Michael Bergmann
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199275748
- eISBN:
- 9780191603907
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199275742.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
Virtually all philosophers agree that for a belief to be epistemically justified, it must satisfy certain conditions. Perhaps it must be supported by evidence, or perhaps it must be reliably formed, ...
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Virtually all philosophers agree that for a belief to be epistemically justified, it must satisfy certain conditions. Perhaps it must be supported by evidence, or perhaps it must be reliably formed, or perhaps there is some other ‘good-making’ features it must have. But does a belief’s justification also require some sort of awareness of its good-making features? The answer to this question has been hotly contested in contemporary epistemology, creating a deep divide among its practitioners. Internalists insist that such awareness is required for justification whereas externalists insist that it is not. The first part of this book argues that internalism faces an inescapable dilemma: either it leads to vicious regress problems and, ultimately, radical skepticism or it is entirely unmotivated. The second part of the book begins by developing the author’s own externalist theory of justification, one imposing both a proper function and a no-defeater requirement. It concludes by demonstrating the failure of two prominent critiques of externalism: that it is infected with epistemic circularity and that it cannot respond adequately to skepticism. Together, the two parts of the book provide a decisive refutation of internalism and a sustained defense of externalism.Less
Virtually all philosophers agree that for a belief to be epistemically justified, it must satisfy certain conditions. Perhaps it must be supported by evidence, or perhaps it must be reliably formed, or perhaps there is some other ‘good-making’ features it must have. But does a belief’s justification also require some sort of awareness of its good-making features? The answer to this question has been hotly contested in contemporary epistemology, creating a deep divide among its practitioners. Internalists insist that such awareness is required for justification whereas externalists insist that it is not. The first part of this book argues that internalism faces an inescapable dilemma: either it leads to vicious regress problems and, ultimately, radical skepticism or it is entirely unmotivated. The second part of the book begins by developing the author’s own externalist theory of justification, one imposing both a proper function and a no-defeater requirement. It concludes by demonstrating the failure of two prominent critiques of externalism: that it is infected with epistemic circularity and that it cannot respond adequately to skepticism. Together, the two parts of the book provide a decisive refutation of internalism and a sustained defense of externalism.
Gillian Russell
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- May 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780199232192
- eISBN:
- 9780191715907
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199232192.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
The analytic/synthetic distinction looks simple. It is a distinction between two different kinds of sentence: synthetic sentences are true in part because of the way the world is, and in part because ...
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The analytic/synthetic distinction looks simple. It is a distinction between two different kinds of sentence: synthetic sentences are true in part because of the way the world is, and in part because of what they mean, whereas analytic sentences — like all bachelors are unmarried and triangles have three sides — are different; they are true in virtue of meaning and so, no matter what the world is like, as long as the sentence means what it does, it will be true. The distinction seems powerful because analytic sentences seem to be knowable in a special way; one can know that all bachelors are unmarried, for example, just by thinking about what it means. But many 20th-century philosophers, with Quine in the lead, argued that there were no analytic sentences, that the idea of analyticity didn't even make sense and that the analytic/synthetic distinction was therefore an illusion. Others couldn't see how there could fail to be a distinction, however ingenious the arguments. But since the heyday of the debate, things have changed in the philosophy of language. Tools have been refined, confusions cleared up, and most significantly, many philosophers now accept a view of language — semantic externalism — on which it is possible to see how the distinction could fail. One might be tempted to think that ultimately the distinction has fallen for reasons other than those proposed in the original debate. This book argues that it hasn't. It uses the tools of contemporary philosophy of language to outline a view of analytic sentences which is compatible with semantic externalism, and defends that view against the old Quinean arguments. It then goes on to draw out some surprising epistemological consequences.Less
The analytic/synthetic distinction looks simple. It is a distinction between two different kinds of sentence: synthetic sentences are true in part because of the way the world is, and in part because of what they mean, whereas analytic sentences — like all bachelors are unmarried and triangles have three sides — are different; they are true in virtue of meaning and so, no matter what the world is like, as long as the sentence means what it does, it will be true. The distinction seems powerful because analytic sentences seem to be knowable in a special way; one can know that all bachelors are unmarried, for example, just by thinking about what it means. But many 20th-century philosophers, with Quine in the lead, argued that there were no analytic sentences, that the idea of analyticity didn't even make sense and that the analytic/synthetic distinction was therefore an illusion. Others couldn't see how there could fail to be a distinction, however ingenious the arguments. But since the heyday of the debate, things have changed in the philosophy of language. Tools have been refined, confusions cleared up, and most significantly, many philosophers now accept a view of language — semantic externalism — on which it is possible to see how the distinction could fail. One might be tempted to think that ultimately the distinction has fallen for reasons other than those proposed in the original debate. This book argues that it hasn't. It uses the tools of contemporary philosophy of language to outline a view of analytic sentences which is compatible with semantic externalism, and defends that view against the old Quinean arguments. It then goes on to draw out some surprising epistemological consequences.
Katalin Farkas
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- January 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199230327
- eISBN:
- 9780191710629
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199230327.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
This book defends a conception of the mind that is inspired by some of Descartes's writings. The crucial feature of the Cartesian view defended is not dualism — which is not adopted here — but ...
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This book defends a conception of the mind that is inspired by some of Descartes's writings. The crucial feature of the Cartesian view defended is not dualism — which is not adopted here — but internalism about the mind. Internalism is opposed to the widely accepted thesis of externalism, which states that some mental features constitutively depend on features of our physical and social environment. In contrast, this book defends the minority internalist view that the mind is autonomous with respect to its environment: although it is obviously influenced by things in the environment, this influence is merely contingent and does not delimit what is thinkable in principle. The first part of the book argues that privileged accessibility is the mark of the mental, and that this thesis is strongly tied to criteria of personhood. The second part argues that internalism is best formulated as the thesis that mental features are determined by the phenomenal properties of our conscious mental life, and that the externalist denial of this thesis is incompatible with privileged self-knowledge. Hence, externalism is in conflict with the conception of the mind and personhood defended in the first part of the book. Supporters of the externalist view often present their theory as the most thoroughgoing criticism of the Cartesian conception of the mind; this book answers these criticisms and argues for an uncompromising internalist Cartesian theory of the mind.Less
This book defends a conception of the mind that is inspired by some of Descartes's writings. The crucial feature of the Cartesian view defended is not dualism — which is not adopted here — but internalism about the mind. Internalism is opposed to the widely accepted thesis of externalism, which states that some mental features constitutively depend on features of our physical and social environment. In contrast, this book defends the minority internalist view that the mind is autonomous with respect to its environment: although it is obviously influenced by things in the environment, this influence is merely contingent and does not delimit what is thinkable in principle. The first part of the book argues that privileged accessibility is the mark of the mental, and that this thesis is strongly tied to criteria of personhood. The second part argues that internalism is best formulated as the thesis that mental features are determined by the phenomenal properties of our conscious mental life, and that the externalist denial of this thesis is incompatible with privileged self-knowledge. Hence, externalism is in conflict with the conception of the mind and personhood defended in the first part of the book. Supporters of the externalist view often present their theory as the most thoroughgoing criticism of the Cartesian conception of the mind; this book answers these criticisms and argues for an uncompromising internalist Cartesian theory of the mind.
Jack C. Lyons
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- January 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780195373578
- eISBN:
- 9780199871988
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195373578.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This book addresses two central questions in epistemology: (1) which beliefs are epistemologically basic (i.e., noninferentially justified)? and (2) where does perception end and inferential ...
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This book addresses two central questions in epistemology: (1) which beliefs are epistemologically basic (i.e., noninferentially justified)? and (2) where does perception end and inferential cognition begin? The book offers a highly externalist theory, arguing that it is not introspectible features of the beliefs that determine their status as basic or as perceptual; instead, these are determined by the nature of the cognitive system, or module, that produced the beliefs. On this view, the sensory experiences that typically accompany perceptual beliefs play no indispensable role in the justification of these beliefs, and one can have perceptual beliefs—justified perceptual beliefs—even in the absence of any sensory experiences whatsoever. The book develops a general theory of basic beliefs and argues that perceptual beliefs are a species of basic beliefs. This results from the fact that perceptual modules are a special type of basic-belief-producing modules. Importantly, some beliefs are not the outputs of this class of cognitive module; these beliefs are nonbasic, thus requiring evidential support from other beliefs for their justification. This last point is used to defend a reliabilist epistemology against an important class of traditional objections (where the agent uses a reliable process that she doesn't know to be reliable). The overarching view defended in the book is a type of reliabilism, and the basic/nonbasic distinction developed here offers a version of reliabilism that takes inference seriously yet remains staunchly externalist.Less
This book addresses two central questions in epistemology: (1) which beliefs are epistemologically basic (i.e., noninferentially justified)? and (2) where does perception end and inferential cognition begin? The book offers a highly externalist theory, arguing that it is not introspectible features of the beliefs that determine their status as basic or as perceptual; instead, these are determined by the nature of the cognitive system, or module, that produced the beliefs. On this view, the sensory experiences that typically accompany perceptual beliefs play no indispensable role in the justification of these beliefs, and one can have perceptual beliefs—justified perceptual beliefs—even in the absence of any sensory experiences whatsoever. The book develops a general theory of basic beliefs and argues that perceptual beliefs are a species of basic beliefs. This results from the fact that perceptual modules are a special type of basic-belief-producing modules. Importantly, some beliefs are not the outputs of this class of cognitive module; these beliefs are nonbasic, thus requiring evidential support from other beliefs for their justification. This last point is used to defend a reliabilist epistemology against an important class of traditional objections (where the agent uses a reliable process that she doesn't know to be reliable). The overarching view defended in the book is a type of reliabilism, and the basic/nonbasic distinction developed here offers a version of reliabilism that takes inference seriously yet remains staunchly externalist.
Joseph Mendola
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- January 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199534999
- eISBN:
- 9780191715969
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199534999.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Metaphysics/Epistemology
Externalism about mental content is the view that things outside of the skin or in the past are constitutive parts of present mental states. Internalism is the denial of externalism. This book ...
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Externalism about mental content is the view that things outside of the skin or in the past are constitutive parts of present mental states. Internalism is the denial of externalism. This book propounds a plausible physicalist internalism, called qualia empiricism. Qualia empiricism is the conjunction of a modal structuralist account of perceptual experience, an account of the content contributed to thought by referring terms that deploys rigidified description clusters, and an account of non-epistemic internal resources that can bridge those first two elements. It also argues that externalism is supported by no reasons that withstand close scrutiny. These include case-based arguments and arguments entwined with externalist accounts of perceptual states and language. The book critically considers externalist arguments rooted in work by Putnam, Kripke, Burge, Millikan, Dretske, Papineau, Prinz, Fodor, Harman, Stampe, Stalnaker, Tye, Kant, Williamson, disjunctivists, Wittgenstein, Wright, Davidson, and Brandom, among others.Less
Externalism about mental content is the view that things outside of the skin or in the past are constitutive parts of present mental states. Internalism is the denial of externalism. This book propounds a plausible physicalist internalism, called qualia empiricism. Qualia empiricism is the conjunction of a modal structuralist account of perceptual experience, an account of the content contributed to thought by referring terms that deploys rigidified description clusters, and an account of non-epistemic internal resources that can bridge those first two elements. It also argues that externalism is supported by no reasons that withstand close scrutiny. These include case-based arguments and arguments entwined with externalist accounts of perceptual states and language. The book critically considers externalist arguments rooted in work by Putnam, Kripke, Burge, Millikan, Dretske, Papineau, Prinz, Fodor, Harman, Stampe, Stalnaker, Tye, Kant, Williamson, disjunctivists, Wittgenstein, Wright, Davidson, and Brandom, among others.
Alvin I. Goldman
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- May 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199812875
- eISBN:
- 9780199933150
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199812875.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, General
This is a collection of chapters by the leading proponent of process reliabilism, explaining its relation to rival and/or neighboring theories including evidentialism, other forms of reliabilism, and ...
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This is a collection of chapters by the leading proponent of process reliabilism, explaining its relation to rival and/or neighboring theories including evidentialism, other forms of reliabilism, and virtue epistemology. It addresses other prominent themes in contemporary epistemology, such as the internalism/externalism debate, the epistemological upshots of experimental challenges to intuitional methodology, the source of epistemic value, and social epistemology. The Introduction addresses late-breaking responses to ongoing exchanges with friends, rivals, and critics of reliabilism.Less
This is a collection of chapters by the leading proponent of process reliabilism, explaining its relation to rival and/or neighboring theories including evidentialism, other forms of reliabilism, and virtue epistemology. It addresses other prominent themes in contemporary epistemology, such as the internalism/externalism debate, the epistemological upshots of experimental challenges to intuitional methodology, the source of epistemic value, and social epistemology. The Introduction addresses late-breaking responses to ongoing exchanges with friends, rivals, and critics of reliabilism.
Duncan Pritchard
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- April 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780199280384
- eISBN:
- 9780191602290
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/019928038X.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
One of the key supposed ‘platitudes’ of contemporary epistemology is the claim that knowledge excludes luck. One can see the attraction of such a claim, in that knowledge is something that one can ...
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One of the key supposed ‘platitudes’ of contemporary epistemology is the claim that knowledge excludes luck. One can see the attraction of such a claim, in that knowledge is something that one can take credit for; it is an achievement of sorts, and yet luck undermines genuine achievements. The problem, however, is that luck seems to be an all-pervasive feature of our epistemic enterprises that tempts us to think that either scepticism is true, and we don’t know very much after all, or else knowledge is compatible with knowledge after all. My claim is that we do not need to choose between these two austere alternatives, since a closer inspection of what is involved in the notion of epistemic luck reveals varieties of luck that are compatible with knowledge possession and varieties that aren’t. We can thus do justice to the intuition that knowledge is compatible with (some forms of) luck without acceding to the sceptical claim that we do not know as much as we think we do. Nevertheless, I also claim that there is a sceptical problem lurking in the background that is related to the problem of epistemic luck, though it is not best thought of in terms of the possession of knowledge.Less
One of the key supposed ‘platitudes’ of contemporary epistemology is the claim that knowledge excludes luck. One can see the attraction of such a claim, in that knowledge is something that one can take credit for; it is an achievement of sorts, and yet luck undermines genuine achievements. The problem, however, is that luck seems to be an all-pervasive feature of our epistemic enterprises that tempts us to think that either scepticism is true, and we don’t know very much after all, or else knowledge is compatible with knowledge after all. My claim is that we do not need to choose between these two austere alternatives, since a closer inspection of what is involved in the notion of epistemic luck reveals varieties of luck that are compatible with knowledge possession and varieties that aren’t. We can thus do justice to the intuition that knowledge is compatible with (some forms of) luck without acceding to the sceptical claim that we do not know as much as we think we do. Nevertheless, I also claim that there is a sceptical problem lurking in the background that is related to the problem of epistemic luck, though it is not best thought of in terms of the possession of knowledge.
Anthony Brueckner
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- January 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199585861
- eISBN:
- 9780191595332
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199585861.003.0012
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter gives a brief coda in which the limitations of the Putnamian strategy are discussed. (Chapter 16, Section 2, provides another twist on the Putnam story.)
This chapter gives a brief coda in which the limitations of the Putnamian strategy are discussed. (Chapter 16, Section 2, provides another twist on the Putnam story.)
Bryan Frances
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- October 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780199282135
- eISBN:
- 9780191602917
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199282137.003.0013
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
The importance of what was argued in the book was evaluated, with comments on which elements are of lasting significance for epistemology as a discipline. Notions treated include epistemic deference, ...
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The importance of what was argued in the book was evaluated, with comments on which elements are of lasting significance for epistemology as a discipline. Notions treated include epistemic deference, liveness of hypotheses, mere mortality with respect to a hypothesis, epistemic superiority, responsibility to one’s epistemic community, the epistemic significance of expert disagreement, epistemic externalism, and content externalism.Less
The importance of what was argued in the book was evaluated, with comments on which elements are of lasting significance for epistemology as a discipline. Notions treated include epistemic deference, liveness of hypotheses, mere mortality with respect to a hypothesis, epistemic superiority, responsibility to one’s epistemic community, the epistemic significance of expert disagreement, epistemic externalism, and content externalism.
Anna Marmodoro and Jonathan Hill (eds)
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- May 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199583164
- eISBN:
- 9780191725647
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199583164.001.0001
- Subject:
- Religion, Philosophy of Religion
The growth of both philosophy of mind and cognitive science has developed our understanding of the human mind in ways that just a few decades ago were unthinkable. As ideas from philosophy of mind ...
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The growth of both philosophy of mind and cognitive science has developed our understanding of the human mind in ways that just a few decades ago were unthinkable. As ideas from philosophy of mind begin to cross over into philosophy of religion, there is renewed interest in questions about the divine mind, about how it might relate to a human body, and about whether incarnation itself might be articulated with the conceptual tools offered by the current research developments in the philosophy of mind. This book offers chapters by leading philosophers of religion representing these new approaches to theological problems such as incarnation. The doctrine of incarnation—that Jesus Christ was God become human—has always been one of the most central and distinctive features of Christianity. Similar doctrines about divine humans can be found in other religions, from the claims to divinity made by ancient kings and emperors to the concept of avatars in Hinduism. But many people regard the notion that a human being could also be divine as unjustifiable or incoherent, and none of the many attempts to articulate it philosophically has earned general acceptance. The chapters explore, from a variety of different viewpoints, whether any metaphysically rigorous and coherent model of incarnation can be defended today.Less
The growth of both philosophy of mind and cognitive science has developed our understanding of the human mind in ways that just a few decades ago were unthinkable. As ideas from philosophy of mind begin to cross over into philosophy of religion, there is renewed interest in questions about the divine mind, about how it might relate to a human body, and about whether incarnation itself might be articulated with the conceptual tools offered by the current research developments in the philosophy of mind. This book offers chapters by leading philosophers of religion representing these new approaches to theological problems such as incarnation. The doctrine of incarnation—that Jesus Christ was God become human—has always been one of the most central and distinctive features of Christianity. Similar doctrines about divine humans can be found in other religions, from the claims to divinity made by ancient kings and emperors to the concept of avatars in Hinduism. But many people regard the notion that a human being could also be divine as unjustifiable or incoherent, and none of the many attempts to articulate it philosophically has earned general acceptance. The chapters explore, from a variety of different viewpoints, whether any metaphysically rigorous and coherent model of incarnation can be defended today.
Sherrilyn Roush
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- February 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199274734
- eISBN:
- 9780191603228
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199274738.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This book develops and defends a new externalist, reliabilist theory of knowledge and evidence, and develops a new view about scientific realism. Knowledge is viewed as a tracking theory that has a ...
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This book develops and defends a new externalist, reliabilist theory of knowledge and evidence, and develops a new view about scientific realism. Knowledge is viewed as a tracking theory that has a conditional probability rather than counterfactual formulation, and the property of closure under known implication is imposed on knowledge. It is argued that the tracking theory of evidence is best formulated and defended as a confirmation theory based on the Likelihood Ratio. These tracking theories of knowledge and evidence fit together to provide a deep explanation of why having better evidence makes one more likely to know. The new tracking theory of knowledge is argued to be superior to all currently known externalist rivals. It provides a distinctive explanation of why knowledge is more valuable than mere true belief, and explains why knowledge is power in the Baconian sense. Finally, the book argues that confirmation theory is relevant to debates about scientific realism, and defends a position intermediate between realism and anti-realism based on a view about what having evidence requires.Less
This book develops and defends a new externalist, reliabilist theory of knowledge and evidence, and develops a new view about scientific realism. Knowledge is viewed as a tracking theory that has a conditional probability rather than counterfactual formulation, and the property of closure under known implication is imposed on knowledge. It is argued that the tracking theory of evidence is best formulated and defended as a confirmation theory based on the Likelihood Ratio. These tracking theories of knowledge and evidence fit together to provide a deep explanation of why having better evidence makes one more likely to know. The new tracking theory of knowledge is argued to be superior to all currently known externalist rivals. It provides a distinctive explanation of why knowledge is more valuable than mere true belief, and explains why knowledge is power in the Baconian sense. Finally, the book argues that confirmation theory is relevant to debates about scientific realism, and defends a position intermediate between realism and anti-realism based on a view about what having evidence requires.
Earl Conee and Richard Feldman
- Published in print:
- 2004
- Published Online:
- August 2004
- ISBN:
- 9780199253722
- eISBN:
- 9780191601361
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199253722.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
The essays in this book defend evidentialism. This is the view that whether a person is epistemically justified in believing a proposition is determined entirely by the person's evidence. ...
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The essays in this book defend evidentialism. This is the view that whether a person is epistemically justified in believing a proposition is determined entirely by the person's evidence. Fundamentally, it is a supervenience thesis according to which facts about whether or not a person is epistemically justified in believing a proposition supervene on facts describing the evidence that person has. According to evidentialism, epistemic evaluations are distinct from moral and prudential evaluations of believing, and epistemically justified beliefs may fail to be morally or prudentially valuable. The evidence to which the theory refers includes other justified beliefs and, ultimately, experiences. While evidentialism is not an inherently anti-skeptical view, we argue that people do have knowledge level justification for many beliefs. Several essays in the volume criticize rival theories of justification, notably externalist theories such as reliabilism.Less
The essays in this book defend evidentialism. This is the view that whether a person is epistemically justified in believing a proposition is determined entirely by the person's evidence. Fundamentally, it is a supervenience thesis according to which facts about whether or not a person is epistemically justified in believing a proposition supervene on facts describing the evidence that person has. According to evidentialism, epistemic evaluations are distinct from moral and prudential evaluations of believing, and epistemically justified beliefs may fail to be morally or prudentially valuable. The evidence to which the theory refers includes other justified beliefs and, ultimately, experiences. While evidentialism is not an inherently anti-skeptical view, we argue that people do have knowledge level justification for many beliefs. Several essays in the volume criticize rival theories of justification, notably externalist theories such as reliabilism.
Rowland Stout
- Published in print:
- 1996
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198240631
- eISBN:
- 9780191680212
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198240631.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Mind
Philosophers have usually argued that the right way to explain people's actions is in terms of their beliefs and intentions rather than in terms of objective facts. This book takes the opposite line. ...
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Philosophers have usually argued that the right way to explain people's actions is in terms of their beliefs and intentions rather than in terms of objective facts. This book takes the opposite line. Appeal to teleology is widely regarded with suspicion, but he argues that there are things in nature, namely actions, which can be teleologically explained: they happen because they serve some end. Moreover, this teleological explanation is externalist: it cites facts about the world, not beliefs and intentions which only represent the world. Such externalism about the explanation of action is a natural partner to externalism about knowledge and about reference, but has hardly ever been considered seriously before. One dramatic consequence of such a position is that it opens up the possibility of a behaviourist account of beliefs and intentions.Less
Philosophers have usually argued that the right way to explain people's actions is in terms of their beliefs and intentions rather than in terms of objective facts. This book takes the opposite line. Appeal to teleology is widely regarded with suspicion, but he argues that there are things in nature, namely actions, which can be teleologically explained: they happen because they serve some end. Moreover, this teleological explanation is externalist: it cites facts about the world, not beliefs and intentions which only represent the world. Such externalism about the explanation of action is a natural partner to externalism about knowledge and about reference, but has hardly ever been considered seriously before. One dramatic consequence of such a position is that it opens up the possibility of a behaviourist account of beliefs and intentions.
Sven Bernecker
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- May 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199577569
- eISBN:
- 9780191722820
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199577569.003.0007
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Metaphysics/Epistemology
Content externalism is the view that the individuation conditions of mental content depend, in part, on external or relational properties of the subject's environment rather than only on internal ...
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Content externalism is the view that the individuation conditions of mental content depend, in part, on external or relational properties of the subject's environment rather than only on internal properties of the subject's mind and brain. This chapter motivates content externalism by discussing Putnam's and Burge's Twin Earth thought experiments. It gives an overview over different versions of externalism and applies externalism to memory contents. There are three different kind of externalism about memory content: pastist, presentist, and futurist externalism. According to the version of pastist externalism argued for here, the content of a memory state is fixed, once and for all, by the environment the subject was in at the time he had the original thought. When some content is stored in memory it is inert to all subsequent environmental changes. Content externalism is compared and contrasted with the hypothesis of the extended mind. The chapter also includes a brief discussion of collective memory.Less
Content externalism is the view that the individuation conditions of mental content depend, in part, on external or relational properties of the subject's environment rather than only on internal properties of the subject's mind and brain. This chapter motivates content externalism by discussing Putnam's and Burge's Twin Earth thought experiments. It gives an overview over different versions of externalism and applies externalism to memory contents. There are three different kind of externalism about memory content: pastist, presentist, and futurist externalism. According to the version of pastist externalism argued for here, the content of a memory state is fixed, once and for all, by the environment the subject was in at the time he had the original thought. When some content is stored in memory it is inert to all subsequent environmental changes. Content externalism is compared and contrasted with the hypothesis of the extended mind. The chapter also includes a brief discussion of collective memory.
Robert C. Stalnaker
- Published in print:
- 1999
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198237075
- eISBN:
- 9780191598456
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198237073.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
A collection about the intentionality of speech acts and propositional attitudes. The chapters in the first section develop a framework for pragmatics—the study of the interaction of speech acts and ...
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A collection about the intentionality of speech acts and propositional attitudes. The chapters in the first section develop a framework for pragmatics—the study of the interaction of speech acts and the contexts in which they are performed. The framework is used to defend and apply a pragmatic conception of presupposition, to account for the role of indicative conditional statements in reasoning, and to solve some puzzles about statements of identity and existence. The chapters in the second section concern the semantics of the attribution of belief and other propositional attitudes. They attempt to reconcile the possible‐worlds analysis of propositional content with the phenomena, including de re belief attribution and the attribution of indexical or self‐locating belief. The chapters in the third section defend an externalist account of the contents of thought. It is argued that there is no reason to think a viable account of narrow content can be developed, and that none is needed to provide an adequate account of the role of intentional content in the explanation of behaviour and experience. The chapters in the fourth section discuss the relation between the content of thoughts and the forms in which content is represented and expressed. It is argued that the temptation to build linguistic structure into the content of thought should be resisted since it does not provide the material for an adequate solution to the problems that plague the possible‐worlds conception of proposition, such as the problem of logical omniscience.Less
A collection about the intentionality of speech acts and propositional attitudes. The chapters in the first section develop a framework for pragmatics—the study of the interaction of speech acts and the contexts in which they are performed. The framework is used to defend and apply a pragmatic conception of presupposition, to account for the role of indicative conditional statements in reasoning, and to solve some puzzles about statements of identity and existence. The chapters in the second section concern the semantics of the attribution of belief and other propositional attitudes. They attempt to reconcile the possible‐worlds analysis of propositional content with the phenomena, including de re belief attribution and the attribution of indexical or self‐locating belief. The chapters in the third section defend an externalist account of the contents of thought. It is argued that there is no reason to think a viable account of narrow content can be developed, and that none is needed to provide an adequate account of the role of intentional content in the explanation of behaviour and experience. The chapters in the fourth section discuss the relation between the content of thoughts and the forms in which content is represented and expressed. It is argued that the temptation to build linguistic structure into the content of thought should be resisted since it does not provide the material for an adequate solution to the problems that plague the possible‐worlds conception of proposition, such as the problem of logical omniscience.
Alvin Plantinga
- Published in print:
- 1993
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195078626
- eISBN:
- 9780199833559
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195078624.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
In this book and in its sequels, Warrant and Proper Function and Warranted Christian Belief, I examine the nature of epistemic warrant, that quantity, enough of which distinguishes knowledge from ...
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In this book and in its sequels, Warrant and Proper Function and Warranted Christian Belief, I examine the nature of epistemic warrant, that quantity, enough of which distinguishes knowledge from mere true belief. Contemporary epistemologists seldom focus attention on the nature of warrant; and when they do, they display deplorable diversity: some claim that what turns true belief into knowledge is a matter of epistemic dutifulness, others that it goes by coherence, and still others that it is conferred by reliability. I shall argue that none of these claims is correct, and (in Warrant and Proper Function) suggest a more satisfactory alternative. In the present book, I survey current contributions to the discussion of warrant and neighboring issues. I begin with internalism, looking first at the carefully crafted foundationalist internalism of Roderick Chisholm (Chs. 2 and 3). To better understand Chisholm and other internalists, however, I first make a preliminary excursus (Ch 1) into the classical internalism of Descartes, Locke, and others. After Chisholmian internalism, I turn to coherentism, which for classificatory purposes I take as a form of internalism. In the next three chapters, I consider coherentism taken generally (Ch. 4), the specific version of coherentism developed by Laurence BonJour (Ch. 5), and contemporary Bayesian versions of coherentism (Chs. 6 and 7). Next (Ch. 8), there is the more attenuated internalism of John Pollock, which I see as a transition from internalism to externalism. Finally, I examine the reliabilist and externalist views of William Alston, Fred Dretske, and Alvin Goldman (Ch. 9), and close with a preview of Warrant and Proper Function (Ch. 10).Less
In this book and in its sequels, Warrant and Proper Function and Warranted Christian Belief, I examine the nature of epistemic warrant, that quantity, enough of which distinguishes knowledge from mere true belief. Contemporary epistemologists seldom focus attention on the nature of warrant; and when they do, they display deplorable diversity: some claim that what turns true belief into knowledge is a matter of epistemic dutifulness, others that it goes by coherence, and still others that it is conferred by reliability. I shall argue that none of these claims is correct, and (in Warrant and Proper Function) suggest a more satisfactory alternative. In the present book, I survey current contributions to the discussion of warrant and neighboring issues. I begin with internalism, looking first at the carefully crafted foundationalist internalism of Roderick Chisholm (Chs. 2 and 3). To better understand Chisholm and other internalists, however, I first make a preliminary excursus (Ch 1) into the classical internalism of Descartes, Locke, and others. After Chisholmian internalism, I turn to coherentism, which for classificatory purposes I take as a form of internalism. In the next three chapters, I consider coherentism taken generally (Ch. 4), the specific version of coherentism developed by Laurence BonJour (Ch. 5), and contemporary Bayesian versions of coherentism (Chs. 6 and 7). Next (Ch. 8), there is the more attenuated internalism of John Pollock, which I see as a transition from internalism to externalism. Finally, I examine the reliabilist and externalist views of William Alston, Fred Dretske, and Alvin Goldman (Ch. 9), and close with a preview of Warrant and Proper Function (Ch. 10).
Robert C. Stalnaker
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- April 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780199251483
- eISBN:
- 9780191602320
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199251487.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This book features a collection of papers on metaphysical topics. These papers echo the recurring themes of the Quinean picture, resulting from his critique of logical empiricism. They reflect an ...
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This book features a collection of papers on metaphysical topics. These papers echo the recurring themes of the Quinean picture, resulting from his critique of logical empiricism. They reflect an ambivalence about metaphysics, a preoccupations with the interplay of semantic and metaphysical questions, and an externalist perspective reflected in Quine’s approach to semantic and metaphysical questions. The book is divided into five parts. Part I focuses on the questions about possible worlds. Parts II and III develop representations of the space of possible worlds that make sense of metaphysical thesis about relations between individuals and their properties. Part IV delves into the relation between semantics and metaphysics. Part V explores the problem of accounting for the subject’s point of view, and its relation to our account of the way the world is and the possible worlds are, in themselves.Less
This book features a collection of papers on metaphysical topics. These papers echo the recurring themes of the Quinean picture, resulting from his critique of logical empiricism. They reflect an ambivalence about metaphysics, a preoccupations with the interplay of semantic and metaphysical questions, and an externalist perspective reflected in Quine’s approach to semantic and metaphysical questions. The book is divided into five parts. Part I focuses on the questions about possible worlds. Parts II and III develop representations of the space of possible worlds that make sense of metaphysical thesis about relations between individuals and their properties. Part IV delves into the relation between semantics and metaphysics. Part V explores the problem of accounting for the subject’s point of view, and its relation to our account of the way the world is and the possible worlds are, in themselves.
Adam Morton
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- January 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780199658534
- eISBN:
- 9780191746192
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199658534.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Mind
The book describes virtues of limitation management, intellectual virtues of adapting to the fact that we cannot solve many problems that we can easily describe. How to be profitably stupid. It ...
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The book describes virtues of limitation management, intellectual virtues of adapting to the fact that we cannot solve many problems that we can easily describe. How to be profitably stupid. It argues that we do give one another guidance on managing our limitations, but that this has to be in terms of virtues and not of rules, and in terms of success—knowledge and accomplishment—rather than rationality. So there is the beginning of a taxonomy of intellectual virtues. These include ‘paradoxical virtues’, that sound like vices, such as the virtue of ignoring evidence and the virtue of not thinking too hard. There are also virtues of not planning ahead, ‘possibilist virtues’, in that some forms of such planning require present knowledge of one’s future knowledge that is arguably impossible. A person’s best response to many problems depends not on the most rationally promising solution to solving them but on the most likely route to success given the person’s profile of intellectual virtues and failings. This is illustrated with a discussion of several paradoxes and conundra. At the end of the book there is a discussion of intelligence and rationality that argues that both have very limited usefulness as evaluations of who will make progress on which problems.Less
The book describes virtues of limitation management, intellectual virtues of adapting to the fact that we cannot solve many problems that we can easily describe. How to be profitably stupid. It argues that we do give one another guidance on managing our limitations, but that this has to be in terms of virtues and not of rules, and in terms of success—knowledge and accomplishment—rather than rationality. So there is the beginning of a taxonomy of intellectual virtues. These include ‘paradoxical virtues’, that sound like vices, such as the virtue of ignoring evidence and the virtue of not thinking too hard. There are also virtues of not planning ahead, ‘possibilist virtues’, in that some forms of such planning require present knowledge of one’s future knowledge that is arguably impossible. A person’s best response to many problems depends not on the most rationally promising solution to solving them but on the most likely route to success given the person’s profile of intellectual virtues and failings. This is illustrated with a discussion of several paradoxes and conundra. At the end of the book there is a discussion of intelligence and rationality that argues that both have very limited usefulness as evaluations of who will make progress on which problems.
David B. Wong
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780195305395
- eISBN:
- 9780199786657
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195305396.003.0007
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
This chapter addresses the question how deeply moral reasons relate to human motivation through discussing the debate over internalism and externalism in ethics. Internalists on moral reasons hold ...
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This chapter addresses the question how deeply moral reasons relate to human motivation through discussing the debate over internalism and externalism in ethics. Internalists on moral reasons hold that an agent’s having a reason to act requires that it be based in some motive that she already has, while externalists deny the necessary relation. The position defended here is externalist about reasons, but it specifies an intelligible relation between external reasons and the possibility of agents acting on them. Recognition of a moral reason to help another, for example, can become embedded during moral learning in the intentional objects of prior motivational propensities to respond to the suffering of others. Because they become embedded in and function to channel pre-existing motivations, reasons are external to any particular individual’s pre-existing motivations, but they must be internal to the general motivational capabilities of human nature.Less
This chapter addresses the question how deeply moral reasons relate to human motivation through discussing the debate over internalism and externalism in ethics. Internalists on moral reasons hold that an agent’s having a reason to act requires that it be based in some motive that she already has, while externalists deny the necessary relation. The position defended here is externalist about reasons, but it specifies an intelligible relation between external reasons and the possibility of agents acting on them. Recognition of a moral reason to help another, for example, can become embedded during moral learning in the intentional objects of prior motivational propensities to respond to the suffering of others. Because they become embedded in and function to channel pre-existing motivations, reasons are external to any particular individual’s pre-existing motivations, but they must be internal to the general motivational capabilities of human nature.
Bill Brewer
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199250455
- eISBN:
- 9780191597114
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199250456.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
Discusses the role of conscious experiences in the acquisition of empirical knowledge. Most epistemology of perception takes a person's possession of beliefs about the mind‐independent world for ...
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Discusses the role of conscious experiences in the acquisition of empirical knowledge. Most epistemology of perception takes a person's possession of beliefs about the mind‐independent world for granted and goes on to ask what further conditions these beliefs must meet if they are to be cases of knowledge. I argue that this approach is completely mistaken. Perceptual experiences must provide reasons for empirical beliefs if there are to be any determinate beliefs about particular objects in the world at all. So there are epistemic requirements upon the very possibility of empirical belief. The crucial epistemological role of experience lies in its essential contribution to the subject's understanding of certain perceptual demonstrative contents, simply grasping which provides him with a reason to endorse them in belief. I explain in detail how this is so; defend my position against a wide range of objections; compare and contrast it with a number of influential alternative views in the area; and bring out its connection with Russell's Principle of Acquaintance, and its consequences for the compatibility of content externalism with an adequate account of self‐knowledge.Less
Discusses the role of conscious experiences in the acquisition of empirical knowledge. Most epistemology of perception takes a person's possession of beliefs about the mind‐independent world for granted and goes on to ask what further conditions these beliefs must meet if they are to be cases of knowledge. I argue that this approach is completely mistaken. Perceptual experiences must provide reasons for empirical beliefs if there are to be any determinate beliefs about particular objects in the world at all. So there are epistemic requirements upon the very possibility of empirical belief. The crucial epistemological role of experience lies in its essential contribution to the subject's understanding of certain perceptual demonstrative contents, simply grasping which provides him with a reason to endorse them in belief. I explain in detail how this is so; defend my position against a wide range of objections; compare and contrast it with a number of influential alternative views in the area; and bring out its connection with Russell's Principle of Acquaintance, and its consequences for the compatibility of content externalism with an adequate account of self‐knowledge.
