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This chapter examines the project of astrobiology and its object, the “signature of life,” by drawing on the work of Hillel Schwartz, particularly his writing on time in Century's End, on duplication in The Culture of the Copy, and on signification in “De-Signing.” Schwartz's work can provide a fresh angle on the doublings, redoublings, definitions, and redefinitions at the heart of astrobiology's quest for extraterrestrial life. His crabwise approach offers provocative paratactical techniques for traversing the networks of association, acknowledged and unacknowledged, that support the concept of the signature of life. The chapter first considers the Search for Extraterrestrial Intelligence (SETI), through the optic of Schwartz's writings on copying and his work on noise before discussing astrobiology's notion of the signature of life. It also offers suggestions for thwarting the overreaching of the theoretical impulse in both life sciences and humanities.

This chapter considers and rejects traditional spaceflight rationales, accenting the insubstantial evidence that is usually offered in their support. It uses regression analyses and public opinion data to show that spaceflight activities do not have a clear impact on either STEM degree conferral rates or overall scientific literacy within the United States. Next, it uses public opinion data to show that the general public is not especially interested in astrobiology or in the scientific search for extraterrestrial life. It also uses genetics and anthropological research to show that there is no innate human biological compulsion to explore space. Finally, it describes and criticizes the “space frontier” metaphor as well as basic arguments for space resource exploitation and space settlement.

This chapter discusses how the scientific search for evidence of extraterrestrial life has affected people's conception of the terrestrial biosphere. Austrian geologist Eduard Suess originated the term “biosphere” in 1875, describing Earth's biosphere as the area of the planet that supports life. With a deeper understanding of the history and nature of the terrestrial biosphere, the community of scientists engaged in space science and exploration recognizes the possibility of other biospheres beyond Earth. As a result, the quest to find evidence of extraterrestrial life has affected people's conception of the biosphere, the way they think about their home planet and their place on it, and their perspective on the possibility of extraterrestrial biospheres nearby and far away. Indeed, astrobiology, planetary exploration, and exoplanet science have made significant contributions to this changing understanding.

This chapter examines how classical ethical theory might apply to the kind of alien life humans are most likely to encounter: nonrational, nonsentient life. Humans are unlikely to have basic ethical obligations to extraterrestrial life because it is very unlikely that extraterrestrial life could have moral status, by the lights of leading moral theories. Furthermore, even if extraterrestrial life did have moral status, consistency with moral practices on Earth would suggest that humans have very few basic ethical obligations to this life. However, it does not follow that humans could treat extraterrestrial life in any matter human beings see fit, because extraterrestrial life may require protection as humans follow through on basic ethical obligations to themselves. In sum, humans would not have ethical obligations to such life per se but the obligations people clearly do have to their fellow humans entail that people cherish, promote, and protect extraterrestrial life.

This concluding chapter discusses some of the lessons that can be learned from studying the planets and planetary climates. It first considers the general principles that turned out to be right; for example, size and distance from the Sun matter. The larger objects are able to hold on to their atmospheres better than the small objects. The outer solar system is hydrogen rich and the inner solar system is oxygen rich; as one moves away from the Sun different substances take on different roles. There are also assumptions that proved inaccurate; such was the case for Venus, Mars, and the moons of the giant planets. The chapter also asks whether the study of planetary climates provides lessons for Earth, whether the study of planets has informed us about the likelihood of extraterrestrial life, and whether it has made the development of extraterrestrial life seem more likely.

This chapter argues that the scope of planetary protection policies should be expanded to include all potential sites of interest to space science. It begins by providing an overview of planetary protection policies and their history. This is followed by discussions of Charles Cockell’s views on the ethics of microbial life, Holmes Rolston’s views on the preservation of natural value in the solar system, and Tony Milligan’s views on respecting natural integrity in space. It argues that each view unnecessarily understates the scope of science’s interest in the protection of space environments. Since every space environment is virtually unexplored, as a precautionary default it should be assumed that a space environment is of interest to science (and thus worth protecting) until otherwise proven.

This chapter examines conspiracy theories surrounding the Roswell UFO incident. Believers contend that a secret group within the federal government is covering up the evidence of extraterrestrial contact, and conspiring to discredit them and deceive the public. Thy feel that Roswell was, moreover, only the first instance of deception, setting the pattern for official denials about UFO sightings, abductions, cattle mutilations, crop circles, and even hidden alien bases.

This chapter explores Kant’s belief in the existence of intelligent extraterrestrial life—a form of life superior to the one known to us as humans on the Earth. Starting with one of his first pieces of writing, Universal Natural History and Theory of the Heavens (1755), all the way through one of the last, Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View (1798), Kant, apparently without making it a major theme of his philosophy, will have regularly summoned inhabitants of other planets, inviting them over and over again into his discourse.

This concluding chapter explains why Steven Spielberg's Close Encounters of the Third Kind (1977) remains a singular science-fiction film. In the intervening years since the release of Close Encounters, one can arguably see in the convergence of science fiction, ufology, and SETI, a continuing desire for the kind of transformative ‘encounter’ with alien intelligence that Close Encounters represents. The cultural impact of Close Encounters and ‘transcendent’ science fiction in general has, in fact, served to increase public awareness of the work being done in the scientific community to detect extraterrestrial life. Even now, cosmologists involved in SETI are proposing a more active form of search for alien civilisations, in which radio signals will be aimed at parts of the galaxy where Earth-like planets exist and with it an increased possibility of contact with intelligent life. However, the recent detection of these Earth-like planets that may be capable of sustaining life in the ‘habitable zones’ of distant stars has prompted scientists to consider stepping up activities to what is known as METI (Messaging to Extraterrestrial Intelligence). Regardless of the objections of some scientists to METI, the scientific community in general seems to be in consensus that the likelihood of intelligent life existing elsewhere is high (the so-called ‘Drake Equation’), even though the probability of detection may be low.

This chapter traces the history of the search for life in the universe, from the ancient Greek atomists to the emergence of modern astrobiology. The idea of inhabited worlds dates back at least to the ancient Greeks and was rationally discussed as a part of natural philosophy, mainly in the context of cosmological worldviews. If cosmological worldviews gave birth to the idea of extraterrestrial life, then philosophy and literature, in their traditional role of examining the human condition, explored the ramifications of the idea borne of that cosmological context. Interest in astrobiology and society in its broadest sense dates back at least a quarter century to the days when NASA was planning its Search for Extraterrestrial Intelligence (SETI) program. Today, astrobiology is a thriving enterprise around the world and the societal aspects are becoming an integral part of it.

This chapter addresses a sociological question that has largely been ignored: How much does the public care about life in space? It argues that there is no clear evidence of widespread support in the United States for the scientific search for extraterrestrial life. First, a comparison with U.S. views on evolution suggests that many religious individuals would be opposed to the search. Second, a comparison with U.S. views on space exploration suggests that a large majority of the public would be unwilling to support increased funding for the search. Finally, a review of existing surveys on the public's views about astrobiology suggests that little is known about how the public frames the search for extraterrestrial life. This makes it difficult to draw any decisive conclusions about the purported universal appeal of astrobiology.

This chapter examines the history of questions concerning life on other worlds within theology. Not surprisingly, in each phase of the historic extraterrestrial life (ETL) debates, the conceptions of ETL that were put forward tended either to strongly reflect and reinforce—or else provocatively controvert and undermine—traditional human self-conceptions. As such, traditional Christianity—as constructed in the Renaissance and early modern periods, in both its Catholic and non-Catholic forms—faced unique conceptual and interpretive exigencies in relation to the possibility of ETL, precisely because of its particular metaphysical and existential construction of the divine-human relation. Some thinkers viewed these conceptual and interpretive exigencies as opportunities for the creative extension, reinterpretation, and transformation of traditional Christian understandings. Others took their traditional understandings to be sufficient counterevidence to the ETL hypothesis, denying the possibility of life elsewhere in the cosmos on the basis that it conflicted with what they “knew” to be true, on the basis of Biblical or doctrinal authority. Still others viewed the emerging scientific plausibility of ETL as definitive counterevidence against Christianity.

Organisms that live with ice are extremophiles, and are viewed as analogues for potential life on other planets and their moons in our solar system. Extraterrestrial cryospheric environments are found on Mars, Europa (a Jovian moon), and Enceladus and Titan (small and large Saturnian moons, respectively). This chapter describes their potential for supporting both water and life, along with the types of chemical reactions that might be exploited as energy sources, which include methanogenesis on Mars, Enceladus, and Titan; and oxidation of organic matter on Europa. Finally, the weaknesses of using terrestrial environments as analogues for those in the extraterrestrial cryosphere are discussed.

This chapter analyzes the extraterrestrial plots of films such as Invasion of the Body Snatchers (1956), They Live (1988), and Men in Black (1997). It also examines the philosofictive plot in Kant’s tale, which is divided into several volumes, from The Theory of the Heavens to the Conflict of the Faculties by way of a return to The Critique of the Power of Judgment and the “philosophical sketch” called Perpetual Peace.

This chapter addresses the implications of people’s understanding of conceptual intelligence on extraterrestrial debates in astrobiology. In presupposing life, and by extension conceptual intelligence, is so fine-tuned as to be unique to this planet creates an equivocation that opens up scientific claims to ineradicable skepticism. It is one thing to be doubtful about whether life exists elsewhere, if that life is intelligent, or even if humans will ever find it. This is to be expected and healthy. However, it is quite another to assume that all expressions of intelligence on this planet are the direct product of natural processes unique to Earth. If all forms of intelligence are ultimately rooted in local expressions of biological utility, then the necessity and universality that anchors scientific explanations can be no more than complicated ways of registering people’s own interspecies agreement on things and thus of no help in critically investigating the larger structure of the natural universe with some measure of objectivity.

This concluding chapter details the current state of space law and, in particular, the mechanisms that might be used to deal with the discovery of extraterrestrial life. The law in such discovery events will operate in a number of ways, defining the roles of different terrestrial agencies, protecting the scientific integrity of any discovered life, and providing valuable protection for the newly discovered life form. The chapter then argues that existing planetary protection and contamination rules, with their clearly anthropocentric bias (preserve the science), are outmoded and the resulting regulatory gap should be filled with nonbinding soft laws. It also proposes some ways forward to ensure that the seminal discovery event does not lead to conflict on Earth, the loss of irreplaceable scientific information, or even the destruction of the alien life. Ultimately, at present, there is little consensus as to how to start formulating laws to govern relations with alien lifeforms, no matter what their composition.

This chapter reflects on the cultural impact of Steven Spielberg's Close Encounters of the Third Kind (1977). During the filming of Close Encounters, a rumour spread that the film was being secretly sponsored by an American government agency as part of its acclimation programme to ready humankind for imminent first contact with extraterrestrials. In some ways, there is a sense — conspiracy theories aside — that Spielberg may have achieved something along those lines. As such, the cosmic outlook of Close Encounters has influenced not only subsequent science-fiction films but also the continuing fascination with extraterrestrial life and a whole UFO subculture. Even if the film itself is all but forgotten in certain quarters, its impact can still be felt keenly on popular culture and in the SETI/ufology community at large.

This chapter explores Kant’s thoughts about extraterrestrials. It suggests that Kant’s speculations are directly and structurally linked to the cosmopolitical stakes of his thinking—in other words, to what we would refer today as globalization. It further argues that only by surveying the spatial conquests of our time and following Carl Schmitt in deciphering the international treaties that regulate the exploration of celestial bodies will we be able to understand Kant’s cosmopolitics and its indissociable cosmological resonances.

An overheard (fictional) conversation between a terrestrial speaker and a representative alien from some other planet orbiting some other star. The conversation touches on moral and spiritual issues. The main aim is to make the attempt not to be parochial.

This chapter explores the concept of alien phenomenology. SETI’s (Search for Extraterrestrial Intelligence) fundamental assumption states that if there is life in the universe, it ought to be able to recognize its counterparts by pointing radio astronomy apparatuses like the VLA (Very Large Array) in their direction, and to understand their answer. In the 1980s, German American Philosopher Nicholas Rescher argued against SETI’s insistence that the signs of extraterrestrial life would resemble detectable communication technology. Rescher suggested that extraterrestrials are perhaps so alien that their science and technology is incomprehensible to us; we could never understand it as intelligence. The alien might not be life, at all. The alien is not limited to another person, or even another creature.