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This chapter examines the way in which environmental groups and activists shape the energy policymaking processes. Based on case studies of countries that adopted early and strong feed‐in tariff (FIT) policies—Germany, Denmark, and Spain—it shows that the environmental movement contributes to both the adoption and implementation of those policies through campaigns against nuclear power, air pollution, and global climate change. The chapter also shows that environmental groups' ability to influence the adoption of pro–renewable energy policies depends on their ability to mobilize large green‐energy advocacy coalitions, to take advantage of favorable political contexts and an unbiased mass media, and to instill positive public opinion. Environmental groups vigorously defended the implementation of feed‐in tariffs whenever they were threatened by the fossil‐fuel, nuclear power, or utility lobbies. Environmental groups fighting for strong policies have been successful, particularly when they could build large pro–renewable energy coalitions with unions, farmers, and civic associations; when they had allies among political elites; and when mass media's coverage of environmental issues was favorable and public opinion was positive.

The chapter follows the adoption of an administered price, a feed-in tariff, for wind power in France in 2000. Valuation in the case of the feed-in tariff unfolds around activities of knitting together distinct assemblages including entities such as competing energy technologies, electricity system management, calculations of ‘fair’ profitability, etc. A critical aspect of these assemblages is questioning the commensurability of wind power and nuclear power, their prices and profits. At the centre of these controversies, the feed-in tariff becomes more than a simple instrument for bridging political objectives with the order of market exchange; and qualifications of the governance instrument are entirely entangled with the construction of value for wind power.

This chapter combines insight from the literature on industry creation and social movement outcomes to identify the main factors that shape the global development of the wind power industry. It builds a model that illustrates the pathways through which environmental activists, organizations, and research institutes contribute to the growth of this industry. The model's fundamental assumption is that the environmental movement's influence is mediated by social context and natural resources. The chapter also tests the model using quantitative analysis. Results from regression analysis offer support for the theoretical model and are consistent with previous studies on industry emergence and social movement outcomes. These results advance research on industry creation and social movement outcomes by showing that the effect of the variable that measures the strength of environmental organizations is mediated by the natural resources and social context variables. The findings are also consistent with the argument advanced by many energy analysts—that renewable energy feed‐in tariffs (FITs) are essential for the rapid growth of the industry. Taken together, results from the quantitative analysis show that the wind energy industry grows faster in countries that have strong environmental organizations, as well as high‐quality wind and pro‐environment political allies aligned with environmental organizations.

In the previous chapter, the malleability of Danish energy policy was highlighted as a key factor behind the successful diffusion of wind power in Denmark. This chapter examines wind power diffusion in Germany, and in the process highlights a different, though equally successful policy ideology. Compared to policy of its Nordic neighbor, wind power development policy in Germany has been far more structured and invariable. In fact, the success of Germany’s wind power development strategy often serves as an exemplar for proponents of consistent feed-in tariff regimes, which is considered by some to be the most effective strategy for driving wind power development. As this chapter will demonstrate, fostering wind power development in Germany is, like in other nations, a complex challenge involving dynamic interactions between government and nongovernment actors. As German wind power capacity expanded, there has been social dissent and utility opposition. Nevertheless, the German government has remained committed to aggressive wind power diffusion policies and has responded to emergent challenges in a remarkably unified manner wherein state, regional, and local government actors have formed integrated problem-solving networks. This chapter also highlights the seamless web of nation-specific STEP factors influencing wind power development that is apparent in Germany. As one pair of researchers observed, wind power development in Germany has been marked by “close interplay between the actors within the political system, technical and economic development, as well as social factors.” As has been the case in most industrialized nations, forces in support of wind power development began to amass during the two energy crises of the 1970s. As the government began to evaluate its alternative energy technology options, nuclear power and wind power emerged as the two most viable utility-scale options. In the 1970s, nuclear power in Germany enjoyed a modicum of developmental success. The nation’s first commercial nuclear power plant commenced operation in 1969. By 2010, nuclear power contributed approximately 22% to Germany’s electricity supply. However, nuclear power development has been contentious. Although there has been industrial support, there has also been strident public opposition, especially since Chernobyl.

Part III draws the threads together to discuss the emergence of this new model of “green development”, or green growth capitalism. Chapter Seven is concerned with the process of transition itself, emphasizing the barriers and difficulties encountered by any change on the scale of the new greening trajectory. The greening of markets for energy, commodities and capital can be expected to propagate to encompass the entire economy, through multiple inter-firm connections and driven by competitive forces. Green products will call for new value chains that will propagate via intermediate suppliers and aggregators back to ultimate commodity suppliers, where the greening of commodity markets will exert their effects downstream. The barriers that stand in the way of this emergent system are formidable, from the protection of vested interests and continuation of subsidies to fossil fuels, to the clash of sectional interests. Ultimately it is strong states that drive fundamental change.

We argue that it is not enough to declare an intention, even a sincere intention, to be a sustainable company; the implementation journey is a difficult one. Typically, implementation involves multiple parallel projects that are inherently prone to setbacks and conflict. This chapter focuses on the challenges originating from different and dynamic levels of goal consensus and task clarity. Across projects, and over time, both goal consensus and task clarity tend to shift—often for external and unavoidable reasons. The three cases in the chapter—Google, BP, and the German Feed-In Tariff—illustrate the ways in which each combination of high/low goal consensus and high/low task clarity requires different leadership styles and decision-making processes. In particular, the combination of low agreement and high uncertainty—a combination that often characterizes sustainability programs at some point in their lifespan—calls for a strategy of partisan mutual adjustment

In this chapter, the authors’ guiding principles are compared to the strategy adopted by Europe, followed by an exploration of the ways in which the European Union could become a real crucible for the ecological transition.

We might not live in a sustainable age, but we’re living in the age of sustainability. The movement has gained a level of prominence in recent years that is difficult to dispute. The scholarly fields associated with sustainability have expanded dramatically; new tools and methods have appeared that help define, measure, and assess sustainability; and a broad range of organizations and communities have embraced the principles of sustainable living. Sustainability, in fact, has gone from marginal ecological idea to mainstream movement in a surprisingly short amount of time. We now see sustainability publicized at the supermarket, on university campuses, at the aquarium, in corporate headquarters, in government ministries, and in countless other places. A growing number of universities, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and corporations in the Western world possess an “office of sustainability”— replete with sustainability plans and guidebooks—but none have an “office of green radicalism” or an “office of the status quo.” In a sense, this environmental discourse has won out over rival conceptions of humanity’s relationship to the natural world. This chapter is an attempt to sketch out the different ways in which sustainability has gained a foothold in contemporary society. It is not meant to suggest that our world is sustainable. On the contrary, many barriers and entrenched interests have kept our world rather unsustainable, and Mathis Wackernagel has even argued that, since the 1990s, we have exceeded the Earth’s capacity to sustain us; we are now living in a state of global overshoot. The goal here, rather, is to show the ways in which our society has constructively responded to our ecological crisis—to demonstrate the growth and elaboration of the sustainability movement and describe some of the successes it has achieved in counteracting our bad habits. As the philosophy of sustainability has developed, so too has it expanded its scope. If we recall from earlier chapters, the concept of sustainability began in the eighteenth century as a method of managing forests, and by the 1960s and 1970s it had become a reaction to industrialism and the trend toward ecological overshoot.

This chapter reviews the development and role of financial mechanisms and fiscal incentives in two African economic powerhouses, South Africa and Nigeria, and the two largest emitters of greenhouse gases on the continent. Inoutlining both countries’ financial and fiscal policy response to promoting renewable energy, the term ‘financial mechanisms or incentives’ refers to macro-economic instruments such as feed-in tariffs; while ‘fiscal incentive’ refers to narrower revenue incentives including disincentives such as a carbon tax. In South Africa, a shift from traditional carbon-based energy sources towards renewables is encouraged by both financial mechanisms and fiscal incentives . In Nigeria, fiscal incentives are promoted by focusing on measures to increase non-oil revenues, primarily through improved tax policy and administration The chapter reveals that while significant strides have been made in both countries to invoke fiscal and financial incentives to promote renewable energy many challenges remain before this ideal becomes a reality.

The years 2006–2007 represented an intellectual tipping point for climate change advocacy. Over this short period of time, there was ample evidence of a general convergence of understanding between many environmentalists and economists on the perilous threat posed by climate change. In the summer of 2006, the release of Al Gore’s An Inconvenient Truth turned climate change into an issue of public concern in the United States. The domestic debate that the film helped inspire escalated over the next year to a point where energy policy suddenly became a vote swaying issue in American politics. This development became a topic of interest for the rest of the world because signs of a weakening in American reticence toward climate change mitigation would have significant repercussions for the 128 nations that were struggling to keep the Kyoto Protocol from falling apart. In October 2006, a comprehensive independent study called the Stern Review, commissioned by the Chancellor of the Exchequer in the United Kingdom, presented an assessment of the anticipated impacts of climate change. As a foreboding sign of the content which would follow, the report began by describing climate change as “the greatest and widest ranging market failure ever seen”. The report concluded that the long-term costs of climate change were expected to be so great that early action to abate global warming was the most cost-effective alternative. It estimated that the net benefits (benefits less costs) from reducing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions to achieve a stabilization level of 550 parts per million (ppm) by 2050 would be in the neighborhood of US$2.5 trillion. In February 2007, the first of four reports that comprise the Fourth Assessment Report of the United Nation’s Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) was released. The goal of this first report was to “describe progress in understanding of the human and natural drivers of climate change, observed climate change, climate processes and attribution, and estimates of projected future climate change.”