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This chapter extends the analysis of the previous chapter to an open economy by introducing exchange rate policy; analyzing the complex relationships between exchange rate, fiscal, and monetary policies; and examining the ways in which capital flows complicate traditional analyses. Despite the greater complexities associated with open economy macroeconomics, the policy conclusions for a closed economy remain remarkably unaffected. While Keynesians and heterodox economists believe that government should actively intervene, conservatives remain skeptical about the desirability of such interventions. The objective of this chapter is to shed some light on how economists can come to such diverse views on economic policy. The first section examines the macroeconomic effects of exchange rates on employment, trade, inflation, aggregate demand, growth, and balance sheets. The second section examines the complex interactions between fiscal, monetary, and exchange rate policies in open economies with either fixed or flexible exchange rate regimes. This section also examines the effects of interest rates and exchange rates on capital flows in both crisis and non-crisis situations.

This chapter looks at exchange rate management and other policy options for an open economy. It begins with an introductory discussion of overall macroeconomic management for open economies, including the issues of internal and external balance and inflation targeting. It then examines how countries can attempt to manage the exchange rate. Topics covered in this section include the benefits of maintaining an undervalued exchange rate in some developing countries, government interventions to smooth out exchange rate fluctuations, and the trade-off between stability and flexibility when choosing an exchange rate regime. The chapter concludes with an analysis of other policy options in open economies, including heterodox microeconomic interventions, public sector liability management, and debt restructuring.

This chapter formulates political-exchange and social-exchange games that corporations and their stakeholders play along with other agents in society. Multiple equilibria of the political exchange game are identified as discrete forms of political states, and institutional complementarity of each of them with a particular corporate governance form is discussed. Agents, including corporations, also engage in social-exchange games using social symbols to derive social payoffs, and strategically calculate tradeoffs between social and materialistic payoffs. CSR is understood as a means for corporations to accumulate their own social capital in this game. The chapter then inquires why the value of corporate social capital is partially internalized by share markets and what its implications are to stakeholders' interests, corporate governance, and social welfare.

This chapter discusses the role of regulation in corporate governance. The UK system has generally depended on a mixture of primary and secondary legislation with rules made by various non-statutory bodies, some of which may, like the Stock Exchange, work under the umbrella of some legislation, and some, like the Cadbury Committee, with no umbrella at all. The creation of the Financial Services Authority is surely helpful. The work of the takeover panel is makes for interesting analysis. It can change its rules without reference to any other authority and has no means of enforcing its rules beyond what supporters are willing to do. Yet UK shareholders have good cause to be grateful to it, because it has succeeded in ensuring relatively equal treatment between them. It has established the rules of conduct about the purchase of shares in the market and governs the timetable and what must and must not be said.

This chapter examines the multinational company, the shareholders, diversification through international investment, private shareholders, and future developments to globalization. There will inevitably be further convergence on accounting practices; the more firms seek to raise capital internationally or seek quotation on overseas stock exchanges, the more likely this becomes. If tax is simplified too, so that expenses are reduced, another obstacle will be easier to surmount — as a more efficient flow of capital should ensue. All this may lead to foreign-held stakes growing in significance and if so the incentive for foreign institutions to monitor their investments will increase. The trends towards globalization will not lead to an erosion of differences in domestic markets, other than what is absolutely essential for transparency of information and protection of shareholder rights in order to attract international capital; but beyond this, nations will cherish their special emphasis on particular aspects of a corporate purpose.

This chapter presents a series of case studies illustrating how specific exchanges have actually been governed in particular contexts. The following institutions and contexts are described in turn: the proposed iX merger between Deutsche Börse and the London Stock Exchange (LSE), and its subsequent collapse, in 2000; the “Penny Stocks Incident” at Hong Kong Exchanges and Clearing Ltd. in 2002; the attempted takeover of the LSE by NASDAQ over the period 2006–8; Euronext's purchase of London International Financial Futures and Options Exchange in 2001; the resignation of the chairman/CEO of the New York Stock Exchange in 2003; and the purchase by the “Murakami Fund” of a major block of shares in the Osaka Securities Exchange in 2005. A few brief general lessons from each case study are also identified.

Judith Andre examines the issue of the scope of the market. She offers a framework for thinking about the issue of blocked exchanges that draws upon concepts of ownership, alienation, and the impact of the market on exchanges, interactions, and market participants. She shows where Michael Walzer's notion of dominance fits into her wider taxonomy of the limits of the market.

This chapter analyses how and why two forms of internationalisation — transnational technological and economic developments and reforms in the US — were met with institutional inertia, or at most limited divergent reforms in France, West Germany, and Italy between the mid-1960s and 1985. It shows that the two forms of internationalisation placed major pressures on traditional sectoral institutions that were very long-standing and protective of suppliers, such as public ownership of stock exchanges, legal monopolies, and the allocation of regulatory powers to governments and associations of brokers and exchanges. They led to debates in all three countries on modest reform proposals. Yet even limited alterations were largely blocked, due to the failure of governments to form a strong alliance with the leaders of stock exchanges that could overcome opposition to change. Instead, either poorly-functioning institutions were continued or non-institutional responses to internationalisation pressures were found.

Britain is treated separately because it had a different institutional starting point in the securities sector, reformed earlier and then influenced the other three countries, and followed a specific ‘British reform path’. Between the mid-1960s and the early 1980s, despite pressures from transnational technological and economic developments, traditionalists in the London Stock Exchange successfully fought to retain their inheritance. However, the position changed greatly after the early 1980s. The LSE was transformed from a private British club into a listed company open to takeover. Reversing decades of self-regulation, powers were delegated to new independent financial regulatory authorities. Reforms were led by British state actors. They were triggered for domestic reasons, but thereafter, international factors became important, as British policy makers became concerned about regulatory competition from the US, and selectively used US reforms to justify changes. The chapter therefore shows the importance of US policies in the strategies of domestic policy makers and their legitimation of reforms.