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This chapter examines the ontological status of Arthur Schopenhauer’s doctrine of the will. It begins by addressing the question that has dogged Schopenhauer’s philosophy: how the will can be said to deny itself. Schopenhauer argued that the denial of the will was an act of the intellect that had, in exceptional persons, somehow struggled free from the will that gave it birth. But since throughout his writings Schopenhauer insists that the intellect is “originally a mere instrument in the service of our will,” this argument has not seemed to convince many skeptics. This chapter considers whether the will, as conceived by Schopenhauer, is absolute and final reality, or whether self-denial of the will is a somewhat misleading figure of speech. In particular, it expounds on what Schopenhauer means by the term “thing-in-itself” as it relates to his doctrine of the will. It also discusses the ways in which Indian thought helps elucidate Schopenhauer’s difficulties concerning the relation of the will to ultimate reality.

This chapter examines Arthur Schopenhauer’s contention that philosophy should not encroach on the territory of mysticism, the two having different starting points and outcomes. Many of the expressions employed by Schopenhauer in the Manuscript Remains when speaking of the better consciousness bear a markedly religious or even mystical flavor. Schopenhauer makes no pretence of being a mystic and insists that he considers the agreement of his own philosophy with quietism and asceticism to be a proof of its accuracy. According to Bryan Magee, the mystical side of Schopenhauer “is basic to the whole thrust and tenor of his philosophy. His affinity with Hinduism and Buddhism, and with the mystical tradition in all religions, rests on it.” This chapter discusses Schopenhauer’s description of philosophy as being like a pendulum, swinging between what he calls rationalism and illuminism. It also considers Schopenhauer’s ideas regarding denial of the will in relation to final reality or “better will.”

This chapter examines what lies beyond Arthur Schopenhauer’s doctrine of the will, given his argument that the will, in spite of being the metaphysical core of existence, does not constitute final reality. It begins with a discussion of two forms of consciousness articulated by Schopenhauer in the early Manuscript Remains: empirical consciousness and better consciousness (bessere Bewusstsein). It then expounds on the concept of better consciousness and how it differs from empirical consciousness and what Schopenhauer calls the subject of consciousness. It also explores a third form of consciousness found in Manuscript Remains, namely, the pure subject of knowing. Finally, it highlights some interesting points of contact between Schopenhauer’s better consciousness—or, expressed in negative form, denial of the will—and Indian conceptions.

This book explores Arthur Schopenhauer’s encounter with Indian thought, with particular emphasis on his doctrine of representation and his account of the genesis of the will. It considers the extent and nature of the affinities between Schopenhauer’s thought and the philosophical and religious ideas of India by concentrating on the schools associated with Hinduism and Buddhism: the Advaita Vedānta and the Mādhyamika and Yogācāra schools. The book is divided into four sections. The first section provides the background to Schopenhauer’s interest in Indian thought and the growth and extent of his knowledge of Hindu and Buddhist ideas. The second section deals with the doctrine of representation and related views found in India, while the third section discusses the doctrine of the will and its relation to Indian thought. The fourth and lasr section focuses on the ontological status of the will and the nature of final reality.