Michael Fishbane
- Published in print:
- 1988
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198266990
- eISBN:
- 9780191600593
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198266995.003.0009
- Subject:
- Religion, Judaism
Provides a detailed consideration of legal exegesis and explication in the pentateuchal legal corpora. It begins with an exposition of these corpora and the conditions that are condition ...
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Provides a detailed consideration of legal exegesis and explication in the pentateuchal legal corpora. It begins with an exposition of these corpora and the conditions that are condition interpretation. The types of exegesis found in these sources are explications and glosses; legal expansions with introductory formulas indicating analogy or similarity (e.g. ‘like’ or ‘also’); without introductory formulas (but involving interpolations and explications in parallel sources); legal restrictions with introductory formulas (e.g. ‘however’). A broad range of types from the civil and religious law are adduced. Also considered are types of legal comparisons, introduced with formulas (e.g. ‘like the rule’ or ‘just as...so’); as well as comparison of cases without formulas (involving the careful comparison of similar rules). Finally, the exegetical recombination of legal rules is considered. Altogether, a vast exegetical enterprise of revision and analysis is documented.Less
Provides a detailed consideration of legal exegesis and explication in the pentateuchal legal corpora. It begins with an exposition of these corpora and the conditions that are condition interpretation. The types of exegesis found in these sources are explications and glosses; legal expansions with introductory formulas indicating analogy or similarity (e.g. ‘like’ or ‘also’); without introductory formulas (but involving interpolations and explications in parallel sources); legal restrictions with introductory formulas (e.g. ‘however’). A broad range of types from the civil and religious law are adduced. Also considered are types of legal comparisons, introduced with formulas (e.g. ‘like the rule’ or ‘just as...so’); as well as comparison of cases without formulas (involving the careful comparison of similar rules). Finally, the exegetical recombination of legal rules is considered. Altogether, a vast exegetical enterprise of revision and analysis is documented.
Nicholas Jardine
- Published in print:
- 2000
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198250395
- eISBN:
- 9780191681288
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198250395.003.0012
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy, Philosophy of Science
This chapter begins by reviewing the question-oriented account of historical understanding of explaining scenes of inquiry, local reality, and interpretation. It follows with an argument of an ...
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This chapter begins by reviewing the question-oriented account of historical understanding of explaining scenes of inquiry, local reality, and interpretation. It follows with an argument of an account that avoids the most blatant forms of hermeneutic circularity, unlike related question-oriented accounts. It then discusses the main topic, the relation between the explication of historical understanding and the craft of historical interpretation. In particular, it examines the validity of two additional criteria of adequacy of interpretation: faithfulness to authorial intention and imputation of consistency. It argues that the theoretical account pointed out in this chapter entails definite stances on these issues, and that these stances are in good accord with common sense and sound historical practice. The chapter concludes with a reflection on the prospects for extension of this account from the history of philosophy and the sciences to the history of writings in general.Less
This chapter begins by reviewing the question-oriented account of historical understanding of explaining scenes of inquiry, local reality, and interpretation. It follows with an argument of an account that avoids the most blatant forms of hermeneutic circularity, unlike related question-oriented accounts. It then discusses the main topic, the relation between the explication of historical understanding and the craft of historical interpretation. In particular, it examines the validity of two additional criteria of adequacy of interpretation: faithfulness to authorial intention and imputation of consistency. It argues that the theoretical account pointed out in this chapter entails definite stances on these issues, and that these stances are in good accord with common sense and sound historical practice. The chapter concludes with a reflection on the prospects for extension of this account from the history of philosophy and the sciences to the history of writings in general.
Mary Dunn
- Published in print:
- 2015
- Published Online:
- May 2016
- ISBN:
- 9780823267217
- eISBN:
- 9780823272327
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Fordham University Press
- DOI:
- 10.5422/fordham/9780823267217.003.0002
- Subject:
- Religion, History of Christianity
Chapter 1 gives an explication of the abandonment—a description of the abandonment, in other words, in terms that can be plausibly ascribed to Marie herself. Over time, Marie’s doubts about whether ...
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Chapter 1 gives an explication of the abandonment—a description of the abandonment, in other words, in terms that can be plausibly ascribed to Marie herself. Over time, Marie’s doubts about whether the abandonment had been divinely inspired give way to a certitude that it had, such that Marie comes to represent the abandonment unambiguously in the familiar idiom of Christian sacrifice performed in submission to the will of God. This chapter argues, taking its cue from the work of Paul Ricoeur, that within the context of the Relation of 1654 and Marie’s later letters to Claude, the abandonment takes its place as an inevitable and necessary episode in a story of spiritual progress, healing the rift in a personal narrative that threatens to fracture under the twin pressures of mysticism and maternity.Less
Chapter 1 gives an explication of the abandonment—a description of the abandonment, in other words, in terms that can be plausibly ascribed to Marie herself. Over time, Marie’s doubts about whether the abandonment had been divinely inspired give way to a certitude that it had, such that Marie comes to represent the abandonment unambiguously in the familiar idiom of Christian sacrifice performed in submission to the will of God. This chapter argues, taking its cue from the work of Paul Ricoeur, that within the context of the Relation of 1654 and Marie’s later letters to Claude, the abandonment takes its place as an inevitable and necessary episode in a story of spiritual progress, healing the rift in a personal narrative that threatens to fracture under the twin pressures of mysticism and maternity.
Edward Craig
- Published in print:
- 1999
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198238799
- eISBN:
- 9780191597237
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198238797.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
Raises two problems for the standard approach to the concept of knowledge, which consists in attempting to provide an analysis in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions. First, it is difficult ...
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Raises two problems for the standard approach to the concept of knowledge, which consists in attempting to provide an analysis in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions. First, it is difficult to make intuitive ‘extensional’ ascriptions of knowledge mesh with ‘intensional’ intuitions about what makes for knowledge. Second, the approach gives no answer as to why the concept of knowledge enjoys such widespread use and to which needs of human life and thought it answers. The suggested alternative approach is the naturalistic one of practical explication, i.e. to start with a reasoned hypothesis about the answer to this last question by considering the state of nature, and then to ask what conditions would govern the application of such a concept.Less
Raises two problems for the standard approach to the concept of knowledge, which consists in attempting to provide an analysis in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions. First, it is difficult to make intuitive ‘extensional’ ascriptions of knowledge mesh with ‘intensional’ intuitions about what makes for knowledge. Second, the approach gives no answer as to why the concept of knowledge enjoys such widespread use and to which needs of human life and thought it answers. The suggested alternative approach is the naturalistic one of practical explication, i.e. to start with a reasoned hypothesis about the answer to this last question by considering the state of nature, and then to ask what conditions would govern the application of such a concept.
Edward Craig
- Published in print:
- 1999
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198238799
- eISBN:
- 9780191597237
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198238797.003.0006
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
The practical explication is employed to explain why accidental fulfilment of the conditions for knowledge leads us to withhold the ascription of it, and what is meant by accidental in this context. ...
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The practical explication is employed to explain why accidental fulfilment of the conditions for knowledge leads us to withhold the ascription of it, and what is meant by accidental in this context. The inquirer wants her informant to have some detectable property, X, possession of which correlates well with being right about p, and for this correlation to be law‐like, and for the continuation of the correlation in any given instance to be non‐accidental. At this point, a dilemma arises: either X must entail that S is right about p (too strong), or X must give a high probability of being right as to p (but then it is possible for X to be present but for S to be wrong on p). This property of p, inherent in the explicated concept of knowledge, thus mirrors a feature which, to judge by the discussion of the Gettier problem, the analysed concept has too.Less
The practical explication is employed to explain why accidental fulfilment of the conditions for knowledge leads us to withhold the ascription of it, and what is meant by accidental in this context. The inquirer wants her informant to have some detectable property, X, possession of which correlates well with being right about p, and for this correlation to be law‐like, and for the continuation of the correlation in any given instance to be non‐accidental. At this point, a dilemma arises: either X must entail that S is right about p (too strong), or X must give a high probability of being right as to p (but then it is possible for X to be present but for S to be wrong on p). This property of p, inherent in the explicated concept of knowledge, thus mirrors a feature which, to judge by the discussion of the Gettier problem, the analysed concept has too.
Kitcher Philip
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- January 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780199899555
- eISBN:
- 9780199980154
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199899555.003.0009
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General
This chapter shows how Carnap's conception of the proper goals and methods of philosophy can be used to support a pragmatist critique of some current tendencies in the philosophy of science. Carnap ...
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This chapter shows how Carnap's conception of the proper goals and methods of philosophy can be used to support a pragmatist critique of some current tendencies in the philosophy of science. Carnap takes an important project of scientific philosophy to be the construction of systems of exact concepts that can better serve the purposes toward which older, vaguer, more confused forms of language have been directed. The author believes that Carnap's advice is worth taking seriously both in contemporary general philosophy of science and in current philosophy of biology. He uses Carnap's ideas about explication as a perspective from which to examine some discussions in which philosophers of biology have recently engaged.Less
This chapter shows how Carnap's conception of the proper goals and methods of philosophy can be used to support a pragmatist critique of some current tendencies in the philosophy of science. Carnap takes an important project of scientific philosophy to be the construction of systems of exact concepts that can better serve the purposes toward which older, vaguer, more confused forms of language have been directed. The author believes that Carnap's advice is worth taking seriously both in contemporary general philosophy of science and in current philosophy of biology. He uses Carnap's ideas about explication as a perspective from which to examine some discussions in which philosophers of biology have recently engaged.
Roger W. Shuy
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- September 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199926961
- eISBN:
- 9780199980505
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199926961.003.0011
- Subject:
- Linguistics, Sociolinguistics / Anthropological Linguistics
This chapter addresses a case of sexual misconduct that occurred in the workplace. This case involved Candie and her primary care physician, Dr. Mark Berger, who apparently asked for sexual favors ...
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This chapter addresses a case of sexual misconduct that occurred in the workplace. This case involved Candie and her primary care physician, Dr. Mark Berger, who apparently asked for sexual favors after Candie asked him to refer her to a neurologist that he knew. Due to the small amount of data available—Candie presented two recordings of her thirty-minute meetings with Dr. Berger—the author used close reading, or explication de text, in order to analyze these conversations. These conversations demonstrate classic examples of verbal dueling, which usually occurs between two people who have separate agendas, and the safe haven conversational strategy, where a person returns to his/her safe haven topics whenever it becomes obvious that he/she is unable to get the other person to agree to his/her agenda.Less
This chapter addresses a case of sexual misconduct that occurred in the workplace. This case involved Candie and her primary care physician, Dr. Mark Berger, who apparently asked for sexual favors after Candie asked him to refer her to a neurologist that he knew. Due to the small amount of data available—Candie presented two recordings of her thirty-minute meetings with Dr. Berger—the author used close reading, or explication de text, in order to analyze these conversations. These conversations demonstrate classic examples of verbal dueling, which usually occurs between two people who have separate agendas, and the safe haven conversational strategy, where a person returns to his/her safe haven topics whenever it becomes obvious that he/she is unable to get the other person to agree to his/her agenda.
Giovanni Boniolo, Rossella Faraldo, and Antonio Saggion
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- September 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199574131
- eISBN:
- 9780191728921
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199574131.003.0024
- Subject:
- Mathematics, Logic / Computer Science / Mathematical Philosophy
This chapter proposes an empirical explication of the notion of ‘causation’, which the chapter calls a generalized explication of ‘causation’ (GEC), based on the numerical balance between ...
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This chapter proposes an empirical explication of the notion of ‘causation’, which the chapter calls a generalized explication of ‘causation’ (GEC), based on the numerical balance between instantiations of extensive quantities. In this way, the chapter shows that both the conserved and the non‐conserved quantities have a role. It follows that the Salmon–Dowe approach should be considered valid only in particular cases.Less
This chapter proposes an empirical explication of the notion of ‘causation’, which the chapter calls a generalized explication of ‘causation’ (GEC), based on the numerical balance between instantiations of extensive quantities. In this way, the chapter shows that both the conserved and the non‐conserved quantities have a role. It follows that the Salmon–Dowe approach should be considered valid only in particular cases.
Miguel de Beistegui
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- September 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780748638307
- eISBN:
- 9780748671816
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Edinburgh University Press
- DOI:
- 10.3366/edinburgh/9780748638307.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Political Philosophy
This chapter addresses the question of how Gilles Deleuze adopts the standpoint of immanence. Deleuze agrees with Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel's own praise of Baruch Spinoza, and the privileged ...
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This chapter addresses the question of how Gilles Deleuze adopts the standpoint of immanence. Deleuze agrees with Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel's own praise of Baruch Spinoza, and the privileged position which he occupies in the history of philosophy. He also precisely considers Spinoza as a way out of Hegel and the false movement of dialectic. His concern with immanence is closely wrapped up with his reading of Spinoza. The connection between immanence and emanation is demonstrated. Thought and Extension both express the essence of substance, but determine that essence into different forms. Immanence represents the unity of complication and explication, of inherence and implication. It is noted that Deleuze's two doctoral theses, namely Difference and Repetition and Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza, complement one another. In Difference and Repetition, expression becomes differenciation.Less
This chapter addresses the question of how Gilles Deleuze adopts the standpoint of immanence. Deleuze agrees with Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel's own praise of Baruch Spinoza, and the privileged position which he occupies in the history of philosophy. He also precisely considers Spinoza as a way out of Hegel and the false movement of dialectic. His concern with immanence is closely wrapped up with his reading of Spinoza. The connection between immanence and emanation is demonstrated. Thought and Extension both express the essence of substance, but determine that essence into different forms. Immanence represents the unity of complication and explication, of inherence and implication. It is noted that Deleuze's two doctoral theses, namely Difference and Repetition and Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza, complement one another. In Difference and Repetition, expression becomes differenciation.
Jan Sprenger and Stephan Hartmann
- Published in print:
- 2019
- Published Online:
- October 2019
- ISBN:
- 9780199672110
- eISBN:
- 9780191881671
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780199672110.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Science
“Bayesian Philosophy of Science” addresses classical topics in philosophy of science, using a single key concept—degrees of beliefs—in order to explain and to elucidate manifold aspects of scientific ...
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“Bayesian Philosophy of Science” addresses classical topics in philosophy of science, using a single key concept—degrees of beliefs—in order to explain and to elucidate manifold aspects of scientific reasoning. The basic idea is that the value of convincing evidence, good explanations, intertheoretic reduction, and so on, can all be captured by the effect it has on our degrees of belief. This idea is elaborated as a cycle of variations about the theme of representing rational degrees of belief by means of subjective probabilities, and changing them by a particular rule (Bayesian Conditionalization). Partly, the book is committed to the Carnapian tradition of explicating essential concepts in scientific reasoning using Bayesian models (e.g., degree of confirmation, causal strength, explanatory power). Partly, it develops new solutions to old problems such as learning conditional evidence and updating on old evidence, and it models important argument schemes in science such as the No Alternatives Argument, the No Miracles Argument or Inference to the Best Explanation. Finally, it is explained how Bayesian inference in scientific applications—above all, statistics—can be squared with the demands of practitioners and how a subjective school of inference can make claims to scientific objectivity. The book integrates conceptual analysis, formal models, simulations, case studies and empirical findings in an attempt to lead the way for 21th century philosophy of science.Less
“Bayesian Philosophy of Science” addresses classical topics in philosophy of science, using a single key concept—degrees of beliefs—in order to explain and to elucidate manifold aspects of scientific reasoning. The basic idea is that the value of convincing evidence, good explanations, intertheoretic reduction, and so on, can all be captured by the effect it has on our degrees of belief. This idea is elaborated as a cycle of variations about the theme of representing rational degrees of belief by means of subjective probabilities, and changing them by a particular rule (Bayesian Conditionalization). Partly, the book is committed to the Carnapian tradition of explicating essential concepts in scientific reasoning using Bayesian models (e.g., degree of confirmation, causal strength, explanatory power). Partly, it develops new solutions to old problems such as learning conditional evidence and updating on old evidence, and it models important argument schemes in science such as the No Alternatives Argument, the No Miracles Argument or Inference to the Best Explanation. Finally, it is explained how Bayesian inference in scientific applications—above all, statistics—can be squared with the demands of practitioners and how a subjective school of inference can make claims to scientific objectivity. The book integrates conceptual analysis, formal models, simulations, case studies and empirical findings in an attempt to lead the way for 21th century philosophy of science.
Paul Lauter
- Published in print:
- 1991
- Published Online:
- November 2020
- ISBN:
- 9780195055931
- eISBN:
- 9780197560228
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780195055931.003.0008
- Subject:
- Education, Philosophy and Theory of Education
An image has long haunted the study of American culture. It limits our thought, shapes our values. We speak of the “mainstream,” and we imply by that term ...
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An image has long haunted the study of American culture. It limits our thought, shapes our values. We speak of the “mainstream,” and we imply by that term the existence of other work, minor rills and branches. In prose, the writing of men like Franklin, Emerson, Thoreau, Hawthorne, Melville, James, Eliot, Hemingway, Faulkner, Bellow—to name some of the central figures—constituted the “mainstream.” Others—writers of color, most women writers, “regional” or “ethnic” male and female authors—might, we said, be assimilated into the mainstream, though probably they would continue to constitute tributaries, interesting and often sparkling, but finally of less importance. They would, we tacitly assumed, be judged by the standards and aesthetic categories we had developed for the canonical writers. At best, we acknowledged that including in the canon writers like Wharton, Cather, Chopin, and Ellison might change somewhat our definition of the mainstream, but the intellectual model imposed by that mainstream image, this Great River theory of American letters, has persisted even among mildly revisionist critics. Such critics have continued to focus on a severely limited canon of “major” writers based on historical and aesthetic categories from this slightly augmented mainstream. The problem we face is that the model itself is fundamentally misleading. The United States is a heterogeneous society whose cultures, while they overlap in significant respects, also differ in critical ways. A normative model presents those variations from the mainstream as abnormal, deviant, lesser, perhaps ultimately unimportant. That kind of standard is no more helpful in the study of culture than is a model, in the study of gender differences, in which the male is considered the norm, or than are paradigms, in the study of minority or ethnic social organization and behavior based on Anglo-American society. What we need, rather, is to pose a comparativist model for the study of American literature. It is true that few branches of academe in the United States have been so self-consciously indifferent to comparative study as has been the field we call “American literature.”
Less
An image has long haunted the study of American culture. It limits our thought, shapes our values. We speak of the “mainstream,” and we imply by that term the existence of other work, minor rills and branches. In prose, the writing of men like Franklin, Emerson, Thoreau, Hawthorne, Melville, James, Eliot, Hemingway, Faulkner, Bellow—to name some of the central figures—constituted the “mainstream.” Others—writers of color, most women writers, “regional” or “ethnic” male and female authors—might, we said, be assimilated into the mainstream, though probably they would continue to constitute tributaries, interesting and often sparkling, but finally of less importance. They would, we tacitly assumed, be judged by the standards and aesthetic categories we had developed for the canonical writers. At best, we acknowledged that including in the canon writers like Wharton, Cather, Chopin, and Ellison might change somewhat our definition of the mainstream, but the intellectual model imposed by that mainstream image, this Great River theory of American letters, has persisted even among mildly revisionist critics. Such critics have continued to focus on a severely limited canon of “major” writers based on historical and aesthetic categories from this slightly augmented mainstream. The problem we face is that the model itself is fundamentally misleading. The United States is a heterogeneous society whose cultures, while they overlap in significant respects, also differ in critical ways. A normative model presents those variations from the mainstream as abnormal, deviant, lesser, perhaps ultimately unimportant. That kind of standard is no more helpful in the study of culture than is a model, in the study of gender differences, in which the male is considered the norm, or than are paradigms, in the study of minority or ethnic social organization and behavior based on Anglo-American society. What we need, rather, is to pose a comparativist model for the study of American literature. It is true that few branches of academe in the United States have been so self-consciously indifferent to comparative study as has been the field we call “American literature.”
John Gardner
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- January 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780199695553
- eISBN:
- 9780191741296
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199695553.003.0003
- Subject:
- Law, Philosophy of Law
this chapter is concerned with the classification of laws according to how they are made. This is already a philosophically partisan enterprise. Some laws, say some people, are not made at all. They ...
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this chapter is concerned with the classification of laws according to how they are made. This is already a philosophically partisan enterprise. Some laws, say some people, are not made at all. They are not artefacts. They have no agent(s) who serve as their originator or creator or author. By demystifying some of the intriguing ways in which laws are made, the chapter hopes to remove some of the appeal of this view. The first three sections consider, respectively, legislated law, customary law, and case law. In the fourth section the chapter discusses common law: How does it fit in? The final section concludes that all the types of law discussed here are types of positive law. There is, it suggests, no other type of law but positive law, i.e. law that is made.Less
this chapter is concerned with the classification of laws according to how they are made. This is already a philosophically partisan enterprise. Some laws, say some people, are not made at all. They are not artefacts. They have no agent(s) who serve as their originator or creator or author. By demystifying some of the intriguing ways in which laws are made, the chapter hopes to remove some of the appeal of this view. The first three sections consider, respectively, legislated law, customary law, and case law. In the fourth section the chapter discusses common law: How does it fit in? The final section concludes that all the types of law discussed here are types of positive law. There is, it suggests, no other type of law but positive law, i.e. law that is made.
Marcus Klamert
- Published in print:
- 2014
- Published Online:
- April 2014
- ISBN:
- 9780199683123
- eISBN:
- 9780191763182
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199683123.003.0015
- Subject:
- Law, EU Law, Constitutional and Administrative Law
The Introduction explains the methodology used in the book, which involves the explication of unclear or inconsistent legal concepts. It also lays out the structure of the book, contrasting it with ...
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The Introduction explains the methodology used in the book, which involves the explication of unclear or inconsistent legal concepts. It also lays out the structure of the book, contrasting it with the approach common to most of the existent literature on the subject. Thus, a part on Cohesion deals with the role of loyalty as the rationale for the intervention of Union law in national law by instruments such as direct and indirect effect. A part on Cooperation is concerned with the delimitation of powers between the EU institutions and the Member States in matters such as supporting competences and mixed agreements. A final part on Construction discusses the role of loyalty in resolving conflicts within the EU and in relation to the Member States, the legal nature of loyalty, and how it relates to effectiveness and effet utile.Less
The Introduction explains the methodology used in the book, which involves the explication of unclear or inconsistent legal concepts. It also lays out the structure of the book, contrasting it with the approach common to most of the existent literature on the subject. Thus, a part on Cohesion deals with the role of loyalty as the rationale for the intervention of Union law in national law by instruments such as direct and indirect effect. A part on Cooperation is concerned with the delimitation of powers between the EU institutions and the Member States in matters such as supporting competences and mixed agreements. A final part on Construction discusses the role of loyalty in resolving conflicts within the EU and in relation to the Member States, the legal nature of loyalty, and how it relates to effectiveness and effet utile.
Laura Richardson
- Published in print:
- 2017
- Published Online:
- January 2018
- ISBN:
- 9780813054421
- eISBN:
- 9780813053165
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- University Press of Florida
- DOI:
- 10.5744/florida/9780813054421.003.0008
- Subject:
- Literature, 20th-century Literature and Modernism
Contrary to a long history of scholarship that considers Sitwell’s personality a major detriment to her historical and contemporary reception, this chapter understands Sitwell’s self-marketing ...
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Contrary to a long history of scholarship that considers Sitwell’s personality a major detriment to her historical and contemporary reception, this chapter understands Sitwell’s self-marketing strategy as genius critical self-doubling. To this end, Sitwell’s most important genre is criticism, in which she displays a penchant for often unattributed self-reference and self-explication. Sitwell doubles herself in her criticism, forging an arbitrary division between Sitwell the empirical critic and Sitwell the poet-philosopher; the empirical critic functions as a stand-in for the critico-literary institution, providing an “external” imprimatur for the poet-philosopher. Examining Noël Coward’s creation of Sitwell’s parodic poet-doppelgänger, Hernia Whittlebot, thus allows an understanding of Sitwell’s own self-doubling as integral to her self-marketing genius—Whittlebot’s relationship to Sitwell reenacts Sitwell’s approach to her own work. More broadly, these relations are a microcosm for the institution of modernist literary criticism that developed conterminously with the maturation and solidification of Sitwell’s strategies of authorship.Less
Contrary to a long history of scholarship that considers Sitwell’s personality a major detriment to her historical and contemporary reception, this chapter understands Sitwell’s self-marketing strategy as genius critical self-doubling. To this end, Sitwell’s most important genre is criticism, in which she displays a penchant for often unattributed self-reference and self-explication. Sitwell doubles herself in her criticism, forging an arbitrary division between Sitwell the empirical critic and Sitwell the poet-philosopher; the empirical critic functions as a stand-in for the critico-literary institution, providing an “external” imprimatur for the poet-philosopher. Examining Noël Coward’s creation of Sitwell’s parodic poet-doppelgänger, Hernia Whittlebot, thus allows an understanding of Sitwell’s own self-doubling as integral to her self-marketing genius—Whittlebot’s relationship to Sitwell reenacts Sitwell’s approach to her own work. More broadly, these relations are a microcosm for the institution of modernist literary criticism that developed conterminously with the maturation and solidification of Sitwell’s strategies of authorship.
Ronald Bruzina
- Published in print:
- 2004
- Published Online:
- October 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780300092097
- eISBN:
- 9780300130157
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Yale University Press
- DOI:
- 10.12987/yale/9780300092097.003.0006
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
This chapter discusses Husserl's final years and how, although he no longer belongs to the University of Freiburg's roster of its academic personnel, he is now writing for an audience beyond the ...
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This chapter discusses Husserl's final years and how, although he no longer belongs to the University of Freiburg's roster of its academic personnel, he is now writing for an audience beyond the increasingly bleak and twisted world of Freiburg and Germany. He also has Fink to speak with about his work and the ideas that are still alive in it. Yet that they share a common frame in the program of phenomenology does not mean that they have a common assessment of what is to come next in that program's development. To Husserl the fundamentals of phenomenology compose a groundwork of ever-holding, ever-renewable insightfulness in rigorous fulfillment of the ideal of rational explication. For Fink, however, those same fundamentals are themselves deeply problematic.Less
This chapter discusses Husserl's final years and how, although he no longer belongs to the University of Freiburg's roster of its academic personnel, he is now writing for an audience beyond the increasingly bleak and twisted world of Freiburg and Germany. He also has Fink to speak with about his work and the ideas that are still alive in it. Yet that they share a common frame in the program of phenomenology does not mean that they have a common assessment of what is to come next in that program's development. To Husserl the fundamentals of phenomenology compose a groundwork of ever-holding, ever-renewable insightfulness in rigorous fulfillment of the ideal of rational explication. For Fink, however, those same fundamentals are themselves deeply problematic.
Sean Morris
- Published in print:
- 2020
- Published Online:
- June 2020
- ISBN:
- 9780190641221
- eISBN:
- 9780190641245
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780190641221.003.0016
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics, General
This chapter examines the development of and motives for Quine’s particular form of mathematical structuralism. It will argue that Quine, unlike many contemporary mathematical structuralists, does ...
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This chapter examines the development of and motives for Quine’s particular form of mathematical structuralism. It will argue that Quine, unlike many contemporary mathematical structuralists, does not appeal to structuralism as a way of accounting for what the numbers really are in any robust metaphysical sense. Instead, his structuralism is deeply rooted in an earlier structuralist tradition found in scientific philosophers such as Russell and Carnap, which emphasized structuralism as a critique of more metaphysical approaches to philosophy. On this view, a philosophy of mathematics answers, in a sense, only to mathematics itself. An account of mathematical objects requires only that the entities—whatever they are—serving as the mathematical objects satisfy the relevant postulates and theorems. Here we also see how Quine’s early work in the foundations of mathematics leads in a natural way to the more general naturalism of his later philosophy.Less
This chapter examines the development of and motives for Quine’s particular form of mathematical structuralism. It will argue that Quine, unlike many contemporary mathematical structuralists, does not appeal to structuralism as a way of accounting for what the numbers really are in any robust metaphysical sense. Instead, his structuralism is deeply rooted in an earlier structuralist tradition found in scientific philosophers such as Russell and Carnap, which emphasized structuralism as a critique of more metaphysical approaches to philosophy. On this view, a philosophy of mathematics answers, in a sense, only to mathematics itself. An account of mathematical objects requires only that the entities—whatever they are—serving as the mathematical objects satisfy the relevant postulates and theorems. Here we also see how Quine’s early work in the foundations of mathematics leads in a natural way to the more general naturalism of his later philosophy.
Rachel Sagner Buurma and Laura Heffernan
- Published in print:
- 2020
- Published Online:
- June 2020
- ISBN:
- 9780198749967
- eISBN:
- 9780191890871
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780198749967.003.0004
- Subject:
- Literature, 20th-century Literature and Modernism, Criticism/Theory
Why has it been so hard to retain an accurate representation of the varied nature of critical practice through each generation? This chapter argues that Joseph Kuntz and George Arms’s 1950 Poetry ...
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Why has it been so hard to retain an accurate representation of the varied nature of critical practice through each generation? This chapter argues that Joseph Kuntz and George Arms’s 1950 Poetry Explication may provide an answer: it suggests that formalist close reading became dominant by rendering explications—rather than poems—as autonomous. By excerpting explications from their original print contexts, Kuntz and Arms’s bibliographic index excises the immediate considerations—historical, biographical, bibliographical—that extend from a critic’s turn to a poem. Shorn of such contexts, the many and varied ‘explications’ seem to approach an asymptotic ideal of what close reading is and does. Revealing that formalism’s rise required a curation of criticism, the index invites us to think about how scholarly tools that usher readers in and out of scholarly textual worlds had a role to play in the making of ‘close reading’.Less
Why has it been so hard to retain an accurate representation of the varied nature of critical practice through each generation? This chapter argues that Joseph Kuntz and George Arms’s 1950 Poetry Explication may provide an answer: it suggests that formalist close reading became dominant by rendering explications—rather than poems—as autonomous. By excerpting explications from their original print contexts, Kuntz and Arms’s bibliographic index excises the immediate considerations—historical, biographical, bibliographical—that extend from a critic’s turn to a poem. Shorn of such contexts, the many and varied ‘explications’ seem to approach an asymptotic ideal of what close reading is and does. Revealing that formalism’s rise required a curation of criticism, the index invites us to think about how scholarly tools that usher readers in and out of scholarly textual worlds had a role to play in the making of ‘close reading’.
Carol Priestley
- Published in print:
- 2017
- Published Online:
- June 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780198736721
- eISBN:
- 9780191800382
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780198736721.003.0006
- Subject:
- Linguistics, Semantics and Pragmatics, Psycholinguistics / Neurolinguistics / Cognitive Linguistics
This chapter discusses body part nouns, a part of language that is central to human life, and the polysemy that arises in connection with them. Examples from everyday speech and narrative in various ...
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This chapter discusses body part nouns, a part of language that is central to human life, and the polysemy that arises in connection with them. Examples from everyday speech and narrative in various contexts are examined in a Papuan language called Koromu and semantic characteristics of body part nouns in other studies are also considered. Semantic templates are developed for nouns that represent highly visible body parts: for example, wapi ‘hands/arms’, ehi ‘feet/legs’, and their related parts. Culture-specific explications are expressed in a natural metalanguage that can be translated into Koromu to avoid the cultural bias inherent in using other languages and to reveal both distinctive semantic components and similarities to cross-linguistic examples.Less
This chapter discusses body part nouns, a part of language that is central to human life, and the polysemy that arises in connection with them. Examples from everyday speech and narrative in various contexts are examined in a Papuan language called Koromu and semantic characteristics of body part nouns in other studies are also considered. Semantic templates are developed for nouns that represent highly visible body parts: for example, wapi ‘hands/arms’, ehi ‘feet/legs’, and their related parts. Culture-specific explications are expressed in a natural metalanguage that can be translated into Koromu to avoid the cultural bias inherent in using other languages and to reveal both distinctive semantic components and similarities to cross-linguistic examples.
Edouard Machery
- Published in print:
- 2017
- Published Online:
- August 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780198807520
- eISBN:
- 9780191845444
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780198807520.003.0008
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
Chapter 7 proposes a new, naturalistic characterization of conceptual analysis, defends its philosophical significance, and shows that usual concerns with conceptual analysis do not apply to this ...
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Chapter 7 proposes a new, naturalistic characterization of conceptual analysis, defends its philosophical significance, and shows that usual concerns with conceptual analysis do not apply to this revamped version. So understood, conceptual analysis encompasses both a descriptive project and a normative project, similar to explication or to conceptual engineering. Chapter 7 also defends the philosophical significance of this novel form of conceptual analysis and its continuity with the role of conceptual analysis in the philosophical tradition. Furthermore, naturalized conceptual analysis often requires empirical tools to be pursued successfully, and an experimental method of cases 2.0 should often replace the traditional use of cases in philosophy.Less
Chapter 7 proposes a new, naturalistic characterization of conceptual analysis, defends its philosophical significance, and shows that usual concerns with conceptual analysis do not apply to this revamped version. So understood, conceptual analysis encompasses both a descriptive project and a normative project, similar to explication or to conceptual engineering. Chapter 7 also defends the philosophical significance of this novel form of conceptual analysis and its continuity with the role of conceptual analysis in the philosophical tradition. Furthermore, naturalized conceptual analysis often requires empirical tools to be pursued successfully, and an experimental method of cases 2.0 should often replace the traditional use of cases in philosophy.
Joan Weiner
- Published in print:
- 2020
- Published Online:
- December 2020
- ISBN:
- 9780198865476
- eISBN:
- 9780191897832
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780198865476.003.0007
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
This chapter is largely an examination of the significance one of Frege’s views has for contemporary thought. The view, which was labeled the “apparently absurd view” in Chapter 6, is that (1) it is ...
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This chapter is largely an examination of the significance one of Frege’s views has for contemporary thought. The view, which was labeled the “apparently absurd view” in Chapter 6, is that (1) it is appropriate to give definitions of terms already in use that are, in part, stipulative and (2) it is appropriate to take sentences in which such terms appear as, already (pre-definition), having truth-values. It is argued that, although this view may seem absurd, it is perfectly in line with some scientific practices, in particular unexceptionable practices routinely used in epidemiology. If we follow Hilary Putnam’s view about the significance of our deference to experts, we should accept Frege’s apparently absurd view as not absurd in the least. Moreover, what we see on examination of this view are reasons for rejecting a number of contemporary views about vague language, including those of Field, Fine, Fodor and Lepore, and Williamson.Less
This chapter is largely an examination of the significance one of Frege’s views has for contemporary thought. The view, which was labeled the “apparently absurd view” in Chapter 6, is that (1) it is appropriate to give definitions of terms already in use that are, in part, stipulative and (2) it is appropriate to take sentences in which such terms appear as, already (pre-definition), having truth-values. It is argued that, although this view may seem absurd, it is perfectly in line with some scientific practices, in particular unexceptionable practices routinely used in epidemiology. If we follow Hilary Putnam’s view about the significance of our deference to experts, we should accept Frege’s apparently absurd view as not absurd in the least. Moreover, what we see on examination of this view are reasons for rejecting a number of contemporary views about vague language, including those of Field, Fine, Fodor and Lepore, and Williamson.
