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The human mind often relies on external mechanisms for carrying out its cognitive processes, for example by using a calculator. Vehicle externalism and in particular the Extended Mind theory (Clark and Chalmers 1998) explore whether such external mechanisms, under specified conditions, are more than mere instruments for the mind; the claim is that they are parts of the mind and thus extend it beyond its outer boundaries of skin and skull. This chapter argues that high degrees of interdependence between the mind and its extensions give rise to ontological entanglements, with respect to which there is at present no theory of individuation which can tell us how many entities there are in the entanglement and what type of entity the entanglement is. The chapter argues that the Extended Mind theory sheds light on the problem of the incarnation by motivating, in a more intuitively compelling way, the need for new ways of thinking about oneness and distinctness. The problems we encounter with the metaphysics of the incarnation are not peculiar to it; the solutions might not be either.

This chapter examines the relationship between poikilia and the specific brand of cunning termed mētis, “cunning intelligence” and argues that there exists a unique relationship between this form of cognition and ordinary objects, including the most familiar material of all: the human body. It is thus the purpose of this chapter to delineate how each of the figures termed with this epithet–Prometheus, Hermes, and Odysseus–merits this appellation through their skilful manipulation of their physical and bodily environments. In this way, Prometheus, Hermes, and Odysseus each typify different strategies of thinking in and through things and so reveal a conception of the mind as a concrete, material entity. Drawing on Lambros Malafouris’ theory of material engagement and Andy Clark’s extended mind hypothesis, this chapter demonstrates that a fundamental aspect of mētis is the extension of cunning into the material world, most notably in the form of lies and traps, doloi.

This chapter focuses on the effort of Adams and Aizawa to refute the arguments presented by Clark and Chalmers regarding the extended mind. Using the famous example of the pencil, Adams and Aizawa show that the extended mind theory falls victim to the “coupling-constitution fallacy,” one often evident in the pervading literature for the extended mind. This fallacy, attributed to Van Gelder and Port (1995), Clark and Chalmers (1998), Haugeland (1998), Dennett (2000), Clark (2001), Gibbs (2001), and Wilson (2004), jumps to the conclusion that the causal coupling of some object or process to some cognitive agent makes it part of the cognitive agent or its cognitive processing ability. Adams and Aizawa assert that extended mind theorists commit this fallacy because they fail to recognize and appreciate “what makes something a cognitive agent.”

While the previous chapters have sought primarily to illuminate the porousness of materials in their interactions with human agents, this chapter confronts the opacity of things as much as the propensity for humans to “couple” with objects in their environment. Thus this chapter will examine two facets of human cognition and will probe the conditions under which objects veer towards one or the other of these categories: 1) the intractability or paradoxical quality of the material entity and the wonder (thauma) that this evokes; 2) conversely, the means and mechanisms by which material objects could function as cognitive extensions of the human mind in the form of craftsmanship. These two interpretative lenses will therefore impart a guiding structure to this chapter, which will criss-cross archaic and classical prose and poetry, grouping such objects as Pandora and Hephaestus’ automata alongside things like labyrinths and riddles.

Chapter 5 argues that inhabitants have natural use-rights to their home as well as rights of residence in the wider area where they live. This chapter, which is grounded in extended mind theory, argues that central cognitive functions of autonomy are often embedded in the home environment. Use-rights to the home include claims against removal and the right to access and to use their home exclusively while the home serves its purpose for those persons. Nine’s theory does not assume conformity in beliefs, values, or plans among the individuals who live in an area. This makes the right of residence in the home an essential foundational title for territorial rights. Arguments for rights of residence in regions, such as those from Margaret Moore and Anna Stilz, are sound but not inclusive enough to justify foundational titles. The right to reside in a region and the right to the home ought to support each other.