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Interest‐Relative Invariantism versus Relativism

Jason Stanley

in Knowledge and Practical Interests

Published in print:
2005
Published Online:
May 2006
ISBN:
9780199288038
eISBN:
9780191603679
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0199288038.003.0008
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

Relativism about knowledge-attributions is the thesis that knowledge attributions express propositions the truth of which is relative to a judge. On this view, a knowledge attribution may express a ... More


True Enough

Catherine Z. Elgin

Published in print:
2017
Published Online:
May 2018
ISBN:
9780262036535
eISBN:
9780262341370
Item type:
book
Publisher:
The MIT Press
DOI:
10.7551/mitpress/9780262036535.001.0001
Subject:
Philosophy, History of Philosophy

Epistemology standardly holds that there can be no epistemically good reason to accept a known falsehood or to accept a mode of justification that is not truth-conducive. Such a stance cannot ... More


Facts: Particulars or Information Units? *

Angelika Kratzer

in Modals and Conditionals: New and Revised Perspectives

Published in print:
2012
Published Online:
May 2012
ISBN:
9780199234684
eISBN:
9780191738432
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199234684.003.0006
Subject:
Linguistics, Semantics and Pragmatics, Theoretical Linguistics

The chapter documents the role of facts in producing Gettier puzzles for factive constructions. Gettier puzzles are typically discussed with knowledge ascriptions, but Gettier puzzles can be ... More


Concluding Remarks

Sven Rosenkranz

in Justification as Ignorance: An Essay in Epistemology

Published in print:
2021
Published Online:
April 2021
ISBN:
9780198865636
eISBN:
9780191897979
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780198865636.003.0011
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

According to the account of epistemic justification developed in this book, one has propositional justification for p just in case one is in no position to know that one is in no position to know p; ... More


Parentheticalism, Normative Reasons, and Error Cases

Tim Henning

in From a Rational Point of View: How We Represent Subjective Perspectives in Practical Discourse

Published in print:
2018
Published Online:
May 2018
ISBN:
9780198797036
eISBN:
9780191860850
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780198797036.003.0005
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Moral Philosophy

This chapter discusses another crucial use of parenthetical sentences in normative reasons-discourse. Due to their feature of subject-orientation, they enable us to cite known falsehoods as normative ... More


Austinian semantics and linguistic data

Krista Lawlor

in Assurance: An Austinian View of Knowledge and Knowledge Claims

Published in print:
2013
Published Online:
May 2013
ISBN:
9780199657896
eISBN:
9780191748127
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199657896.003.0004
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Language, Metaphysics/Epistemology

Austinian semantics resolves some problems that beset other semantic accounts of knowledge claims. Special attention is given to problems that arise for more standard forms of semantic contextualism, ... More


Information and the Foundations of Quantum Mechanics: Preliminaries

Christopher G. Timpson

in Quantum Information Theory and the Foundations of Quantum Mechanics

Published in print:
2013
Published Online:
September 2013
ISBN:
9780199296460
eISBN:
9780191741791
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199296460.003.0007
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Science

Some simple preliminaries are set out to guide the investigation of what work appeal to the concept of information might do for the foundations of quantum mechanics. One point noted is that if all ... More


Deriving the formal ontology of language

Wolfram Hinzen and Michelle Sheehan

in The Philosophy of Universal Grammar

Published in print:
2013
Published Online:
January 2014
ISBN:
9780199654833
eISBN:
9780191747977
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199654833.003.0004
Subject:
Linguistics, Theoretical Linguistics, Psycholinguistics / Neurolinguistics / Cognitive Linguistics

In Chapter 4, we derive formal-ontological distinctions in the objects we refer to in language from the grammatical dynamics in which such acts of reference are configured. The contention is that ... More


Clausal adjunction

Patrícia Amaral and Manuel Delicado Cantero

in Noun-Based Constructions in the History of Portuguese and Spanish

Published in print:
2021
Published Online:
February 2022
ISBN:
9780198847182
eISBN:
9780191882098
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780198847182.003.0003
Subject:
Linguistics, Historical Linguistics, Syntax and Morphology

This chapter analyzes the properties of the clause-taking nouns hecho and feito/facto in Spanish and Portuguese. After reviewing the semantic literature on events and facts, we present the divergent ... More


What it is to Possess a Reason: The Epistemic Condition

Errol Lord

in The Importance of Being Rational

Published in print:
2018
Published Online:
July 2018
ISBN:
9780198815099
eISBN:
9780191852916
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780198815099.003.0003
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

It is a truism that in order to possess a reason, one must stand in a privileged epistemic relation with that reason. Most of the literature on possession is about this condition. This chapter ... More


On being in a position to know

Sven Rosenkranz

in Justification as Ignorance: An Essay in Epistemology

Published in print:
2021
Published Online:
April 2021
ISBN:
9780198865636
eISBN:
9780191897979
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780198865636.003.0003
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

The notion of being in a position to know contrasts with that of knowledge, and yet, both notions are intimately related. Just as one can only know what is true, one can only be in a position to know ... More


On Knowing One’s Reason

Jonathan Dancy

in Practical Thought: Essays on Reason, Intuition, and Action

Published in print:
2021
Published Online:
August 2021
ISBN:
9780198865605
eISBN:
9780191897955
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780198865605.003.0020
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy

This chapter is about the question whether one can act for the reason that p when one does not know that p. A negative answer to this question has been promoted by Unger, Hornsby, Hyman, and others, ... More


Usage Challenges to Fallibilism

Jody Azzouni

in Attributing Knowledge: What It Means to Know Something

Published in print:
2020
Published Online:
October 2020
ISBN:
9780197508817
eISBN:
9780197508848
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780197508817.003.0011
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

A definition of fallibility shows that agents are fallible about necessary truths. It is shown that fallibility of agents implies a denial of parity reasoning. Moorean paradoxes appear to undercut ... More


Dimensions of Perceptual Content

Robert Audi

in Seeing, Knowing, and Doing: A Perceptualist Account

Published in print:
2020
Published Online:
April 2020
ISBN:
9780197503508
eISBN:
9780197503539
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780197503508.003.0002
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

This chapter presents a causal theory of perception according to which perceiving something is, in outline, equivalent to its producing or sustaining, in the right way, a phenomenal representation of ... More


Theory of Knowledge without (Comparative) Linguistics

Allan Hazlett

in Epistemology for the Rest of the World

Published in print:
2018
Published Online:
October 2018
ISBN:
9780190865085
eISBN:
9780190865115
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780190865085.003.0011
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

What is the relationship between the theory of knowledge and linguistics? Consider a familiar epistemological methodology, on which facts about how “knows” is ordinarily used provide evidence for and ... More


Rationality as Responding Correctly to Reasons

Benjamin Kiesewetter

in The Normativity of Rationality

Published in print:
2017
Published Online:
October 2017
ISBN:
9780198754282
eISBN:
9780191815973
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780198754282.003.0007
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

Chapter 7 outlines a non-structural account of rationality according to which rationality requires us to respond to available reasons, where a reason is available if it is part of an agent’s body of ... More


False Memories and Quasi-Memories are Memories

Vilius Dranseika

in Oxford Studies in Experimental Philosophy Volume 3

Published in print:
2020
Published Online:
May 2020
ISBN:
9780198852407
eISBN:
9780191886867
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780198852407.003.0008
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Moral Philosophy

There are two constraints that are often taken to be essential features of ordinary use of ‘remembering’ and ‘having a memory’: the factivity constraint (i.e., that one can be truly said to ... More


Introduction

Jody Azzouni

in Attributing Knowledge: What It Means to Know Something

Published in print:
2020
Published Online:
October 2020
ISBN:
9780197508817
eISBN:
9780197508848
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780197508817.003.0001
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

Part 1 of the introduction describes the motivations and approach of the book, then summarizes the contents of the book chapter by chapter. Part 2 provides the linguistic and methodological ... More


Subjective Reasons and Truth

Mark Schroeder

in Reasons First

Published in print:
2021
Published Online:
July 2021
ISBN:
9780198868224
eISBN:
9780191904745
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780198868224.003.0004
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

Chapter 4 takes up the question of why epistemologists have been reluctant to endorse answers to what evidence supports basic perceptual beliefs that allow such evidence to be false, and argues that ... More


Cross-Context Attributions and the Knowability Problem: Does Contextualism Lead to a Contradiction?

Peter Baumann

in Epistemic Contextualism: A Defense

Published in print:
2016
Published Online:
November 2016
ISBN:
9780198754312
eISBN:
9780191815980
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198754312.003.0006
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

Chapter 5 deals with a “homemade” problem for contextualism: the knowability problem. This problem concerns the evaluation of the truth value of knowledge attributions made in other contexts than the ... More


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