Berys Gaut
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199263219
- eISBN:
- 9780191718854
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199263219.003.0009
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Aesthetics
Emotions figure in both the cognitive argument, through the idea of emotional education, and in the merited response argument. This chapter argues for emotional realism, the doctrine that emotions ...
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Emotions figure in both the cognitive argument, through the idea of emotional education, and in the merited response argument. This chapter argues for emotional realism, the doctrine that emotions can be real rather than merely imagined when directed towards fictional situations, and that such emotions can be rational. The most influential irrealist account due to Kendall Walton is criticized. It is argued that one need not have an appropriate belief in order to have an emotion, an anti-judgementalist position defended by Patricia Greenspan. It is also shown that the motivational aspect of an emotion may consist only in a desire or wish. Three criteria are developed for the rationality of emotions. It is argued that according to these criteria, fiction-directed emotions can be rational.Less
Emotions figure in both the cognitive argument, through the idea of emotional education, and in the merited response argument. This chapter argues for emotional realism, the doctrine that emotions can be real rather than merely imagined when directed towards fictional situations, and that such emotions can be rational. The most influential irrealist account due to Kendall Walton is criticized. It is argued that one need not have an appropriate belief in order to have an emotion, an anti-judgementalist position defended by Patricia Greenspan. It is also shown that the motivational aspect of an emotion may consist only in a desire or wish. Three criteria are developed for the rationality of emotions. It is argued that according to these criteria, fiction-directed emotions can be rational.
Craig Delancey
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195142716
- eISBN:
- 9780199833153
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195142713.003.0006
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
The fact that we emote for fictions is incompatible with some cognitivist views of emotions and has therefore received a great deal of attention and been called the paradox of emotion and fiction. I ...
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The fact that we emote for fictions is incompatible with some cognitivist views of emotions and has therefore received a great deal of attention and been called the paradox of emotion and fiction. I show how the affect program theory offers an explanation of how and why we emote for fictions. Central to this approach, is the idea that the entertainment of content is prior to and more basic than the consideration of whether a content is warranted.Less
The fact that we emote for fictions is incompatible with some cognitivist views of emotions and has therefore received a great deal of attention and been called the paradox of emotion and fiction. I show how the affect program theory offers an explanation of how and why we emote for fictions. Central to this approach, is the idea that the entertainment of content is prior to and more basic than the consideration of whether a content is warranted.
Berys Gaut
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199263219
- eISBN:
- 9780191718854
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199263219.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Aesthetics
This book investigates the relation of art to morality, a topic that has been of central and recurring interest to the philosophy of art since Plato. The book explores the various positions that have ...
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This book investigates the relation of art to morality, a topic that has been of central and recurring interest to the philosophy of art since Plato. The book explores the various positions that have been taken in this debate, and argues for ethicism — a position that holds that an artwork is always aesthetically flawed insofar as it possesses an ethical demerit that is aesthetically relevant. Three main arguments are developed for this view: these involve showing that moral goodness is a kind of beauty (the moral beauty argument); that art can teach us about morality and thereby often has aesthetic value (the cognitive argument); and that our emotional responses to works are merited in part by ethical considerations (the merited response argument). In the course of its argument for the correctness of ethical criticism of art, the book also develops a new theory of the nature of aesthetic value, explores how art can teach us about the world and what we morally ought to do by guiding our imaginings, and argues that we can have genuine emotions towards people and events that we know are merely fictional. The book also examines several artworks in detail, showing how ethical criticism can yield rich and plausible accounts of works such as Rembrandt's Bathsheba and Nabokov's Lolita.Less
This book investigates the relation of art to morality, a topic that has been of central and recurring interest to the philosophy of art since Plato. The book explores the various positions that have been taken in this debate, and argues for ethicism — a position that holds that an artwork is always aesthetically flawed insofar as it possesses an ethical demerit that is aesthetically relevant. Three main arguments are developed for this view: these involve showing that moral goodness is a kind of beauty (the moral beauty argument); that art can teach us about morality and thereby often has aesthetic value (the cognitive argument); and that our emotional responses to works are merited in part by ethical considerations (the merited response argument). In the course of its argument for the correctness of ethical criticism of art, the book also develops a new theory of the nature of aesthetic value, explores how art can teach us about the world and what we morally ought to do by guiding our imaginings, and argues that we can have genuine emotions towards people and events that we know are merely fictional. The book also examines several artworks in detail, showing how ethical criticism can yield rich and plausible accounts of works such as Rembrandt's Bathsheba and Nabokov's Lolita.
Kathleen Stock
- Published in print:
- 2014
- Published Online:
- September 2014
- ISBN:
- 9780199669639
- eISBN:
- 9780191749384
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199669639.003.0011
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Aesthetics, Philosophy of Mind
Philosophical aesthetics has increasingly turned towards empirical evidence to settle long-standing questions. Yet, surprisingly, given philosophers’ tendencies to cautious critical analysis, the use ...
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Philosophical aesthetics has increasingly turned towards empirical evidence to settle long-standing questions. Yet, surprisingly, given philosophers’ tendencies to cautious critical analysis, the use of such evidence is not always inspected as scrupulously as it could be. In this paper, Stock presents a case study illustrating what she takes to be one instance of the misuse of empirical evidence in a current debate within aesthetics: that of the so-called ‘paradox of fiction’. In some relatively recent literature, there has been a shift towards the citing of sub-personal events as a means of attempting to address this problem. In particular, those neurological or other physiological events that accompany imaginative responses to fictional entities are often cited. Yet, Stock argues, there are often flaws in the way empirical evidence is used to support this sort of account.Less
Philosophical aesthetics has increasingly turned towards empirical evidence to settle long-standing questions. Yet, surprisingly, given philosophers’ tendencies to cautious critical analysis, the use of such evidence is not always inspected as scrupulously as it could be. In this paper, Stock presents a case study illustrating what she takes to be one instance of the misuse of empirical evidence in a current debate within aesthetics: that of the so-called ‘paradox of fiction’. In some relatively recent literature, there has been a shift towards the citing of sub-personal events as a means of attempting to address this problem. In particular, those neurological or other physiological events that accompany imaginative responses to fictional entities are often cited. Yet, Stock argues, there are often flaws in the way empirical evidence is used to support this sort of account.
