Jason A. Mahn
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- September 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199790661
- eISBN:
- 9780199897391
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199790661.001.0001
- Subject:
- Religion, Philosophy of Religion
This book deconstructs and reconstructs the fortunate Fall (felix culpa) theme of Western thought, using Kierkegaard as a guide. Dating back to the fifth century Easter Eve Mass, the claim that ...
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This book deconstructs and reconstructs the fortunate Fall (felix culpa) theme of Western thought, using Kierkegaard as a guide. Dating back to the fifth century Easter Eve Mass, the claim that Adam's Fall might be considered “fortunate” in light of a resultant good has become Christianity's most controversial and unwieldy idea. Whereas the phrase originally praised sin as a backhanded witness to the ineffability of redemption, modern speculative theodicy came to understand all evil as comprehensible, historically productive, and therefore fortunate, while the Romantic poets celebrated transgression for bolstering individual creativity and spiritedness. This book traces Kierkegaard's blunt critique of Idealism's justification of evil, as well as his playful deconstruction of Romantic celebrations of sin. The book argues, however, that Kierkegaard also resists the moralization of evil, preferring to consider temptation and sin as determinative dimensions of religious existence. At least in relation to the assumed “innocence” of Christendom's cultured Christians, the self-conscious sinner might be the better religious witness. Although the book shows how Kierkegaard finally replaces actual sin with human fragility, temptation, and the possibility of spiritual offense as that which “happily” shapes religious faith, it also argues that his understanding of “fortunate fallibility” is at least as rhetorically compelling and theologically operative as talk of a “fortunate Fall.” Together, Kierkegaard's playful maneuvers and this book's thematizations carve rhetorical space for Christian theologians to speak of sin in ways that are more particular and peculiar than the typical discourses of Church and culture.Less
This book deconstructs and reconstructs the fortunate Fall (felix culpa) theme of Western thought, using Kierkegaard as a guide. Dating back to the fifth century Easter Eve Mass, the claim that Adam's Fall might be considered “fortunate” in light of a resultant good has become Christianity's most controversial and unwieldy idea. Whereas the phrase originally praised sin as a backhanded witness to the ineffability of redemption, modern speculative theodicy came to understand all evil as comprehensible, historically productive, and therefore fortunate, while the Romantic poets celebrated transgression for bolstering individual creativity and spiritedness. This book traces Kierkegaard's blunt critique of Idealism's justification of evil, as well as his playful deconstruction of Romantic celebrations of sin. The book argues, however, that Kierkegaard also resists the moralization of evil, preferring to consider temptation and sin as determinative dimensions of religious existence. At least in relation to the assumed “innocence” of Christendom's cultured Christians, the self-conscious sinner might be the better religious witness. Although the book shows how Kierkegaard finally replaces actual sin with human fragility, temptation, and the possibility of spiritual offense as that which “happily” shapes religious faith, it also argues that his understanding of “fortunate fallibility” is at least as rhetorically compelling and theologically operative as talk of a “fortunate Fall.” Together, Kierkegaard's playful maneuvers and this book's thematizations carve rhetorical space for Christian theologians to speak of sin in ways that are more particular and peculiar than the typical discourses of Church and culture.
Albert Casullo
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- May 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780195115055
- eISBN:
- 9780199786190
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195115058.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter articulates the requirements of fallible a priori justification. It distinguishes two senses of fallibility: c-fallibility, justification that does not guarantee truth; and ...
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This chapter articulates the requirements of fallible a priori justification. It distinguishes two senses of fallibility: c-fallibility, justification that does not guarantee truth; and p-fallibility, justification that is defeasible. It argues that although these senses are logically independent of one another, there are some significant relations between them mediated by the concepts of self-revision, overriding defeater, and undermining defeater. It is shown that several alternative fallibilist accounts of a priori justification face difficulties that are avoided by the account defended in Chapter 2.Less
This chapter articulates the requirements of fallible a priori justification. It distinguishes two senses of fallibility: c-fallibility, justification that does not guarantee truth; and p-fallibility, justification that is defeasible. It argues that although these senses are logically independent of one another, there are some significant relations between them mediated by the concepts of self-revision, overriding defeater, and undermining defeater. It is shown that several alternative fallibilist accounts of a priori justification face difficulties that are avoided by the account defended in Chapter 2.
Thomas Christiano
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- September 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780198297475
- eISBN:
- 9780191716867
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198297475.003.0003
- Subject:
- Political Science, Comparative Politics, Political Theory
This chapter argues that social justice requires that equality be publicly realized. Social justice is realized in social and political institutions that attempt to establish justice. It requires ...
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This chapter argues that social justice requires that equality be publicly realized. Social justice is realized in social and political institutions that attempt to establish justice. It requires that justice must not only be done, it must be seen to be done. In the case of justice as equality, it must not only be the case that people are treated as equals; they must be able to see that they are treated as equals. Hence, social justice requires what is called public equality. It is argued that public equality is grounded on the principle of equality defended in the last chapter and the circumstances of disagreement, diversity, fallibility, and cognitive bias that attend efforts to implement justice in any moderately complex society as well as the fundamental interests of persons in society. This grounds the idea of the egalitarian standpoint from which the justification of political institutions proceeds. That is the first stage of the argument for grounding of democracy on equality.Less
This chapter argues that social justice requires that equality be publicly realized. Social justice is realized in social and political institutions that attempt to establish justice. It requires that justice must not only be done, it must be seen to be done. In the case of justice as equality, it must not only be the case that people are treated as equals; they must be able to see that they are treated as equals. Hence, social justice requires what is called public equality. It is argued that public equality is grounded on the principle of equality defended in the last chapter and the circumstances of disagreement, diversity, fallibility, and cognitive bias that attend efforts to implement justice in any moderately complex society as well as the fundamental interests of persons in society. This grounds the idea of the egalitarian standpoint from which the justification of political institutions proceeds. That is the first stage of the argument for grounding of democracy on equality.
Ingo Gildenhard
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- January 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199291557
- eISBN:
- 9780191594885
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199291557.003.0002
- Subject:
- Classical Studies, Prose and Writers: Classical, Early, and Medieval
This chapter discusses figures of thought in Cicero's speeches to do with being human and the human condition. Special attention is given to the notions that human beings are inherently fallible and ...
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This chapter discusses figures of thought in Cicero's speeches to do with being human and the human condition. Special attention is given to the notions that human beings are inherently fallible and that human life unfolds in an unpredictable environment (personified in Fortune, goddess of happenstance and caprice) and is thus subject to random, i.e. amoral disasters. Both notions found articulation in new comic scripts, before appearing in other genres of discourse, such as rhetorical handbooks and public oratory. Against this background, the chapter explores how Cicero uses them to fashion models of the human self and of the universe, not least to address the problem of social accountability.Less
This chapter discusses figures of thought in Cicero's speeches to do with being human and the human condition. Special attention is given to the notions that human beings are inherently fallible and that human life unfolds in an unpredictable environment (personified in Fortune, goddess of happenstance and caprice) and is thus subject to random, i.e. amoral disasters. Both notions found articulation in new comic scripts, before appearing in other genres of discourse, such as rhetorical handbooks and public oratory. Against this background, the chapter explores how Cicero uses them to fashion models of the human self and of the universe, not least to address the problem of social accountability.
John Wall
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- July 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780195182569
- eISBN:
- 9780199835737
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195182561.003.0002
- Subject:
- Religion, Philosophy of Religion
There can be no meaning to the notion of human moral creativity without first the ontological possibility for a poetic moral self. In the face of a range of contemporary attacks on moral selfhood, ...
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There can be no meaning to the notion of human moral creativity without first the ontological possibility for a poetic moral self. In the face of a range of contemporary attacks on moral selfhood, Paul Ricoeur’s “poetics of the will” opens the way for a new postmodern phenomenology of the moral self rooted not in the autonomous ego of modernity, but in a radical religious affirmation or wager of the human capability for making meaning of its historical and embodied world. A careful reading of Ricoeur’s extensive oeuvre over the second half of the twentieth century shows the development of a highly original moral anthropology—combining elements from Edmund Husserl, Hans-Georg Gadamer, Gabriel Marcel, Karl Barth, Paul Tillich, and others—based on a fallible tension of finitude and freedom within the self that is nevertheless capable of giving rise to concrete historical meaning over time in the form of the self’s interpretations of symbols, traditions, and narratives. Ricoeur’s unique hermeneutical phenomenology does not, however, fully articulate the primordiality of human moral creativity itself. The decisive further step that may be taken, by more closely integrating poetics and religion, is to affirm the human self as ultimately capable, in the face of its own idolatrous fallibility, of imitating the mythical world-creative activity of the world’s own primordial Creator.Less
There can be no meaning to the notion of human moral creativity without first the ontological possibility for a poetic moral self. In the face of a range of contemporary attacks on moral selfhood, Paul Ricoeur’s “poetics of the will” opens the way for a new postmodern phenomenology of the moral self rooted not in the autonomous ego of modernity, but in a radical religious affirmation or wager of the human capability for making meaning of its historical and embodied world. A careful reading of Ricoeur’s extensive oeuvre over the second half of the twentieth century shows the development of a highly original moral anthropology—combining elements from Edmund Husserl, Hans-Georg Gadamer, Gabriel Marcel, Karl Barth, Paul Tillich, and others—based on a fallible tension of finitude and freedom within the self that is nevertheless capable of giving rise to concrete historical meaning over time in the form of the self’s interpretations of symbols, traditions, and narratives. Ricoeur’s unique hermeneutical phenomenology does not, however, fully articulate the primordiality of human moral creativity itself. The decisive further step that may be taken, by more closely integrating poetics and religion, is to affirm the human self as ultimately capable, in the face of its own idolatrous fallibility, of imitating the mythical world-creative activity of the world’s own primordial Creator.
Stephen C. Angle
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- February 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780195385144
- eISBN:
- 9780199869756
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195385144.003.0012
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General
This chapter articulates a contemporary Confucian politics that allows the ideal of sagehood to inform both personal and public activities, without falling into the traps that have snared both the ...
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This chapter articulates a contemporary Confucian politics that allows the ideal of sagehood to inform both personal and public activities, without falling into the traps that have snared both the theory and practice of previous Confucian politics. The chapter begins with a review of the relation between perfection and fallibility. The attitude toward perfection and ideals that is recommended leads to a second topic, which spans questions of ritual and reverence. Ritual must feature prominently in any Confucian politics. Embracing ritual and reverence entails an affirmative attitude toward spirituality, but this is a very different thing from advocating the establishment of a Confucian church or state religion. Instead, this general approach to embracing ideals undergirds the importance of what Joseph Chan has called “moderate perfectionist institutions.” These institutions must invest a plurality of voices with sovereignty if the effort to look for harmony in our world is to have any practical hope. This, then, leads to a substantial discussion of the ways in which sagely politics must be participatory. Lastly, the chapter argues that in a contemporary Confucian context, laws and rights should be seen as a system of second resort.Less
This chapter articulates a contemporary Confucian politics that allows the ideal of sagehood to inform both personal and public activities, without falling into the traps that have snared both the theory and practice of previous Confucian politics. The chapter begins with a review of the relation between perfection and fallibility. The attitude toward perfection and ideals that is recommended leads to a second topic, which spans questions of ritual and reverence. Ritual must feature prominently in any Confucian politics. Embracing ritual and reverence entails an affirmative attitude toward spirituality, but this is a very different thing from advocating the establishment of a Confucian church or state religion. Instead, this general approach to embracing ideals undergirds the importance of what Joseph Chan has called “moderate perfectionist institutions.” These institutions must invest a plurality of voices with sovereignty if the effort to look for harmony in our world is to have any practical hope. This, then, leads to a substantial discussion of the ways in which sagely politics must be participatory. Lastly, the chapter argues that in a contemporary Confucian context, laws and rights should be seen as a system of second resort.
Jason A. Mahn
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- September 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199790661
- eISBN:
- 9780199897391
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199790661.003.0001
- Subject:
- Religion, Philosophy of Religion
This chapter introduces the interconnected themes of fortunate Fall and fortunate fallibility and argues against the moralization of theological accounts of sin. While scholars such as David Kelsey ...
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This chapter introduces the interconnected themes of fortunate Fall and fortunate fallibility and argues against the moralization of theological accounts of sin. While scholars such as David Kelsey resist the “migration” of the doctrine of sin into theological hamartiology for implying that evil is necessary, the Introduction argues that attending to human fragility and tragedy does not assuage responsibility for sin. Rather, it begins to “repeat”—in Kierkegaard's nonidentical sense—the “para/orthodoxical” language of the fifth-century Easter vigil. This chapter also analyzes Kierkegaard's Fear and Trembling to show the interrelation between faith and sin, as well as argues for a theological-rhetorical reading of Kierkegaard's understanding of sin.Less
This chapter introduces the interconnected themes of fortunate Fall and fortunate fallibility and argues against the moralization of theological accounts of sin. While scholars such as David Kelsey resist the “migration” of the doctrine of sin into theological hamartiology for implying that evil is necessary, the Introduction argues that attending to human fragility and tragedy does not assuage responsibility for sin. Rather, it begins to “repeat”—in Kierkegaard's nonidentical sense—the “para/orthodoxical” language of the fifth-century Easter vigil. This chapter also analyzes Kierkegaard's Fear and Trembling to show the interrelation between faith and sin, as well as argues for a theological-rhetorical reading of Kierkegaard's understanding of sin.
Bernard Gert
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- April 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780195176896
- eISBN:
- 9780199835300
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195176898.003.0008
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
This chapter argues that the moral rules: do not deceive, keep your promises, do not cheat, obey the law, and do your duty, are justified moral rules. It provides analyses of deception, promises, ...
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This chapter argues that the moral rules: do not deceive, keep your promises, do not cheat, obey the law, and do your duty, are justified moral rules. It provides analyses of deception, promises, cheating, law, and duties. After showing the importance of fallibility, it points out some problems with rule consequentialism.Less
This chapter argues that the moral rules: do not deceive, keep your promises, do not cheat, obey the law, and do your duty, are justified moral rules. It provides analyses of deception, promises, cheating, law, and duties. After showing the importance of fallibility, it points out some problems with rule consequentialism.
Alvin Plantinga
- Published in print:
- 1993
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195078640
- eISBN:
- 9780199872213
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195078640.003.0006
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
In this chapter, I examine a priori knowledge from the perspective of my account of warrant. According to the epistemological tradition, what is known a priori is known, somehow, prior to or ...
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In this chapter, I examine a priori knowledge from the perspective of my account of warrant. According to the epistemological tradition, what is known a priori is known, somehow, prior to or independently of experience; in the first section of this chapter, I attempt to clarify this claim and describe some of the general features of a priori belief and knowledge. In the second section I argue, among other things, that a priori warrant (more precisely, intuitive warrant) is fallible and comes in degrees. I go on to consider an objection to the existence of a priori knowledge based on what has been called the causal requirement (roughly, the claim that any objects of which we have knowledge must be such that we stand in an appropriate causal relation with them). I argue that there is no plausible form of the causal requirement that constitutes a good objection to the existence of a priori knowledge; along the way, I offer an argument for the conclusion that propositions cannot be concrete objects of any sort, and point out that it is quite possible to think of abstract objects as capable of standing in causal relations with us.Less
In this chapter, I examine a priori knowledge from the perspective of my account of warrant. According to the epistemological tradition, what is known a priori is known, somehow, prior to or independently of experience; in the first section of this chapter, I attempt to clarify this claim and describe some of the general features of a priori belief and knowledge. In the second section I argue, among other things, that a priori warrant (more precisely, intuitive warrant) is fallible and comes in degrees. I go on to consider an objection to the existence of a priori knowledge based on what has been called the causal requirement (roughly, the claim that any objects of which we have knowledge must be such that we stand in an appropriate causal relation with them). I argue that there is no plausible form of the causal requirement that constitutes a good objection to the existence of a priori knowledge; along the way, I offer an argument for the conclusion that propositions cannot be concrete objects of any sort, and point out that it is quite possible to think of abstract objects as capable of standing in causal relations with us.
Anthony O'Hear
- Published in print:
- 1999
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198250043
- eISBN:
- 9780191598111
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198250045.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Science
What does it mean to be self‐conscious? Mere consciousness involves no conception of the self. Self‐consciousness requires a conceptual scheme or symbolic system and this in itself—drawing on ...
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What does it mean to be self‐conscious? Mere consciousness involves no conception of the self. Self‐consciousness requires a conceptual scheme or symbolic system and this in itself—drawing on Wittgensteinian points about the essentially public and social nature of language—presupposes that, contrary to sceptical doubts, we are already part of a language using community. Pierce made the point that self‐consciousness only arises if one sees oneself as a fallible member of a community of speakers—that self‐consciousness requires the possibility of error. While this role for fallibility in the arising of self‐consciousness carries with it some sceptical risks, it casts doubt on any extreme form of scepticism.Less
What does it mean to be self‐conscious? Mere consciousness involves no conception of the self. Self‐consciousness requires a conceptual scheme or symbolic system and this in itself—drawing on Wittgensteinian points about the essentially public and social nature of language—presupposes that, contrary to sceptical doubts, we are already part of a language using community. Pierce made the point that self‐consciousness only arises if one sees oneself as a fallible member of a community of speakers—that self‐consciousness requires the possibility of error. While this role for fallibility in the arising of self‐consciousness carries with it some sceptical risks, it casts doubt on any extreme form of scepticism.
A. A. Long
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199245567
- eISBN:
- 9780191597923
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199245568.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Ancient Philosophy
Discusses the life of Epictetus, and situates him in his cultural and intellectual context. He was taught Stoicism by Musonius Rufus, and the salient doctrines of traditional Stoicism are compared ...
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Discusses the life of Epictetus, and situates him in his cultural and intellectual context. He was taught Stoicism by Musonius Rufus, and the salient doctrines of traditional Stoicism are compared with Epictetus’ main themes, with a view to assess his originality. Epictetus plays down Stoic paradoxes and technicalities, focusing instead on moral progress and the fallibility of ordinary persons.Less
Discusses the life of Epictetus, and situates him in his cultural and intellectual context. He was taught Stoicism by Musonius Rufus, and the salient doctrines of traditional Stoicism are compared with Epictetus’ main themes, with a view to assess his originality. Epictetus plays down Stoic paradoxes and technicalities, focusing instead on moral progress and the fallibility of ordinary persons.
C. A. J. Coady
- Published in print:
- 1994
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198235514
- eISBN:
- 9780191597220
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198235518.003.0007
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
The eighteenth‐century Scots philosopher Thomas Reid's account of testimony is one of his most interesting and original contributions. Reid's analogy between the epistemic roles of perception and of ...
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The eighteenth‐century Scots philosopher Thomas Reid's account of testimony is one of his most interesting and original contributions. Reid's analogy between the epistemic roles of perception and of testimony is explored in this chapter and its consequences for the view that testimonial knowledge can be direct (or non‐inferential) are discussed. Coady also examines Reid's resort to epistemic first principles and his placing of reliance upon testimony amongst them.Less
The eighteenth‐century Scots philosopher Thomas Reid's account of testimony is one of his most interesting and original contributions. Reid's analogy between the epistemic roles of perception and of testimony is explored in this chapter and its consequences for the view that testimonial knowledge can be direct (or non‐inferential) are discussed. Coady also examines Reid's resort to epistemic first principles and his placing of reliance upon testimony amongst them.
John Kekes
- Published in print:
- 2020
- Published Online:
- July 2020
- ISBN:
- 9780197514047
- eISBN:
- 9780197514078
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780197514047.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General
This book develops and defends a humanistic conception of wisdom as a personal attitude that guides how we evaluate the possibilities and limits of life in the context in which we live. The attitude ...
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This book develops and defends a humanistic conception of wisdom as a personal attitude that guides how we evaluate the possibilities and limits of life in the context in which we live. The attitude is formed of our beliefs, emotions, desires, evaluations, and experiences that make our inner life what it is. It is personal, pluralistic, and fallible. Its components differ from person to person and each may be mistaken. It is a wise attitude if it is based on a critical enough understanding of the reasons for and against its components; if its basic factual and evaluative assumptions are realistic; and if it involves a sufficiently reflective and deep understanding of the prevailing conditions, personal and social problems and possibilities, and of the strengths and weaknesses of the available evaluative resources. We all have some attitude of how we should live, but it is difficult to have a wise attitude. That is why wisdom is at once rare and precious because the sense we can make of our life depends on it. This humanistic conception of wisdom is personal, pluralistic, and fallible. It is a radical departure from traditional conceptions of wisdom understood as knowledge of the ideal of The Good that holds for everyone, always, everywhere. It is a conception that is personal, not theoretical; anthropocentric, not metaphysical; context-dependent, not universal; and humanistic, not scientific. The conception that emerges from this book is intended to be a contribution to philosophy as a humanistic disciplineLess
This book develops and defends a humanistic conception of wisdom as a personal attitude that guides how we evaluate the possibilities and limits of life in the context in which we live. The attitude is formed of our beliefs, emotions, desires, evaluations, and experiences that make our inner life what it is. It is personal, pluralistic, and fallible. Its components differ from person to person and each may be mistaken. It is a wise attitude if it is based on a critical enough understanding of the reasons for and against its components; if its basic factual and evaluative assumptions are realistic; and if it involves a sufficiently reflective and deep understanding of the prevailing conditions, personal and social problems and possibilities, and of the strengths and weaknesses of the available evaluative resources. We all have some attitude of how we should live, but it is difficult to have a wise attitude. That is why wisdom is at once rare and precious because the sense we can make of our life depends on it. This humanistic conception of wisdom is personal, pluralistic, and fallible. It is a radical departure from traditional conceptions of wisdom understood as knowledge of the ideal of The Good that holds for everyone, always, everywhere. It is a conception that is personal, not theoretical; anthropocentric, not metaphysical; context-dependent, not universal; and humanistic, not scientific. The conception that emerges from this book is intended to be a contribution to philosophy as a humanistic discipline
Mark Kelman
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- May 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199755608
- eISBN:
- 9780199895236
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199755608.003.0010
- Subject:
- Law, Philosophy of Law
The chapter reviews the similarities, both methodological and substantive, between the heuristics and biases and the fast and frugal heuristics school. But it emphasizes to a greater extent ...
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The chapter reviews the similarities, both methodological and substantive, between the heuristics and biases and the fast and frugal heuristics school. But it emphasizes to a greater extent distinctions between the schools, both in how proponents model cognition generally, and the implications of these distinct models for thinking about the general quality of human judgment, the need for expertise in making collective decisions, the utility of cost-benefit analysis, the propriety of paternalism, how best to solve information problems in markets, the desirability of using rules rather than standards, and the nature of discrimination. It argues that the better known aspect of the debate—about how well people reason—might be profitably advanced if not resolved if each side acknowledged the contributions of its opponents, but that the F&F insistence on both the prevalence and superiority of lexical decision making is both unconvincing and impossible to incorporate into existing understandings of law and policy.Less
The chapter reviews the similarities, both methodological and substantive, between the heuristics and biases and the fast and frugal heuristics school. But it emphasizes to a greater extent distinctions between the schools, both in how proponents model cognition generally, and the implications of these distinct models for thinking about the general quality of human judgment, the need for expertise in making collective decisions, the utility of cost-benefit analysis, the propriety of paternalism, how best to solve information problems in markets, the desirability of using rules rather than standards, and the nature of discrimination. It argues that the better known aspect of the debate—about how well people reason—might be profitably advanced if not resolved if each side acknowledged the contributions of its opponents, but that the F&F insistence on both the prevalence and superiority of lexical decision making is both unconvincing and impossible to incorporate into existing understandings of law and policy.
Rodrigo Borges, Claudio de Almeida, and Peter D. Klein (eds)
- Published in print:
- 2017
- Published Online:
- December 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780198724551
- eISBN:
- 9780191840142
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780198724551.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This is an edited collection of twenty-three new papers on the Gettier Problem and the issues connected with it. The set of authors includes many of the major figures in contemporary epistemology who ...
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This is an edited collection of twenty-three new papers on the Gettier Problem and the issues connected with it. The set of authors includes many of the major figures in contemporary epistemology who have developed some of the well-known responses to the problem, and it also contains some younger epistemologists who bring new perspectives to the issues raised in the literature. Together, they cover the state of the art on virtually every epistemological and methodological aspect of the Gettier Problem. The volume also includes some skeptical voices according to which the Gettier Problem is not deeply problematic or some of the problems it raises are not genuine philosophical problems.Less
This is an edited collection of twenty-three new papers on the Gettier Problem and the issues connected with it. The set of authors includes many of the major figures in contemporary epistemology who have developed some of the well-known responses to the problem, and it also contains some younger epistemologists who bring new perspectives to the issues raised in the literature. Together, they cover the state of the art on virtually every epistemological and methodological aspect of the Gettier Problem. The volume also includes some skeptical voices according to which the Gettier Problem is not deeply problematic or some of the problems it raises are not genuine philosophical problems.
Paul Thagard
- Published in print:
- 2019
- Published Online:
- March 2019
- ISBN:
- 9780190678739
- eISBN:
- 9780190686451
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780190678739.003.0003
- Subject:
- Psychology, Cognitive Models and Architectures
For the semantic pointer theory of mind, the bearers of knowledge are not abstract propositions but rather patterns of neural firing that constitute mental representations, including concepts, ...
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For the semantic pointer theory of mind, the bearers of knowledge are not abstract propositions but rather patterns of neural firing that constitute mental representations, including concepts, beliefs, nonverbal rules, images, and emotions. This neurocognitive perspective suggests new answers for questions about the generation of candidates for knowledge and their relations to the world via sensory-motor interactions. Semantic pointers support knowledge that beliefs are true or false, how to do things using multimodal rules, and of things via sensory-motor experience. The Semantic Pointer Architecture meshes well with coherence-based justification that abandons foundational certainty for fallible attempts to fit diverse elements of knowledge into the best overall explanation. Knowledge has important social dimensions.Less
For the semantic pointer theory of mind, the bearers of knowledge are not abstract propositions but rather patterns of neural firing that constitute mental representations, including concepts, beliefs, nonverbal rules, images, and emotions. This neurocognitive perspective suggests new answers for questions about the generation of candidates for knowledge and their relations to the world via sensory-motor interactions. Semantic pointers support knowledge that beliefs are true or false, how to do things using multimodal rules, and of things via sensory-motor experience. The Semantic Pointer Architecture meshes well with coherence-based justification that abandons foundational certainty for fallible attempts to fit diverse elements of knowledge into the best overall explanation. Knowledge has important social dimensions.
Jody Azzouni
- Published in print:
- 2020
- Published Online:
- October 2020
- ISBN:
- 9780197508817
- eISBN:
- 9780197508848
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780197508817.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
The word “know” is revealed as vague, applicable to fallible agents, factive, and criterion-transcendent. It is invariant in its meaning across contexts and invariant relative to different agents. ...
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The word “know” is revealed as vague, applicable to fallible agents, factive, and criterion-transcendent. It is invariant in its meaning across contexts and invariant relative to different agents. Only purely epistemic properties affect its correct application—not the interests of agents or those who attribute the word to agents. These properties enable “know” to be applied correctly—as it routinely is—to cognitive agents ranging from sophisticated human knowers, who engage in substantial metacognition, to various animals, who know much less and do much less, if any, metacognition, to nonconscious mechanical devices such as drones, robots, and the like. These properties of the word “know” suffice to explain the usage phenomena that contextualists and subject-sensitive invariantists invoke to place pressure on an understanding of the word that treats its application as involving no interests of agents, or others. It is also shown that the factivity and the fallibilist-compatibility of the word “know” explain Moorean paradoxes, the preface paradox, and the lottery paradox. A fallibility-sensitive failure of knowledge closure is given along with a similar failure of rational-belief closure. The latter explains why rational agents can nevertheless believe A and B, where A and B contradict each other. A substantial discussion of various kinds of metacognition is given—as well as a discussion of the metacognition literature in cognitive ethology. An appendix offers a new resolution of the hangman paradox, one that turns neither on a failure of knowledge closure nor on a failure of KK.Less
The word “know” is revealed as vague, applicable to fallible agents, factive, and criterion-transcendent. It is invariant in its meaning across contexts and invariant relative to different agents. Only purely epistemic properties affect its correct application—not the interests of agents or those who attribute the word to agents. These properties enable “know” to be applied correctly—as it routinely is—to cognitive agents ranging from sophisticated human knowers, who engage in substantial metacognition, to various animals, who know much less and do much less, if any, metacognition, to nonconscious mechanical devices such as drones, robots, and the like. These properties of the word “know” suffice to explain the usage phenomena that contextualists and subject-sensitive invariantists invoke to place pressure on an understanding of the word that treats its application as involving no interests of agents, or others. It is also shown that the factivity and the fallibilist-compatibility of the word “know” explain Moorean paradoxes, the preface paradox, and the lottery paradox. A fallibility-sensitive failure of knowledge closure is given along with a similar failure of rational-belief closure. The latter explains why rational agents can nevertheless believe A and B, where A and B contradict each other. A substantial discussion of various kinds of metacognition is given—as well as a discussion of the metacognition literature in cognitive ethology. An appendix offers a new resolution of the hangman paradox, one that turns neither on a failure of knowledge closure nor on a failure of KK.
- Published in print:
- 2018
- Published Online:
- May 2019
- ISBN:
- 9780226469140
- eISBN:
- 9780226469287
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- University of Chicago Press
- DOI:
- 10.7208/chicago/9780226469287.003.0007
- Subject:
- History, History of Ideas
This chapter studies the disruption of the prevailing impression that print was a transparent vehicle for ideas. It shows how print sometimes presents an appearance of stability and reliability that ...
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This chapter studies the disruption of the prevailing impression that print was a transparent vehicle for ideas. It shows how print sometimes presents an appearance of stability and reliability that makes it seem like a transparent medium for conveying ideas. On this appearance, print lends an inherent authority to the content it mediates. This aura of reliability may be more the result of long cultural work than it is a property inherent to the medium. Sophisticated readers have always understood print's fallibility both in the sense that it conveys false as well as true information and in the sense that printed texts are often strewn with errors. Nonetheless, the notion that print was a transparent, reliable vehicle for conveying ideas was sufficiently widespread during the eighteenth to nineteenth centuries that it inspired satirical or ironic commentaries, which themselves appeared in printed texts and images. Several writers, printers, and artists thus used print to draw attention to its own materiality and fallibility.Less
This chapter studies the disruption of the prevailing impression that print was a transparent vehicle for ideas. It shows how print sometimes presents an appearance of stability and reliability that makes it seem like a transparent medium for conveying ideas. On this appearance, print lends an inherent authority to the content it mediates. This aura of reliability may be more the result of long cultural work than it is a property inherent to the medium. Sophisticated readers have always understood print's fallibility both in the sense that it conveys false as well as true information and in the sense that printed texts are often strewn with errors. Nonetheless, the notion that print was a transparent, reliable vehicle for conveying ideas was sufficiently widespread during the eighteenth to nineteenth centuries that it inspired satirical or ironic commentaries, which themselves appeared in printed texts and images. Several writers, printers, and artists thus used print to draw attention to its own materiality and fallibility.
Klaus Füβer
- Published in print:
- 1999
- Published Online:
- March 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780198267904
- eISBN:
- 9780191683404
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198267904.003.0005
- Subject:
- Law, Philosophy of Law
H. L. A Hart complained about the ambiguity of legal positivism, and proposed a definition that refers to particular explications of the concept of law, to certain theories of legal interpretation, ...
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H. L. A Hart complained about the ambiguity of legal positivism, and proposed a definition that refers to particular explications of the concept of law, to certain theories of legal interpretation, to particular views on the moral problem of a duty to obey the law, and to a sceptical position with regard to the meta-ethical issue of the possibility of moral knowledge. It is said to be restricted to the Thesis of Separation — the contention that there is no necessary connection between law and morals. In this chapter, the Separation Thesis is discussed even further, and has three shortcomings identified: first, that it has been vacillating between object-level contentions about moral qualities of the law; that the precise logical relation between both levels has never been properly accounted for; and that the question of necessary relations between morality and law hinges crucially on the presupposition that the very concept of law itself does not unravel into different sets of convenient stipulations from different epistemological angles, each of which renders the question of such necessary relations trivial. The Separation Thesis is also identified as having two versions: the Fallibility Law and the Neutrality Law.Less
H. L. A Hart complained about the ambiguity of legal positivism, and proposed a definition that refers to particular explications of the concept of law, to certain theories of legal interpretation, to particular views on the moral problem of a duty to obey the law, and to a sceptical position with regard to the meta-ethical issue of the possibility of moral knowledge. It is said to be restricted to the Thesis of Separation — the contention that there is no necessary connection between law and morals. In this chapter, the Separation Thesis is discussed even further, and has three shortcomings identified: first, that it has been vacillating between object-level contentions about moral qualities of the law; that the precise logical relation between both levels has never been properly accounted for; and that the question of necessary relations between morality and law hinges crucially on the presupposition that the very concept of law itself does not unravel into different sets of convenient stipulations from different epistemological angles, each of which renders the question of such necessary relations trivial. The Separation Thesis is also identified as having two versions: the Fallibility Law and the Neutrality Law.
Alan Millar
- Published in print:
- 2019
- Published Online:
- March 2019
- ISBN:
- 9780198755692
- eISBN:
- 9780191816840
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780198755692.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
Recognizing a thing as being some way from its appearance to some sense-modality is knowing that it is that way from that appearance. It is the exercise of a general ability to tell of things that ...
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Recognizing a thing as being some way from its appearance to some sense-modality is knowing that it is that way from that appearance. It is the exercise of a general ability to tell of things that are the way in question that they are that way from the way they appear. The ability is exercised only if the subject succeeds in that respect. Our fallibility in relation to those abilities consists in our not always exercising them whenever we make a judgement directed at recognition. For things to be recognized as being of some kind from their appearance, the environment has to be favourable to the exercise of the relevant ability. It will be so only if the appearance of things of the kind is distinctive of being of the kind. The view does not depend on the assumption that experiences have representational content in any rich sense.Less
Recognizing a thing as being some way from its appearance to some sense-modality is knowing that it is that way from that appearance. It is the exercise of a general ability to tell of things that are the way in question that they are that way from the way they appear. The ability is exercised only if the subject succeeds in that respect. Our fallibility in relation to those abilities consists in our not always exercising them whenever we make a judgement directed at recognition. For things to be recognized as being of some kind from their appearance, the environment has to be favourable to the exercise of the relevant ability. It will be so only if the appearance of things of the kind is distinctive of being of the kind. The view does not depend on the assumption that experiences have representational content in any rich sense.
