Sergio Tenenbaum
- Published in print:
- 2020
- Published Online:
- October 2020
- ISBN:
- 9780198851486
- eISBN:
- 9780191886096
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780198851486.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General
Human actions unfold over time, in pursuit of ends that are not fully specified in advance. Rational Powers in Action locates these features of the human condition at the heart of a new theory of ...
More
Human actions unfold over time, in pursuit of ends that are not fully specified in advance. Rational Powers in Action locates these features of the human condition at the heart of a new theory of instrumental rationality. Where many theories of rational agency focus on instantaneous choices between sharply defined outcomes, treating the temporally extended and partially open-ended character of action as an afterthought, this book argues that the deep structure of instrumental rationality can only be understood if we see how it governs the pursuit of long-term, indeterminate ends. These are ends that cannot be realized through a single momentary action, and whose content leaves partly open what counts as realizing the end. For example, one cannot simply write a book through an instantaneous choice to do so; over time, one must execute a variety of actions to realize one’s goal of writing a book, where one may do a better or worse job of attaining that goal, and what counts as succeeding at it is not fully determined in advance. Even to explain the rational governance of much less ambitious actions like making dinner, this book argues that we need to focus on temporal duration and the indeterminacy of ends in intentional action. Theories of moment-by-moment preference maximization, or indeed any understanding of instrumental rationality on the basis of momentary mental items, cannot capture the fundamental structure of our instrumentally rational capacities. This book puts forward a theory of instrumental rationality as rationality in action.Less
Human actions unfold over time, in pursuit of ends that are not fully specified in advance. Rational Powers in Action locates these features of the human condition at the heart of a new theory of instrumental rationality. Where many theories of rational agency focus on instantaneous choices between sharply defined outcomes, treating the temporally extended and partially open-ended character of action as an afterthought, this book argues that the deep structure of instrumental rationality can only be understood if we see how it governs the pursuit of long-term, indeterminate ends. These are ends that cannot be realized through a single momentary action, and whose content leaves partly open what counts as realizing the end. For example, one cannot simply write a book through an instantaneous choice to do so; over time, one must execute a variety of actions to realize one’s goal of writing a book, where one may do a better or worse job of attaining that goal, and what counts as succeeding at it is not fully determined in advance. Even to explain the rational governance of much less ambitious actions like making dinner, this book argues that we need to focus on temporal duration and the indeterminacy of ends in intentional action. Theories of moment-by-moment preference maximization, or indeed any understanding of instrumental rationality on the basis of momentary mental items, cannot capture the fundamental structure of our instrumentally rational capacities. This book puts forward a theory of instrumental rationality as rationality in action.
Sergio Tenenbaum
- Published in print:
- 2020
- Published Online:
- October 2020
- ISBN:
- 9780198851486
- eISBN:
- 9780191886096
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780198851486.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General
This chapter considers a major alternative to the extended theory of instrumental rationality (ETR): the view, pioneered by Michael Bratman, that future-directed intentions (FDIs) have a fundamental ...
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This chapter considers a major alternative to the extended theory of instrumental rationality (ETR): the view, pioneered by Michael Bratman, that future-directed intentions (FDIs) have a fundamental role to play in our understanding of the rationality of extended agency. FDIs come in many flavours; they can be specific intentions, plans, policies, or projects. I argue in this chapter that ETR naturally classifies some of these “flavours” as instances of extended actions, and therefore they are structurally identical and subject to the exact same basic instrumental requirements as other instances of extended actions. Once we see this point, it turns out that purported norms and principles governing FDIs are either superfluous or invalid.Less
This chapter considers a major alternative to the extended theory of instrumental rationality (ETR): the view, pioneered by Michael Bratman, that future-directed intentions (FDIs) have a fundamental role to play in our understanding of the rationality of extended agency. FDIs come in many flavours; they can be specific intentions, plans, policies, or projects. I argue in this chapter that ETR naturally classifies some of these “flavours” as instances of extended actions, and therefore they are structurally identical and subject to the exact same basic instrumental requirements as other instances of extended actions. Once we see this point, it turns out that purported norms and principles governing FDIs are either superfluous or invalid.
Sergio Tenenbaum
- Published in print:
- 2020
- Published Online:
- October 2020
- ISBN:
- 9780198851486
- eISBN:
- 9780191886096
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780198851486.003.0008
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General
Chapter 8 concludes the discussion of instrumental virtues started in the previous chapter. It argues that ETR gives us the tools to account for an overlooked instrumental virtue, which I call ...
More
Chapter 8 concludes the discussion of instrumental virtues started in the previous chapter. It argues that ETR gives us the tools to account for an overlooked instrumental virtue, which I call “practical judgment”. An agent exhibits the virtue of practical judgment insofar as she can pursue long-term ends without relying too much on restrictive implementation policies; this virtue turns out to be essential to our understanding of a rational agent who pursues indeterminate ends over time. The account also allows us to understand ordinary phenomena such as procrastination as manifestations of practical judgment’s corresponding vices, such as procrastination.Less
Chapter 8 concludes the discussion of instrumental virtues started in the previous chapter. It argues that ETR gives us the tools to account for an overlooked instrumental virtue, which I call “practical judgment”. An agent exhibits the virtue of practical judgment insofar as she can pursue long-term ends without relying too much on restrictive implementation policies; this virtue turns out to be essential to our understanding of a rational agent who pursues indeterminate ends over time. The account also allows us to understand ordinary phenomena such as procrastination as manifestations of practical judgment’s corresponding vices, such as procrastination.
