Carl A. Raschke
- Published in print:
- 2015
- Published Online:
- May 2016
- ISBN:
- 9780231173841
- eISBN:
- 9780231539623
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Columbia University Press
- DOI:
- 10.7312/columbia/9780231173841.003.0006
- Subject:
- Religion, Philosophy of Religion
The historical irruption of the force of exception—the impulse to universality—can only be attributed to singular eventualities. Monotheism can be considered the strong force of exception within the ...
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The historical irruption of the force of exception—the impulse to universality—can only be attributed to singular eventualities. Monotheism can be considered the strong force of exception within the unified field of human significations that establishes the real intention of the concept we have in mind when we talk about human solidarity. The historic drive toward the formation of an ever more inclusive politeia amounts to a “secularized,” or domesticated, rechanneling of the monotheistic impulse. That is why all militant ideologies of democracy, especially in their early Enlightenment phases turn out to be exceptionalist. It is also why militant universalist ideologies in general are ultimately divisive rather than inclusive.Less
The historical irruption of the force of exception—the impulse to universality—can only be attributed to singular eventualities. Monotheism can be considered the strong force of exception within the unified field of human significations that establishes the real intention of the concept we have in mind when we talk about human solidarity. The historic drive toward the formation of an ever more inclusive politeia amounts to a “secularized,” or domesticated, rechanneling of the monotheistic impulse. That is why all militant ideologies of democracy, especially in their early Enlightenment phases turn out to be exceptionalist. It is also why militant universalist ideologies in general are ultimately divisive rather than inclusive.
Peter Ramsay
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- September 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199581061
- eISBN:
- 9780191741005
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199581061.001.0001
- Subject:
- Law, Criminal Law and Criminology
This book presents a theory of the recent emergence of a right to security and of its protection by the criminal law in the UK. It states that the protection of such a right makes sense of the ...
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This book presents a theory of the recent emergence of a right to security and of its protection by the criminal law in the UK. It states that the protection of such a right makes sense of the liabilities found in much of the expansive criminal legislation enacted under that government. This book identifies the normative source of the right to security in the idea of vulnerable autonomy. It demonstrates that this idea is axiomatic to political theories that have enjoyed a preponderant influence across the political mainstream, well beyond the ranks of the Labour government. It considers the continuing influence of these normative commitments on the Coalition government's policy. The book explores how the contemporary criminal law's institutionalization of a right to security differs from the law's earlier protection of security interests. It exposes the paradox presented by laws that declare their own lack of authority by threatening punishments that are justified on the assumption that the normal condition of the representative subject of law is one of feeling vulnerable to criminal victimization. The book presents unorthodox criminal law theory in two respects. First, it offers an explanatory political sociology of a contemporary trend in the criminal law's ‘special part’ rather than a philosophical treatment of the law's general principles. Second, rather than applying a pre-existing sociological or philosophical theory to the law, it develops its theoretical explanation from a detailed legal analysis and reconstruction of New Labour's flagship criminal justice policy, the Anti-Social Behaviour Order.Less
This book presents a theory of the recent emergence of a right to security and of its protection by the criminal law in the UK. It states that the protection of such a right makes sense of the liabilities found in much of the expansive criminal legislation enacted under that government. This book identifies the normative source of the right to security in the idea of vulnerable autonomy. It demonstrates that this idea is axiomatic to political theories that have enjoyed a preponderant influence across the political mainstream, well beyond the ranks of the Labour government. It considers the continuing influence of these normative commitments on the Coalition government's policy. The book explores how the contemporary criminal law's institutionalization of a right to security differs from the law's earlier protection of security interests. It exposes the paradox presented by laws that declare their own lack of authority by threatening punishments that are justified on the assumption that the normal condition of the representative subject of law is one of feeling vulnerable to criminal victimization. The book presents unorthodox criminal law theory in two respects. First, it offers an explanatory political sociology of a contemporary trend in the criminal law's ‘special part’ rather than a philosophical treatment of the law's general principles. Second, rather than applying a pre-existing sociological or philosophical theory to the law, it develops its theoretical explanation from a detailed legal analysis and reconstruction of New Labour's flagship criminal justice policy, the Anti-Social Behaviour Order.
David G. Lewis
- Published in print:
- 2020
- Published Online:
- September 2020
- ISBN:
- 9781474454766
- eISBN:
- 9781474480611
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Edinburgh University Press
- DOI:
- 10.3366/edinburgh/9781474454766.001.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory
In this book, David Lewis offers an original interpretation of the Russian political system that developed under Vladimir Putin as a new form of authoritarianism. Lewis argues that the Putinist ...
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In this book, David Lewis offers an original interpretation of the Russian political system that developed under Vladimir Putin as a new form of authoritarianism. Lewis argues that the Putinist worldview challenged liberal beliefs about concepts such as sovereignty, the state, and democracy, and instead promoted a set of illiberal norms and ideas that contributed to a global backlash against liberal politics. The book uses the political thought of Carl Schmitt, the Nazi jurist and anti-liberal political theorist, to explore political developments in Russia in the first two decades of the 21st century. Case-studies examine how ideas of sovereign decision-making and exceptionality undermined the rule of law in Russia, producing a system of politicised, selective justice. A striving for national unity degenerated into a search for external and internal enemies. Russia’s democratic institutions were gradually hollowed out as Russia developed a form of “illiberal democracy”. The second part of the book uses Schmitt’s theories of international relations to study Russian foreign policy, including a detailed case-study of the annexation of Crimea, a new interpretation of Russia’s search for a sphere of influence in the former Soviet space, and a study of messianic thinking in Russian policy in the Middle East. The book is a detailed study of contemporary Russian politics, but also draws parallels between developments in Russia and the global growth of right-wing populism and authoritarianism.Less
In this book, David Lewis offers an original interpretation of the Russian political system that developed under Vladimir Putin as a new form of authoritarianism. Lewis argues that the Putinist worldview challenged liberal beliefs about concepts such as sovereignty, the state, and democracy, and instead promoted a set of illiberal norms and ideas that contributed to a global backlash against liberal politics. The book uses the political thought of Carl Schmitt, the Nazi jurist and anti-liberal political theorist, to explore political developments in Russia in the first two decades of the 21st century. Case-studies examine how ideas of sovereign decision-making and exceptionality undermined the rule of law in Russia, producing a system of politicised, selective justice. A striving for national unity degenerated into a search for external and internal enemies. Russia’s democratic institutions were gradually hollowed out as Russia developed a form of “illiberal democracy”. The second part of the book uses Schmitt’s theories of international relations to study Russian foreign policy, including a detailed case-study of the annexation of Crimea, a new interpretation of Russia’s search for a sphere of influence in the former Soviet space, and a study of messianic thinking in Russian policy in the Middle East. The book is a detailed study of contemporary Russian politics, but also draws parallels between developments in Russia and the global growth of right-wing populism and authoritarianism.
William J. Talbott
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- January 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780195173482
- eISBN:
- 9780199872176
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195173482.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Political Philosophy
This chapter shows how libertarianism can be seen to be a moral theory that explains exceptions to earlier moral norms and principles and the chapter shows how various exceptions to libertarian ...
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This chapter shows how libertarianism can be seen to be a moral theory that explains exceptions to earlier moral norms and principles and the chapter shows how various exceptions to libertarian principles, including necessity and unconscionability exceptions, can be seen to lead beyond libertarianism to contractarian theories of morality and justice. The chapteer raises a general problem for contractarian theories and shows how the problem applies to the theories of Rawls and Habermas. This sets the stage for the book’s own meta-level consequentialist explanation of the exceptions in the next chapter.Less
This chapter shows how libertarianism can be seen to be a moral theory that explains exceptions to earlier moral norms and principles and the chapter shows how various exceptions to libertarian principles, including necessity and unconscionability exceptions, can be seen to lead beyond libertarianism to contractarian theories of morality and justice. The chapteer raises a general problem for contractarian theories and shows how the problem applies to the theories of Rawls and Habermas. This sets the stage for the book’s own meta-level consequentialist explanation of the exceptions in the next chapter.
Katherine Isobel Baxter
- Published in print:
- 2019
- Published Online:
- May 2020
- ISBN:
- 9781474420839
- eISBN:
- 9781474476478
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Edinburgh University Press
- DOI:
- 10.3366/edinburgh/9781474420839.001.0001
- Subject:
- Law, Legal History
Imagined States examines the significance of the law in colonial and postcolonial fiction from and about Nigeria between 1900 and 1966. The book argues that in the discrete period of the final ...
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Imagined States examines the significance of the law in colonial and postcolonial fiction from and about Nigeria between 1900 and 1966. The book argues that in the discrete period of the final half-century of British colonialism in Nigeria through into the early years of independence prior to the Biafran War, the law provided a key site for fiction’s negotiations with the increasingly complex realities of the colonial project. Attending to the representation of the law in that fiction provides important insights not only into the realities of the historical period but, equally importantly, into the dominant and emergent discourses and ideologies that shaped those realities. Imagined States explores a range of texts including popular, middle-brow and acclaimed postcolonial novels, as well as newspaper stories and memoirs, by both British and Nigerian authors (including Chinua Achebe, Joyce Carey, Cyprian Ekwensi and Edgar Wallace), focusing in particular on how the state of exception and ideas of civilisation were negotiated imaginatively in the law and fiction. These explorations are organised chronologically and thematically, moving from the law ‘upcountry’ (focusing on pre- and inter-war British representations of the District Commissioner), through the law in the city (focusing on late colonial and early postcolonial Nigerian fiction), to law and politics (focusing on postcolonial Nigerian representations of treason and violence).Less
Imagined States examines the significance of the law in colonial and postcolonial fiction from and about Nigeria between 1900 and 1966. The book argues that in the discrete period of the final half-century of British colonialism in Nigeria through into the early years of independence prior to the Biafran War, the law provided a key site for fiction’s negotiations with the increasingly complex realities of the colonial project. Attending to the representation of the law in that fiction provides important insights not only into the realities of the historical period but, equally importantly, into the dominant and emergent discourses and ideologies that shaped those realities. Imagined States explores a range of texts including popular, middle-brow and acclaimed postcolonial novels, as well as newspaper stories and memoirs, by both British and Nigerian authors (including Chinua Achebe, Joyce Carey, Cyprian Ekwensi and Edgar Wallace), focusing in particular on how the state of exception and ideas of civilisation were negotiated imaginatively in the law and fiction. These explorations are organised chronologically and thematically, moving from the law ‘upcountry’ (focusing on pre- and inter-war British representations of the District Commissioner), through the law in the city (focusing on late colonial and early postcolonial Nigerian fiction), to law and politics (focusing on postcolonial Nigerian representations of treason and violence).
Steffen Hindelang
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- September 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199572656
- eISBN:
- 9780191705540
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199572656.003.0007
- Subject:
- Law, EU Law
This chapter addresses those exceptions that apply in intra Community and third-country contexts alike, i.e., Article 58 (1) lit. b EC and the ‘rule of reason’ (unwritten exceptions). Within this ...
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This chapter addresses those exceptions that apply in intra Community and third-country contexts alike, i.e., Article 58 (1) lit. b EC and the ‘rule of reason’ (unwritten exceptions). Within this context, the operation of the proportionality test is considered. Article 58 (1) lit. b. EC contains three different groups of grounds of justification. Each group of grounds of justification is addressed in this chapter separately with respect to its scope of application, predominantly with attention given to the first and third groups, which are the most relevant ones in practice. Within the first group, the focus is placed on national measures securing effective fiscal supervision and preventing tax evasion and avoidance. They carry great potential for protectionist interferences with direct investments, though not constituting a phenomenon specific to this economic activity. The discussion in the context of the third group, referring to the ordre public exception, revolves around the question of whether and to what degree it allows the Member States to self judge their requirements of public policy and public security. The ordre public clause constitutes the most important potential legal basis for saving national measures aiming specifically at the restriction of cross border direct investment. In regard to the rule of reason, its scope in the ambit of free movement of capital is set out first, thereby focusing on the question of whether the formula applies only to hindering or also to discriminatory national measures. Second, the chapter elaborates on mandatory requirements accepted and refused by the Court. In doing so, particular attention is paid to the recognised mandatory requirement of fiscal cohesion and the refused one of securing the tax base; both play a significant role later, in the discussion on the operation of the rule of reason in a third-country context.Less
This chapter addresses those exceptions that apply in intra Community and third-country contexts alike, i.e., Article 58 (1) lit. b EC and the ‘rule of reason’ (unwritten exceptions). Within this context, the operation of the proportionality test is considered. Article 58 (1) lit. b. EC contains three different groups of grounds of justification. Each group of grounds of justification is addressed in this chapter separately with respect to its scope of application, predominantly with attention given to the first and third groups, which are the most relevant ones in practice. Within the first group, the focus is placed on national measures securing effective fiscal supervision and preventing tax evasion and avoidance. They carry great potential for protectionist interferences with direct investments, though not constituting a phenomenon specific to this economic activity. The discussion in the context of the third group, referring to the ordre public exception, revolves around the question of whether and to what degree it allows the Member States to self judge their requirements of public policy and public security. The ordre public clause constitutes the most important potential legal basis for saving national measures aiming specifically at the restriction of cross border direct investment. In regard to the rule of reason, its scope in the ambit of free movement of capital is set out first, thereby focusing on the question of whether the formula applies only to hindering or also to discriminatory national measures. Second, the chapter elaborates on mandatory requirements accepted and refused by the Court. In doing so, particular attention is paid to the recognised mandatory requirement of fiscal cohesion and the refused one of securing the tax base; both play a significant role later, in the discussion on the operation of the rule of reason in a third-country context.
Stanley Peters
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199291267
- eISBN:
- 9780191700590
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199291267.003.0009
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics
Exception phrases often consist of an exceptive marker and a noun phrase. Though these markers all have to do with making exceptions, they differ somewhat in their semantic properties. This chapter ...
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Exception phrases often consist of an exceptive marker and a noun phrase. Though these markers all have to do with making exceptions, they differ somewhat in their semantic properties. This chapter focuses on English and on its presumably most typical exceptive marker: except. Except can be inserted in sentences in several different positions. The distinction between free and connected exception phrases is discussed. This chapter also casts some doubt on the so-called Inclusion Condition and the Negative Condition (in its various versions), arguing that these are often too strong, but suggests a principle of exception conservativity that seems to hold generally. The so-called Quantifier Constraint, which says that only the quantifiers every and no admit exceptions, is examined.Less
Exception phrases often consist of an exceptive marker and a noun phrase. Though these markers all have to do with making exceptions, they differ somewhat in their semantic properties. This chapter focuses on English and on its presumably most typical exceptive marker: except. Except can be inserted in sentences in several different positions. The distinction between free and connected exception phrases is discussed. This chapter also casts some doubt on the so-called Inclusion Condition and the Negative Condition (in its various versions), arguing that these are often too strong, but suggests a principle of exception conservativity that seems to hold generally. The so-called Quantifier Constraint, which says that only the quantifiers every and no admit exceptions, is examined.
John T. Hamilton
- Published in print:
- 2013
- Published Online:
- October 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780691157528
- eISBN:
- 9781400846474
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Princeton University Press
- DOI:
- 10.23943/princeton/9780691157528.003.0014
- Subject:
- Literature, Criticism/Theory
This chapter begins by discussing Heidegger's thoughts on security. For Heidegger notions of security should be treated with utmost caution. If human being is a manifestation of Being—Being as Time, ...
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This chapter begins by discussing Heidegger's thoughts on security. For Heidegger notions of security should be treated with utmost caution. If human being is a manifestation of Being—Being as Time, self-disclosing and self-concealing—then any project designed to contain Being or evade its destabilizing call would be a failure in thinking. The chapter then turns to Carl Schmitt and the ambivalence of security that underlies his political theorizations. On the surface, Schmitt's much discussed notions of sovereignty, the exception, and decisionism reflect a committed belief in the primacy of state safety classically expressed in the Ciceronian formula salus populi suprema lex—“The safety of the people is the highest law.” However, Schmitt at times challenges this prioritization of security, whose privative force, in his view, tends to become manifest in the way the private sphere dangerously impinges upon state policy.Less
This chapter begins by discussing Heidegger's thoughts on security. For Heidegger notions of security should be treated with utmost caution. If human being is a manifestation of Being—Being as Time, self-disclosing and self-concealing—then any project designed to contain Being or evade its destabilizing call would be a failure in thinking. The chapter then turns to Carl Schmitt and the ambivalence of security that underlies his political theorizations. On the surface, Schmitt's much discussed notions of sovereignty, the exception, and decisionism reflect a committed belief in the primacy of state safety classically expressed in the Ciceronian formula salus populi suprema lex—“The safety of the people is the highest law.” However, Schmitt at times challenges this prioritization of security, whose privative force, in his view, tends to become manifest in the way the private sphere dangerously impinges upon state policy.
Philomen Probert
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199279609
- eISBN:
- 9780191707292
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199279609.003.0006
- Subject:
- Classical Studies, Literary Studies: Classical, Early, and Medieval
This chapter introduces the problem addressed in Part II: why does the accentuation of some categories of Greek word appear subject to tendencies with exceptions? Historically, did exceptions arise ...
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This chapter introduces the problem addressed in Part II: why does the accentuation of some categories of Greek word appear subject to tendencies with exceptions? Historically, did exceptions arise in a previously more rule-governed system, or did tendencies to regularity develop in a previously less rule-governed system? Synchronically, what role did these ‘tendencies’ play in speakers’ competence? Two properties of the accent system are discussed as crucial to the account to be offered: the status of recessive accentuation as in some sense the most regular or default accentuation, and the way in which accentuation interacts with morphology. Finally, a question bearing on words with -ro-, -to-, -no-, and -lo-, and previous scholarship on this question, are introduced: why do adjectives with these suffixes tend to be accented differently from nouns?Less
This chapter introduces the problem addressed in Part II: why does the accentuation of some categories of Greek word appear subject to tendencies with exceptions? Historically, did exceptions arise in a previously more rule-governed system, or did tendencies to regularity develop in a previously less rule-governed system? Synchronically, what role did these ‘tendencies’ play in speakers’ competence? Two properties of the accent system are discussed as crucial to the account to be offered: the status of recessive accentuation as in some sense the most regular or default accentuation, and the way in which accentuation interacts with morphology. Finally, a question bearing on words with -ro-, -to-, -no-, and -lo-, and previous scholarship on this question, are introduced: why do adjectives with these suffixes tend to be accented differently from nouns?
María Florencia Nelli
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- September 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199559213
- eISBN:
- 9780191594403
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199559213.003.0020
- Subject:
- Classical Studies, Literary Studies: Classical, Early, and Medieval
Griselda Gambaro's play Antígona Furiosa was written and staged after Gambaro's exile as a consequence of Argentina's so‐called ‘Dirty War’ in the mid‐1970s. This chapter discusses Gambaro's play, ...
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Griselda Gambaro's play Antígona Furiosa was written and staged after Gambaro's exile as a consequence of Argentina's so‐called ‘Dirty War’ in the mid‐1970s. This chapter discusses Gambaro's play, taking into account some of Giorgio Agamben's thoughts in Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life (1998) and The State of Exception (2005). Concepts such as ‘state of exception’, ‘inclusion of the exclusion’, ‘threshold’, and ‘living dead man’, as well as the figure of the camp are approached, illustrated, and fully explored by Antígona Furiosa in so far as they are at the heart of the structure of all major modern totalitarian states, of which the Argentinean ‘Proceso’ with its thousands of desaparecidos is just a new example. This chapter seeks to examine those notions not only as they are represented in the script of the play but essentially as they are reflected in the design of the performance space.Less
Griselda Gambaro's play Antígona Furiosa was written and staged after Gambaro's exile as a consequence of Argentina's so‐called ‘Dirty War’ in the mid‐1970s. This chapter discusses Gambaro's play, taking into account some of Giorgio Agamben's thoughts in Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life (1998) and The State of Exception (2005). Concepts such as ‘state of exception’, ‘inclusion of the exclusion’, ‘threshold’, and ‘living dead man’, as well as the figure of the camp are approached, illustrated, and fully explored by Antígona Furiosa in so far as they are at the heart of the structure of all major modern totalitarian states, of which the Argentinean ‘Proceso’ with its thousands of desaparecidos is just a new example. This chapter seeks to examine those notions not only as they are represented in the script of the play but essentially as they are reflected in the design of the performance space.
S. E. Wilmer
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- September 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199559213
- eISBN:
- 9780191594403
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199559213.003.0022
- Subject:
- Classical Studies, Literary Studies: Classical, Early, and Medieval
This chapter examines some productions in the late twentieth century (Fugard's The Island, Gambaro's Antígona Furiosa, and Glowacki's Antigone in New York) that have employed Antigone as a kind of ...
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This chapter examines some productions in the late twentieth century (Fugard's The Island, Gambaro's Antígona Furiosa, and Glowacki's Antigone in New York) that have employed Antigone as a kind of homo sacer, and then applies this analogy in a more detailed discussion of Seamus Heaney's version of The Burial at Thebes at the Abbey Theatre in Dublin in 2004. Heaney's version was inspired by President Bush's ‘war on terror’ and the detention and ‘rendition’ of suspected terrorists in prisons beyond legal redress. The language deployed in the play echoed statements made by President Bush and evoked his administration's unwarranted invasion of Iraq and torture of prisoners. By comparing recent versions of Antigone that represent her as homo sacer, subjected to a liminal state between life and death, the chapter demonstrates how the ‘state of exception’ theorized by Georgio Agamben has become normalized in the twenty‐first century. It draws parallels between the ‘exceptional’ actions of governments such as the Bush administration and the Argentinian dictatorship, making up the laws as they go along, removing people from their homes and environment, and incarcerating or disposing of them outside the polis, outside the reach of their friends and families. Moreover, it shows that Western governments are taking advantage of the ‘war on terror’ to develop new methods of social control (such as increased security measures by the US Department of Homeland Security and other agencies, including more intensive customs inspections, omnipresent CCTV cameras, heightened threat alerts, etc.) that deprive citizens of their civil rights. By applying Agamben's notions of ‘homo sacer’ and ‘state of exception’ to these adaptations, as well as Slavoj Žižek's and Judith Butler's comments on recent political developments, it demonstrates the claim that Antigone makes on behalf of the disenfranchised of the world.Less
This chapter examines some productions in the late twentieth century (Fugard's The Island, Gambaro's Antígona Furiosa, and Glowacki's Antigone in New York) that have employed Antigone as a kind of homo sacer, and then applies this analogy in a more detailed discussion of Seamus Heaney's version of The Burial at Thebes at the Abbey Theatre in Dublin in 2004. Heaney's version was inspired by President Bush's ‘war on terror’ and the detention and ‘rendition’ of suspected terrorists in prisons beyond legal redress. The language deployed in the play echoed statements made by President Bush and evoked his administration's unwarranted invasion of Iraq and torture of prisoners. By comparing recent versions of Antigone that represent her as homo sacer, subjected to a liminal state between life and death, the chapter demonstrates how the ‘state of exception’ theorized by Georgio Agamben has become normalized in the twenty‐first century. It draws parallels between the ‘exceptional’ actions of governments such as the Bush administration and the Argentinian dictatorship, making up the laws as they go along, removing people from their homes and environment, and incarcerating or disposing of them outside the polis, outside the reach of their friends and families. Moreover, it shows that Western governments are taking advantage of the ‘war on terror’ to develop new methods of social control (such as increased security measures by the US Department of Homeland Security and other agencies, including more intensive customs inspections, omnipresent CCTV cameras, heightened threat alerts, etc.) that deprive citizens of their civil rights. By applying Agamben's notions of ‘homo sacer’ and ‘state of exception’ to these adaptations, as well as Slavoj Žižek's and Judith Butler's comments on recent political developments, it demonstrates the claim that Antigone makes on behalf of the disenfranchised of the world.
Audronė Žukauskaitė
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- September 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199559213
- eISBN:
- 9780191594403
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199559213.003.0004
- Subject:
- Classical Studies, Literary Studies: Classical, Early, and Medieval
The Lacanian philosopher Slavoj Žižek interprets Antigone as a figure driven by some pathological desire, being attached to the Other (Polyneices) without the mediation of symbolic rules and laws. In ...
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The Lacanian philosopher Slavoj Žižek interprets Antigone as a figure driven by some pathological desire, being attached to the Other (Polyneices) without the mediation of symbolic rules and laws. In this sense, Antigone's decision to bury her brother is seen as an authoritarian or even totalitarian act. On the other hand, the same gesture, which is seen as pathological, can also be interpreted as an ethical act par excellence: Antigone's transgression is an ethical act, which intervenes into social reality and changes the very coordinates of what is perceived to be possible. These coordinates, it is argued, can't be explained either in terms of kinship, or in terms of the unconscious. The very idea of transgression acquires meaning only in a more general framework of the analysis of power relationships. But what kind of power relationships could we have in mind and what is Antigone's position in it? The Chorus describes Antigone as ‘inhuman’ and it is necessary to decide how to interpret this ‘inhumanness’. Lacan points out that inhuman ‘literally means something uncivilized, something raw’. It is precisely this ‘raw flesh’, this ‘inhumanness’, on which the chapter's interpretation is focused. Two thinkers, Michel Foucault and Giorgio Agamben, are very important in order to reconsider this ‘rawness’ of Antigone not as an insignificant feature, but, probably, as the main conflict of the tragedy. This ‘rawness’ or biological life of man, which Foucault made the main object of his research, appears to be not the ‘natural condition’ of human life, but a result of power relations. Agamben develops Foucault's ideas further, establishing a clear connection between what he calls ‘bare life’ and modern state power. The question, asked in the chapter, is this: are these theories of sovereign power relevant in interpreting the Sophoclean play? Can it be presupposed that the limit, for which Antigone stands, is ‘the trace of an alternate legality that haunts the conscious, public sphere as its scandalous future’ and that comes into existence in modern times?Less
The Lacanian philosopher Slavoj Žižek interprets Antigone as a figure driven by some pathological desire, being attached to the Other (Polyneices) without the mediation of symbolic rules and laws. In this sense, Antigone's decision to bury her brother is seen as an authoritarian or even totalitarian act. On the other hand, the same gesture, which is seen as pathological, can also be interpreted as an ethical act par excellence: Antigone's transgression is an ethical act, which intervenes into social reality and changes the very coordinates of what is perceived to be possible. These coordinates, it is argued, can't be explained either in terms of kinship, or in terms of the unconscious. The very idea of transgression acquires meaning only in a more general framework of the analysis of power relationships. But what kind of power relationships could we have in mind and what is Antigone's position in it? The Chorus describes Antigone as ‘inhuman’ and it is necessary to decide how to interpret this ‘inhumanness’. Lacan points out that inhuman ‘literally means something uncivilized, something raw’. It is precisely this ‘raw flesh’, this ‘inhumanness’, on which the chapter's interpretation is focused. Two thinkers, Michel Foucault and Giorgio Agamben, are very important in order to reconsider this ‘rawness’ of Antigone not as an insignificant feature, but, probably, as the main conflict of the tragedy. This ‘rawness’ or biological life of man, which Foucault made the main object of his research, appears to be not the ‘natural condition’ of human life, but a result of power relations. Agamben develops Foucault's ideas further, establishing a clear connection between what he calls ‘bare life’ and modern state power. The question, asked in the chapter, is this: are these theories of sovereign power relevant in interpreting the Sophoclean play? Can it be presupposed that the limit, for which Antigone stands, is ‘the trace of an alternate legality that haunts the conscious, public sphere as its scandalous future’ and that comes into existence in modern times?
Katja Maria Vogt
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- January 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780195320091
- eISBN:
- 9780199869657
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195320091.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Ancient Philosophy
It is argued that the two dominant ways of reconstructing the Stoic conception of law—as a set of rules (rules‐interpretation) or as identified with the perfect decision‐making of the sage ...
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It is argued that the two dominant ways of reconstructing the Stoic conception of law—as a set of rules (rules‐interpretation) or as identified with the perfect decision‐making of the sage (prescriptive reason—interpretation)—miss important aspects of the theory. There is not enough textual evidence to show that the Stoics conceived of universal or general rules; even those texts which, by apparently mentioning exceptions, seem to imply the existence of rules are more plausibly interpreted without this assumption. The prescriptive reason—interpretation correctly captures key ideas of the Stoics' theory, but misses the substantive side of their conception of the law. A third interpretation is proposed that draws in crucial ways on the Stoics' substantive conception of reason. What the law commands is a life based on an understanding of what is valuable for human beings; the law thus is substantive without breaking down into rules—it is substantive in the same way in which perfect reason, which knows everything that is relevant to wisdom, is substantive.Less
It is argued that the two dominant ways of reconstructing the Stoic conception of law—as a set of rules (rules‐interpretation) or as identified with the perfect decision‐making of the sage (prescriptive reason—interpretation)—miss important aspects of the theory. There is not enough textual evidence to show that the Stoics conceived of universal or general rules; even those texts which, by apparently mentioning exceptions, seem to imply the existence of rules are more plausibly interpreted without this assumption. The prescriptive reason—interpretation correctly captures key ideas of the Stoics' theory, but misses the substantive side of their conception of the law. A third interpretation is proposed that draws in crucial ways on the Stoics' substantive conception of reason. What the law commands is a life based on an understanding of what is valuable for human beings; the law thus is substantive without breaking down into rules—it is substantive in the same way in which perfect reason, which knows everything that is relevant to wisdom, is substantive.
David S. Wendler
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- May 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199730087
- eISBN:
- 9780199776689
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199730087.003.0008
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
Chapter 8 considers the implications of the present analysis for the regulation and conduct of nonbeneficial pediatric research. It points out that while making a contribution can be in one's ...
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Chapter 8 considers the implications of the present analysis for the regulation and conduct of nonbeneficial pediatric research. It points out that while making a contribution can be in one's interests, making passive contributions to even very valuable projects has only minimal significance for one's personal interests. This suggests that passive contributions can justify only very low risks. When the children are older and able to make a more active contribution this possibility increases the extent to which participating in valuable research can be in their interests, hence, can justify greater risks. The chapter argues that these considerations provide a reason to use two different risk thresholds for nonbeneficial pediatric research, one for younger children who make largely passive contributions and a higher threshold for older children who can make more active contributions.Less
Chapter 8 considers the implications of the present analysis for the regulation and conduct of nonbeneficial pediatric research. It points out that while making a contribution can be in one's interests, making passive contributions to even very valuable projects has only minimal significance for one's personal interests. This suggests that passive contributions can justify only very low risks. When the children are older and able to make a more active contribution this possibility increases the extent to which participating in valuable research can be in their interests, hence, can justify greater risks. The chapter argues that these considerations provide a reason to use two different risk thresholds for nonbeneficial pediatric research, one for younger children who make largely passive contributions and a higher threshold for older children who can make more active contributions.
Catharine Cookson
- Published in print:
- 2001
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195129441
- eISBN:
- 9780199834105
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/019512944X.003.0002
- Subject:
- Religion, Religion and Society
Examines the various legal standards, rules, or tests that have been used by the U.S. Supreme Court to resolve free exercise cases, and places these tests within the full factual and legal contexts ...
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Examines the various legal standards, rules, or tests that have been used by the U.S. Supreme Court to resolve free exercise cases, and places these tests within the full factual and legal contexts of the cases. Particular attention is paid to the no‐exception test adopted in 1879 in the Reynolds case, the tests used in the important string of Jehovah's Witnesses cases of the 1940's, the more recent compelling state interest test as used in an Amish case involving compulsory formal education of children up to the age of 16, and finally the neutrality standard of the 1990 Smith case that reinvigorated the no‐exception test of 1879. A careful, detailed review of the particulars of the cases shows that the underlying analytical process used is excruciatingly influential to the ultimate decision: Justices in factually similar cases purportedly using the same abstract legal test reach different conclusions based upon the analytical process they use.Less
Examines the various legal standards, rules, or tests that have been used by the U.S. Supreme Court to resolve free exercise cases, and places these tests within the full factual and legal contexts of the cases. Particular attention is paid to the no‐exception test adopted in 1879 in the Reynolds case, the tests used in the important string of Jehovah's Witnesses cases of the 1940's, the more recent compelling state interest test as used in an Amish case involving compulsory formal education of children up to the age of 16, and finally the neutrality standard of the 1990 Smith case that reinvigorated the no‐exception test of 1879. A careful, detailed review of the particulars of the cases shows that the underlying analytical process used is excruciatingly influential to the ultimate decision: Justices in factually similar cases purportedly using the same abstract legal test reach different conclusions based upon the analytical process they use.
John J. Coughlin
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- January 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780195372977
- eISBN:
- 9780199871667
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195372977.003.0002
- Subject:
- Law, Philosophy of Law
This chapter offers an overview of canon law. It starts by defining what canon law is not. It then traces the historical development of canon law from its origins in the early church to its flowering ...
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This chapter offers an overview of canon law. It starts by defining what canon law is not. It then traces the historical development of canon law from its origins in the early church to its flowering in the medieval period. Beginning with the 20th-century codifications of canon law, the second part of the chapter describes contemporary canon law. It discusses legislative, judicial, and executive acts of governance. It also distinguishes universal and particular law, as well as various other types of canon law and the related features of dispensation, exception, privilege, and canonical equity. The chapter concludes with some thoughts about the relationship between canon law and theology.Less
This chapter offers an overview of canon law. It starts by defining what canon law is not. It then traces the historical development of canon law from its origins in the early church to its flowering in the medieval period. Beginning with the 20th-century codifications of canon law, the second part of the chapter describes contemporary canon law. It discusses legislative, judicial, and executive acts of governance. It also distinguishes universal and particular law, as well as various other types of canon law and the related features of dispensation, exception, privilege, and canonical equity. The chapter concludes with some thoughts about the relationship between canon law and theology.
Thomas E. Hill Jr.
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- September 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199692002
- eISBN:
- 9780191741241
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199692002.003.0009
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, Political Philosophy
What is it to treat someone as a person with dignity? There are no doubt some descriptive criteria for "treating a person as a person," but the idea of dignity implies something more. Drawing from ...
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What is it to treat someone as a person with dignity? There are no doubt some descriptive criteria for "treating a person as a person," but the idea of dignity implies something more. Drawing from Wittgenstein's famous duck-rabbit example, we might try to interpret “seeing someone as a person” in a more expressivist fashion. Though perhaps promising, this leaves open important ethical questions. The discussion turns, then, to Kant, who made the idea of dignity a center-piece in his moral theory. After a review of basic features of Kant’s idea, the chapter expresses doubts about aspects of the interpretations proposed by some other commentators, notably, Marcus Singer, Alan Donagan, David Cummiskey, Christine Korsgaard, and Allen Wood. Kant's idea of dignity raises two important problems of application. The first is that it apparently generates conflicts of duty. The second is that, although it offers an appealing contrast to consequentialism, it imposes such severe constraints that its practical implications are often counter-intuitive. In particular, it seems to require strict conformity to moral principles that are appropriate for most conditions even when extraordinary circumstances make it reasonable to make exceptions. Arguably these problems are more manageable, however, if we use the idea of the dignity of persons at a second-order level of moral deliberation rather than case by case. The chapter pursues this suggestion by developing further some earlier ideas about humanity as an end in itself and incorporating them into a fuller account of the deliberative standpoint suggested by Kant’s ideal of moral legislation in a kingdom of ends. This is a framework for articulating and assessing mid-level moral principles, addressing conflicts among them, and considering possible exceptions. It is a basis for the later chapters here on practical issues.Less
What is it to treat someone as a person with dignity? There are no doubt some descriptive criteria for "treating a person as a person," but the idea of dignity implies something more. Drawing from Wittgenstein's famous duck-rabbit example, we might try to interpret “seeing someone as a person” in a more expressivist fashion. Though perhaps promising, this leaves open important ethical questions. The discussion turns, then, to Kant, who made the idea of dignity a center-piece in his moral theory. After a review of basic features of Kant’s idea, the chapter expresses doubts about aspects of the interpretations proposed by some other commentators, notably, Marcus Singer, Alan Donagan, David Cummiskey, Christine Korsgaard, and Allen Wood. Kant's idea of dignity raises two important problems of application. The first is that it apparently generates conflicts of duty. The second is that, although it offers an appealing contrast to consequentialism, it imposes such severe constraints that its practical implications are often counter-intuitive. In particular, it seems to require strict conformity to moral principles that are appropriate for most conditions even when extraordinary circumstances make it reasonable to make exceptions. Arguably these problems are more manageable, however, if we use the idea of the dignity of persons at a second-order level of moral deliberation rather than case by case. The chapter pursues this suggestion by developing further some earlier ideas about humanity as an end in itself and incorporating them into a fuller account of the deliberative standpoint suggested by Kant’s ideal of moral legislation in a kingdom of ends. This is a framework for articulating and assessing mid-level moral principles, addressing conflicts among them, and considering possible exceptions. It is a basis for the later chapters here on practical issues.
Kohn Margaret and McBride Keally
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- May 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780195399578
- eISBN:
- 9780199894437
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195399578.003.0005
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory, Comparative Politics
This chapter focuses on law as one dimension of the problem of transition into the postcolonial regime. Martial law was frequently declared in the colonies, but it remained controversial since it ...
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This chapter focuses on law as one dimension of the problem of transition into the postcolonial regime. Martial law was frequently declared in the colonies, but it remained controversial since it seemed antithetical to image of colonialism as a civilizing mission that would bring the rule of law to barbaric places. Mill, Burke, and Tocqueville all debated martial law; while they were in broad agreement about the legitimacy of the colonial state, they disagreed about the extent of exceptional measures. Ngugi wa Thiong'o and Achille Mbembe, on the other hand, argue that the real issue is the state itself not the exception. For Ngugi, the State of Emergency in Kenya revealed the deeper logic of colonial governance. Their approach to the concept of the state of exception, with its attentiveness to the lawlessness at the heart of legality itself, illuminates the problem of founding a new state out of the violent vestiges of the old order.Less
This chapter focuses on law as one dimension of the problem of transition into the postcolonial regime. Martial law was frequently declared in the colonies, but it remained controversial since it seemed antithetical to image of colonialism as a civilizing mission that would bring the rule of law to barbaric places. Mill, Burke, and Tocqueville all debated martial law; while they were in broad agreement about the legitimacy of the colonial state, they disagreed about the extent of exceptional measures. Ngugi wa Thiong'o and Achille Mbembe, on the other hand, argue that the real issue is the state itself not the exception. For Ngugi, the State of Emergency in Kenya revealed the deeper logic of colonial governance. Their approach to the concept of the state of exception, with its attentiveness to the lawlessness at the heart of legality itself, illuminates the problem of founding a new state out of the violent vestiges of the old order.
Lea Shaver
- Published in print:
- 2020
- Published Online:
- September 2020
- ISBN:
- 9780300226003
- eISBN:
- 9780300249316
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Yale University Press
- DOI:
- 10.12987/yale/9780300226003.003.0008
- Subject:
- Business and Management, Business Ethics and Corporate Social Responsibility
This chapter analyzes the nuances of the copyright law book, such as translating a book into another language for academic use, adapting a famous book to make it more multicultural, or cheaply ...
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This chapter analyzes the nuances of the copyright law book, such as translating a book into another language for academic use, adapting a famous book to make it more multicultural, or cheaply photocopying a book to give away to low-income families. Copyright exceptions are sometimes quite specific and clearly defined, while others are open-ended and subject to broad interpretation. It talks about the doctrine of “fair use” in America. Contrary to popular belief, the fact that something is widely done is no assurance that it is legally recognized as fair use. The chapter also provides a hypothetical situation in order to illustrate how the fair use doctrine might apply to a potential non-profit publishing project to address book hunger.Less
This chapter analyzes the nuances of the copyright law book, such as translating a book into another language for academic use, adapting a famous book to make it more multicultural, or cheaply photocopying a book to give away to low-income families. Copyright exceptions are sometimes quite specific and clearly defined, while others are open-ended and subject to broad interpretation. It talks about the doctrine of “fair use” in America. Contrary to popular belief, the fact that something is widely done is no assurance that it is legally recognized as fair use. The chapter also provides a hypothetical situation in order to illustrate how the fair use doctrine might apply to a potential non-profit publishing project to address book hunger.
William J. Talbott
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- January 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780195173482
- eISBN:
- 9780199872176
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195173482.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Political Philosophy
This chapter replies to some standard objections to consequentialist moral principle, including the problem of expensive tastes, and R. Dworkin’s circularity objection. The chapter compares the main ...
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This chapter replies to some standard objections to consequentialist moral principle, including the problem of expensive tastes, and R. Dworkin’s circularity objection. The chapter compares the main principle with Rawls’s resource-based theory of primary goods and the capabilities theories of Nussbaum and Sen. It then compares the main principle with J. S. Mill’s utilitarian principle and Rawls’s maximin expectation principle. This requires a further development of the idea of life prospects. The chapter then shows that both Mill’s and Rawls’s principles have a distributional blindspot and explains why the main principle does not. As a heuristic for making determinations of the equitable promotion of life prospects, the chapter defines an expanded original position that makes it possible to extend the application of the main principle extend beyond the application of Rawls’s principles to include those with special health care needs and those with severe mental or physical impairments. The chapter explains why the main principle is prioritarian, rather than egalitarian or sufficientarian. It explains how the application of the main principle to social practices solves the problem of descriptive relativity. Finally, he explains his reasons for classifying the main principle as a consequentialist principle of moral improvement.Less
This chapter replies to some standard objections to consequentialist moral principle, including the problem of expensive tastes, and R. Dworkin’s circularity objection. The chapter compares the main principle with Rawls’s resource-based theory of primary goods and the capabilities theories of Nussbaum and Sen. It then compares the main principle with J. S. Mill’s utilitarian principle and Rawls’s maximin expectation principle. This requires a further development of the idea of life prospects. The chapter then shows that both Mill’s and Rawls’s principles have a distributional blindspot and explains why the main principle does not. As a heuristic for making determinations of the equitable promotion of life prospects, the chapter defines an expanded original position that makes it possible to extend the application of the main principle extend beyond the application of Rawls’s principles to include those with special health care needs and those with severe mental or physical impairments. The chapter explains why the main principle is prioritarian, rather than egalitarian or sufficientarian. It explains how the application of the main principle to social practices solves the problem of descriptive relativity. Finally, he explains his reasons for classifying the main principle as a consequentialist principle of moral improvement.
