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Knowing What It Is Like

Michael Tye

in Knowing How: Essays on Knowledge, Mind, and Action

Published in print:
2012
Published Online:
May 2012
ISBN:
9780195389364
eISBN:
9780199932368
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195389364.003.0013
Subject:
Philosophy, General, Metaphysics/Epistemology

Frank Jackson's knowledge argument invites reflection on the character of knowing what it is like to have an experience. Is knowing what it is like a matter of knowing certain facts? Or is it a ... More


Knowledge from Perceived Indicators and Background Knowledge

Alan Millar

in Knowing by Perceiving

Published in print:
2019
Published Online:
March 2019
ISBN:
9780198755692
eISBN:
9780191816840
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780198755692.003.0008
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

The focus is on knowing that something is so by perceiving something that indicates that it is so. It is argued that some of our knowledge of this sort is more akin to perceptual knowledge than might ... More


Eating Text

Gill Burbridge

in Doing Text: Media After the Subject

Published in print:
2017
Published Online:
February 2021
ISBN:
9781911325031
eISBN:
9781800342576
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Liverpool University Press
DOI:
10.3828/liverpool/9781911325031.003.0009
Subject:
Film, Television and Radio, Film

This chapter examines the act of eating text. The approach to learning and enquiry explored here is, in part, an act of resistance and re-appropriation, genuinely committed to challenging and ... More


Induction, Samples, and Kinds

Peter Godfrey-Smith

in Carving Nature at Its Joints: Natural Kinds in Metaphysics and Science

Published in print:
2011
Published Online:
August 2013
ISBN:
9780262015936
eISBN:
9780262298780
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
The MIT Press
DOI:
10.7551/mitpress/9780262015936.003.0002
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Science

This chapter criticizes a familiar group of ideas about “inductive” inference, and uses that criticism to promote a different group. Many hold on to the position that induction is rational because, ... More


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