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This chapter begins with a brief discussion of the distinctive features of antitrust extraterritoriality as it has been experienced in the United States. It then discusses US appetite for extraterritoriality, the limits to judicial and enforcement comity, and the efforts by antitrust authorities to assist one another in fulfilling their independent objectives.

In a small, open economy like Canada's, it would be plainly incomplete to think of antitrust law and policy as involving only domestic interests. This has always been true, but of course this has become even more essential to appreciate the growth in international trade. This chapter maps out the international contours of Canadian competition law and practice. First, it considers the extraterritorial reach of Canadian competition law. It looks at three relevant dimensions of extraterritorial application: Does Canadian law reach domestic conduct that affects foreign markets? Does Canadian law reach foreign conduct that affects domestic markets? Finally, does Canadian law reach foreign conduct that affects foreign markets? In discussing extraterritoriality, the central issue is whether Canadian law has jurisdiction over the relevant conduct. But even if it does have jurisdiction, it may decline to assume jurisdiction on grounds of international comity. The second section outlines the role of comity in Canadian attitudes to the extraterritorial reach of its statutes.

This chapter analyzes the tools available to Israel to tackle international antitrust issues. The chapter is organized as follows. The second section analyzes the current international antitrust regime in Israel. The analysis raises interesting theoretical and practical issues that are relevant to all jurisdictions that apply their domestic laws to foreign firms. The third section analyzes the regime from a wider perspective and focuses on the practical aspects of antitrust enforcement. The next section analyzes some of the implications of the findings for international antitrust and suggests some ways that small economies can adopt in order to play a more effective role in the international antitrust arena.

This chapter begins with an overview of Singapore's competition law and policy. It then discusses the extraterritorial reach of Singapore's competition law regime, comity, and the exercise of jurisdiction by tribunals in Singapore, and international cooperation.

Antitrust law has moved from a national enterprise to an international enterprise. Markets transcend national boundaries, and many problems appear to require supranational or cooperative solutions. The 1990s were an era of visions of a multilateral framework, possibly under the aegis of the World Trade Organization. As the 1990s drew to a close, multilateral agreement seemed more remote, and networking solutions seemed more practical and attractive. International antitrust today is less “world antitrust” and more “antitrust without borders”. This chapter describes the intellectual journey from hierarchy to networking; although the journey is not over. Using the subsidiarity principle, it identifies the problems that can be tackled horizontally, and how and in what forum; it identifies the problems that still need a solution from the top; and it suggests that, at least in the short term, more targeted solutions will be sought for the truly global problems.

In many respects, international competition policy already exists. Overlapping domestic legal regimes create a de facto regime that firms involved in international business must navigate. There are, however, almost no binding international agreements on the topic; there is no overarching institution that applies or enforces laws on competition; and there are no international requirements regarding procedural or substantive rules. This chapter addresses the following questions: What characterizes the relationship between domestic competition laws and international business activities? To what extent is international cooperation on competition policy likely or possible? Finally, given the answers to the first two questions, what form might international cooperation on competition policy take?

This chapter follows the institutionalization of consular jurisdiction after the Opium War, with a special focus on the Mixed Court and British Supreme Court in Shanghai, which were established in the 1860s in order to resolve criminal and civil cases between Britons, Chinese, and other nationalities. A comparison of the Chinese version of treaty texts with other legal sources shows that Qing officials borrowed and adapted long standing Sino-Manchu legal concepts and institutions when they accepted and cooperated in the establishment of the Courts.

Chapter 4 explores the evolution of jurisdiction over foreigners in Japan from the promulgation of the “Expulsion Edict” in 1825 through the conclusion of the Sino-Japanese Treaty of Tianjin in 1871, a neglected chapter in Sino-Japanese relations. The extraterritorial arrangements in the “Ansei Treaties,” which Japan concluded with Western powers 1854-58, are compared with the corresponding arrangements in the Sino-Japanese “Treaty of Tianjin.” The extraterritorial arrangements in the Treaty of Tianjin were informed by the Chinese experience of consular jurisdiction in the treaty ports, which stood in sharp contrast to the lack of reciprocity in the Qing Empire’s relations with the Western treaty powers. Since there were far more Chinese in Japan than there were Japanese in China prior to 1895, the Treaty of Tianjin had a much greater impact in Japan than it had in China.

This chapter examines how legal pluralism and extraterritoriality contributed to shape the public debate in China and Japan in the last decades of the nineteenth century. It contrasts official Chinese and Japanese responses to a series of widely publicized consular courts cases and shows that the Japanese authorities were much more successful in mobilizing public opinion against extraterritoriality than the Qing Empire was. The chapter argues that one of the reasons for the Japanese success was the fact that the Japanese state had created a relatively unified citizenry by abolishing all traces of legal pluralism.

By avoiding the strict war/peace dichotomy, the overall book seeks to demonstrate how human rights law applies at all times. Despite theoretical and practical obstacles, ESC rights do apply in armed conflict, and both states and non-state actors have obligations in this regard. It is explained that the challenge is therefore not so much about the legal validity of ESC rights in armed conflict, but more the precise content of each individual right that must be respected, as well as the extent to which each right must also be protected and fulfilled given the maelstrom of often co-existing violence and destruction.

This chapter critically examines the principles that ground extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction over domestic offences under international law. It argues that the reasons that account for a state holding the power to punish advocated in Chapter 2 explain it as having jurisdiction over any offence committed on its territory and over offences committed abroad against their sovereignty, security, or important governmental functions (principle of protection). It suggests, however, that these reasons are incompatible with the widely-held principles according to which states claim extraterritorial jurisdiction over an offence on the basis of the nationality of either the offender (nationality principle) or the victim (principle of passive personality). The chapter not only argues that all the reasons that are often given for these principles are ultimately unconvincing at the bar of justice; it also argues that the argument for the scope of states' right to punish is overall more convincing than the one that would result from some of the most influential justifications for legal punishment available in the literature.

This chapter presents a jurisdictional theory of international crimes. It argues that the defining feature of the concept of an international crime is that it warrants conferring upon at least some extraterritorial authority the power to punish their perpetrators. It critically examines the leading arguments available in the literature, i.e., piracy-based explanations and the view of international crimes as harming humanity as a whole, and submits that they ultimately fail to account for their specific jurisdictional regime. This is mainly because these arguments are entirely unrelated to the reasons that justify meting out legal punishment to offenders in the first place. By contrast, the argument provided in Chapter 2 allows us to explain precisely this normative implication for standard cases of international crimes. The chapter also considers certain cases of war crimes and different varieties of terrorism to assess the explanatory potential of the view hereby endorsed. It concludes by examining the general objection put forward in the literature that a plausible theory of international criminal justice does not need an account of international crimes.

This chapter provides a theory of legitimate authority to try offenders. It applies Joseph Raz's service conception of authority to the question of what conditions a given body should meet in order to claim, itself, the power to punish an offender. This approach enable the chapter to conduct a philosophical examination of certain charges often raised against extraterritorial prosecutions, such as ‘show trials’, victor's justice, ‘clean hands’, tu quoque, and trials in absentia or against defendants who have been abducted abroad. It ultimately argues that although some of these considerations might undermine a particular state holding the authority to punish a given offender, they are all unrelated to the fact that it purports to punish an offender extraterritorially. In other words, it submits that although the argument for a given body's authority is necessary in order to provide a complete justification for this body holding the power to punish an offender, it is conceptually and normatively mistaken to consider these obstacles as objects to extraterritoriality itself.