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This chapter examines the relationship between parody and an author’s moral rights. It first traces the evolution of the concept of moral rights as a means of providing protection not only of the authors’ personal interests but also the public interest before discussing the reasons why moral rights might conflict with parodies. It considers two competing theories underlying the protection of authorial interests—the ‘monist’ theory and the ‘dualist’ theory—and their implications for the parody exception. It also explains how jurisdictions differ in the nature and scope of protection afforded to moral rights, noting that the parody exception in ‘copyright’ law does not extend to moral rights. The chapter goes on to explore the author’s paternity and integrity rights as well as their right against false attribution. It shows that, in the case of parodies, an overlap exists between the regimes applied to moral and economic rights.

This chapter summarizes the findings on authorship controversies. It highlights the extent to which false or not genuine attributions without intent to deceive has been made or claimed. It also explains the three categories of attribution: genuine attribution, false attribution with intent to deceive, and false attribution without intent to deceive. The chapter analyzes the basic principles for authorship studies and compares similarities in the types of arguments used by the defenders of the traditional attributions to Ivan IV, Andrei Kurbskii, and William Shakespeare. It also concentrates on issues of attribution and misattribution, which involve accusations of forgery and plagiarism, as well as the question of who the author was.

The two-systems model of mindreading advocated by Ian Apperly and Steve Butterfill seeks to find a middle ground between full-blown mindreading and either behaviour-reading or so-called ‘sub-mentalizing’. Minimal mindreading is taken to be efficient, automatic, and to emerge early in human ontogenetic development. Full-blown mindreading is taken to be flexible, less efficient, and to develop later. This chapter raises three challenges for this model. First, it challenges its claim to resolve the developmental puzzle. Secondly, it challenges the claim that the representation of the aspectuality of beliefs falls outside the scope of minimal mindreading. Finally, examination of the contrast between Level-1 and Level-2 visual perspective-taking undermines the sharp dichotomy between automatic and flexible cognitive processes. The alternative picture supported by this chapter is of a single mindreading system that can be used in ways that are more or less effortful as a result of interacting with other cognitive systems, such as working memory and executive control.