George Klosko
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- April 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780199256204
- eISBN:
- 9780191602351
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199256209.001.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory
Provides a full defence of a theory of political obligation on the basis of the principle of fairness (or fair play). The book responds to the most important objections and extends a theory-based on ...
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Provides a full defence of a theory of political obligation on the basis of the principle of fairness (or fair play). The book responds to the most important objections and extends a theory-based on fairness into a developed ‘multiple principle’ theory of obligation. The ‘self-image of the state’ in regard to political obligations is explored through examination of judicial decisions in three different democratic countries, while the book also breaks new ground by studying attitudes towards political obligations, through the use of small focus groups.Less
Provides a full defence of a theory of political obligation on the basis of the principle of fairness (or fair play). The book responds to the most important objections and extends a theory-based on fairness into a developed ‘multiple principle’ theory of obligation. The ‘self-image of the state’ in regard to political obligations is explored through examination of judicial decisions in three different democratic countries, while the book also breaks new ground by studying attitudes towards political obligations, through the use of small focus groups.
Ken Binmore
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- January 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780195178111
- eISBN:
- 9780199783670
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195178111.001.0001
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, Microeconomics
This book attempts to create an evolutionary theory of fairness. Sharing food is commonplace in the animal kingdom because it insures animals that share against hunger. Anthropologists report that ...
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This book attempts to create an evolutionary theory of fairness. Sharing food is commonplace in the animal kingdom because it insures animals that share against hunger. Anthropologists report that hunter-gatherer societies which survived into the 20th century shared on a very egalitarian basis. What can such information tell us about the sense of fairness with which modern man is born? Using game theory as a basic tool, the book argues that fairness norms should be seen as a device for selecting an efficient equilibrium in the human game of life. Evolutionary arguments are then used to argue that the deep structure of this device resembles the original position formulated by John Rawls in his Theory of Justice. Such an evolutionary framework allows problems over welfare comparison and norm enforcement to be tackled in a manner that resolves the long debate between utilitarianism and egalitarianism.Less
This book attempts to create an evolutionary theory of fairness. Sharing food is commonplace in the animal kingdom because it insures animals that share against hunger. Anthropologists report that hunter-gatherer societies which survived into the 20th century shared on a very egalitarian basis. What can such information tell us about the sense of fairness with which modern man is born? Using game theory as a basic tool, the book argues that fairness norms should be seen as a device for selecting an efficient equilibrium in the human game of life. Evolutionary arguments are then used to argue that the deep structure of this device resembles the original position formulated by John Rawls in his Theory of Justice. Such an evolutionary framework allows problems over welfare comparison and norm enforcement to be tackled in a manner that resolves the long debate between utilitarianism and egalitarianism.
Liam Murphy and Thomas Nagel
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195150162
- eISBN:
- 9780199833924
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195150163.001.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory
In a capitalist economy, taxes are the most significant instrument by which the political system can put into practice a conception of economic justice. But conventional ideas about what constitutes ...
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In a capitalist economy, taxes are the most significant instrument by which the political system can put into practice a conception of economic justice. But conventional ideas about what constitutes tax fairness--found in the vigorous debates about tax policy going on in political and public policy circles, in economics and law--are misguided. In particular, the emphasis on distributing the tax burden relative to pretax income is a fundamental mistake. Taxation does not take from people what they already own. Property rights are the product of a set of laws and conventions, of which the tax system forms a central part, so the fairness of taxes can’t be evaluated by their impact on preexisting entitlements. Pretax income has no independent moral significance. Standards of justice should be applied not to the distribution of tax burdens but to the operation and results of the entire framework of economic institutions. The result is an entirely different understanding of a host of controversial issues, such as the estate tax, the tax treatment of marriage, “flat” versus progressive taxes, consumption versus income taxes, tax cuts for the wealthy, and negative income taxes for the poor.Less
In a capitalist economy, taxes are the most significant instrument by which the political system can put into practice a conception of economic justice. But conventional ideas about what constitutes tax fairness--found in the vigorous debates about tax policy going on in political and public policy circles, in economics and law--are misguided. In particular, the emphasis on distributing the tax burden relative to pretax income is a fundamental mistake. Taxation does not take from people what they already own. Property rights are the product of a set of laws and conventions, of which the tax system forms a central part, so the fairness of taxes can’t be evaluated by their impact on preexisting entitlements. Pretax income has no independent moral significance. Standards of justice should be applied not to the distribution of tax burdens but to the operation and results of the entire framework of economic institutions. The result is an entirely different understanding of a host of controversial issues, such as the estate tax, the tax treatment of marriage, “flat” versus progressive taxes, consumption versus income taxes, tax cuts for the wealthy, and negative income taxes for the poor.
Samuel Scheffler
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- May 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199281688
- eISBN:
- 9780191603747
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199281688.003.0007
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory
This essay focuses on Cohen’s recent arguments for extending the scope of justice beyond Rawls’s formulation. It argues for the merits of Rawls’s argument that the primary subject of justice should ...
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This essay focuses on Cohen’s recent arguments for extending the scope of justice beyond Rawls’s formulation. It argues for the merits of Rawls’s argument that the primary subject of justice should be restricted to social institutions. It contends that whether or not one agrees with Rawls’s view of what should count as the subject of justice, Cohen is wrong to understand the upshot of this to be either a paltry measure of redistribution or the accommodation of the untrammelled pursuit of selfish interests.Less
This essay focuses on Cohen’s recent arguments for extending the scope of justice beyond Rawls’s formulation. It argues for the merits of Rawls’s argument that the primary subject of justice should be restricted to social institutions. It contends that whether or not one agrees with Rawls’s view of what should count as the subject of justice, Cohen is wrong to understand the upshot of this to be either a paltry measure of redistribution or the accommodation of the untrammelled pursuit of selfish interests.
Jan Abel Olsen
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- May 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199237814
- eISBN:
- 9780191717215
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199237814.001.0001
- Subject:
- Public Health and Epidemiology, Public Health, Epidemiology
Principles in Health Economics and Policy is a concise introduction to health economics and its application to health policy. It introduces the subject of economics, explains the ...
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Principles in Health Economics and Policy is a concise introduction to health economics and its application to health policy. It introduces the subject of economics, explains the fundamental failures in the market for health care, and discusses the concepts of equity and fairness when applied to health and health care. The book takes a policy-oriented approach, emphasizing the application of economic analysis to universal health policy issues. It explores the key questions facing health policy-makers across the globe right now, such as: how should society intervene in the determinants that affect health? How should health care be financed? How should health care providers be paid? And, how should alternative health care programmes be evaluated when setting priorities? Exercises and suggested readings are included after each chapter.Less
Principles in Health Economics and Policy is a concise introduction to health economics and its application to health policy. It introduces the subject of economics, explains the fundamental failures in the market for health care, and discusses the concepts of equity and fairness when applied to health and health care. The book takes a policy-oriented approach, emphasizing the application of economic analysis to universal health policy issues. It explores the key questions facing health policy-makers across the globe right now, such as: how should society intervene in the determinants that affect health? How should health care be financed? How should health care providers be paid? And, how should alternative health care programmes be evaluated when setting priorities? Exercises and suggested readings are included after each chapter.
George Klosko
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- April 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780199256204
- eISBN:
- 9780191602351
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199256209.003.0010
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory
Continues the analysis of focus group responses discussed in Ch. 9. It is argued that the way different people respond to examples of the kind commonly employed in contemporary moral and political ...
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Continues the analysis of focus group responses discussed in Ch. 9. It is argued that the way different people respond to examples of the kind commonly employed in contemporary moral and political argument provides some test of the examples' persuasiveness. The subject of investigation in this chapter is responses to a series of vignettes concerning connections between different forms of cooperative activity and the generation of obligations. In particular, is a strong sense of cooperation necessary to generate obligations? Subjects were given vignettes that concerned cooperative schemes that provide excludable benefits, essential public goods, and trivial public goods, respectively. Their responses indicate strong connections between the generation of obligations and the nature of specific benefits provided, especially their weight or importance. Receipt of important benefits was viewed as generating obligations, even without a strong sense of cooperation. Receipt of benefits from activity characterized by a strong sense of cooperation was viewed as not establishing obligations, if benefits produced were not of significant importance.Less
Continues the analysis of focus group responses discussed in Ch. 9. It is argued that the way different people respond to examples of the kind commonly employed in contemporary moral and political argument provides some test of the examples' persuasiveness. The subject of investigation in this chapter is responses to a series of vignettes concerning connections between different forms of cooperative activity and the generation of obligations. In particular, is a strong sense of cooperation necessary to generate obligations? Subjects were given vignettes that concerned cooperative schemes that provide excludable benefits, essential public goods, and trivial public goods, respectively. Their responses indicate strong connections between the generation of obligations and the nature of specific benefits provided, especially their weight or importance. Receipt of important benefits was viewed as generating obligations, even without a strong sense of cooperation. Receipt of benefits from activity characterized by a strong sense of cooperation was viewed as not establishing obligations, if benefits produced were not of significant importance.
William Talbott
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- April 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780195173475
- eISBN:
- 9780199835331
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195173473.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General
In this book, William Talbott builds on the work of J.S. Mill, John Rawls, and Jürgen Habermas to develop a new equilibrium model for moral reasoning, in which moral reasoning is primarily bottom-up, ...
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In this book, William Talbott builds on the work of J.S. Mill, John Rawls, and Jürgen Habermas to develop a new equilibrium model for moral reasoning, in which moral reasoning is primarily bottom-up, from judgments about particular actual and hypothetical cases to norms or principles that best explain the particular judgments. Employing the equilibrium model, Talbott builds on the work of John Rawls, Amartya Sen, and Henry Shue to explain how, over the course of history, human beings have learned to adopt a distinctively moral standpoint from which it is possible to make reliable, though not infallible, universal judgments of right and wrong. He explains how this distinctively moral standpoint has led to the discovery of the moral importance of nine basic human rights. The book is constructed around pivotal examples. Talbott uses the example of Bartolomé de Las Casas and his opposition to the Spanish colonists’ treatment of the American natives in the 16th century to illustrate the possibility of attaining a universal moral standpoint. He uses the example of the development of women's rights as a microcosm of the development of basic human rights. He argues that assertions of basic human rights are almost always a response to oppressive norms justified by self-reinforcing paternalism. Talbott uses examples from Marxist dictatorships to show the importance of basic human rights in solving what he refers to as the reliable feedback problem and the appropriate responsiveness problem for governments. He uses Sen’s research on famines and psychological research on the ultimatum game and other related games to explain how individual fairness judgments from the moral standpoint make rights-respecting democracies self-improving self-regulating systems that become more just over time. Undoubtedly, the most controversial issue raised by the claim of universal human rights is the issue of moral relativism. How can the advocate of universal rights avoid being a moral imperialist? In this book, Talbott shows how to defend basic individual rights from a universal moral point of view that is not imperialistic. Talbott avoids moral imperialism, first, by insisting that all of us, himself included, have moral blindspots and that we usually depend on others to help us to identify those blindspots; second, by emphasizing the importance of avoiding moral paternalism. In the book, Talbott develops a new consequentialist account of the importance of the basic human rights, which he employs to augment the more familiar nonconsequentialist accounts.Less
In this book, William Talbott builds on the work of J.S. Mill, John Rawls, and Jürgen Habermas to develop a new equilibrium model for moral reasoning, in which moral reasoning is primarily bottom-up, from judgments about particular actual and hypothetical cases to norms or principles that best explain the particular judgments. Employing the equilibrium model, Talbott builds on the work of John Rawls, Amartya Sen, and Henry Shue to explain how, over the course of history, human beings have learned to adopt a distinctively moral standpoint from which it is possible to make reliable, though not infallible, universal judgments of right and wrong. He explains how this distinctively moral standpoint has led to the discovery of the moral importance of nine basic human rights. The book is constructed around pivotal examples. Talbott uses the example of Bartolomé de Las Casas and his opposition to the Spanish colonists’ treatment of the American natives in the 16th century to illustrate the possibility of attaining a universal moral standpoint. He uses the example of the development of women's rights as a microcosm of the development of basic human rights. He argues that assertions of basic human rights are almost always a response to oppressive norms justified by self-reinforcing paternalism. Talbott uses examples from Marxist dictatorships to show the importance of basic human rights in solving what he refers to as the reliable feedback problem and the appropriate responsiveness problem for governments. He uses Sen’s research on famines and psychological research on the ultimatum game and other related games to explain how individual fairness judgments from the moral standpoint make rights-respecting democracies self-improving self-regulating systems that become more just over time. Undoubtedly, the most controversial issue raised by the claim of universal human rights is the issue of moral relativism. How can the advocate of universal rights avoid being a moral imperialist? In this book, Talbott shows how to defend basic individual rights from a universal moral point of view that is not imperialistic. Talbott avoids moral imperialism, first, by insisting that all of us, himself included, have moral blindspots and that we usually depend on others to help us to identify those blindspots; second, by emphasizing the importance of avoiding moral paternalism. In the book, Talbott develops a new consequentialist account of the importance of the basic human rights, which he employs to augment the more familiar nonconsequentialist accounts.
Steve Vanderheiden
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- May 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780195334609
- eISBN:
- 9780199868759
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195334609.003.0007
- Subject:
- Political Science, Environmental Politics
This chapter incorporates arguments and observations from earlier chapters into a case for a version of the equal shares approach of equal per capita national emissions allowances, contrasting this ...
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This chapter incorporates arguments and observations from earlier chapters into a case for a version of the equal shares approach of equal per capita national emissions allowances, contrasting this approach with the equal burdens model in which costs of mitigation and adaptation are equally assigned. A case is made against several versions of the equal burdens approach (including the Kyoto Protocol and the Bush administration's emissions intensity proposal) as being unjust, and a modified equal shares approach is defended against several anticipated objections. The case is made for instantiating the equal basic access to the earth's atmospheric services as a moral and legal environmental right, drawing upon Shue's distinction between basic and non-basic rights, and comparing this right with the claimed right to develop. Finally, it makes the case for procedural fairness in global climate policy development, urging recognition of this democratic norm for both principled and practical reasons.Less
This chapter incorporates arguments and observations from earlier chapters into a case for a version of the equal shares approach of equal per capita national emissions allowances, contrasting this approach with the equal burdens model in which costs of mitigation and adaptation are equally assigned. A case is made against several versions of the equal burdens approach (including the Kyoto Protocol and the Bush administration's emissions intensity proposal) as being unjust, and a modified equal shares approach is defended against several anticipated objections. The case is made for instantiating the equal basic access to the earth's atmospheric services as a moral and legal environmental right, drawing upon Shue's distinction between basic and non-basic rights, and comparing this right with the claimed right to develop. Finally, it makes the case for procedural fairness in global climate policy development, urging recognition of this democratic norm for both principled and practical reasons.
George Klosko
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- April 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780199256204
- eISBN:
- 9780191602351
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199256209.003.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory
Reviews the basic features of a theory of political obligation on the basis of the principle of fairness, discusses the criteria a successful theory of obligation should satisfy, and explores the ...
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Reviews the basic features of a theory of political obligation on the basis of the principle of fairness, discusses the criteria a successful theory of obligation should satisfy, and explores the claim that most people believe that they have political obligations.Less
Reviews the basic features of a theory of political obligation on the basis of the principle of fairness, discusses the criteria a successful theory of obligation should satisfy, and explores the claim that most people believe that they have political obligations.
George Klosko
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- April 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780199256204
- eISBN:
- 9780191602351
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199256209.003.0003
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory
The most powerful objection to political obligations based on the principle of fairness concerns alternative supply of necessary public goods. According to this line of argument, if the subject ...
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The most powerful objection to political obligations based on the principle of fairness concerns alternative supply of necessary public goods. According to this line of argument, if the subject prefers not to receive particular benefits from the state, then he need not incur obligations through their provision. However, as the discussion in Ch. 2 shows, for certain essential public goods, there is no alternative to state provision. Moreover, the fact that a subject prefers that goods be provided in a different form or by a mechanism other than the state is not ordinarily sufficient to dissolve obligations that they would otherwise incur.Less
The most powerful objection to political obligations based on the principle of fairness concerns alternative supply of necessary public goods. According to this line of argument, if the subject prefers not to receive particular benefits from the state, then he need not incur obligations through their provision. However, as the discussion in Ch. 2 shows, for certain essential public goods, there is no alternative to state provision. Moreover, the fact that a subject prefers that goods be provided in a different form or by a mechanism other than the state is not ordinarily sufficient to dissolve obligations that they would otherwise incur.
George Klosko
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- April 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780199256204
- eISBN:
- 9780191602351
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199256209.003.0005
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory
Scholars who doubt the existence of general political obligations typically criticize and reject theories of obligation on the basis of individual moral principles, for example, consent, fairness, or ...
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Scholars who doubt the existence of general political obligations typically criticize and reject theories of obligation on the basis of individual moral principles, for example, consent, fairness, or a natural duty of justice. A stronger position can result from combining different principles in a single theory. This chapter develops a multi-principle theory of political obligation, on the basis of the principle of fairness, a natural duty of justice, and what I call the ‘common good’ principle. The three principles interact in three main ways: ‘cumulation’, combining the separate state services that different principles cover; ‘mutual support’, combining the force of different principles in regard to the same state services; and simple overlap. The result is a theory that can satisfy the main criteria of a theory of political obligation.Less
Scholars who doubt the existence of general political obligations typically criticize and reject theories of obligation on the basis of individual moral principles, for example, consent, fairness, or a natural duty of justice. A stronger position can result from combining different principles in a single theory. This chapter develops a multi-principle theory of political obligation, on the basis of the principle of fairness, a natural duty of justice, and what I call the ‘common good’ principle. The three principles interact in three main ways: ‘cumulation’, combining the separate state services that different principles cover; ‘mutual support’, combining the force of different principles in regard to the same state services; and simple overlap. The result is a theory that can satisfy the main criteria of a theory of political obligation.
George Klosko
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- April 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780199256204
- eISBN:
- 9780191602351
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199256209.003.0007
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory
This and the following chapters explore the ‘self-image of the state’ in regard to political obligations through analysis of judicial decisions. Examining the reasons that states themselves provide ...
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This and the following chapters explore the ‘self-image of the state’ in regard to political obligations through analysis of judicial decisions. Examining the reasons that states themselves provide to justify political obligations provides an empirical test of normative theories. Although judicial decisions have no claim to moral truth, the fact that justices regularly argue from certain principles rather than others adds to the plausibility of a theory based on the former and increases the burden of justification for proponents of other principles. Supreme Court justices usually defend their opinions on the basis of statutory or constitutional interpretation and seldom appeal directly to moral principles. However, on occasion they do invoke moral principles to support their opinions, especially in difficult cases. Justices of the US Supreme Court consistently ground obligations on protection that individuals receive from society. The most likely basis of these ‘reciprocal obligations’ is a principle of fairness, as expressed most notably in Arver v. U.S., the most important of the 'Selective Draft Law Cases'.Less
This and the following chapters explore the ‘self-image of the state’ in regard to political obligations through analysis of judicial decisions. Examining the reasons that states themselves provide to justify political obligations provides an empirical test of normative theories. Although judicial decisions have no claim to moral truth, the fact that justices regularly argue from certain principles rather than others adds to the plausibility of a theory based on the former and increases the burden of justification for proponents of other principles. Supreme Court justices usually defend their opinions on the basis of statutory or constitutional interpretation and seldom appeal directly to moral principles. However, on occasion they do invoke moral principles to support their opinions, especially in difficult cases. Justices of the US Supreme Court consistently ground obligations on protection that individuals receive from society. The most likely basis of these ‘reciprocal obligations’ is a principle of fairness, as expressed most notably in Arver v. U.S., the most important of the 'Selective Draft Law Cases'.
George Klosko
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- April 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780199256204
- eISBN:
- 9780191602351
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199256209.003.0008
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory
Examines judicial decisions in Germany and Israel in order to provide a comparative test of the analysis of US Supreme Court decisions in Ch. 7. Although questions of political obligation have been ...
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Examines judicial decisions in Germany and Israel in order to provide a comparative test of the analysis of US Supreme Court decisions in Ch. 7. Although questions of political obligation have been much discussed by scholars, little attention has been paid to moral reasons advanced by actual states to justify the compliance of their subjects. Because in US cases, justices appeal to moral reasons most explicitly in difficult cases that concern imposing military service on conscientious objectors, the analysis focuses on this area. In spite of their important constitutional and judicial differences, Germany and Israel support military obligations along similar lines. German decisions emphasize norms of equality or fairness. Israeli Justices have generally appealed to the importance of each individual's contribution to national defence. However, in a recent decision, norms of fairness are invoked.Less
Examines judicial decisions in Germany and Israel in order to provide a comparative test of the analysis of US Supreme Court decisions in Ch. 7. Although questions of political obligation have been much discussed by scholars, little attention has been paid to moral reasons advanced by actual states to justify the compliance of their subjects. Because in US cases, justices appeal to moral reasons most explicitly in difficult cases that concern imposing military service on conscientious objectors, the analysis focuses on this area. In spite of their important constitutional and judicial differences, Germany and Israel support military obligations along similar lines. German decisions emphasize norms of equality or fairness. Israeli Justices have generally appealed to the importance of each individual's contribution to national defence. However, in a recent decision, norms of fairness are invoked.
George Klosko
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- April 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780199256204
- eISBN:
- 9780191602351
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199256209.003.0009
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory
Examines opinions of ordinary people in regard to political obligations through small focus groups. Under certain circumstances, the views of ordinary people can lend support to the particular ...
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Examines opinions of ordinary people in regard to political obligations through small focus groups. Under certain circumstances, the views of ordinary people can lend support to the particular theories to which they subscribe and increase burdens of justification for proponents of alternative theories. Responses of participants in ten focus groups indicate strong consensus on basic points. Participants strongly believe they have political obligations, although they make exceptions for particular laws, which seem to them to serve no real social purpose. They ground their obligations on benefits provided by the state, and strongly connect up their own requirements to obey the law with requirements that all other people behave similarly. The moral principle that appears to coincide most closely with their views is a variant of the principle of fairness.Less
Examines opinions of ordinary people in regard to political obligations through small focus groups. Under certain circumstances, the views of ordinary people can lend support to the particular theories to which they subscribe and increase burdens of justification for proponents of alternative theories. Responses of participants in ten focus groups indicate strong consensus on basic points. Participants strongly believe they have political obligations, although they make exceptions for particular laws, which seem to them to serve no real social purpose. They ground their obligations on benefits provided by the state, and strongly connect up their own requirements to obey the law with requirements that all other people behave similarly. The moral principle that appears to coincide most closely with their views is a variant of the principle of fairness.
Lane Kenworthy
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- September 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780199550593
- eISBN:
- 9780191720727
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199550593.003.0006
- Subject:
- Political Science, Comparative Politics, Political Economy
Strict employment protection rules are typically motivated by concern for fairness rather than equality, but they may nevertheless help to reduce inequality in earnings among the employed. The ...
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Strict employment protection rules are typically motivated by concern for fairness rather than equality, but they may nevertheless help to reduce inequality in earnings among the employed. The concern is that they may also reduce hiring, thereby inhibiting employment growth. What does the experience of affluent countries in recent decades suggest? This chapter examines this issue.Less
Strict employment protection rules are typically motivated by concern for fairness rather than equality, but they may nevertheless help to reduce inequality in earnings among the employed. The concern is that they may also reduce hiring, thereby inhibiting employment growth. What does the experience of affluent countries in recent decades suggest? This chapter examines this issue.
Thomas Christiano
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- September 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780198297475
- eISBN:
- 9780191716867
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198297475.003.0004
- Subject:
- Political Science, Comparative Politics, Political Theory
This chapter argues that democracy is grounded in the principle of public equality defended in the first two chapters. Thinking of the grounds of democracy in this way helps us understand the sense ...
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This chapter argues that democracy is grounded in the principle of public equality defended in the first two chapters. Thinking of the grounds of democracy in this way helps us understand the sense in which democracy is intrinsically just, while preserving the idea that democracy serves important purposes that are independent of it and it helps us understand the reasons for equality of citizenship. It also sets the stage for the later chapters on the authority of democracy and its limits. This chapter explores the implications of this grounding of democracy in equality for representative democracy and political equality across age groups and shows how the fairness of democratic procedures is distinct from fair lotteries. It responds to two major objections to democracy: the objection that power ought to be apportioned to knowledge and the objection that power ought to be decentralized rather than democratized.Less
This chapter argues that democracy is grounded in the principle of public equality defended in the first two chapters. Thinking of the grounds of democracy in this way helps us understand the sense in which democracy is intrinsically just, while preserving the idea that democracy serves important purposes that are independent of it and it helps us understand the reasons for equality of citizenship. It also sets the stage for the later chapters on the authority of democracy and its limits. This chapter explores the implications of this grounding of democracy in equality for representative democracy and political equality across age groups and shows how the fairness of democratic procedures is distinct from fair lotteries. It responds to two major objections to democracy: the objection that power ought to be apportioned to knowledge and the objection that power ought to be decentralized rather than democratized.
James Pattison
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- May 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199561049
- eISBN:
- 9780191722318
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199561049.003.0007
- Subject:
- Political Science, Comparative Politics, International Relations and Politics
This chapter begins by bringing together the findings of the previous six chapters to outline the complete conception of legitimacy—the Moderate Instrumentalist Approach. It goes on to use this ...
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This chapter begins by bringing together the findings of the previous six chapters to outline the complete conception of legitimacy—the Moderate Instrumentalist Approach. It goes on to use this approach to consider to answer two central questions: (a) ‘Who has the right to intervene?’ and (b) ‘Who has the duty to intervene?’ It first suggests that any agent that has an adequate degree of legitimacy has the right to intervene. Second, it argues that the duty to intervene should fall on the most legitimate intervener. Assigning the duty to intervene raises additional issues, such as that of fairness. The chapter therefore defends the view that the most legitimate agent has the duty to intervene against three leading alternatives and the claims that this is unfair. The third section considers who, out of current agents (the NATO, the states, the UN, the regional organizations, and the private military companies), (a) has an adequate degree of legitimacy, and therefore the right to intervene, and (b) is the most legitimate agent, and therefore has the duty to intervene. It concludes that, although some agents of intervention possess an adequate degree of legitimacy, no current agent is fully legitimate.Less
This chapter begins by bringing together the findings of the previous six chapters to outline the complete conception of legitimacy—the Moderate Instrumentalist Approach. It goes on to use this approach to consider to answer two central questions: (a) ‘Who has the right to intervene?’ and (b) ‘Who has the duty to intervene?’ It first suggests that any agent that has an adequate degree of legitimacy has the right to intervene. Second, it argues that the duty to intervene should fall on the most legitimate intervener. Assigning the duty to intervene raises additional issues, such as that of fairness. The chapter therefore defends the view that the most legitimate agent has the duty to intervene against three leading alternatives and the claims that this is unfair. The third section considers who, out of current agents (the NATO, the states, the UN, the regional organizations, and the private military companies), (a) has an adequate degree of legitimacy, and therefore the right to intervene, and (b) is the most legitimate agent, and therefore has the duty to intervene. It concludes that, although some agents of intervention possess an adequate degree of legitimacy, no current agent is fully legitimate.
Ken Binmore
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- January 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780195178111
- eISBN:
- 9780199783670
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195178111.003.0001
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, Microeconomics
This chapter presents an overview of the book. It argues that the metaphysical approach to ethics is a failure and that the time has come to take a scientific view of morality. A social contract is ...
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This chapter presents an overview of the book. It argues that the metaphysical approach to ethics is a failure and that the time has come to take a scientific view of morality. A social contract is taken to be the set of common understandings that allow the citizens of a society to coordinate. Such social contracts are seen as the product of biological and cultural evolution. To survive, a social contract must therefore be an equilibrium in the repeated game of life played by a society. Since the folk theorem of repeated game theory says that there are large numbers of such equilibria, fairness norms then become explicable as an equilibrium selection device that selects one of the many efficient equilibria of a society's game of life. It is suggested that the deep structure of such fairness norms is captured by John Rawls' notion of the original position, and is therefore universal in the human species. On the other hand, the standard of interpersonal comparison needed as an input to the original position is culturally determined.Less
This chapter presents an overview of the book. It argues that the metaphysical approach to ethics is a failure and that the time has come to take a scientific view of morality. A social contract is taken to be the set of common understandings that allow the citizens of a society to coordinate. Such social contracts are seen as the product of biological and cultural evolution. To survive, a social contract must therefore be an equilibrium in the repeated game of life played by a society. Since the folk theorem of repeated game theory says that there are large numbers of such equilibria, fairness norms then become explicable as an equilibrium selection device that selects one of the many efficient equilibria of a society's game of life. It is suggested that the deep structure of such fairness norms is captured by John Rawls' notion of the original position, and is therefore universal in the human species. On the other hand, the standard of interpersonal comparison needed as an input to the original position is culturally determined.
Liam Murphy and Thomas Nagel
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195150162
- eISBN:
- 9780199833924
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195150163.003.0005
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory
The choice of tax base–income, consumption, wealth–is an instrumental one: it depends upon the efficiency and justice of the outcomes different tax bases promote. Traditional fairness-based arguments ...
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The choice of tax base–income, consumption, wealth–is an instrumental one: it depends upon the efficiency and justice of the outcomes different tax bases promote. Traditional fairness-based arguments for the consumption base–for example, that it is fairer to savers, or appropriately taxes according to what is taken out rather than put into the “common pool”–all suffer from the everyday libertarian mistake of treating the pretax distribution as morally significant. But there are important philosophical questions to be asked about the value of wealth and the legitimacy of taxing endowment (potential rather than actual income).Less
The choice of tax base–income, consumption, wealth–is an instrumental one: it depends upon the efficiency and justice of the outcomes different tax bases promote. Traditional fairness-based arguments for the consumption base–for example, that it is fairer to savers, or appropriately taxes according to what is taken out rather than put into the “common pool”–all suffer from the everyday libertarian mistake of treating the pretax distribution as morally significant. But there are important philosophical questions to be asked about the value of wealth and the legitimacy of taxing endowment (potential rather than actual income).
Liam Murphy and Thomas Nagel
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195150162
- eISBN:
- 9780199833924
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195150163.003.0006
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory
Considerations of fairness have no direct bearing on the issue of progressivity in tax rates; there is no genuine issue of vertical equity. Whether a proportional, progressive, or a regressive tax ...
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Considerations of fairness have no direct bearing on the issue of progressivity in tax rates; there is no genuine issue of vertical equity. Whether a proportional, progressive, or a regressive tax rate scheme is to be preferred on ethical grounds depends upon the justice of the outcomes the different schemes tend to promote. It is clear that this instrumental question requires a good deal of empirical information for its answer. While it is often claimed that high marginal tax rates greatly deter work (which is bad according to most theories of justice), this is not the consensus among economists.Less
Considerations of fairness have no direct bearing on the issue of progressivity in tax rates; there is no genuine issue of vertical equity. Whether a proportional, progressive, or a regressive tax rate scheme is to be preferred on ethical grounds depends upon the justice of the outcomes the different schemes tend to promote. It is clear that this instrumental question requires a good deal of empirical information for its answer. While it is often claimed that high marginal tax rates greatly deter work (which is bad according to most theories of justice), this is not the consensus among economists.
