation of the main focus of the book, namely the central aspects of self-consciousness. It then discusses a first-person reference, in particular it talks about two strategies one might take in response to the objection that an appeal to the self-reference principle will be insufficient to explain first-person reference: the reductionist strategy and the two-tier strategy. An inquiry into actions and self-knowledge and an overview of the chapters in this volume are presented.
Lucy O'Brien
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199261482
- eISBN:
- 9780191718632
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199261482.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
This chapter focuses on developing an account of first-person reference, which draws on the insights of the two-tier strategy but denies that first-person reference is equivocal. It seeks to make ...
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This chapter focuses on developing an account of first-person reference, which draws on the insights of the two-tier strategy but denies that first-person reference is equivocal. It seeks to make plausible that the form of the account offered, in terms of the joint operation of SRR and a primitive form of self-awareness we have as agents (agent's awareness), is of a kind that can explain first-person reference.Less
This chapter focuses on developing an account of first-person reference, which draws on the insights of the two-tier strategy but denies that first-person reference is equivocal. It seeks to make plausible that the form of the account offered, in terms of the joint operation of SRR and a primitive form of self-awareness we have as agents (agent's awareness), is of a kind that can explain first-person reference.
Lucy O'Brien
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199261482
- eISBN:
- 9780191718632
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199261482.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
This chapter examines Evans's account of first-person reference and finds it unsatisfactory. It argues that to the extent that an account of first-person reference assumes that the referent of ‘I’ is ...
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This chapter examines Evans's account of first-person reference and finds it unsatisfactory. It argues that to the extent that an account of first-person reference assumes that the referent of ‘I’ is fixed by perceptual information — which is the essential claim of a perceptual account — the account will be subject to the possibility of coherent and comprehending uses of ‘I’ surviving the absence or disturbance of such information. In order to block such a possibility, a tight conceptual dependence between our currently being able to refer to ourselves and our having available accurate perceptual information to identify the person we are would be needed.Less
This chapter examines Evans's account of first-person reference and finds it unsatisfactory. It argues that to the extent that an account of first-person reference assumes that the referent of ‘I’ is fixed by perceptual information — which is the essential claim of a perceptual account — the account will be subject to the possibility of coherent and comprehending uses of ‘I’ surviving the absence or disturbance of such information. In order to block such a possibility, a tight conceptual dependence between our currently being able to refer to ourselves and our having available accurate perceptual information to identify the person we are would be needed.
Christopher Peacocke
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- May 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780199239443
- eISBN:
- 9780191717000
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199239443.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
This chapter takes the first person as the subject matter for a case study of the thesis of the preceding chapter — the thesis that the fundamental reference rule for a concept contributes ...
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This chapter takes the first person as the subject matter for a case study of the thesis of the preceding chapter — the thesis that the fundamental reference rule for a concept contributes essentially to the explanation of the norms distinctive of that concept. There are two aims in this exercise. One is to suggest ways in which the extraordinarily rich and philosophically interesting epistemic phenomena exhibited by such an important concept as that of the first person can be explained by its fundamental reference rule. The other aim is to consider a much more general issue that arises about the individuation of certain concepts — input or output is more fundamental than the other in the individuation of the first-person concept, or is some third position correct, a position that can explain the role of the first person both on the input and on the output sides. It is argued that the reference rule is more fundamental than either the input-oriented or the output-oriented accounts of individuation; and that it can explain phenomena that pose difficulties for those accounts.Less
This chapter takes the first person as the subject matter for a case study of the thesis of the preceding chapter — the thesis that the fundamental reference rule for a concept contributes essentially to the explanation of the norms distinctive of that concept. There are two aims in this exercise. One is to suggest ways in which the extraordinarily rich and philosophically interesting epistemic phenomena exhibited by such an important concept as that of the first person can be explained by its fundamental reference rule. The other aim is to consider a much more general issue that arises about the individuation of certain concepts — input or output is more fundamental than the other in the individuation of the first-person concept, or is some third position correct, a position that can explain the role of the first person both on the input and on the output sides. It is argued that the reference rule is more fundamental than either the input-oriented or the output-oriented accounts of individuation; and that it can explain phenomena that pose difficulties for those accounts.
Stephen Mulhall
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- January 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199208548
- eISBN:
- 9780191709067
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199208548.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
This chapter examines §246 of Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations, which begins to question the conception of sensations as ‘private’. Wittgenstein seems essentially uninterested in the ...
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This chapter examines §246 of Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations, which begins to question the conception of sensations as ‘private’. Wittgenstein seems essentially uninterested in the possibility of any lack of clarity or ambiguity in what his interlocutor might mean by his answer to the opening question; he does not ask himself, and thereby invite us to ask ourselves, what the interlocutor might be trying to get at through his invocation of a cognitive disparity between the first-person and third-person cases. Instead, he responds as if the meanings of the words he employs are either self-evident and singular (adverting to the normal use of the word ‘to know’), or barely capable of an alternative interpretation (‘except perhaps as a joke’). This apparent refusal to open himself to other possibilities of sense is epitomized by the moment when he turns words which might have been used to invite an exercise of the sympathetic imagination to purely sarcastic intent (‘How else are we to use it?’, ‘What is it supposed to mean?’). And without allowing such space for the imagination to be exercised, there seems to be little ground for attributing a resolute strategy to Wittgenstein at this point.Less
This chapter examines §246 of Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations, which begins to question the conception of sensations as ‘private’. Wittgenstein seems essentially uninterested in the possibility of any lack of clarity or ambiguity in what his interlocutor might mean by his answer to the opening question; he does not ask himself, and thereby invite us to ask ourselves, what the interlocutor might be trying to get at through his invocation of a cognitive disparity between the first-person and third-person cases. Instead, he responds as if the meanings of the words he employs are either self-evident and singular (adverting to the normal use of the word ‘to know’), or barely capable of an alternative interpretation (‘except perhaps as a joke’). This apparent refusal to open himself to other possibilities of sense is epitomized by the moment when he turns words which might have been used to invite an exercise of the sympathetic imagination to purely sarcastic intent (‘How else are we to use it?’, ‘What is it supposed to mean?’). And without allowing such space for the imagination to be exercised, there seems to be little ground for attributing a resolute strategy to Wittgenstein at this point.
Marcia Cavell
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199287086
- eISBN:
- 9780191603921
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199287082.003.0011
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
Self-knowledge is supposed to be transforming. Yet ordinarily, knowledge by itself has no effect on the object known. This chapter discusses the phenomenon of first-person authority; ‘the ocular ...
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Self-knowledge is supposed to be transforming. Yet ordinarily, knowledge by itself has no effect on the object known. This chapter discusses the phenomenon of first-person authority; ‘the ocular view’ of self-knowledge and an alternative account; and self-knowledge with regard to beliefs and to emotions. It argues that self-discovery often requires a dialectic between the first-person and the third-person points of view in relation to one’s self.Less
Self-knowledge is supposed to be transforming. Yet ordinarily, knowledge by itself has no effect on the object known. This chapter discusses the phenomenon of first-person authority; ‘the ocular view’ of self-knowledge and an alternative account; and self-knowledge with regard to beliefs and to emotions. It argues that self-discovery often requires a dialectic between the first-person and the third-person points of view in relation to one’s self.
Colin McGinn
- Published in print:
- 2004
- Published Online:
- January 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780199267606
- eISBN:
- 9780191601798
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/019926760X.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
This book features collection of essays on consciousness. It is intended as a sequel to the author’s 1991 book, The Problem of Consciousness. Although the author has not modified his views in the ...
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This book features collection of essays on consciousness. It is intended as a sequel to the author’s 1991 book, The Problem of Consciousness. Although the author has not modified his views in the last decade, he has included his position under the label ‘mysterianism’, in the canon of positions regarding the mind-body problem. Chapters 1-3 focus on the mind-body problem. Chapters 4-6 deal with the concept of matter. Chapter 7 features a dialogue on consciousness and cosmology. Chapter 8 discusses the problem of philosophy. Chapter 9 questions the first person authority theory. Chapter 10 analyses the objects of intentionality.Less
This book features collection of essays on consciousness. It is intended as a sequel to the author’s 1991 book, The Problem of Consciousness. Although the author has not modified his views in the last decade, he has included his position under the label ‘mysterianism’, in the canon of positions regarding the mind-body problem. Chapters 1-3 focus on the mind-body problem. Chapters 4-6 deal with the concept of matter. Chapter 7 features a dialogue on consciousness and cosmology. Chapter 8 discusses the problem of philosophy. Chapter 9 questions the first person authority theory. Chapter 10 analyses the objects of intentionality.
George Sher
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- September 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780195389197
- eISBN:
- 9780199866724
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195389197.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
To be responsible for their acts, agents must both act voluntarily and in some sense know what they are doing. Of these requirements, the voluntariness condition has been much discussed, but the ...
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To be responsible for their acts, agents must both act voluntarily and in some sense know what they are doing. Of these requirements, the voluntariness condition has been much discussed, but the epistemic condition has received far less attention. This book seeks to remedy that imbalance: it first criticizes a popular but inadequate way of understanding the epistemic condition and then seeks to develop a more adequate alternative. The popular but inadequate view asserts that agents are responsible only for what they are consciously aware of doing or bringing about. (Because this view takes an agent's responsibility to extend only as far as the searchlight of his consciousness, the book refers to it as the searchlight view.) By contrast, on the proposed alternative, even agents who unwittingly act wrongly or foolishly can be responsible if (1) they have information that supports the conclusion that their acts are wrong or foolish, and (2) their failure to draw that conclusion on the basis of that information falls short of meeting some appropriate standard, and (3) the failure is caused by the constellation of psychological and/or physical features that makes them the persons they are. Because it integrates first- and third-personal elements, this alternative account is well suited to capture the complexity of responsible agents, who at once have their own private perspectives and live in a public world.Less
To be responsible for their acts, agents must both act voluntarily and in some sense know what they are doing. Of these requirements, the voluntariness condition has been much discussed, but the epistemic condition has received far less attention. This book seeks to remedy that imbalance: it first criticizes a popular but inadequate way of understanding the epistemic condition and then seeks to develop a more adequate alternative. The popular but inadequate view asserts that agents are responsible only for what they are consciously aware of doing or bringing about. (Because this view takes an agent's responsibility to extend only as far as the searchlight of his consciousness, the book refers to it as the searchlight view.) By contrast, on the proposed alternative, even agents who unwittingly act wrongly or foolishly can be responsible if (1) they have information that supports the conclusion that their acts are wrong or foolish, and (2) their failure to draw that conclusion on the basis of that information falls short of meeting some appropriate standard, and (3) the failure is caused by the constellation of psychological and/or physical features that makes them the persons they are. Because it integrates first- and third-personal elements, this alternative account is well suited to capture the complexity of responsible agents, who at once have their own private perspectives and live in a public world.
James Higginbotham
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- May 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199239313
- eISBN:
- 9780191716904
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199239313.003.0012
- Subject:
- Linguistics, Semantics and Pragmatics, Theoretical Linguistics
It is widely supposed that certain uses of anaphoric forms (pronouns, reflexives, and others) give rise to peculiarly ‘first-personal’ interpretations, and it has become customary following David ...
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It is widely supposed that certain uses of anaphoric forms (pronouns, reflexives, and others) give rise to peculiarly ‘first-personal’ interpretations, and it has become customary following David Lewis (1979) to call these interpretations de se. Assuming that de se interpretations do indeed contrast with interpretations along the familiar, if not necessarily pellucid, de dicto-de re axis, there are then four questions about the de se, the first two more philosophical and the latter two more linguistic: (i) what is the nature of de se interpretations?; (ii) what relation do they bear to ordinary uses of the first-person pronoun?; (iii) why are they triggered by the particular linguistic items that trigger them?; and (iv) are they universal in human language, and what relation, if any, do they bear to logophoric phenomena in languages having special logophoric forms? This chapter considers almost exclusively the first question, hazarding only a few remarks about the second and third; and omits the fourth, most properly linguistic, question entirely.Less
It is widely supposed that certain uses of anaphoric forms (pronouns, reflexives, and others) give rise to peculiarly ‘first-personal’ interpretations, and it has become customary following David Lewis (1979) to call these interpretations de se. Assuming that de se interpretations do indeed contrast with interpretations along the familiar, if not necessarily pellucid, de dicto-de re axis, there are then four questions about the de se, the first two more philosophical and the latter two more linguistic: (i) what is the nature of de se interpretations?; (ii) what relation do they bear to ordinary uses of the first-person pronoun?; (iii) why are they triggered by the particular linguistic items that trigger them?; and (iv) are they universal in human language, and what relation, if any, do they bear to logophoric phenomena in languages having special logophoric forms? This chapter considers almost exclusively the first question, hazarding only a few remarks about the second and third; and omits the fourth, most properly linguistic, question entirely.
Lucy O'Brien
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199261482
- eISBN:
- 9780191718632
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199261482.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
This chapter presents an extended discussion of Anscombe on the problem of first-person reference. It introduces and criticizes the internal perceptual model for first-person reference. It also ...
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This chapter presents an extended discussion of Anscombe on the problem of first-person reference. It introduces and criticizes the internal perceptual model for first-person reference. It also introduces and undercuts the motivation behind Anscombe's sceptical and unacceptable view that ‘I’ does not refer.Less
This chapter presents an extended discussion of Anscombe on the problem of first-person reference. It introduces and criticizes the internal perceptual model for first-person reference. It also introduces and undercuts the motivation behind Anscombe's sceptical and unacceptable view that ‘I’ does not refer.
Christopher Peacocke
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- May 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780199239443
- eISBN:
- 9780191717000
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199239443.003.0007
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
The question of what it is to possess the concept of perception is also of interest to the philosophy of mind more generally. A perceiving thinker who has the capacity to appreciate that others also ...
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The question of what it is to possess the concept of perception is also of interest to the philosophy of mind more generally. A perceiving thinker who has the capacity to appreciate that others also perceive is on the way to thinking of others as subjects like himself — to thinking of another person as ‘another I’, in Zeno's phrase. The chapter begins by considering the first-person case, that in which a thinker judges that he himself sees. After proposing a treatment of the first-person case, and some of its epistemic and metaphysical ramifications, it goes on to compare it with Evans's account. It discusses the relation between first-person and third-person ascription, and explains some developmental phenomena. Finally, the extension of the model presented to the self-ascription and other-ascription of action and intentionality is discussed.Less
The question of what it is to possess the concept of perception is also of interest to the philosophy of mind more generally. A perceiving thinker who has the capacity to appreciate that others also perceive is on the way to thinking of others as subjects like himself — to thinking of another person as ‘another I’, in Zeno's phrase. The chapter begins by considering the first-person case, that in which a thinker judges that he himself sees. After proposing a treatment of the first-person case, and some of its epistemic and metaphysical ramifications, it goes on to compare it with Evans's account. It discusses the relation between first-person and third-person ascription, and explains some developmental phenomena. Finally, the extension of the model presented to the self-ascription and other-ascription of action and intentionality is discussed.
David J. Chalmers
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- January 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780195311105
- eISBN:
- 9780199870851
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195311105.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
In recent years there has been an explosion of scientific work on consciousness in cognitive neuroscience, psychology, and other fields. It has become possible to think that we are moving toward a ...
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In recent years there has been an explosion of scientific work on consciousness in cognitive neuroscience, psychology, and other fields. It has become possible to think that we are moving toward a genuine scientific understanding of conscious experience. But what is the science of consciousness all about, and what form should such a science take? This chapter gives an overview of the agenda.Less
In recent years there has been an explosion of scientific work on consciousness in cognitive neuroscience, psychology, and other fields. It has become possible to think that we are moving toward a genuine scientific understanding of conscious experience. But what is the science of consciousness all about, and what form should such a science take? This chapter gives an overview of the agenda.
Jonardon Ganeri
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- May 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199652365
- eISBN:
- 9780191740718
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199652365.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, History of Philosophy
What is it to occupy a first‐person stance? Is the first‐personal idea one has of oneself in conflict with the idea of oneself as a physical being? How, if there is a conflict, is it to be resolved? ...
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What is it to occupy a first‐person stance? Is the first‐personal idea one has of oneself in conflict with the idea of oneself as a physical being? How, if there is a conflict, is it to be resolved? In this book a new way to address those questions, drawing inspiration from theories about the self in first millennial India, is formulated. These philosophers do not regard the first‐person stance as in conflict with the natural—their idea of nature not that of scientific naturalism but rather a liberal naturalism non‐exclusive of the normative. A wide range of ideas are explored: reflexive self‐representation, mental files, and quasi‐subject analyses of subjective consciousness; the theory of emergence as transformation; embodiment and the idea of a bodily self; the centrality of the emotions to the unity of self. Buddhism's claim that there is no self too readily assumes an account of what a self must be. This book argues instead that the self is a negotiation between self‐presentation and normative avowal, a transaction grounded in unconscious mind. Immersion, participation, and coordination are jointly constitutive of self, the first‐person stance at once lived, engaged, and underwritten. And all is in harmony with the idea of the natural.Less
What is it to occupy a first‐person stance? Is the first‐personal idea one has of oneself in conflict with the idea of oneself as a physical being? How, if there is a conflict, is it to be resolved? In this book a new way to address those questions, drawing inspiration from theories about the self in first millennial India, is formulated. These philosophers do not regard the first‐person stance as in conflict with the natural—their idea of nature not that of scientific naturalism but rather a liberal naturalism non‐exclusive of the normative. A wide range of ideas are explored: reflexive self‐representation, mental files, and quasi‐subject analyses of subjective consciousness; the theory of emergence as transformation; embodiment and the idea of a bodily self; the centrality of the emotions to the unity of self. Buddhism's claim that there is no self too readily assumes an account of what a self must be. This book argues instead that the self is a negotiation between self‐presentation and normative avowal, a transaction grounded in unconscious mind. Immersion, participation, and coordination are jointly constitutive of self, the first‐person stance at once lived, engaged, and underwritten. And all is in harmony with the idea of the natural.
Charles Siewert
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- September 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199744794
- eISBN:
- 9780199933396
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199744794.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Metaphysics/Epistemology
An account of introspection is proposed that features notions of phenomenal consciousness and attention. Though it rejects theories of inner sense, it aims to do justice to the source of their ...
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An account of introspection is proposed that features notions of phenomenal consciousness and attention. Though it rejects theories of inner sense, it aims to do justice to the source of their appeal. It argues that a distinction between sensing and thinking cannot be drawn beyond the first-order level of mind. For no ‘sensing of one’s own sensing’ is phenomenologically discernible but a sensing that coincides with what is sensed: no ‘objectual sensing’ or ‘registration’ beyond the first-order is found and none need be postulated. But we should acknowledge there is a special introspective form of attention involved in ‘identifying for recognition’ one’s own phenomenal features, and in having ‘recognitional concepts’ of them. This attention is cognitive rather than sensory, and essentially involves no ‘turn inward,’ but can be at once attention both to one’s surroundings and to one’s experience. Warrant for first-person judgment is rooted in the tie between this and a legitimate presumption of semantic competence in speaking of one’s own experience. This helps illuminate how critical first-person reflection on experience (i.e. phenomenology) is possible.Less
An account of introspection is proposed that features notions of phenomenal consciousness and attention. Though it rejects theories of inner sense, it aims to do justice to the source of their appeal. It argues that a distinction between sensing and thinking cannot be drawn beyond the first-order level of mind. For no ‘sensing of one’s own sensing’ is phenomenologically discernible but a sensing that coincides with what is sensed: no ‘objectual sensing’ or ‘registration’ beyond the first-order is found and none need be postulated. But we should acknowledge there is a special introspective form of attention involved in ‘identifying for recognition’ one’s own phenomenal features, and in having ‘recognitional concepts’ of them. This attention is cognitive rather than sensory, and essentially involves no ‘turn inward,’ but can be at once attention both to one’s surroundings and to one’s experience. Warrant for first-person judgment is rooted in the tie between this and a legitimate presumption of semantic competence in speaking of one’s own experience. This helps illuminate how critical first-person reflection on experience (i.e. phenomenology) is possible.
