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Copyright is at once an engine of free expression and impediment to free expression. Copyright law underwrites much literature, journalism, music, art, and film. Yet copyright often stands in the way of speech that would build upon existing expression to convey new messages and artistic perspectives.

In a seminal 1970 article, Melville Nimmer, the leading copyright and First Amendment scholar of his day, aptly termed the copyright‐free speech conflict a “largely ignored paradox.” Yet today that conflict has come virulently to the fore, and copyright is increasingly chastised as a tool of private censorship.

Why has that happened? What values and practices does the copyright‐free speech conflict put at stake? How should the conflict be resolved?

These are the principal questions this book seeks to answer. This book explores the copyright‐free speech conflict as it cuts across traditional and digital media alike. In so doing, it juxtaposes the dramatic expansion of copyright holders' proprietary control against individuals' newly found ability to digitally cut, paste, edit, remix, and distribute popular sound recordings, movies, TV programs, graphics, and texts the world over. It tests whether, in light of these developments and others, copyright still serves as a vital engine of free expression and assesses how copyright does—and does not—burden speech. Taking First Amendment values as its lodestar, the book argues that copyright should be delimited by how it can best promote robust debate and expressive diversity, and it presents a blueprint for how that can be accomplished.

The central claim of this book is that I is a deictic term, like the other singular personal pronouns You and He/She. This is true of the logical character, inferential role, referential function, expressive use, and communicative role of all and only expressions used to formulate first-personal reference in any language. The first part of the book shows why the standard account of I as a ‘pure indexical’ (‘purism’) should be rejected. Purism requires three mutually supportive doctrines which turn out to be myths: a) that a simple rule is sufficient to give the meaning of I (‘rule theory’); b) that one can use I to express thoughts without having to identify what is being referred to (‘independence’); and c) that as a matter of the meaning of I, any use of the term is logically guaranteed against failure to refer (‘the guarantee’). The second part of the book shows why the radically new account of I should be endorsed as a deictic term. Substitution instances and the behaviour of I in inference reveal that it has an obligatorily deictic logical character and inferential role. I fulfils its referential function in the deictic way, providing determinacy of reference by making an individual referentially salient in the extra-sentential context. The discriminability of the referent of an I-use depends on recognizing the referentially salient individual. This is true of its discriminability both to the reference-maker and to the audience. So I has the expressive use and communicative role of a deictic term. The conclusion of the book directs research towards the next step, showing how the meaning of I may be used to elucidate the thoughts expressed by the term, and from there questions relating to self-knowledge, practical reasoning, belief-acquisition, and belief-ascription.

This book offers a general theory of expressive behavior, including but not limited to such behavior as it occurs in our own species. At the core of the project is the thesis that self-expression is a matter of showing a cognitive, affective, or qualitative state in such a way that the showing is a product of design. Design may be the result of conscious intention, natural selection, artificial selection, or convention. Showing comes in three forms: showing that something is so, showing something in such a way as to make it perceptible, and showing how an object appears or how an experience or affect feels. This elucidation of self-expression as designed showing of something inner sheds light on such issues as the distinction between saying and showing, the nature of speaker meaning, speech acts, the problem of other minds, implicature, the psychology and evolutionary biology of facial expression, idiosyncratic and conventional aspects of expressive behavior, empathy, qualia, and artistic expression, particularly expression in music. The work blends insights from evolutionary game theory, ethology, experimental psychology, neuroscience, pragmatics, and the philosophies of mind and language.

The artworld is a complicated place. It contains acts of artistic creation, interpretation, evaluation, preservation, misunderstanding, and condemnation. The goal of this book is to turn a critical reflective eye upon various aspects of the artworld, and to articulate some of the problems, principles, and norms implicit in the actual practices of artistic creation, interpretation, evaluation, and commodification. Aesthetic theory is treated as a descriptive, rather than normative, enterprise: one that relates to artworld realities as a semantic theory relates to the fragments of natural language it seeks to describe. Sustained efforts are made to illuminate emotional expression, correct interpretation, and objectivity in the context of artworld practice; the relevance of jazz to aesthetic theory; the goals of ontology (artworld and otherwise); the relation(s) between art and language; and the relation(s) between artistic/critical practice and aesthetic theory.

This book discusses novel advances in informatics and statistics in molecular cancer research. Through eight chapters it discusses specific topics in cancer research, talks about how the topics give rise to development of new informatics and statistics tools, and explains how the tools can be applied. The focus of the book is to provide an understanding of key concepts and tools, rather than focusing on technical issues. A main theme is the extensive use of array technologies in modern cancer research — gene expression and exon arrays, SNP and copy number arrays and methylation arrays — to derive quantitative and qualitative statements about cancer, its progression and aetiology, and to understand how these technologies at one hand allow us learn about cancer tissue as a complex system and at the other hand allow us to pinpoint key genes and events as crucial for the development of the disease. Cancer is characterized by genetic and genomic alterations that influence all levels of the cell's machinery and function.

This book examines some recent answers to the questions of how and where to draw the divide between semantics (roughly, features of the literal meaning of linguistic items) and pragmatics (roughly, features emerging from the context within which such items are being used). In particular, the book defends what is commonly known as ‘minimal semantics’ (aka ‘semantic invariantism’ or ‘insensitive semantics’). Minimal semantics, as the name suggests, offers a pretty minimal account of the inter-relation between semantics and pragmatics. Specifically, it holds that while context can affect literal semantic content in the case of genuine (i.e. lexically or syntactically marked) context-sensitive items (e.g. indexicals, demonstratives, tense markers), this is the extent of pragmatic influence within the semantic realm. Minimalism, then, prohibits what are here called ‘free pragmatic effects’: putative effects on semantic content which are not required by any lexico‐syntactic item in a sentence. The book opens with an exploration of the current positions in this debate, introducing the main approaches of minimalism, indexicalism, contextualism, relativism, and occasionalism and offers some initial reasons for being concerned about many of the positions opposing minimalism. The main arguments against minimalism are then explored, looking at the argument that minimal contents are explanatorily irrelevant, the argument that at least some sentences fail to express minimal contents, and the argument that the kinds of word meanings which minimalism requires are either impossible or explanatorily inadequate. The ultimate conclusion of the book is that none of these arguments are compelling and that minimalism in fact provides an attractive and plausible account of the literal meanings of natural language sentences.

This treatment of “party” life traces the many different forms of communal expression that underlie black parties. It reveals new dimensions to the way we think about the cultural and political sphere, both nationally and transnationally. This book draws broadly on examples from popular culture, literature, social movements, and daily life to explore an array of themes ranging from black ideologies, the demise of Black power and Third Worldism as emancipatory projects for liberation, to more contemporary issues and debates on multiculturalism and transnational forms of identity. Capturing what is often overlooked due to an emphasis on nations, on surveys, and on formal institutions, it offers an expansive, integrated framework for the study of not only black politics but of political and social theory the world over.

This book examines how emotions form a bridge between our experience of art and of life. We often find that a particular poem, painting, or piece of music carries an emotional charge; we may also experience emotions towards, or on behalf of, a particular fictional character. These experiences are philosophically puzzling, for their causes seem quite different from the causes of emotion in the rest of our lives. Using many literary, visual and musical examples, this book shows that what these experiences have in common, and what links them to the expression of emotion in non-artistic cases, is the role played by feeling. It surveys various accounts of the nature of fiction, attacks contemporary cognitivist accounts of expression, and offers an uncompromising defence of a controversial view about musical expression: that music expresses the emotions it causes its listeners to feel. Whilst this book engages with the work of contemporary theorists, it remains accessible to readers without philosophical training.

Despite widespread admiration for the First Amendment's protection of speech, this iconic feature of American legal thought has never been adequately theorized. Existing theories of speech proceed on the basis of legal doctrine and judicial decisionmaking, social and political philosophy, or legal and intellectual history. But these are not the disciplines one would most naturally turn to in analyzing speech. This book takes a new and different approach. The book develops a general legal theory of speech on the basis of linguistic theory and the philosophy of language. The opening chapters retrace the main conceptual stages in the expression of meaning: from natural meaning, through symbolism, to signification. The book then focuses on three failed attempts to demarcate the outer, definitional boundaries of “speech” in the constitutional sense: prior restraints, obscenity, and defamation. Later chapters analyze symbolic speech (communication by nonlinguistic means) as the key to developing an intention-based theory of speech. The essential elements of the theory are: Nonnatural Meaning; The Signaling of Intent; The Recognition of Intent; and Establishing a Convention. A final chapter applies these insights to the case law of symbolic speech and resolves some basic confusions in the legal literature. This analysis proceeds by way of an original distinction between actual conduct (in the real world) and the “ideal conduct” described in a statute. The former may be described both as communicative and noncommunicative, while the latter has already been conceptualized as either communicative or noncommunicative. This distinction clears up a major legal quandary: how conduct that counts as communication may nevertheless be regulated or prohibited, without running afoul of the First Amendment's protection of speech.

This book explores the difficulties presented for Gottlob Frege's semantic theory, as well as its modern descendents, by the treatment of defined expressions. The book begins by focusing on the psychological constraints governing Frege's notion of sense, or meaning, and argues that, given these constraints, even the treatment of simple stipulative definitions led Frege to important difficulties. This book suggests ways out of these difficulties that are both philosophically and logically plausible and Fregean in spirit. This discussion is then connected to a number of more familiar topics, such as indexicality and the discussion of concepts in recent theories of mind and language. The latter part of the book, after introducing a simple semantic model of senses as procedures, considers the problems that definitions present for Frege's idea that the sense of an expression should mirror its grammatical structure. The requirement can be satisfied, the book argues, only if defined expressions—and incomplete expressions as well—are assigned senses of their own, rather than treated contextually. The book then explores one way in which these senses might be reified within the procedural model, drawing on ideas from work in the semantics of computer programming languages. With its combination of technical semantics and history of philosophy, the book tackles some of the hardest questions in the philosophy of language.

What's so special about music? We experience it internally, yet at the same time it is highly social. Music engages our cognitive/affective and sensory systems. We use music to communicate with one another—and even with other species—the things that we cannot express through language. Music is both ancient and ever evolving. Without music, our world is missing something essential. This book offers a social and behavioral neuroscientific explanation of why music matters. Its aim is not to provide a grand, unifying theory. Instead, it guides the reader through the relevant scientific evidence that links neuroscience, music, and meaning. It considers how music evolved in humans and birds, how music is experienced in relation to aesthetics and mathematics, the role of memory in musical expression, the role of music in child and social development, and the embodied experience of music through dance. It concludes with reflections on music and well-being. The book is a tour through the current research on the neuroscience of music.