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This chapter investigates how the colonial government promoted capital formation through fiscal and financial policies, by providing financial incentives and creating a favorable economic environment to invest in newly-produced capital assets. The fiscal policies examined are the taxation and subsidy measures that enhanced business opportunities for profit, especially in the targeted industries. The financial policies examined are those that established various financial institutions to mobilize savings — both from domestic and foreign sources — and allocate loans with subsidized interest for investment in the targeted industries through public financial institutions. The means through which savings were mobilized are examined, including deposits in financial institutions, which were loaned out for investment; Japanese government grants, foreign borrowings, and “forced savings” through currency issues to supplement inadequate owners equity. Since the government's excessive intervention through preferential schemes, such as directed credits, subsidies, and tax exemptions carried a considerable economic burden, its negative impact is also evaluated.

Many bioethicists worry about the use of financial incentives to recruit research subjects. This chapter argues that most of those worries are not well founded. It considers arguments based on coercion, undue inducement, commodification, etc. It argues that paying research subjects is no different than paying people for risky employment.

Because not even the largest MNC can afford to invest in every country, an important phase of the FDI cycle is the process by which a country chooses where to establish its foreign subsidiaries. The heterogeneity of business strategies and objectives means that no single guideline exists for manufacturing and services companies when selecting appropriate overseas sites. This chapter begins with a statistical breakdown showing the asymmetrical geographical distribution of MNCs, with emphasis on their concentration in industrial countries. Next, the various positive factors that attract MNCs to certain countries, including financial incentives, are examined in detail. A separate section examines the various conditions that tend to repel incoming FDI. A recurring theme is that those persons believing MNCs to be a negative force on host countries would applaud government policies to discourage their entry or impose comprehensive regulation; advocates of private enterprise would have the opposite value judgment.

This chapter looks at the incentives that payment schemes create for both buyers and sellers and how these incentives can be adjusted to further the goals of health-sector reform. It begins with a brief explanation of how financial incentives affect health-system performance. It then discusses the four key factors to be considered when designing a payment system. It describes and analyzes the principal payment methods. Finally, it presents some conditional guidance for reformers about which payment methods to use.

This chapter focuses on a program that offers financial incentives for weight loss in various work sites in the United States. It examines two outcomes for evaluating weight loss interventions: attrition and weight loss and reports higher attrition and found 80 percent weight loss failure. It was found that the financial rewards in this program are associated with modest weight loss. After one year, it averages 1.4 pounds for those in the standard incentives group, 1.7 pounds for those in the control group, and 3.6 pounds for those in the modified incentives group, under the assumption that dropouts experienced no weight loss. The NIH considers a loss of 10 percent of baseline weight in six months to one year to be good progress for an obese individual. By this standard, very few participants in this program achieve good progress toward weight loss.

The Chapter explores the various types and sub-types of investment incentives, including not only the usually considered financial, fiscal and regulatory incentives, but also the less studied but very often used information and technical services, that can be particularly relevant in determining the final location of investment. The chapter also discusses other stimuli to investment location, specifically focusing on the role of investment promotion institutions/agencies (IPAs).

This chapter explores how money came to exert such a remarkable influence over the medical profession. It considers some of the factors that made many of America's doctors pay more attention to their own desires than to the health of their patients. It proposes that the runaway cost of care, changing financial incentives, inflated income expectations, falling physicians' income, changes in patent law, and substantial influence of industry on medical research were essential ingredients. Societal and cultural factors also contributed heavily. Putting “business strategies” on a high pedestal encouraged many in medicine to ignore a long-held principle that the patient comes first, and a permissive attitude outside of medicine toward financial conflicts of interest, undoubtedly led many to think that such arrangements were also acceptable inside the walls of health care. The new complicity with industry spread like an infectious disease through a community.

This chapter discusses the implementation of family psychoeducation (FPE) in mental health services in the United States and in Europe. It presents research findings on implementation and application and fidelity issues. Barriers to implementation may come from families and consumers, with time, distance, and confidentiality issues, as well as from clinicians and administrators reluctant to commit staff effort and funding. Major issues identified in research included reimbursement and financial incentives, commitment of stakeholders, and training and appropriate administration. Various solutions are offered by seasoned FPE researchers and clinicians, such as establishing an agency position for family-friendly services, staff training, and funding commitments from county or state mental health administrators.

This chapter debunks the myth that Krupp had been a driving force behind the high-level making of Nazi policy, rather than a participant in a massive web of ideologically driven immorality. It examines the Nuremberg trial of the Krupp directors, considering the issue of the extent to which businessmen had choices or a freedom to maneuver in the Nazi era. Furthermore, though the prospect of rearmament was an issue within the company, the chapter argues that the rise and fall of profitability did not correspond directly to the political stance of the company, its owners, and its management. Financial incentives alone did not determine the political orientation of the Krupp business, particularly as the company soon found itself embroiled in the Nazis' politics and the Second World War loomed over the horizon.

Considers the impact of the policy context on motivation, asking whether individuals’ motivations are independent of the context in which they operate or whether they are in fact deeply affected by that context. Do market‐oriented policies, such as the introduction of financial incentives for previously voluntary activities such as blood donation, corrupt? Do they turn knights into knaves? Alternatively, does government corrupt—or lead to moral atrophy? The answers are somewhat surprising, with both markets and governments devaluing knightly motivations on occasion but at other times rewarding or revaluing it.

This chapter portrays the largely unregulated use of investment incentives by states and municipalities in the United States and describes the “veritable cornucopia of exemptions, allowances, and credits” offered to investments. The authors illustrate how state and municipal governments use “beggar-thy-neighbor” policies to lure investments away from neighboring or competing states or cities; in the end, the authors contend, the only winners are the companies, as the incentives become so generous that they do not outweigh the fiscal costs, and that in fact, there is no clear correlation between incentives granted and the outcomes achieved by the governments granting them.

In this work we take advantage of the detailed health information available in the Survey of Health and Retirement in Europe (SHARE) to explore the link between health, financial incentives and retirement. With this purpose, we construct a health index and classify individuals into health quintiles and use this information to assess the extent to which differences in health are translated into differences in the responsiveness to changes in financial incentives. In addition, we construct a single option value measure by compiling the information on financial incentives from the disability, the old-age and the unemployment systems in order to consider the aggregate incentives from all the social security schemes used as pathways into retirement among individuals aged 50 to 64 in Spain. Our results show that individuals in the worse health quintiles are, indeed, the more responsive to financial incentives as they prove to be less likely to retire when incentives to continue working increase. We further perform a series of simulations to assess the expected changes in retirement choices of older individuals when some of the policy parameters are modified.

This introductory chapter presents three stories of contemporary patients in the United States, France, and Japan to illustrate why patients and the public should worry about the issue of physician payment. Conflicts of interest are endemic in private practice in these countries which have very different medical, legal, and political systems. Yet there are also big differences among these countries in the extent and kind of conflicts of interest that exist in private practice, the measures used to cope with them, and the alternatives to private practice that are available. Each country's laws, insurance, and medical institutions shape medical practice; and within each country, different forms of practice affect clinical choices.

This article argues that virtue ethics provides a deeper and more compelling analysis of the ethical problems raised by conflicts of interest in physician prescribing than do other ethical perspectives. The author argues that disclosure requirements fail to address specifically medical vices, such as physician maleficence and betrayal, which are shown when physicians’ industry ties lead them to engage in harmful prescribing behaviour, or to redefine their therapeutic relationships with patients as business relationships. The author also evaluates proposals to use financial incentives for physicians to avoid biased prescribing, and indicates how such an analysis can also help the development of a virtue ethics model for regulatory interventions more generally. The author then highlights a moral cost to the use of financial incentives here that, while justifiable on utilitarian cost-effectiveness grounds, is a moral cost that on a virtue ethics approach to policy should not be paid in efforts to improve health outcomes.

This chapter uses micro-data from the years 1984 to 1995 to assess the extent to which financial incentives can be seen to determine the retirement decision. In doing so, it can also simulate the effects of possible reforms on participation rates. The results indicate strong and statistically significant incentive effects for males. For females, the estimated effects are smaller and much less significant. The chapter is organized as follows. Section 8.2 sketches the institutional framework within which people retire in the Netherlands. Sections 8.3 and 8.4 describe the data and its application in the analysis. Section 8.5 provides a brief summary of research on retirement in the Netherlands. Section 8.6 is devoted to the construction of incentive measures that are used in the estimation of the retirement equations. Section 8.7 presents the estimation results for the common model, and Section 8.8 gives results of some policy simulations based on the estimated common model. Section 8.9 concludes.

Introduction of many Conditional Cash Transfer (CCT) schemes in India during the last decade is a governmental response to the problem of ‘missing girls’, as reflected in the skewed child sex ratio. Through the provision of financial incentives to poor families following the fulfilment of certain verifiable conditions, CCTs seek to provide short-term income support and promote long-term behavioural changes. The study on which this chapter is based relies heavily on the interactions with officials, NGOs and the analysis of available data of 15 CCT schemes across the states in India designed exclusively for the promotion of girl children. The study discovered that the promise of cash transfers and the conditionality ensured to some extent birth registration, immunization, and school enrolment and retention. Though CCTs offer governments the scope to discriminate in favour of girls, it is not clear how far CCTs have led to a change in parental attitudes and preferences towards daughters.

Health care reform through the Affordable Care Act in the United States contained specific measures to encourage rapid reform in the way that physicians are compensated, moving away from the historical norm of fee-for-service payment to global payments to existing or new “accountable care organizations” (ACOs), combinations of hospitals, and physician groups. The shift to ACOs is intended to bring greater coordination to care while changing the underlying financial incentive for physicians so that they are rewarded for prevention of illness and for more efficient, less costly care overall. Questions remain about how the global payments to large ACOs will be translated into incentives for individual physicians working within these organizations. This chapter emphasizes that the term “bedside rationing” obscures the important distinction between the random variation in rationing possible across individual physicians and a more organized approach to making allocation decisions and treatment guidelines for the population cared for by a physician organization.