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This chapter examines the changing leadership of Vladimir Putin. Most observers initially saw Putin as a transactional leader; with his practical and technocratic approach to fixing problems, he appeared more a prudent manager than political leader. However, as he moved towards his second term, his increased assertion of executive powers has prompted some observers to revise their optimism regarding Russia’s prospects for democracy, viewing Putin’s actions as a possible turn towards dictatorial rule.

This chapter focuses on the internal ordering of executive power within the EU political system and discusses the manner in which executive power is balanced by the other ‘countervailing’ powers in the constitutional system of checks and balances. It focuses on the key ‘executive’ institutions in terms of their original conception and in terms of the interests they were representing, as well as the manner in which that has evolved to become what can be referred to as a composite executive order of sorts.

This chapter on presidential powers first analyzes three concepts that go beyond powers expressly stated: “implied,” “inherent,” and “prerogative.” It then considers specific presidential powers, such as the power to remove executive officials and to issue pardons. Presidential powers wax and wane depending on who occupies the Oval Office; initiatives urged by advisers and supporters, national, and international pressures; popular support (and lack thereof); and actions taken by the legislative and judicial branches to encourage or curb executive power.

Since the retirement of President Kekkonen in 1981, a process of piecemeal constitutional reform has strengthened the core concept of parliamentary government at the expense of the old quasi‐monarchical elements in the Finnish political system; this modernization process has been propelled by a concern to avoid the possibility of a recurrence of the ‘enlightened despotism’ of the Kekkonen era, and has been aided by the collapse of the Soviet Union. Recent constitutional changes have also enhanced the involvement of the prime minister and government in the performance of the federative (foreign policy) function; above all, the institutional adaptation required by membership of the EU has emphasized the bicephalous character of the Finnish political executive in a way reminiscent of interwar practice. Political factors, notably the ability of the party system to deliver stable majority coalitions, have worked in the same direction, and indeed arguments have been made in favour of the abolition of the whole institution of the presidency. With parliament having recently accepted the main findings of the Nikula Committee's report and restricted the president's involvement in the process of coalition‐building, as well as vesting the government with powers jointly to manage foreign policy, it is clear that Finland is en route to becoming an orthodox parliamentary democracy: the head of state has lost his exclusive charge of the federative function; his involvement in the legislative process is limited and exceptional; and even his executive powers—particularly his powers of appointment—have been restricted in recent years. The different sections of the chapter are: Constitution‐Making 1917–1919: A Monarchical Republic?; The Shift to a President‐Dominant System, 1940–1987; From President‐Dominant to Pluralist Foreign Policy‐Making, 1987–1998; and Towards a Ceremonial Presidency?

The structure of the federal government of the United States is characterized by a pronounced application of the principle of separation of powers. A discussion of that principle provides a background against which the three branches of the federal government are presented. These are introduced in the order that they were created by the Constitution: the legislative, the executive, and the judiciary. The second section begins with an exposition of the terms “legislative” and “legislative immunity” before presenting the enumerated congressional powers found in Article I of the US Constitution. The third section presents executive power in the context of treaties, executive agreements, and foreign military interventions, regulated by Congress in the War Powers Resolution. The final section shows how the US Constitution limits the jurisdiction of the federal courts to “Cases or Controversies.” The doctrines and distinctions of advisory opinions, ripeness, mootness, and standing are discussed before turning to the related “political question” doctrine.

This chapter highlights the salience and centrality of contemporary executive power in the EU, and provides an overview of how executive power has jumped arenas over the course of time. This does not indicate a replacement of executive powers at other levels or in other arenas but rather an accumulation of executive power (or ‘executive order’). The picture is more one of overlapping orders and arenas and not neatly ordered substitution.

This chapter focuses on the foreign policy powers of Congress. The discussions cover treaty power; the role of the House; treaty termination and reinterpretation; executive agreements; ambassadors and recognition policy; the right to travel; and the power to exclude aliens.

This chapter discusses The Executive Power Clause under Article II of the U.S. Constitution, which grants the president the executive power in running the state. Scholars criticize the clause, arguing that the grant of executive power is a nullity—it either grants the president those powers awarded elsewhere in Article II, or it does nothing more than signify that there shall be a single executive called the president. Other scholars worry that the Executive Power Clause might grant the president all powers regarded as executive and thereby give way to abusive control over life, liberty, and property. The chapter concludes that The Executive Power Clause is not a grant of absolute authority since the Constitution tempers these powers by giving the Congress control over the military and over many crucial areas of foreign affairs.

This chapter argues that authority of the president over foreign affairs arises from the grant of the executive power and not from foreign relations clauses found in the remainder of Article II of the US Constitution. The president's abilities to formulate and announce generic foreign policy, control U.S. diplomats, and expel foreign diplomats came from The Executive Power Clause—the power of the president to execute the law. While the president may, in general, exercise those foreign affairs powers not granted to the Congress or shared with the Senate, he lacks a broad foreign affairs lawmaking authority under Article II. The president's legislative role is limited to the duty to make legislative proposals, the power to make treaties, and the power to veto bills.

This chapter examines the styles of government, and particularly about different ways in which laws could be enforced, in Scotland during the 16th and 17th centuries. Not all laws were expected to be enforced in full, and a typology of law enforcement patterns is given. There is also a critique of conventional accounts of central and local power, arguing that centralisation was not experienced by the localities as an external force; it occurred in the localities. First, the chapter explains what the enforcement or implementation of law actually meant. It then discusses what is meant by ‘executive powers’, how government was carried out in the localities, whether law was always enforced in the sense of making people do what they did not want to do. Many governmental commands do not seem to have been fully obeyed; hence, the question is whether this should make us sceptical about the power of government, or we should look more carefully at what government was trying to achieve when it issued the commands.

This chapter looks to the overall ecology of EU executive power and its relationship with its surrounding environment. The perspective adopted is, in the final analysis, one of the compound or composite nature of this power, in the sense not only of a shared and plural executive at the EU level but also of very often the same actors performing different roles and tasks at different governance levels without this being very clearly visible or generally understood. This fact, or perspective, is then further considered in the light of a number of the so-called ‘meta-principles’ of the overall political order (such as the principles of legitimacy and of democracy) as well as the arguably lower-level ‘organizing principle’ (at least in procedural terms) of accountability as quite succinctly and precisely defined and applied. The chapter encapsulates the broader narrative of this book, that is, to further contribute and analyze the process of making the invisible visible across the wide spectrum of executive power in the EU political system as a whole.

This chapter discusses constitutional provisions covering the presidential veto; the pocket veto; a hybrid veto; item vetoes; signing statements; legislative vetoes; executive privilege; and employee access to Congress.

This chapter highlights the manner of the evolution of certain practices of public ‘accountability’ in the context of a diffuse and fragmented understanding of EU executive power in the Union political system. The invisible constitution of the EU can also include relatively subterranean processes and practices by non-executive institutions, such as the European Parliament for example, that gradually and incrementally is becoming an accountability forum of some significance with regard to various EU satellite actors.

Chapter 3 accounts for the different factors behind variation in leftist governments’ economic policies. First, it advances an explanation of how the type of leftist economic reforms is best explained by the degree to which the party system is institutionalized. In doing so, this chapter develops the causal logic behind the relationship between party system institutionalization and economic policy changes. It then offers a macro-level test of the logic and alternative explanations drawing on empirical evidence. Chapter 3 finds that centripetal dynamics characteristic of institutionalized party systems make the preservation of the status quo more likely. This is due to differences in the type of candidate likely to reach power and parties’ ability to influence the executive’s policies. This finding refines institutionalist explanations based on fragmentation and polarization and challenges accounts based on resource dependence, economic conditions, interest groups, executive power, and depth of neoliberalism.

This chapter examines powers that routinely call for interactions between the President and Congress. These include the legislative process, appointments, independent counsels, delegation of authority, and independent commissions.

This chapter focuses on the war powers assigned to Congress. The discussions cover the authority to initiate war; military action in practice; the availability of a standing army; international and regional bodies that function as a constitutional substitute for the Senate and the House of Representatives; the Korean War; Truman's seizure of steel mills; the Vietnam War; the War Powers Resolution; and Presidents' circumvention of the legislative branch and treating the Security Council and NATO as constitutional substitutes.