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This chapter uses the movie The Matrix to address issues about our knowledge of the external world. On the face of it, the movie raises a version of Descartes' skeptical challenge. Just as I cannot know I am not the victim of a evil genius, I also cannot know I am not in a matrix. And if I am in a matrix, so the challenge goes, most of my beliefs are false: I am not really seeing a table in front of me, I do not really live in Australia, and so on. It is argued that this thought, although initially compelling, is wrong. Even if I am in a matrix, there are still tables and cars, and most of my beliefs remain true. That is, the hypothesis that I am in a matrix is not a skeptical hypothesis, as traditionally thought. Instead, it is a sort of metaphysical hypothesis about the underlying nature of our world. If we are in a matrix, the physical world is more fundamentally a computational world, in which things are made of bits. This is an interesting new metaphysics, but it does not lead to skepticism. The chapter argues that much the same applies to many traditional skeptical hypotheses, such as the evil demon hypothesis and the hypothesis that my life is a dream. This does not provide a complete victory over skepticism, but it nevertheless helps in the project of vindicating knowledge of the external world.

This chapter is partly stage-setting. It introduces a theory called “External Object Foundationalism,” according to which some basic beliefs are beliefs about external objects and not merely beliefs about simple a priori truths and one's current mental states. This view, sometimes called direct realism, though construed here as an epistemological view and not a metaphysical view about the nature of perception, is poised to solve the traditional skeptical problem of the external world as well as offer a handy solution to the perennial problem of whether there is a principled distinction between perception and inference and if so, where to draw the line. External Object Foundationalism raises a question of central importance to this book: if some beliefs about external objects are basic, which ones?

In the early eighteenth century context there was an intimate connection between problems concerning the existence of the material world and problems of natural religion. Two issues are of particular importance for understanding Hume's irreligious intentions in his discussion of the external world, as presented in the section entitled “Of scepticism with regard to the senses." First, if we are unable to establish that we know that the material world exists, then all arguments for the existence of God that presuppose knowledge of the material world (i.e. its beauty, order, design, etc.) are placed in doubt. Second, if we are naturally disposed to believe in the existence of body, but this belief is false, then it seems to follow that God must be a deceive—or does not exist. Hume's arguments in 1.4.2 are finely crafted to present both these irreligious challenges to the orthodox view.

This chapter discusses the idea that, even if there is no evidence or argument in favour of belief in the external world or religious belief, there is a pragmatic justification for believing in the external world but not for religious belief. It turns out that, ultimately, this pragmatic approach is not satisfying. However, as Austin (1956) famously noted, justifications have had more than their fair share in philosophy. Accordingly, alternative strategies are considered that appeal to a defence — which need not necessarily involve a justification — of our belief in the external world. This chapter considers a defence that appeals to an exemption. The various versions of this strategy, including Strawson's attempt on behalf of Hume and Wittgenstein, are not entirely satisfying. It then considers excuses that are not pleas for exemption. It offers a Hume-inspired, ‘natural’ excuse for our belief in the external world. This excuse constitutes a much better defence of our belief in the external world than any similar excuse for religious belief, so the secular criticism of religious belief is cleared of inconsistency. This solution is independent of any appeal to epistemic justification.

Discusses, and expands on, the Cartesian skeptical argument. According to this argument, we do not have knowledge about the external world since we cannot know that we are not being deceived into having false beliefs about the external world. The chapter strengthens this argument in order to establish that such knowledge is not even possible, and extends it to exclude knowledge about other times as well. It rejects G. E. Moore's reversal of the skeptical argument as counterintuitive. Anticipating the discussions in later chapters, a prima facie case is made for the impossibility of even reasonably believing anything about the external world, and for the consonance of the skeptical results with considerations about certainty.

This chapter focuses on a host of issues that are central to Kant's philosophy in general, and his understanding of the mind in particular, even though they do not correspond to the heading of a specific paralogism. I explain how the modern problem of interaction, in general, dominated Kant's early work, and how Kant's views on the specific issue of mind‐body interaction always have to be approached in this context. Indicative of the complexity of his position here is the fact that in the Critique's second ed., Kant changes the topic of the fourth paralogism, to have it focus on the metaphysical issue of mind‐body interaction, whereas in the first ed., it concerns the epistemological relation of the self to external objects. I explain how and why the latter topic becomes central to other parts of the second ed. Critique, especially, the new section called the Refutation of Idealism.

In this chapter a new, so-called ‘moderate’ conception of the architecture of empirical warrants is presented. The key aspect of the moderate position is that, contrary to Pryor’s ‘liberal’ one, collateral assumptions are needed in order for one’s current sense experience to constitute a justification for ordinary empirical beliefs. As opposed to Wright’s ‘conservative’ view, in contrast, moderatism does not require the existence of a justification for these collateral assumptions. This allows moderates to avoid trafficking in the dubious notion of entitlement — the kind of non-evidential warrant evoked by Wright in order to avoid the sceptical consequences of the conservative view. In closing, the bearing of moderatism on the cogency of Moore’s proof of an external world, on external world scepticism and its relationship with some of Wittgenstein’s remarks in On Certainty are explored.

This chapter lays out the core argument of the book, which runs as follows: (1) if moral facts do not exist, then epistemic facts do not exist; (2) epistemic facts exist; (3) so, moral facts exist; (4) if moral facts exist, then moral realism is true; (5) so, moral realism is true. Having done this, the introduction engages in two other tasks: first, it discusses the structure of the arguments for key premises of the core argument, such as premises (1) and (2) and second, it highlights a series of assumptions that are made in the book's discussion.

Presents Nietzsche's critical reflections directed at traditional metaphysical categories such as the external world, substance, causation, and self. Targeted theories include the doctrine of substance qua substratum for properties; the Lockean ontology of powers inherent in external objects; the construal of the self as either mental substance or transcendental subjects; atomism; and the belief in the explanatory powers of Newtonian force. It is argued that there is a pervasive general line of scepticism in Nietzsche's later thought concerning the possibility of knowledge as rationally justified true belief. The chapter concludes with a defence of Nietzsche's general scepticism against a variety of countervailing arguments.

McGinn presents an indirect, a priori argument for the conjunction of realism about the external world and realism about the mind. The argument is indirect because McGinn's principal targets are the alternative conjunctions that include some form of anti‐realism about either the external world (phenomenalism), the mind (behaviourism), or both: phenomenalism plus realism about the mind; realism about the external world plus behaviourism; phenomenalism plus behaviourism. McGinn argues that both of these anti‐realist positions are self‐refuting. ‘Behaviourism requires realism about material objects, since anti‐realism about material objects is inconsistent with behaviourism; but realism about material objects requires that behaviourism be false; so behaviourism is false.’ Moreover, ‘phenomenalism requires realism about the mind, since anti‐realism about the mind (behaviourism) is inconsistent with phenomenalism; but realism about the mind requires that phenomenalism is false, since it requires that behavioural statements not imply mental statements; so phenomenalism is false’. Therefore, McGinn concludes, we know a priori that ‘any argument (such as Dummett's) that purports to establish anti‐realism in either of these two areas has to be unsound’.

Chapter 1 begins by considering what are my own most certain and most fundamental beliefs, and suggests that they are the most reasonable starting points for addressing questions concerning free will. Like Descartes, I ask what if anything I can be absolutely certain about; but unlike Descartes, I find that I cannot be certain about my own existence, but only that conscious experiences occur. As I explain, this is partly because of the need for a language with which to express and communicate beliefs of any complexity, and thus the dependence of complex beliefs on prior beliefs about language and language use; and this in turn requires prior beliefs about language-users and a world in which language is used.