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This chapter discusses the steps Winston Churchill took to propose a summit. It was part of Churchill's plan to achieve détente, despite the reservations of other world leaders. It looks at the Foreign Affairs debate from May 11 to May 12, the Berlin Uprising, and the moment when Churchill presented his Cabinet, the FO, Britain's European allies, and the Americans with a fait accompli. It is noted that Churchill also suffered a stroke, but that this never dampened his hope of ending the Cold War once and for all.

This chapter discusses the Six-Day War of June 5 through 10, 1967 and how it both deepened and transformed the strategies employed in developing Jerusalem. There was always resentment over Jordan's noncompliance with the armistice agreement that had promised access to the Israeli enclave on Mount Scopus, where the Hadassah Hospital and the original campus of the Hebrew University were located. Israelis were also bitter about the fact that Arabs had abused Jewish property and institutions, such as the ancient cemetery on the Mount of Olives, whose monument stones they used in construction or otherwise desecrated. However, the public did not demand conquest of the Arab part of Jerusalem or of the captured Jewish Quarter in the Old City. An apparent fait accompli had been created since 1948. Jerusalem was a divided city, and there was no open policy of irredentism.

The final chapter looks back at the cases of mutiny through several different lenses. First we use Wright Mills’s notion of Vocabularies of Motive that takes what actors say they are doing as opposed to how we might interpret that. In effect these act as mobilizations, not descriptions, of action and explore the way leaders channel a general discontent into a particular form of action. Second, the cases are distributed according to whether the mutineers appear to assume the situation is one where the economic or social or political contract has been undermined. This is mirrored on the establishment side by considering whether the actions of the mutineers are perceived to be a fait accompli or the result of misled subordinates or something that actually poses an existential threat to the status quo. Finally, the nature of the individual leaders of mutinies is explored through the frame of the puer robustus, a term used by many philosophers and political commentators to describe those individuals—rule breakers—who invariably end up taking control over mutinies and often paying the price for that leadership.