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A Great and Rare Art

John Kekes

in Enjoyment: The Moral Significance of Styles of Life

Published in print:
2008
Published Online:
January 2009
ISBN:
9780199546923
eISBN:
9780191720109
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199546923.003.0005
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy

The enjoyment of one's life depends on the favorable personal evaluation of its style composed of one's attitude, manner, and dominant activities. Enjoyable lives that meet these conditions may still ... More


Standard Egoism

Alison Hills

in The Beloved Self: Morality and the Challenge from Egoism

Published in print:
2010
Published Online:
September 2010
ISBN:
9780199213306
eISBN:
9780191594212
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199213306.003.0002
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

There are many challenges to the authority of morality, the claim that everyone has reasons to be moral. This chapter distinguishes the challenge from Egoism from a recent, widely discussed claim by ... More


The Foundations of Humanity

Roger Crisp

in Ethics and Humanity: Themes from the Philosophy of Jonathan Glover

Published in print:
2010
Published Online:
May 2010
ISBN:
9780195325195
eISBN:
9780199776412
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195325195.003.0009
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, General

This chapter concerns the metaethical foundations of Jonathan Glover's project in Humanity: A Moral History of the Twentieth Century. It begins by outlining both Glover's doubts about so‐called ... More


Responses: A Summing Up

Jonathan Glover

in Ethics and Humanity: Themes from the Philosophy of Jonathan Glover

Published in print:
2010
Published Online:
May 2010
ISBN:
9780195325195
eISBN:
9780199776412
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195325195.003.0013
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, General

“Responses: A Summing Up” replies to the wide‐ranging contributions to the book. It argues for the complete exclusion of torture from public policy, and defends a broadly consequentialist ethical ... More


Against Modern Dualism about the Good

Talbot Brewer

in The Retrieval of Ethics

Published in print:
2009
Published Online:
May 2009
ISBN:
9780199557882
eISBN:
9780191720918
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199557882.003.0007
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy

It is very nearly a fixed point within contemporary analytic philosophy that practical rationality calls for the efficient pursuit of that which is good for oneself. By contrast, it is a hotly ... More


Prudence, Procrastination, and Rationality

Olav Gjelsvik

in The Thief of Time: Philosophical Essays on Procrastination

Published in print:
2010
Published Online:
May 2010
ISBN:
9780195376685
eISBN:
9780199776306
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195376685.003.0006
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy

This chapter defends an aspect of the standard view that procrastination is doing things later in time than you should and does so by accounting for normative aspects of time discounting and ... More


From Prudence to Morality

James Griffin

in Well-Being: Its Meaning, Measurement and Moral Importance

Published in print:
1988
Published Online:
November 2003
ISBN:
9780198248439
eISBN:
9780191597558
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0198248431.003.0009
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy

Morality must be rooted in the natural sources of human action. What are they? For instance, how are morality and self‐interest related? How are morality and personal aims related (a question to ... More


Determinism’s Impact on Normative Judgments

Ishtiyaque Haji

in Reason’s Debt to Freedom: Normative Appraisals, Reasons, and Free Will

Published in print:
2012
Published Online:
September 2012
ISBN:
9780199899203
eISBN:
9780199949885
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199899203.003.0006
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy

The chapter argues for the following claims. First, if one is an incompatibilist who believes the alternatives that the truth of judgments of objective reasons presupposes are ones incompatible with ... More


Moral Sentiments and Alternative Possibilities

Ishtiyaque Haji

in Reason’s Debt to Freedom: Normative Appraisals, Reasons, and Free Will

Published in print:
2012
Published Online:
September 2012
ISBN:
9780199899203
eISBN:
9780199949885
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199899203.003.0005
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy

It is argued in this chapter that various moral sentiments, such as forgiveness, guilt, and indignation are essentially associated with objective reasons. It is also proposed that the truth of ... More


The Resurrection of Jesus and Roman Catholic Fundamental Theology

Francis Schüssler Fiorenza

in The Resurrection: An Interdisciplinary Symposium on the Resurrection of Jesus

Published in print:
1998
Published Online:
November 2003
ISBN:
9780198269854
eISBN:
9780191600517
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0198269854.003.0009
Subject:
Religion, Theology

Francis Schüssler Fiorenza develops a fundamental theological approach to Jesus’ resurrection that takes seriously the contemporary critique of foundationalism. He first discusses two different ... More


The Idiot

Mark Rowlands

in Can Animals Be Moral?

Published in print:
2012
Published Online:
January 2013
ISBN:
9780199842001
eISBN:
9780199979844
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199842001.003.0005
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, General

The concept of control, identified in the arguments of Aristotle and Kant, is rendered more precise in this chapter. The central dialectical figure of Myshkin is introduced. Myshkin is an individual ... More


Bernard Williams on Truth's Values

John Finnis

in Reason in Action: Collected Essays Volume I

Published in print:
2011
Published Online:
September 2011
ISBN:
9780199580057
eISBN:
9780191729379
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199580057.003.0006
Subject:
Law, Philosophy of Law

This chapter is the first part of a 2008 essay whose other parts are collected as Chapter 7 in Volume II of this text and Chapter 8 in Volume V. Here Williams's project in the last book he published, ... More


Reasons

Bryan R. Weaver and Kevin Scharp

in Semantics for Reasons

Published in print:
2019
Published Online:
August 2019
ISBN:
9780198832621
eISBN:
9780191871184
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780198832621.003.0001
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Language

Chapter 1 clarifies, organizes, and in some case corrects the extensive literature on the different kinds of reasons. We focus in particular on (i) contributory, conclusive, and sufficient reasons, ... More


Must We Conform?

John Kekes

in Hard Questions: Facing the Problems of Life

Published in print:
2019
Published Online:
February 2019
ISBN:
9780190919986
eISBN:
9780190920012
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780190919986.003.0003
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy

This chapter compares Melville’s Bartleby and the Venetian atheist savant, Sarpi. Bartleby lived a miserable life in nineteenth-century New York City. His inner resources were meager, and quiet ... More


Subjectivist Reasons

Derek Parfit

in On What Matters: Volume Three

Published in print:
2017
Published Online:
December 2017
ISBN:
9780198778608
eISBN:
9780191853487
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780198778608.003.0014
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy

This chapter examines some arguments made in favour of subjectivism. It considers the claim that, if we were fully procedurally rational, we would want to avoid future agony because such agony would ... More


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