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This chapter explores the constitutional source of ‘inherent powers’. Firstly it analyzes what is meant by express, implied, and emergency powers. Then it examines closely the 1936 Supreme Court case, Curtiss-Wright, that is most often cited for supporting inherent and extra-constitutional powers for the president. The chapter then moves to discussing the use of inherent powers by President Harry Truman in 1952 to seize steel mills to prosecute the war in Korea, and the reliance on inherent powers by President George W. Bush to accomplish a range of war-related actions. Truman's initiative was repudiated by the Supreme Court in the Youngstown case, but the legal and political limits of Bush's actions are still being played out.

This chapter examines the methods available to international courts to refer to the practice of other international judicial bodies, and to interpret and apply their procedure and remedies in similar ways. It begins by outlining the sources of law relating to procedure and remedies, which are principally the constitutive instruments and rules of procedure of international courts. Such instruments are not drafted in identical terms, and often contain lacunae. It examines what international courts do when faced with lacunae in these sources. It then discusses the concept of inherent powers in detail, argues that the exercise of such powers by international courts is justified, and reviews their relevant practice. The possible sources of inherent powers are examined, and it is concluded that they lie in the need of international courts to fulfil their functions, being, principally, the settlement of international disputes and the proper administration of international justice. These functions also serve as limitations on the exercise of inherent powers.

This chapter examines in detail two post-adjudication powers of international courts and tribunals: the power of interpretation and the power of revision. It first explains the post-adjudication role of international courts, which is limited due to the principle of the finality of adjudication. A variety of procedures have been developed, but this chapter focuses on the powers of interpretation and revision. The chapter then analyses the source of these powers, and it is argued that even if these powers are not expressly conferred in an international court's constitutive instruments, they can be exercised as inherent powers. It then turns to a number of issues which are considered by international courts in exercising the powers of interpretation and revision: the jurisdiction of the international court hearing the request; the composition of the international court; the scope of the powers of interpretation and revision; and other conditions. The chapter concludes that these powers are generally exercised in a consistent manner by different international courts.

This chapter examines the power of international courts to grant provisional measures and analyses whether there is an emerging common practice. It first describes the purpose of provisional measures in international adjudication. It then considers the source of the power to grant provisional measures. Many international courts have an express power in their constitutive instruments, but several international courts have exercised the power as an inherent power. The chapter then examines the features common in the exercise of the power by a range of international courts — consideration of the question of jurisdiction over the merits of the dispute; the circumstances relevant to the granting of provisional measures; and the binding quality of provisional measures. Finally, the chapter considers the power of international courts to grant provisional measures ultra petita and proprio motu. It concludes that there is substantial commonality in the practice of international courts concerning provisional measures.

This chapter on the external relations of the European Union (EU) examines the evolutionary development of EU’s constitutional framework for international action. It argues that the role of law has been to establish this framework and to order the institutional space within which external policy is made, rather than defining policy content. The chapter traces the role of law in defining the principles and rules governing the EU’s express and implied competences, exclusive competence, and the evolving practice in managing shared competence including through mixed agreements. Underpinning this, the law has been instrumental in developing conceptions of the unity of the EU legal order and the autonomy of the Union as necessary components of its status as an international actor.