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Phenomenal Concepts and the Explanatory Gap

David J. Chalmers

in Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge: New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism

Published in print:
2007
Published Online:
January 2007
ISBN:
9780195171655
eISBN:
9780199871339
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195171655.003.0009
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

Philosophers have reacted in different ways to the apparent explanatory gap between physical processes and consciousness. Some deny that any explanatory gap exists at all. Some hold that there is an ... More


Beyond Reduction: Philosophy of Mind and Post-Reductionist Philosophy of Science

Steven Horst

Published in print:
2007
Published Online:
September 2007
ISBN:
9780195317114
eISBN:
9780199871520
Item type:
book
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195317114.001.0001
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

Contemporary debates in philosophy of mind‐between reductionists, dualists, nonreductive materialists, and eliminativists‐have been based upon the perception that mental phenomena like consciousness ... More


Phenomenal Concepts and the Materialist Constraint

Joseph Levine

in Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge: New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism

Published in print:
2007
Published Online:
January 2007
ISBN:
9780195171655
eISBN:
9780199871339
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195171655.003.0008
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

This chapter raises a problem for the phenomenal concept strategy. The problem is framed partly in terms of the explanatory gap, which is roughly the claim that the existence or nature of phenomenal ... More


The Explanatory Gap and Dualism Reconsidered

Steven Horst

in Beyond Reduction: Philosophy of Mind and Post-Reductionist Philosophy of Science

Published in print:
2007
Published Online:
September 2007
ISBN:
9780195317114
eISBN:
9780199871520
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195317114.003.0006
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

This chapter examines the implications of post‐reductionist philosophy of science for dualism and the status of the explanatory gaps. The primary argument for dualism is based on a Negative ... More


Phenomenal Concepts and the Explanatory Gap

David J. Chalmers

in The Character of Consciousness

Published in print:
2010
Published Online:
January 2011
ISBN:
9780195311105
eISBN:
9780199870851
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195311105.003.0010
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

Confronted with the apparent explanatory gap between physical processes and consciousness, philosophers have reacted in many different ways. Some deny that any explanatory gap exists at all. Some ... More


Cosmic Hermeneutics vs. Emergence: The Challenge of the Explanatory Gap

Tim Crane

in Emergence in Mind

Published in print:
2010
Published Online:
May 2010
ISBN:
9780199583621
eISBN:
9780191723483
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199583621.003.0002
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Philosophy of Science

This chapter defends Terence Horgan's claim that any genuinely physicalist position must distinguish itself from (what has been traditionally known as) emergentism. It argues that physicalism is ... More


Reduction and Supervenience: The Contemporary Problematic in Philosophy of Mind

Steven Horst

in Beyond Reduction: Philosophy of Mind and Post-Reductionist Philosophy of Science

Published in print:
2007
Published Online:
September 2007
ISBN:
9780195317114
eISBN:
9780199871520
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195317114.003.0003
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

This chapter outlines the contemporary conversation in philosophy of mind. Reductionists claim the mind can or must be reducible to natural phenomena. Eliminativists claim the mind cannot be so ... More


Self‐Representationalism and the Reduction of Consciousness

Uriah Kriegel

in Subjective Consciousness: A Self-Representational Theory

Published in print:
2009
Published Online:
September 2009
ISBN:
9780199570355
eISBN:
9780191721625
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199570355.003.0008
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Philosophy of Science

This chapter argues that the self‐representational theory accounts for the sense that there is an explanatory gap between physical facts and the facts of consciousness. Kriegel suggests that that ... More


Explanation, Emergence, and Causality: Comments on Crane

Michele Di Francesco

in Emergence in Mind

Published in print:
2010
Published Online:
May 2010
ISBN:
9780199583621
eISBN:
9780191723483
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199583621.003.0003
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Philosophy of Science

Tim Crane's ‘Cosmic Hermeneutics vs. Emergence: The Challenge of the Explanatory Gap’ claims that non‐reductive physicalism must either close the explanatory gap, addressing the challenge famously ... More


Reductive Explanation and the ‘Explanatory Gap’

Peter Carruthers

in Consciousness: Essays from a Higher-Order Perspective

Published in print:
2005
Published Online:
July 2005
ISBN:
9780199277360
eISBN:
9780191602597
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0199277362.003.0002
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

Exponents of an ‘explanatory gap’ between physical, functional, and intentional facts, on the one hand, and the facts of phenomenal consciousness, on the other, argue that there are reasons of ... More


Cognitive Phenomenology

Tim Bayne and Michelle Montague (eds)

Published in print:
2011
Published Online:
January 2012
ISBN:
9780199579938
eISBN:
9780191731112
Item type:
book
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199579938.001.0001
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Metaphysics/Epistemology

The word ‘phenomenology’ as it occurs in the title of this book is a name for the subjective qualitative character of experience. It is widely agreed that there is such a thing as sensory ... More


Reduction and Reductive Explanation: Is One Possible Without the Other?

Jaegwon Kim

in Essays in the Metaphysics of Mind

Published in print:
2010
Published Online:
January 2011
ISBN:
9780199585878
eISBN:
9780191595349
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199585878.003.0011
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Metaphysics/Epistemology

“Reduction and Reductive Explanation: Is One Possible Without the Other?” discusses the assumption often made by philosophers to the effect that reductive explanation must be distinguished from ... More


Reductionism and Eliminativism Reconsidered

Steven Horst

in Beyond Reduction: Philosophy of Mind and Post-Reductionist Philosophy of Science

Published in print:
2007
Published Online:
September 2007
ISBN:
9780195317114
eISBN:
9780199871520
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195317114.003.0005
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

This chapter examines the implications of recent philosophy of science for reductionism. The motivations for both normative and positive forms of reductionism are grounded in the assumptions that ... More


“Actin' Funny, But I Don't Know Why” The Explanatory Gap

Joseph Levine

in Purple Haze: The Puzzle of Consciousness

Published in print:
2001
Published Online:
November 2003
ISBN:
9780195132359
eISBN:
9780199833375
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0195132351.003.0004
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

The problem of the explanatory gap is introduced. First, a survey of various theories of scientific explanation reveals that deductive inference plays a crucial role in explanation. Then it is argued ... More


The Explanatory Gap

David Papineau

in Thinking about Consciousness

Published in print:
2002
Published Online:
November 2003
ISBN:
9780199243822
eISBN:
9780191598166
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0199243824.003.0006
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

Joseph Levine argues that there is an “explanatory gap” between the brain and the conscious mind. Papineau agrees that there is such a gap, but points out that similar gaps are found with all ... More


A Metaphysician Looks at the Everett Interpretation 1

John Hawthorne

in Many Worlds?: Everett, Quantum Theory, and Reality

Published in print:
2010
Published Online:
September 2010
ISBN:
9780199560561
eISBN:
9780191721380
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199560561.003.0006
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Science

This chapter compares the relation of emergent branching structure to the quantum state to the fundamental ontology with philosophically more familiar examples of emergence — of ordinary objects, in ... More


Cognitive Pluralism and Modal Metaphysics

Steven Horst

in Beyond Reduction: Philosophy of Mind and Post-Reductionist Philosophy of Science

Published in print:
2007
Published Online:
September 2007
ISBN:
9780195317114
eISBN:
9780199871520
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195317114.003.0010
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

This chapter explores the metaphysical commitments of Cognitive Pluralism. Cognitive Pluralism, as a cognitivist/pragmatist thesis, is opposed to a native realism that assumes that the world divides ... More


The Case Against Cognitive Phenomenology

Peter Carruthers and Bénédicte Veillet

in Cognitive Phenomenology

Published in print:
2011
Published Online:
January 2012
ISBN:
9780199579938
eISBN:
9780191731112
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199579938.003.0002
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Metaphysics/Epistemology

The goal of this chapter is to mount a critique of the claim that cognitive content (that is, the kind of content possessed by our concepts and thoughts) makes a constitutive contribution to the ... More


Explanatory gaps and dualist intuitions

David Papineau

in Frontiers of Consciousness: Chichele Lectures

Published in print:
2008
Published Online:
March 2012
ISBN:
9780199233151
eISBN:
9780191696596
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199233151.003.0002
Subject:
Psychology, Cognitive Psychology

This chapter discusses a set of ideas associated with the phrase ‘the explanatory gap’ and their methodological implications. The ‘explanatory gap’ refers to the lack of any conceptual tie between ... More


Gap? What Gap?

Robert Kirk

in Zombies and Consciousness

Published in print:
2005
Published Online:
February 2006
ISBN:
9780199285488
eISBN:
9780191603150
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0199285489.003.0010
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

Any system with the basic package is a decider; any decider with directly active perceptual information has the ‘basic package-plus’ and is a ‘decider-plus’. This chapter argues that being a ... More


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