Quassim Cassam
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199208319
- eISBN:
- 9780191708992
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199208319.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
How is knowledge of the external world possible? How is knowledge of other minds possible? How is a priori knowledge possible? These are all examples of ‘how-possible’ questions in epistemology. In ...
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How is knowledge of the external world possible? How is knowledge of other minds possible? How is a priori knowledge possible? These are all examples of ‘how-possible’ questions in epistemology. In general, we ask how knowledge, or knowledge of some specific kind, is possible when we encounter obstacles to its existence or acquisition. So the question is: how is knowledge possible given the various factors that make it look impossible? A satisfactory answer to such a question will therefore need to do several different things. In essence, explaining how a particular kind of knowledge is possible is a matter of identifying ways of acquiring it, overcoming or dissipating obstacles to its acquisition, and figuring out what makes it possible to acquire it. To respond to a how-possible question in this way is to go in for what might be called a ‘multi-levels’ approach. The aim of this book is to develop and defend this approach.Less
How is knowledge of the external world possible? How is knowledge of other minds possible? How is a priori knowledge possible? These are all examples of ‘how-possible’ questions in epistemology. In general, we ask how knowledge, or knowledge of some specific kind, is possible when we encounter obstacles to its existence or acquisition. So the question is: how is knowledge possible given the various factors that make it look impossible? A satisfactory answer to such a question will therefore need to do several different things. In essence, explaining how a particular kind of knowledge is possible is a matter of identifying ways of acquiring it, overcoming or dissipating obstacles to its acquisition, and figuring out what makes it possible to acquire it. To respond to a how-possible question in this way is to go in for what might be called a ‘multi-levels’ approach. The aim of this book is to develop and defend this approach.
Barry Stroud
- Published in print:
- 1984
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198247616
- eISBN:
- 9780191598494
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198247613.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
The thesis of scepticism is a thesis about the human condition: the view that we can know nothing, or that nothing is certain, or that everything is open to doubt. This book examines the sceptical ...
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The thesis of scepticism is a thesis about the human condition: the view that we can know nothing, or that nothing is certain, or that everything is open to doubt. This book examines the sceptical thesis that we can know nothing about the physical world around us. The author argues that the sceptical thesis is motivated by a persistent philosophical problem that calls the very possibility of knowledge about the external world into question, and that the sceptical thesis is the only acceptable answer to this problem as traditionally posed.On the basis of a detailed analysis of the sceptical argument advanced by Descartes, Stroud discusses and criticizes responses to scepticism by a wide range of writers, including J. L. Austin, G. E. Moore, Kant, R. Carnap, and W. V. Quine. In this discussion, Stroud is concerned with the significance of philosophical scepticism in three different respects.Firstly, he shows philosophical scepticism to be significant as opposed to insignificant or unimportant: the philosophical study of knowledge is not an idle exercise, and the comforting popular belief that we already understand quite well how and why philosophical scepticism goes wrong is simply not true.Secondly, Stroud argues for the significance of philosophical scepticism by defending it against the charge that it is meaningless or incoherent or unintelligible, and in doing so aims to articulate as clearly as possible what exactly it does mean.Thirdly, and most importantly, Stroud argues that philosophical scepticism is significant in virtue of what it signifies, or indicates, or shows: even if the sceptical thesis turned out to be false, meant nothing, or not what it seemed to mean, the study of scepticism about the the world around us would still reveal something deep and important about human knowledge and human nature and the urge to understand them philosophically. One aim of the book is to investigate how and why this is so. Engaging in a philosophical reflection about our knowledge of the external world in this way, Stroud argues, can also reveal something about the nature of philosophical problems generally and about philosophy itself; studying the sources of the philosophical problem of scepticism can yield some degree of philosophical understanding or illumination even if we never arrive at something we can regard as a solution to that problem.Less
The thesis of scepticism is a thesis about the human condition: the view that we can know nothing, or that nothing is certain, or that everything is open to doubt. This book examines the sceptical thesis that we can know nothing about the physical world around us. The author argues that the sceptical thesis is motivated by a persistent philosophical problem that calls the very possibility of knowledge about the external world into question, and that the sceptical thesis is the only acceptable answer to this problem as traditionally posed.
On the basis of a detailed analysis of the sceptical argument advanced by Descartes, Stroud discusses and criticizes responses to scepticism by a wide range of writers, including J. L. Austin, G. E. Moore, Kant, R. Carnap, and W. V. Quine. In this discussion, Stroud is concerned with the significance of philosophical scepticism in three different respects.
Firstly, he shows philosophical scepticism to be significant as opposed to insignificant or unimportant: the philosophical study of knowledge is not an idle exercise, and the comforting popular belief that we already understand quite well how and why philosophical scepticism goes wrong is simply not true.
Secondly, Stroud argues for the significance of philosophical scepticism by defending it against the charge that it is meaningless or incoherent or unintelligible, and in doing so aims to articulate as clearly as possible what exactly it does mean.
Thirdly, and most importantly, Stroud argues that philosophical scepticism is significant in virtue of what it signifies, or indicates, or shows: even if the sceptical thesis turned out to be false, meant nothing, or not what it seemed to mean, the study of scepticism about the the world around us would still reveal something deep and important about human knowledge and human nature and the urge to understand them philosophically. One aim of the book is to investigate how and why this is so. Engaging in a philosophical reflection about our knowledge of the external world in this way, Stroud argues, can also reveal something about the nature of philosophical problems generally and about philosophy itself; studying the sources of the philosophical problem of scepticism can yield some degree of philosophical understanding or illumination even if we never arrive at something we can regard as a solution to that problem.
David J. Chalmers
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- January 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780195311105
- eISBN:
- 9780199870851
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195311105.003.0013
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
This chapter uses the movie The Matrix to address issues about our knowledge of the external world. On the face of it, the movie raises a version of Descartes' skeptical challenge. Just as I cannot ...
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This chapter uses the movie The Matrix to address issues about our knowledge of the external world. On the face of it, the movie raises a version of Descartes' skeptical challenge. Just as I cannot know I am not the victim of a evil genius, I also cannot know I am not in a matrix. And if I am in a matrix, so the challenge goes, most of my beliefs are false: I am not really seeing a table in front of me, I do not really live in Australia, and so on. It is argued that this thought, although initially compelling, is wrong. Even if I am in a matrix, there are still tables and cars, and most of my beliefs remain true. That is, the hypothesis that I am in a matrix is not a skeptical hypothesis, as traditionally thought. Instead, it is a sort of metaphysical hypothesis about the underlying nature of our world. If we are in a matrix, the physical world is more fundamentally a computational world, in which things are made of bits. This is an interesting new metaphysics, but it does not lead to skepticism. The chapter argues that much the same applies to many traditional skeptical hypotheses, such as the evil demon hypothesis and the hypothesis that my life is a dream. This does not provide a complete victory over skepticism, but it nevertheless helps in the project of vindicating knowledge of the external world.Less
This chapter uses the movie The Matrix to address issues about our knowledge of the external world. On the face of it, the movie raises a version of Descartes' skeptical challenge. Just as I cannot know I am not the victim of a evil genius, I also cannot know I am not in a matrix. And if I am in a matrix, so the challenge goes, most of my beliefs are false: I am not really seeing a table in front of me, I do not really live in Australia, and so on. It is argued that this thought, although initially compelling, is wrong. Even if I am in a matrix, there are still tables and cars, and most of my beliefs remain true. That is, the hypothesis that I am in a matrix is not a skeptical hypothesis, as traditionally thought. Instead, it is a sort of metaphysical hypothesis about the underlying nature of our world. If we are in a matrix, the physical world is more fundamentally a computational world, in which things are made of bits. This is an interesting new metaphysics, but it does not lead to skepticism. The chapter argues that much the same applies to many traditional skeptical hypotheses, such as the evil demon hypothesis and the hypothesis that my life is a dream. This does not provide a complete victory over skepticism, but it nevertheless helps in the project of vindicating knowledge of the external world.
Jack C. Lyons
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- January 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780195373578
- eISBN:
- 9780199871988
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195373578.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter is partly stage-setting. It introduces a theory called “External Object Foundationalism,” according to which some basic beliefs are beliefs about external objects and not merely beliefs ...
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This chapter is partly stage-setting. It introduces a theory called “External Object Foundationalism,” according to which some basic beliefs are beliefs about external objects and not merely beliefs about simple a priori truths and one's current mental states. This view, sometimes called direct realism, though construed here as an epistemological view and not a metaphysical view about the nature of perception, is poised to solve the traditional skeptical problem of the external world as well as offer a handy solution to the perennial problem of whether there is a principled distinction between perception and inference and if so, where to draw the line. External Object Foundationalism raises a question of central importance to this book: if some beliefs about external objects are basic, which ones?Less
This chapter is partly stage-setting. It introduces a theory called “External Object Foundationalism,” according to which some basic beliefs are beliefs about external objects and not merely beliefs about simple a priori truths and one's current mental states. This view, sometimes called direct realism, though construed here as an epistemological view and not a metaphysical view about the nature of perception, is poised to solve the traditional skeptical problem of the external world as well as offer a handy solution to the perennial problem of whether there is a principled distinction between perception and inference and if so, where to draw the line. External Object Foundationalism raises a question of central importance to this book: if some beliefs about external objects are basic, which ones?
Paul Russell
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- May 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780195110333
- eISBN:
- 9780199872084
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195110333.003.0013
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
In the early eighteenth century context there was an intimate connection between problems concerning the existence of the material world and problems of natural religion. Two issues are of particular ...
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In the early eighteenth century context there was an intimate connection between problems concerning the existence of the material world and problems of natural religion. Two issues are of particular importance for understanding Hume's irreligious intentions in his discussion of the external world, as presented in the section entitled “Of scepticism with regard to the senses." First, if we are unable to establish that we know that the material world exists, then all arguments for the existence of God that presuppose knowledge of the material world (i.e. its beauty, order, design, etc.) are placed in doubt. Second, if we are naturally disposed to believe in the existence of body, but this belief is false, then it seems to follow that God must be a deceive—or does not exist. Hume's arguments in 1.4.2 are finely crafted to present both these irreligious challenges to the orthodox view.Less
In the early eighteenth century context there was an intimate connection between problems concerning the existence of the material world and problems of natural religion. Two issues are of particular importance for understanding Hume's irreligious intentions in his discussion of the external world, as presented in the section entitled “Of scepticism with regard to the senses." First, if we are unable to establish that we know that the material world exists, then all arguments for the existence of God that presuppose knowledge of the material world (i.e. its beauty, order, design, etc.) are placed in doubt. Second, if we are naturally disposed to believe in the existence of body, but this belief is false, then it seems to follow that God must be a deceive—or does not exist. Hume's arguments in 1.4.2 are finely crafted to present both these irreligious challenges to the orthodox view.
J. M. Hinton
- Published in print:
- 1973
- Published Online:
- March 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780198244035
- eISBN:
- 9780191680717
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198244035.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Metaphysics/Epistemology
Someone who has more sympathy with traditional empiricism than with much of present-day philosophy may ask himself: ‘How do my experiences give rise to my beliefs about an external world, and to what ...
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Someone who has more sympathy with traditional empiricism than with much of present-day philosophy may ask himself: ‘How do my experiences give rise to my beliefs about an external world, and to what extent do they justify them?’ He wants to refer, among other things, to unremarkable experiences, of a sort which he cannot help believing to be so extremely common that it would be ridiculous to call them common experiences. He mainly has in mind sense-experiences, and he thinks of them in a particular way. His way of thinking of them, roughly speaking as something ‘inner’, is one on which recent logico-linguistic philosophy has thrown a good deal of light. The relevant special notion of an experience contrasts, among other things, with a certain more general biographical notion of an experience, which some dictionaries indicate by the definition, ‘an event of which one is the subject’. This book explores the concept of experiences, focusing on the disjunctions between perception and illusion.Less
Someone who has more sympathy with traditional empiricism than with much of present-day philosophy may ask himself: ‘How do my experiences give rise to my beliefs about an external world, and to what extent do they justify them?’ He wants to refer, among other things, to unremarkable experiences, of a sort which he cannot help believing to be so extremely common that it would be ridiculous to call them common experiences. He mainly has in mind sense-experiences, and he thinks of them in a particular way. His way of thinking of them, roughly speaking as something ‘inner’, is one on which recent logico-linguistic philosophy has thrown a good deal of light. The relevant special notion of an experience contrasts, among other things, with a certain more general biographical notion of an experience, which some dictionaries indicate by the definition, ‘an event of which one is the subject’. This book explores the concept of experiences, focusing on the disjunctions between perception and illusion.
Yuval Avnur
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- January 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780199656417
- eISBN:
- 9780191742163
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199656417.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Religion
This chapter discusses the idea that, even if there is no evidence or argument in favour of belief in the external world or religious belief, there is a pragmatic justification for believing in the ...
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This chapter discusses the idea that, even if there is no evidence or argument in favour of belief in the external world or religious belief, there is a pragmatic justification for believing in the external world but not for religious belief. It turns out that, ultimately, this pragmatic approach is not satisfying. However, as Austin (1956) famously noted, justifications have had more than their fair share in philosophy. Accordingly, alternative strategies are considered that appeal to a defence — which need not necessarily involve a justification — of our belief in the external world. This chapter considers a defence that appeals to an exemption. The various versions of this strategy, including Strawson's attempt on behalf of Hume and Wittgenstein, are not entirely satisfying. It then considers excuses that are not pleas for exemption. It offers a Hume-inspired, ‘natural’ excuse for our belief in the external world. This excuse constitutes a much better defence of our belief in the external world than any similar excuse for religious belief, so the secular criticism of religious belief is cleared of inconsistency. This solution is independent of any appeal to epistemic justification.Less
This chapter discusses the idea that, even if there is no evidence or argument in favour of belief in the external world or religious belief, there is a pragmatic justification for believing in the external world but not for religious belief. It turns out that, ultimately, this pragmatic approach is not satisfying. However, as Austin (1956) famously noted, justifications have had more than their fair share in philosophy. Accordingly, alternative strategies are considered that appeal to a defence — which need not necessarily involve a justification — of our belief in the external world. This chapter considers a defence that appeals to an exemption. The various versions of this strategy, including Strawson's attempt on behalf of Hume and Wittgenstein, are not entirely satisfying. It then considers excuses that are not pleas for exemption. It offers a Hume-inspired, ‘natural’ excuse for our belief in the external world. This excuse constitutes a much better defence of our belief in the external world than any similar excuse for religious belief, so the secular criticism of religious belief is cleared of inconsistency. This solution is independent of any appeal to epistemic justification.
Barry Stroud
- Published in print:
- 1984
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198247616
- eISBN:
- 9780191598494
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198247613.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
In this chapter, Stroud analyses the response to scepticism given by G. E. Moore in his famous ‘Proof of an External World’.Moore seeks to prove that the proposition that there are no external things ...
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In this chapter, Stroud analyses the response to scepticism given by G. E. Moore in his famous ‘Proof of an External World’.Moore seeks to prove that the proposition that there are no external things is in fact false. His proof consists of two premisses and a conclusion: ‘Here is one hand’, ‘And here is another’, therefore ‘Two human hands exist’; the conclusion follows from the premisses, and establishes conclusively that there are external things.Contrasting his interpretation with those of N. Malcolm and A. Ambrose, Stroud argues that Moore in his proof fails to refute philosophical scepticism, but nevertheless makes a significant and legitimate use of the words ‘I know’ in formulating it and succeeds in establishing his conclusion from premisses he knows. Stroud argues that Moore, although he himself does not speak in those terms, can be understood to be giving a conclusive internal answer to the question whether he knows that there are external objects: a response from within his current knowledge to a question about knowledge that merely asks whether a piece of knowledge is already included among all the things he knows, or can be included among them by finding good reason to accept that thing on the basis of other things he already knows; but while this is a perfectly common and legitimate use of the expression ‘know’, it does nothing to answer the external question about knowledge that purports to cast doubt on all knowledge claims at once, and it is this question that must be answered if the sceptic is to be refuted.Less
In this chapter, Stroud analyses the response to scepticism given by G. E. Moore in his famous ‘Proof of an External World’.
Moore seeks to prove that the proposition that there are no external things is in fact false. His proof consists of two premisses and a conclusion: ‘Here is one hand’, ‘And here is another’, therefore ‘Two human hands exist’; the conclusion follows from the premisses, and establishes conclusively that there are external things.
Contrasting his interpretation with those of N. Malcolm and A. Ambrose, Stroud argues that Moore in his proof fails to refute philosophical scepticism, but nevertheless makes a significant and legitimate use of the words ‘I know’ in formulating it and succeeds in establishing his conclusion from premisses he knows. Stroud argues that Moore, although he himself does not speak in those terms, can be understood to be giving a conclusive internal answer to the question whether he knows that there are external objects: a response from within his current knowledge to a question about knowledge that merely asks whether a piece of knowledge is already included among all the things he knows, or can be included among them by finding good reason to accept that thing on the basis of other things he already knows; but while this is a perfectly common and legitimate use of the expression ‘know’, it does nothing to answer the external question about knowledge that purports to cast doubt on all knowledge claims at once, and it is this question that must be answered if the sceptic is to be refuted.
Edward H. Minar
- Published in print:
- 2001
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195139167
- eISBN:
- 9780199833214
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/019513916X.003.0009
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
Section 43 of Heidegger’s Being and Time attempts to demonstrate that external world skepticism is self-defeating. Crucial to this effort is the claim that Dasein is Being-in-the-world, that we are ...
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Section 43 of Heidegger’s Being and Time attempts to demonstrate that external world skepticism is self-defeating. Crucial to this effort is the claim that Dasein is Being-in-the-world, that we are always already involved with external things. Does starting with this phenomenological claim beg the question against the skeptic? No, because Heidegger is contesting the obviousness of the skeptic’s starting point, his depiction of our relation to the world. The essay shows that this strategy renders the skeptic’s demand for justification of Heidegger’s own description of Dasein as Being-in-the-world illegitimate and that charging Heidegger’s phenomenological response to skepticism with idealism is empty.Less
Section 43 of Heidegger’s Being and Time attempts to demonstrate that external world skepticism is self-defeating. Crucial to this effort is the claim that Dasein is Being-in-the-world, that we are always already involved with external things. Does starting with this phenomenological claim beg the question against the skeptic? No, because Heidegger is contesting the obviousness of the skeptic’s starting point, his depiction of our relation to the world. The essay shows that this strategy renders the skeptic’s demand for justification of Heidegger’s own description of Dasein as Being-in-the-world illegitimate and that charging Heidegger’s phenomenological response to skepticism with idealism is empty.
Peter Unger
- Published in print:
- 1978
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198244172
- eISBN:
- 9780191711473
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198244177.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
Discusses, and expands on, the Cartesian skeptical argument. According to this argument, we do not have knowledge about the external world since we cannot know that we are not being deceived into ...
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Discusses, and expands on, the Cartesian skeptical argument. According to this argument, we do not have knowledge about the external world since we cannot know that we are not being deceived into having false beliefs about the external world. The chapter strengthens this argument in order to establish that such knowledge is not even possible, and extends it to exclude knowledge about other times as well. It rejects G. E. Moore's reversal of the skeptical argument as counterintuitive. Anticipating the discussions in later chapters, a prima facie case is made for the impossibility of even reasonably believing anything about the external world, and for the consonance of the skeptical results with considerations about certainty.Less
Discusses, and expands on, the Cartesian skeptical argument. According to this argument, we do not have knowledge about the external world since we cannot know that we are not being deceived into having false beliefs about the external world. The chapter strengthens this argument in order to establish that such knowledge is not even possible, and extends it to exclude knowledge about other times as well. It rejects G. E. Moore's reversal of the skeptical argument as counterintuitive. Anticipating the discussions in later chapters, a prima facie case is made for the impossibility of even reasonably believing anything about the external world, and for the consonance of the skeptical results with considerations about certainty.
Karl Ameriks
- Published in print:
- 2000
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198238973
- eISBN:
- 9780191597022
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198238975.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
This chapter focuses on a host of issues that are central to Kant's philosophy in general, and his understanding of the mind in particular, even though they do not correspond to the heading of a ...
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This chapter focuses on a host of issues that are central to Kant's philosophy in general, and his understanding of the mind in particular, even though they do not correspond to the heading of a specific paralogism. I explain how the modern problem of interaction, in general, dominated Kant's early work, and how Kant's views on the specific issue of mind‐body interaction always have to be approached in this context. Indicative of the complexity of his position here is the fact that in the Critique's second ed., Kant changes the topic of the fourth paralogism, to have it focus on the metaphysical issue of mind‐body interaction, whereas in the first ed., it concerns the epistemological relation of the self to external objects. I explain how and why the latter topic becomes central to other parts of the second ed. Critique, especially, the new section called the Refutation of Idealism.Less
This chapter focuses on a host of issues that are central to Kant's philosophy in general, and his understanding of the mind in particular, even though they do not correspond to the heading of a specific paralogism. I explain how the modern problem of interaction, in general, dominated Kant's early work, and how Kant's views on the specific issue of mind‐body interaction always have to be approached in this context. Indicative of the complexity of his position here is the fact that in the Critique's second ed., Kant changes the topic of the fourth paralogism, to have it focus on the metaphysical issue of mind‐body interaction, whereas in the first ed., it concerns the epistemological relation of the self to external objects. I explain how and why the latter topic becomes central to other parts of the second ed. Critique, especially, the new section called the Refutation of Idealism.
Barry Stroud
- Published in print:
- 1984
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198247616
- eISBN:
- 9780191598494
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198247613.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
Chapter 1 sets out the Problem of the External World to which scepticism is a natural response: the problem, first posed by Descartes in his First Meditation, of how to show that we have any ...
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Chapter 1 sets out the Problem of the External World to which scepticism is a natural response: the problem, first posed by Descartes in his First Meditation, of how to show that we have any knowledge about the world around us.Reflecting on the nature of his sensory experiences, Descartes finds himself unable to rule out the possibility that he is dreaming and, on that account, driven to the devastating conclusion that he knows nothing at all about the world around him. Stroud argues that if Descartes is right to insist that in order to know something about the world around him he must know that he is not dreaming, then he is also right that he has no such knowledge, because the condition for knowledge that Descartes accepts can never be fulfilled: fulfilling it would require knowledge which itself would be possible only if the condition were fulfilled.The more promising strategy in the face of the sceptical argument, therefore, is to examine more carefully the requirement that we must know that we are not dreaming if we are to know anything about the world around us.But if that requirement is a fact of our ordinary conception of knowledge, as it seems to be, we must accept it, because there is no notion of knowledge other than the ordinary one that is embodied in the procedures and practices of everyday and scientific life; and unless we find a way of rejecting the problem altogether, we will have to accept with it the conclusion that no one knows anything about world around us.Less
Chapter 1 sets out the Problem of the External World to which scepticism is a natural response: the problem, first posed by Descartes in his First Meditation, of how to show that we have any knowledge about the world around us.
Reflecting on the nature of his sensory experiences, Descartes finds himself unable to rule out the possibility that he is dreaming and, on that account, driven to the devastating conclusion that he knows nothing at all about the world around him. Stroud argues that if Descartes is right to insist that in order to know something about the world around him he must know that he is not dreaming, then he is also right that he has no such knowledge, because the condition for knowledge that Descartes accepts can never be fulfilled: fulfilling it would require knowledge which itself would be possible only if the condition were fulfilled.
The more promising strategy in the face of the sceptical argument, therefore, is to examine more carefully the requirement that we must know that we are not dreaming if we are to know anything about the world around us.
But if that requirement is a fact of our ordinary conception of knowledge, as it seems to be, we must accept it, because there is no notion of knowledge other than the ordinary one that is embodied in the procedures and practices of everyday and scientific life; and unless we find a way of rejecting the problem altogether, we will have to accept with it the conclusion that no one knows anything about world around us.
Annalisa Coliva
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- January 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780199278053
- eISBN:
- 9780191745386
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199278053.003.0013
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language, Metaphysics/Epistemology
In this chapter a new, so-called ‘moderate’ conception of the architecture of empirical warrants is presented. The key aspect of the moderate position is that, contrary to Pryor’s ‘liberal’ one, ...
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In this chapter a new, so-called ‘moderate’ conception of the architecture of empirical warrants is presented. The key aspect of the moderate position is that, contrary to Pryor’s ‘liberal’ one, collateral assumptions are needed in order for one’s current sense experience to constitute a justification for ordinary empirical beliefs. As opposed to Wright’s ‘conservative’ view, in contrast, moderatism does not require the existence of a justification for these collateral assumptions. This allows moderates to avoid trafficking in the dubious notion of entitlement — the kind of non-evidential warrant evoked by Wright in order to avoid the sceptical consequences of the conservative view. In closing, the bearing of moderatism on the cogency of Moore’s proof of an external world, on external world scepticism and its relationship with some of Wittgenstein’s remarks in On Certainty are explored.Less
In this chapter a new, so-called ‘moderate’ conception of the architecture of empirical warrants is presented. The key aspect of the moderate position is that, contrary to Pryor’s ‘liberal’ one, collateral assumptions are needed in order for one’s current sense experience to constitute a justification for ordinary empirical beliefs. As opposed to Wright’s ‘conservative’ view, in contrast, moderatism does not require the existence of a justification for these collateral assumptions. This allows moderates to avoid trafficking in the dubious notion of entitlement — the kind of non-evidential warrant evoked by Wright in order to avoid the sceptical consequences of the conservative view. In closing, the bearing of moderatism on the cogency of Moore’s proof of an external world, on external world scepticism and its relationship with some of Wittgenstein’s remarks in On Certainty are explored.
Thomas C. Vinci
- Published in print:
- 1998
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195113297
- eISBN:
- 9780199833825
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195113292.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
There are two main formulations of a key causal principle in the Cartesian a priori philosophical system: one, present in Meditation III, says that the cause of the representational content ...
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There are two main formulations of a key causal principle in the Cartesian a priori philosophical system: one, present in Meditation III, says that the cause of the representational content (”objective reality”) of an idea must be situated at the same or higher level in ontology than the level at which the object represented is situated (the ”levels formulation”), the other, present in the axioms section of the Second Replies, says that the cause must contain ( formally or eminently) the same property (”reality”) as is represented by the idea (the ”same‐property” formulation). This central chapter defends four main contentions. (1) The same‐property formulation is basic in Descartes's system. (2) The notion of causality in the basic causal principle does not represent a spatio temporally extended natural process but a form of intentional explanation. (3) When point (2) is combined with the interpretation of the rule of truth offered in Ch. 2, the rule of truth and the basic causal principle prove to be equivalent. Finally, (4) in light of (3), there is one main pattern of inference in Cartesian epistemology taking the rule of truth/causal principle as its major premise and underlying all of Descartes arguments from my ideas to the existence of things outside my ideas, including the proof of my own existence (the cogito), the proof of the existence of God in Meditations III and V and the proof of the existence of the external world in Meditation VI and the Principles of Philosophy II,1.Less
There are two main formulations of a key causal principle in the Cartesian a priori philosophical system: one, present in Meditation III, says that the cause of the representational content (”objective reality”) of an idea must be situated at the same or higher level in ontology than the level at which the object represented is situated (the ”levels formulation”), the other, present in the axioms section of the Second Replies, says that the cause must contain ( formally or eminently) the same property (”reality”) as is represented by the idea (the ”same‐property” formulation). This central chapter defends four main contentions. (1) The same‐property formulation is basic in Descartes's system. (2) The notion of causality in the basic causal principle does not represent a spatio temporally extended natural process but a form of intentional explanation. (3) When point (2) is combined with the interpretation of the rule of truth offered in Ch. 2, the rule of truth and the basic causal principle prove to be equivalent. Finally, (4) in light of (3), there is one main pattern of inference in Cartesian epistemology taking the rule of truth/causal principle as its major premise and underlying all of Descartes arguments from my ideas to the existence of things outside my ideas, including the proof of my own existence (the cogito), the proof of the existence of God in Meditations III and V and the proof of the existence of the external world in Meditation VI and the Principles of Philosophy II,1.
Terence Cuneo
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- January 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780199218837
- eISBN:
- 9780191711749
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199218837.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
This chapter lays out the core argument of the book, which runs as follows: (1) if moral facts do not exist, then epistemic facts do not exist; (2) epistemic facts exist; (3) so, moral facts exist; ...
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This chapter lays out the core argument of the book, which runs as follows: (1) if moral facts do not exist, then epistemic facts do not exist; (2) epistemic facts exist; (3) so, moral facts exist; (4) if moral facts exist, then moral realism is true; (5) so, moral realism is true. Having done this, the introduction engages in two other tasks: first, it discusses the structure of the arguments for key premises of the core argument, such as premises (1) and (2) and second, it highlights a series of assumptions that are made in the book's discussion.Less
This chapter lays out the core argument of the book, which runs as follows: (1) if moral facts do not exist, then epistemic facts do not exist; (2) epistemic facts exist; (3) so, moral facts exist; (4) if moral facts exist, then moral realism is true; (5) so, moral realism is true. Having done this, the introduction engages in two other tasks: first, it discusses the structure of the arguments for key premises of the core argument, such as premises (1) and (2) and second, it highlights a series of assumptions that are made in the book's discussion.
Stephen Mulhall
- Published in print:
- 1999
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198238508
- eISBN:
- 9780191679643
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198238508.003.0008
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy, Aesthetics
In Chapter 4 the treatment of Cavell's scepticism about the external world separated from his treatment of other minds — a highly artificial strategy motivated by the desire to enhance the ...
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In Chapter 4 the treatment of Cavell's scepticism about the external world separated from his treatment of other minds — a highly artificial strategy motivated by the desire to enhance the surveyability of this complex material. However, it is possible to track the development of Cavell's thought beyond The Claim of Reason without taking very seriously the degree to which he sees these two modes or aspects of scepticism as inextricably woven. This chapter isolates and examines Cavell's reasons for holding this view, and traces out some of the consequences flowing from it. In particular, it considers what would follow if we could legitimately transfer a version of the idea of emphatic projection into our understanding of external-world scepticism. For it is with this speculation that Cavell begins to draw his work in The Claim of Reason to a close.Less
In Chapter 4 the treatment of Cavell's scepticism about the external world separated from his treatment of other minds — a highly artificial strategy motivated by the desire to enhance the surveyability of this complex material. However, it is possible to track the development of Cavell's thought beyond The Claim of Reason without taking very seriously the degree to which he sees these two modes or aspects of scepticism as inextricably woven. This chapter isolates and examines Cavell's reasons for holding this view, and traces out some of the consequences flowing from it. In particular, it considers what would follow if we could legitimately transfer a version of the idea of emphatic projection into our understanding of external-world scepticism. For it is with this speculation that Cavell begins to draw his work in The Claim of Reason to a close.
Peter Poellner
- Published in print:
- 2000
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198250630
- eISBN:
- 9780191598258
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198250630.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
Presents Nietzsche's critical reflections directed at traditional metaphysical categories such as the external world, substance, causation, and self. Targeted theories include the doctrine of ...
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Presents Nietzsche's critical reflections directed at traditional metaphysical categories such as the external world, substance, causation, and self. Targeted theories include the doctrine of substance qua substratum for properties; the Lockean ontology of powers inherent in external objects; the construal of the self as either mental substance or transcendental subjects; atomism; and the belief in the explanatory powers of Newtonian force. It is argued that there is a pervasive general line of scepticism in Nietzsche's later thought concerning the possibility of knowledge as rationally justified true belief. The chapter concludes with a defence of Nietzsche's general scepticism against a variety of countervailing arguments.Less
Presents Nietzsche's critical reflections directed at traditional metaphysical categories such as the external world, substance, causation, and self. Targeted theories include the doctrine of substance qua substratum for properties; the Lockean ontology of powers inherent in external objects; the construal of the self as either mental substance or transcendental subjects; atomism; and the belief in the explanatory powers of Newtonian force. It is argued that there is a pervasive general line of scepticism in Nietzsche's later thought concerning the possibility of knowledge as rationally justified true belief. The chapter concludes with a defence of Nietzsche's general scepticism against a variety of countervailing arguments.
Thomas C. Vinci
- Published in print:
- 1998
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195113297
- eISBN:
- 9780199833825
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195113292.003.0007
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
Cartesian epistemology comprises three main divisions: (1) an a priori theory, discussed in Chs. 1–3, (2) a psychological theory of error explanations in judgment induced by features of our sense ...
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Cartesian epistemology comprises three main divisions: (1) an a priori theory, discussed in Chs. 1–3, (2) a psychological theory of error explanations in judgment induced by features of our sense experience discussed in Chs. 4, 5 and 7, and (3) a theory of natural reasons (natural knowledge), discussed here. The theory of natural reasons, based on Descartes's notion of natural inclinations (natural propensities), is expressed here in terms of a series of warrant principles of which there are two main kinds: those that warrant action (reasons of goodness) and those that warrant claims for what is true (reasons of truth). This chapter traces Descartes's epistemically ambivalent attitude to cognitive dispositions from the early treatment in the Rules for the Direction of the Mind through to the final treatment in The Passions of the Soul. The chapter focuses special attention on the appearance of one kind of natural reason, reasons of truth, in the proof of the external world in Meditation VI and the striking absence of same in the proof of the external world in the Principles of Philosophy II. The chapter also considers whether natural reasons apply to particular aspects of corporeal things, concluding with a discussion of the Cartesian Circle.Less
Cartesian epistemology comprises three main divisions: (1) an a priori theory, discussed in Chs. 1–3, (2) a psychological theory of error explanations in judgment induced by features of our sense experience discussed in Chs. 4, 5 and 7, and (3) a theory of natural reasons (natural knowledge), discussed here. The theory of natural reasons, based on Descartes's notion of natural inclinations (natural propensities), is expressed here in terms of a series of warrant principles of which there are two main kinds: those that warrant action (reasons of goodness) and those that warrant claims for what is true (reasons of truth). This chapter traces Descartes's epistemically ambivalent attitude to cognitive dispositions from the early treatment in the Rules for the Direction of the Mind through to the final treatment in The Passions of the Soul. The chapter focuses special attention on the appearance of one kind of natural reason, reasons of truth, in the proof of the external world in Meditation VI and the striking absence of same in the proof of the external world in the Principles of Philosophy II. The chapter also considers whether natural reasons apply to particular aspects of corporeal things, concluding with a discussion of the Cartesian Circle.
Colin McGinn
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199251582
- eISBN:
- 9780191598012
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199251584.003.0013
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
McGinn presents an indirect, a priori argument for the conjunction of realism about the external world and realism about the mind. The argument is indirect because McGinn's principal targets are the ...
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McGinn presents an indirect, a priori argument for the conjunction of realism about the external world and realism about the mind. The argument is indirect because McGinn's principal targets are the alternative conjunctions that include some form of anti‐realism about either the external world (phenomenalism), the mind (behaviourism), or both: phenomenalism plus realism about the mind; realism about the external world plus behaviourism; phenomenalism plus behaviourism. McGinn argues that both of these anti‐realist positions are self‐refuting. ‘Behaviourism requires realism about material objects, since anti‐realism about material objects is inconsistent with behaviourism; but realism about material objects requires that behaviourism be false; so behaviourism is false.’ Moreover, ‘phenomenalism requires realism about the mind, since anti‐realism about the mind (behaviourism) is inconsistent with phenomenalism; but realism about the mind requires that phenomenalism is false, since it requires that behavioural statements not imply mental statements; so phenomenalism is false’. Therefore, McGinn concludes, we know a priori that ‘any argument (such as Dummett's) that purports to establish anti‐realism in either of these two areas has to be unsound’.Less
McGinn presents an indirect, a priori argument for the conjunction of realism about the external world and realism about the mind. The argument is indirect because McGinn's principal targets are the alternative conjunctions that include some form of anti‐realism about either the external world (phenomenalism), the mind (behaviourism), or both: phenomenalism plus realism about the mind; realism about the external world plus behaviourism; phenomenalism plus behaviourism. McGinn argues that both of these anti‐realist positions are self‐refuting. ‘Behaviourism requires realism about material objects, since anti‐realism about material objects is inconsistent with behaviourism; but realism about material objects requires that behaviourism be false; so behaviourism is false.’ Moreover, ‘phenomenalism requires realism about the mind, since anti‐realism about the mind (behaviourism) is inconsistent with phenomenalism; but realism about the mind requires that phenomenalism is false, since it requires that behavioural statements not imply mental statements; so phenomenalism is false’. Therefore, McGinn concludes, we know a priori that ‘any argument (such as Dummett's) that purports to establish anti‐realism in either of these two areas has to be unsound’.
David Hodgson
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- May 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199845309
- eISBN:
- 9780199932269
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199845309.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, General
Chapter 1 begins by considering what are my own most certain and most fundamental beliefs, and suggests that they are the most reasonable starting points for addressing questions concerning free ...
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Chapter 1 begins by considering what are my own most certain and most fundamental beliefs, and suggests that they are the most reasonable starting points for addressing questions concerning free will. Like Descartes, I ask what if anything I can be absolutely certain about; but unlike Descartes, I find that I cannot be certain about my own existence, but only that conscious experiences occur. As I explain, this is partly because of the need for a language with which to express and communicate beliefs of any complexity, and thus the dependence of complex beliefs on prior beliefs about language and language use; and this in turn requires prior beliefs about language-users and a world in which language is used.Less
Chapter 1 begins by considering what are my own most certain and most fundamental beliefs, and suggests that they are the most reasonable starting points for addressing questions concerning free will. Like Descartes, I ask what if anything I can be absolutely certain about; but unlike Descartes, I find that I cannot be certain about my own existence, but only that conscious experiences occur. As I explain, this is partly because of the need for a language with which to express and communicate beliefs of any complexity, and thus the dependence of complex beliefs on prior beliefs about language and language use; and this in turn requires prior beliefs about language-users and a world in which language is used.
