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This chapter discusses naval forces in the exclusive economic zone (EEZ). There are no corresponding limitations on military activities in the EEZ or high seas. Consequently, coastal states that seek to limit military activities beyond the territorial sea have resorted to a host of legal arguments and interpretations that promote their goal, generally by trying to squeeze military activities into the definition of activities over which the coastal state has some legitimate competence.

After a short introduction to law enforcement in the law of the sea, this chapter considers each maritime zone in turn, beginning with those closest to the state's land territory (ports and internal waters) and the territorial sea (straits, the contiguous zone, the continental shelf, Exclusive Economic Zone, and the high seas). For each zone addressed, particular issues for law enforcement in relation to maritime security threats are discussed, notably in relation to transnational crime (such as drug trafficking and people-smuggling), piracy and armed robbery, marine pollution, and IUU fishing. It is shown that there has been greater recognition of enforcement powers to respond to maritime security threats, and this recognition has usually come at the expense of sovereign interests in certain maritime areas and over vessels.

This chapter focuses on sovereignty and security claims over the exclusive economic zone (EEZ). It is sometimes difficult to evaluate which type of excessive EEZ claim is most injurious and destabilizing to the law of the sea: claims of sovereignty over the EEZ, or so-called excessive territorial sea claims extending beyond 12 nm, or excessive regulatory claims within a legitimately drawn 200 nm EEZ. While the first type is a clear-cut case of overreaching by the coastal state, the last example based on an assertion of excessive coastal state competence in the zone, is more pernicious and duplicitous. Regardless of which strategy is employed by the coastal state to appropriate water space, the 200-nm zone has acquired the status of a “psycho-legal” boundary that is used arbitrarily by coastal states in order to attach ad hoc excessive claims to an actual or recognizable regime. In effect, most excessive EEZ claims attempt to move the goal posts of the territorial sea farther from the land. Unlawful claims for coastal state sovereignty or assertions of “sovereignty-like” competence beyond 12 nm in the ocean, however characterized, may be thought of as excessive EEZ claims. For the coastal states, such claims often are a shorthand reference for national assurance and filling a sense of vulnerability over underlying security or resource claims.

This chapter elaborates the concept of the exclusive economic zone (EEZ), created in response to the contemporary need for the economic development of coastal States. Issues such as the legal status of the EEZ, enforcement jurisdiction in the EEZ, the relationship between the EEZ and the continental shelf, the significance of the ‘peaceful use’ or ‘peaceful purposes’ clauses of the Convention, how far a State can impart military activities in the foreign EEZs, and delimitation of the EEZ between adjacent and opposite nations are explored. The author also discusses Institutional Arrangements for Ocean Management made by the Indian Government through the Maritime Zones Act in 1976, the creation of an armed Coast Guard in 1978, the Department of Ocean Development in 1981, and the formation of the Earth Commission in 2006. The chapter concludes with a discussion of bilateral agreements regarding EEZs concluded between some dozen countries around the world.

This chapter discusses environmental claims over the exclusive economic zone (EEZ). The assertion of excessive coastal state or international environmental regulation in the EEZ poses the third of the three major legal and policy threats to the stability of the regime. The EEZ framework is under pressure from a coordinated effort by certain government agencies, coastal states, and international and nongovernmental organizations, to promote a regime of controlled access beyond the territorial sea. These efforts are informed by a number of motivations, including flagrant coastal state nativism or jingoism, good faith, and deep concern over maritime environmental degradation, the social-political appeal of certain endangered marine wildlife, deliberate national military strategy, local and tribal or indigenous politics, thinly veiled anti-capitalist and anti-globalist sentiment, and aggressive claims to offshore natural resources. But for many, the coastal state's prerogative in reducing marine pollution is the over-riding drive for greater control over the EEZ.

The phrase ‘creeping jurisdiction’ has been applied by a number of publicists to the gradual extension of state jurisdiction offshore in the law of the sea through the course of the 20th century. Under the current United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOSC), and confirmed by international practice, the territorial sea is 12 nautical miles wide. It might have been thought that jurisdictional creep had ended with the conclusion of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOSC) in 1982. This chapter examines whether contemporary practice may lead to a further creeping of jurisdiction, not in a further grab for resources, but in an effort by states to provide themselves with greater security from threats from the sea. It examines contemporary and emerging practice in respect of maritime security, and discusses whether seeking greater control over security — which covers military security and environmental security — is the next generation of jurisdictional creep. Beyond the territorial sea, the LOSC also confirms that there is freedom of navigation for all vessels. This is essentially applicable for the exclusive economic zone and high seas areas beyond it.

This chapter first sets out the purpose of the book, which is to examine the law and strategy surrounding the concept of freedom of the seas in the littoral regions of the world—specifically, freedom of navigation and overflight in the exclusive economic zone (EEZ), and the impact of the EEZ on expeditionary and amphibious naval operations. It then discusses approaches to analyzing excessive maritime claims and the political economy of excessive maritime claims.

According to the Food and Agriculture Organisation, an estimated 52 percent of fish stocks are fully exploited and producing catches at the maximum sustainable limit. A further 25 percent of stocks are overexploited, depleted, or recovering from depletion. Moreover, a majority of the most important commercial species are considered to be fully or overexploited. Because more than 90 percent of commercial fisheries are located within the exclusive economic zone (EEZ), effective mechanisms for conserving and managing fisheries within 200 nautical mile EEZs remain of fundamental importance. This chapter examines the general framework established by Part V of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOSC) and suggests that its failure to spell out a sufficiently coherent obligation to steward resources within the EEZ has contributed to the collapse of many domestic fisheries. A number of binding and non-binding instruments which have emerged post-LOSC are also considered, along with the future of international law on fisheries and the conservation and management of living resources under the LOSC, including the prevention of overfishing.

The law of the sea provides the legal framework for national rights and obligations at sea, while it is also an important catalyst for regional security cooperation and dialogue. However, the law of the sea can also be a potential source of tension. All the critical issues with resolving ambiguities in the law of the sea, and the different points of view on particular jurisdictional issues and the freedoms of navigation and overflight, may be found in the seas of East Asia. The 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and customary international law identify three distinct navigational regimes: innocent passage applying to the territorial sea and archipelagic waters; transit passage through straits used for international navigation; and archipelagic sea lanes passage through archipelagic waters. This chapter examines key areas of disagreement in the region with regard to the freedoms of navigation and overflight, including those in the exclusive economic zone (EEZ), and discusses some recent incidents involving these issues.

The 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOSC) came into effect on November 16, 1994, more than ten years after it was concluded in December 1982, and after more than nine years of previous negotiations. There is no doubt that its conclusion represented an outstanding achievement of international law. The 320 Articles and 9 Annexes have been hailed as the modern constitution of the oceans, and the famous ‘package deal’ that it represented addressed many of the problematic issues that conventions had been unable to settle. It proclaimed a new agenda for the oceans, ocean regulation, and ocean space, with a number of innovative concepts such as exclusive economic zone, archipelagic status, and the deep seabed; it embraced new obligations, such as protection of the marine environment. This book offers a critical review of the LOSC and its relationship to, and interface with, the wide range of developments that have occurred since 1982.

The exclusive economic zone (EEZ) was created from the near-shore or littoral waters, so assessing the effect of the EEZ on contemporary expeditionary operations begins with a historical understanding of the importance of military operations in the coastal zone. This chapter discusses sea power in the ancient world; the development of naval powers in Portugal, Spain and the Dutch Republic; and Anglo-American expeditionary naval power.

The equidistance versus equitable principles debate with respect to maritime boundaries was a controversial topic during the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III). Articles 74 and 83 of the Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOSC) indicate that delimitation of the exclusive economic zone and of the continental shelf, respectively, ‘shall be effected by agreement on the basis of international law in order to achieve an equitable solution’. Accordingly, the LOSC devolves the development of rules and principles of delimitation to general international law, and so any comment on the future of delimitation is a matter that must be considered in the wider context of the law of the sea, rather than through the terms of the LOSC itself. This chapter discusses issues related to maritime boundary delimitation, relevant coasts, circumstances which are sufficiently relevant to be special, and proportionality.

The 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOSC) conceals more than it reveals concerning the difficulties experienced by the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III) in introducing restrictive international controls on exploitation of marine living resources, including marine mammals. A considerable number of non-governmental organisations, representing both commercial and environmental concerns, began to attend the UNCLOS III negotiating sessions to lobby the negotiators in order to safeguard their particular interests. Article 65 in its final form reflects the many compromises resulting from this process, including the limitations of marine mammal treaties concluded more than a century ago, as well as more recent fisheries and marine environment conventions across a broad spectrum. This chapter examines the ambiguities of Article 65 of the LOSC with respect to regulation of whaling, along with problems arising in the drafting of Articles 64, 65, and 120 of the LOSC. New initiatives within the International Whaling Commission are also discussed.

In 2012 the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea took decisions in three cases. The most important was the Judgment on the Bay of Bengal case between Bangladesh and Myanmar, the first decision of the Tribunal on a delimitation case. The second was the Order on the admissibility of a counterclaim in the Virginia G. case. The third was the provisional measures Order in the Ara Libertad case between Argentina and Ghana, concerning the scope of the Law of the Sea Convention’s provisions on immunity of warships.

This chapter examines property rights in waters, oceans, and related items. International law recognizes a human right to water which is nearing justiciability. Rights in ocean resources are principally governed by the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). UNCLOS divides the oceans into different regions, each subject to a different level of international regulation, including the territorial sea, the exclusive economic zone, and the high seas. As part of the global commons, the high seas are open for use by all for purposes such as commerce, fishing, and navigation. But, in general, this region cannot be subject to property rights. Special regimes affect property rights in archaeological resources, fisheries, genetic material, icebergs, minerals, shipwrecks, submarine cables and pipelines, and vessels.

The judgment on the Virginia G case (Panama v. Guinea Bissau, handed out on 14 April 2014) was the only judgment of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea in 2014. The key issue dealt with in the judgment concerns the legal regime of bunkering of foreign fishing vessels in the exclusive economic zone. The Tribunal decided in favour of Guinea Bissau holding that the regulation of bunkering of fishing vessels is encompassed in the sovereign right of the coastal state to manage living resources as provided in article 56 of the Law of the Sea Convention. While the coastal State may impose confiscation of the vessel as a sanction for violation of its bunkering regulations, this sanction is not appropriate in all cases. In the instant case the Tribunal held that confiscation was not a “necessary measure” according to article 73, para. 1, of the UNCLOS. Other points of interest of the judgment concern the “genuine link” and exhaustion of domestic remedies.

This chapter discusses the concept of the continental shelf which has global importance because of its mineral and other resources such as oil. This concept of rights over submerged lands beyond territorial waters was charged to oblivion until 1942 when an important treaty (between the UK and Venezuela) was concluded, dividing into two parts the submarine areas of the Gulf of Paria. Laws relating to national jurisdiction over seabed resources are critical to most coastal States. The problem of determining the outer limits of the legal continental shelf was set for discussions in the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) in Geneva (with special reference to the Irish Formula and India’s acceptance of it) which are described in detail. The author then discusses the doctrine of equitable principles as being the fundamental norm of customary international law governing maritime boundary delimitation. The chapter concludes by dangers faced by a State’s continental shelf in that ‘enemy’ dormant mines and submarine listening posts etc. can be installed on them. Now, whether coastal States can legally object to foreign installations or the laying of mines is still being debated.

This chapter looks at the problems of conserving trans-boundary resources by examining the tuna fishery in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean. After 1976, nations increasingly moved to expand their territorial seas, creating Exclusive Economic Zones where activities such as fishing were regulated. The island nations of Micronesia and Polynesia sought to expand their territorial waters in the 1980s, but the United States and Japan resisted, seeking an institutional arrangement that would allow them to continue to be involved in management of the fishery. The delay in creating the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Management Commission allowed other countries to enter the fishery, led to overfishing of tuna stocks, and added to the cost and complexity of management.